Hiring

The Torah lists four types of bailees, and three laws apply to them. The four bailees are: the unpaid bailee, the borrower, the paid bailee, and the renter.

These are the three laws that apply to them. If the deposit is stolen from the unpaid bailee or it is lost and, of course, if the deposit is lost through force majeure - for example [the deposit] was livestock and it died or was taken captive: [The bailee] swears that he exercised the ordinary care of bailees and is exempt. As is written "And it is stolen from the man's home" (Exodus 22:6); "And the house-holder shall approach G-d" (Exodus 22:7). The borrower repays [the owner] in all situations, whether the borrowed item is lost, or stolen, or whether there was force majeure e.g. the borrowed animal died or was injured or taken captive, for thus is written about the borrower: "If [the animal] was injured or died and its owner was not with it - he shall pay" (Exodus 22:13). The same law applies to the paid bailee and to the renter. If the object which [the bailee] rented or was paid to guard was stolen or lost - they pay [the owner]. But if there is force majeure - e.g. there was an animal and it died or was injured or taken captive or became afflicted with a fatal disease - [the paid bailee and the renter] swear that it was force majeure and they are exempt. As it is written: "If it dies or is injured or taken captive and there is no witness" (Exodus 22:9) "the oath of the Lord ..." (Exodus 22:10), and it is written: "If it is stolen from him, he must pay its owner..." (Exodus 22:11). In summary: An unpaid bailee takes an oath in every situation. And a borrower pays in all situations, unless it dies while it is working, as will be explained. A paid bailee and a renter pay for a lost or stolen [deposit], but they take an oath in cases of force majeure such as when the animal is injured or taken captive or killed or develops fatal disease. Or if the object is lost in a boat that sinks or is taken by armed bandits or anything like this that is a case of force majeure.

One who deposits [property] with his fellow - whether for free, or the owner paid the bailee, or the owner lent it to him, or he rented it out to him - if the bailee also took the owner for free along with his property - or hired [the owner for money] - the bailee is completely exempt from all [loss to the property]. As it is said: "If [the property's] owner is with it, he need not pay; if [the property's owner] is a hired worker, [the risk of damage to his property] is included in his wage" (Exodus 22:14). In what circumstances does this apply? When the owners volunteered or were hired at the same time as [the bailee] took the object, even if the owner was not with the object at the time of the theft or the loss or when the [object was lost through] force majeure. But if [the bailee] took the object - and first became a bailee - and only afterwards hired the owners or had them volunteer - even if the owner is standing there at the time when the deposited object is harmed - the [bailee] must pay. As it is written "If its owner is not with it - [the bailee] must pay." (Exodus 22:13). They learned from tradition: If [the owner] was with it at the time of borrowing, even though he was not there at the time of the theft or the death - [the bailee] is exempt. If [the owner] was not with it at the time of borrowing, even though he was with it at the time of death or capture - [the bailee] is liable. And this is the case for the other [types of] bailees. If any of [the objects] come with their owners - [the bailees] are exempt. Even if [the bailee] is negligent - if the object came with its owner, [the bailee] is exempt.

If a bailee was at fault at the beginning, even though the object was - in the end - lost through force majeure, [the bailee] may be liable, as will be explained. And the borrower is not permitted to lend [what he borrowed] to a third party. Even if he borrowed a Torah scroll - where everyone who reads from it performs a mitzvah - he may not lend it to a third party. Likewise, the renter is not permitted to rent out [the object] [to a third party]. Even if [the owner] rented a Torah scroll to him, he may not rent it to a third party, for [the owner] can say to [the bailee]: I don't want my deposit to be in the hands of a third party. If the bailee transgresses and passes the [object] to a second bailee - if there are witnesses that the second bailee exercised the ordinary care of bailees and [the object was lost through] force majeure, the first bailee is not liable - because there are witnesses that [the loss occurred through force majeure. But if there are no witnesses there, the first bailee has to pay the owner, because he passed [the object] to another bailee. And [the first bailee] may recover from the second bailee. Even if the first bailee was an unpaid bailee and he passed [the object] to a paid bailee - [the first bailee is] liable, because the object's owner can say to him: I trust you to take an oath, but I don't trust [the paid bailee's oath]. Therefore, if the owner habitually deposits this object with the second bailee, the first bailee is not liable to pay, because he can say to the owner: this object that you deposited with me or lent to me last night - you used to deposit it with this person with whom I deposited it. But this is only in a case where [the bailee] does not reduce the duty of care. What is a case of reducing the duty of care? If it was deposited with him for money, and he deposited it with the second [bailee] without payment, or if he had borrowed the object, and he deposited it with the second [bailee] for money. Since [the first bailee] lowered the duty of care, he is at fault and he pays [the owner]. Even if [the first bailee] acquired the services of the object's owner for free or by paying [the owner], he has removed the deposited object from his possession to the possession of a different bailee [and must repay the owner].

If the second watchman was able to bring proof that would free the first watchman from responsibility for guarding the article, he is not liable. What is implied? A paid watchman entrusted an animal that was entrusted to him to an unpaid watchman. If the second watchman brought witnesses who testify that the animal died in a natural manner, the first watchman is not liable. The same principles apply in all analogous situations.

When a watchman entrusted an animal entrusted to him to another watchman and increased the responsibility of the watchman and the animal died, the owner receives the benefit. What is implied? A person rents a cow from a colleague and then lends it to another person. Afterwards, the cow dies in an ordinary manner in the possession of the borrower. Since the borrower is required to make full restitution, he should return the worth of the cow to its owners. For the renter is not carrying out business with his colleague's cow. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations. The following rules apply when a person was in possession of an entrusted object belonging to a colleague and gave it to another person to bring to its owner. Since the first watchman is responsible for the article until it reaches its owner's domain, if he desires to retrieve the article from the second watchman, he may. If it is established that the first watchman has denied that property was entrusted to him, he cannot retrieve the article from the second watchman although he remains responsible for the entrusted article.

The three laws that the Torah states with regard to the four watchmen apply only with regard to movable property that is not consecrated and which belongs to a Jew. This is derived from Exodus 22:6,9, which mentions: "money or articles and any animal." This excludes landed property and slaves, for they are equated with landed property. And it excludes promissory notes, for they themselves are not money. And consecrated property is excluded, for ibid.:6 states: "When a person will give to his colleague." And this also excludes property owned by gentiles. Accordingly, our Sages stated: An unpaid watchman need not take an oath with regard to claims involving slaves, promissory notes, landed property and consecrated property. Similarly, a paid watchman or a renter need not pay if they are destroyed. If the watchman performed a kinyan confirming his responsibility for such articles, he is responsible for them.

Our Sages ordained that the oaths required of watchmen should be taken with regard to consecrated property in the same manner as required by the Torah with regard to other property so that people should not deal lightly with consecrated property.

It appears to me that a watchman who was negligent with regard to the care of slaves and the like is obligated to make restitution. For he is freed of responsibility with regard to slaves, landed property and promissory notes -only for the obligations stemming from theft, loss, death and the like. For if he was an unpaid watchman for movable property, and it was stolen or lost, he would be required to take an oath; but for slaves, landed property and promissory notes, he is not required to take an oath. Similarly, if he was a paid watchman, he would be required to make restitution for movable property that was stolen or lost, but for these he is freed of liability. If, however, he was negligent, he is required to make restitution. For everyone who is negligent is considered to be one who damages property, and there is no difference between the laws applying to a person who damages landed property and one who damages movable property. This is a true judgment, as those who understand will see, and this is the appropriate way to rule. Similarly, my teachers issued the following rulings with regard to a person who entrusts his vine to a sharecropper or to a watchman and stipulates that he dig, prune or dust it from his own resources. If the watchman is negligent and does not perform the required task, he is liable as if he destroyed it with his hands. Similarly, he is liable in all instances where he causes a loss through his actions.

When a person entrusts produce that is growing on land - even grapes that are ready to be harvested - to a colleague to watch, they are considered to be landed property with regard to the laws of watchman.

The following principle applies if a person entrusts consecrated property to a watchman and then redeems it, and so it is no longer consecrated at the time the owner takes it from the watchman, or he lends it to a person when it was not consecrated and then consecrates it while it is in the borrower's possession, or a gentile entrusts property and then converts. In all these situations, the laws of watchmen do not apply, unless the article was not consecrated property and belonged to a Jew from the beginning of the time the article was entrusted until the conclusion of that period.

The laws applying to borrowers apply equally to men and to women. This applies if the woman is the owner of the entrusted article, or an article was entrusted to her care.

When a minor entrusts an article to an adult or lends it to him, the adult must take the oaths required of a watchman to the minor. My teachers ruled that the adult is not taking the oath because of the claim of the minor in which instance, the oath would not be required. For an oath is never taken with regard to a claim made by a minor. The rationale is that all the oaths taken by watchmen are taken because of an indefinite claim.

Just as our Sages ordained that a purchaser must finalize his acquisition of an article through meshichah; so, too, they ordained that a watchman's responsibility for an article is established through meshichah. When a person tells a colleague: "Watch an article for me," and he tells him: "Place it down in front of me," he is an unpaid watchman. If he tells him: "Place it down before yourself," or "Place it down" without saying anything else, or tells him: "My house is before you," he is neither a paid watchman nor is an unpaid watchman, nor is he obligated to take an oath at all. The owner of the article may, however, have a ban of ostracism issued applying to anyone who took his article and did not return it to its owner. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations. Whenever a person entrusts, lends or rents an article to a colleague, the same laws apply whether or not the transfer was observed by witnesses. When the watchman himself admits that he served as a watchman, or he borrowed the article, he is required to take the oath required of watchmen. We do not employ the principle of miggo to absolve a person of the responsibility for an oath, but only to free him of the responsibility to make restitution. Even if the article that was borrowed, entrusted or rented was worth only a p'rutah, the watchman is required to take an oath concerning it. None of the watchmen are required to admit to a portion of the plaintiff's claim before being required to take the oath.

An unpaid watchman may make a stipulation to be freed of the responsibility to take an oath, and a borrower may make a stipulation to be freed of the responsibility to make restitution. Similarly, the owner of the entrusted object may make a stipulation that an unpaid watchman, a paid watchman or a borrower will be liable in all situations as a borrower is. This is acceptable, for any stipulation regarding money or an oath that involves money that is agreed upon by both principals is binding. Neither a kinyan to affirm it nor witnesses are required.

When the owner claims that there was a stipulation made requiring the watchman to undertake more responsibility, and the watchman denies that such a stipulation was made, the watchman must take the oath required of a watchman, and on the basis of the principle of gilgul sh'vuah he must include in his oath that there was no stipulation involved.

If the owner of an object claims that he entrusted it to a watchman, and the watchman answers that he said merely: "Place the article down before yourself," and thus never became obligated as a watchman, the defendant is required to take a sh'vuat hesset that this was the manner in which he received the article. He should include in his oath that he did not use it for his own purposes, destroy it with his own hands or cause it to be destroyed in a manner that would obligate him to make restitution.

If the owner of an object claims: "I lent it to you," "I rented it to you," or "I entrusted it to you," and the defendant responds: "This never took place," or "That is true, but I returned it to you, and my responsibility was concluded. There is no obligation between us at all," the defendant must take a sh'vuat hesset. He is then freed of responsibility. When does this apply? When the watchman's responsibility is not recorded in a legal document. If, however, a legal document recorded that the article was entrusted, rented or lent, and the watchman claims that he returned the article, he must affirm his statement with an oath taken while holding a sacred article. The rationale for this ruling is that since an unpaid watchman could claim that the article was stolen or lost, and a borrower could claim that it died because he was working with it, his word is accepted when he says he returned it. But just as if he claimed that it was destroyed by forces beyond his control, he would have been required to take a Scriptural oath while holding a sacred article; so, too, when he claims to have returned it, he is required to take an oath resembling a Scriptural oath. The rationale is that the plaintiff has a legal document recording that the article was entrusted. When does the above apply? When the watchman could have claimed that the article was destroyed by forces beyond his control without having to bring proof of his claim. If, however, he would have to bring proof of his claim, as will be explained, his word is not accepted if he claims that he returned the article. Instead, the plaintiff in possession of the legal document should take an oath while holding a sacred article that the watchman did not return anything to him. The watchman is then required to make restitution. There is no other instance where a defendant is obligated to take an oath while holding a sacred article because he could have used another argument, except a watchman against whom a legal document serves as evidence. Whenever any other defendant is obligated an opportunity to take an oath, because he could have used another argument, all that is involved is a sh'vuat hesset.

8 A shepherd who neglected his flock and came to the city, whether at a time when it would be expected for all shepherds to come into the city, and whether it was a time when the shepherds did not go into the city, and wolves came and preyed or a lion came and mauled the sheep. We don't say "We assume if he would have been present he would have saved the flock, rather we estimate the situation; if he would have been able to save the sheep with extra shepherds and sticks he is liable, and if not he is exempt. If it is unclear if he could have done anything, he is liable for the damage.

If an animal dies in an ordinary manner, this is considered to be a loss beyond the shepherd's control, and he is not liable. If he oppressed it and it died, it is not considered a loss beyond his control. If it overcame the shepherd and ascended to a high cliff, and it overcame him and fell, it is considered to be a loss beyond his control. If he led it up a steep cliff or it ascended on its own accord, but he could have prevented it from doing so and failed to do so, even though it overcame him and fell and died or was injured, he is liable. For whenever there is negligence at the outset, but ultimately the actual loss happens because of factors beyond the watchman's control, he is liable. Similarly, when a shepherd leads animals across a bridge, and one pushes another and it falls into the current of the river, the shepherd is liable. The rationale is that he should have brought them over one by one. Indeed, the reason a shepherd receives a wage is to watch the animals in an effective manner. Since he was negligent at the outset, by causing them to cross together, even though when the animal fell, the loss was beyond his control, he is liable.

If the shepherd was negligent and the animal went out to a swamp and died in an ordinary manner, he is not liable. For the animal's going there did not cause it to be lost due to forces beyond the shepherd's control. Since it died in an ordinary manner, what difference is it whether it died in the watchman's house or in the swamp? If, by contrast, a thief stole it from the swamp, and it died in an ordinary manner in the thief's house, the watchman is liable, even if he is an unpaid watchman. For even if it had not died, it would have been lost to its owner in the possession of the thief, and its going out to the swamp allowed it to be stolen. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

When a person rents a donkey to lead it through the mountains, and instead leads it through a valley, he is not liable if it slips, even though he went against the intentions of the owners. If it is harmed due to heat, the renter is liable. If he rented it to lead it through a valley, and instead leads it through a mountain, he is liable if it slips, because one is more likely to slip in a mountain than in a valley. If it is harmed due to heat, the renter is not liable, since valleys are warmer than mountains, because there is wind blowing in the mountains. If, however, it becomes overheated due to the effort in climbing to the heights, he is liable. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. Similarly, if a person rents a cow to plow on a mountain and plows with it in a valley, the renter is not liable should the cylinder of the plow break. The owner of the cow may sue the workers who did the plowing. Similarly, if the renter did not go against the owner's instructions and the cylinder of the plow broke, the owner of the cow may sue the workers. If he rented it to plow in a valley, and instead plowed on a mountain, and the cylinder of the plow breaks, the renter is liable. The renter may sue the workers.

What is the ruling regarding the workers who break a plow while plowing? They must pay. Who must pay? The one who holds the utensil while plowing. If, however, the field has several plateaus, they share the liability for the cost of the cylinder - both the person holding the guiding pole and the person holding the utensil.

If a person rented a cow to thresh beans and he used it to thresh grain, he is not liable if it slips. If he rented it for grain and used it to thresh beans, he is liable, for beans cause slippage. An incident occurred with regard to a person who rented his donkey to a colleague and told him: "Do not go with it on the way of the Pikud Ravine, where there is water, but rather on the way of the Neresh Ravine, where there is no water." The person who hired the donkey went on the way of the Pikud Ravine and the donkey died. There were no witnesses who were able to testify to which way he went, but the person himself admitted: "I went on the way of the Pikud Ravine, but there was no water, and the donkey died due to natural causes." Our Sages ruled: "Since there are witnesses that there is always water in the Pikud Ravine, he is obligated to pay, for he deviated from the instructions of the owner. And we do not say: "Of what value would it be for him to lie," in a situation where witnesses were present.

When a person rents an animal to bring 200 litra of wheat, and instead, brings 200 litra of barley, he is liable if the animal dies. For the additional volume is more difficult to carry, and barley takes more space than wheat. The same laws apply if he hired an animal to carry grain, and instead used it to carry straw. If, by contrast, he rented an animal to carry barley and instead, brought the same weight of wheat, he is not liable if the animal dies. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.

If a person rented an animal for a man to ride upon, he should not have a woman ride upon it. If he rented it for a woman to ride upon, he may have a man ride upon it. And he may have any woman ride upon it, whether she is small or large, even if she is both nursing and pregnant.

The following rules apply when a person rents an animal with the intent that it carry a burden of a specific weight, and the renter added to that weight. If he added a thirtieth to the weight that he specified, and the animal died, he is liable. If it was a lesser measure, he is not liable. He must, however, pay the fee appropriate for the extra measure. If the renter rented the animal without specifying a measure, he may load upon it the burden that is the local standard for that animal. If he added more than a thirtieth to that weight - e.g., it usually carried 30 measures and he loads it with 31 - and it dies or becomes injured, he is liable. Similarly, if a person loaded a ship with one thirtieth more than its ordinary cargo and it sank, he is liable to make restitution for its worth.

When a person added one kav to the burden of a porter, and the porter was injured because of this burden, the other person is liable for his injury. For although the porter is a conscious being and feels the weight of the extra burden, he might think that it feels heavy because he is ill.

When a person rents a donkey with the intent of riding upon it, he may place his garments, his flask, and his food for this journey upon it, for it is not customary for a renter to stop at each inn to purchase food. The owner of the donkey may prevent the renter from carrying with him anything more. Similarly, the owner of the donkey may place barley and straw for the donkey's food on it for that day. The renter may prevent him from loading anything more, for it is possible for him to purchase these supplies at every inn. Therefore, if there is no place for him to purchase, he may load his food and food for his animal for the entire journey. All of these guidelines apply when a person hires an animal without making any specifications in a place that has no known custom. If, however, there is an accepted local custom, everything follows that custom.

The following rules apply when a person rents an animal and it becomes sick, goes mad, or is conscripted for the king's service, even when it will not be returned. If it was taken or became sick or mad as the renter was journeying to his destination, the owner may tell the renter: "Behold the animal you hired is before you," and the renter is required to pay the full fee. When does the above apply? When he rented it to carry a burden that can be thrown to the ground without worry. If, however, he rented the donkey with the intent of riding on it or carrying glass utensils or the like, the owner of the donkey is required to provide another donkey for him if he hired a donkey without making any further specifications. If he does not provide another donkey, he must return the fee, and then a calculation should be made with regard to how much he should be paid for the portion of the journey that he traveled.

The following rules apply in the above situation if the animal died or was injured, regardless of whether it was rented to carry a burden or to ride. If the owner said: "I am renting you a donkey," without specifying the beast, he is required to provide another donkey for the renter. If he does not, the renter may sell the animal and purchase another animal with [the proceeds], or rent another animal until he arrives at the destination agreed upon if the proceeds are not sufficient to purchase another animal. Different rules apply if the owner told the renter: "I am renting you this donkey." When he rented it to ride upon it or to carry glass utensils and it died in the middle of the way, he should purchase another animal with the proceeds from the sale of the carcass if that is possible. If the proceeds are not sufficient for that, he should rent an animal, even if this demands all the proceeds of the sale to transport him to the destination specified. If the proceeds are not sufficient - neither to purchase nor to rent an animal - the renter must pay the owner the fee for the portion of the journey. With regard to the remainder, all he has against him is complaints. If he hired it to carry a burden that was not fragile, since the owner said "this donkey," and it died in the middle of the journey, he is not required to provide another donkey for him. Instead, the renter must pay him the fee for the portion of the journey and leave him the carcass.

The following rules apply when a person hires a ship and it sinks in the midst of the journey. If the owner told the renter, "I am renting you this ship," and the renter hired it to carry wine without specifying which wine he would be carrying, even if the renter already paid the owner his fee, the owner must return it in its entirety. For the renter can tell him: "Bring the actual ship that I rented from you, for I was very specific in wanting this ship. When you do, I will bring wine and transport it on it." If the owner does not specify a ship and the renter hires one to transport a specific shipment of wine, even though he did not pay the owner any portion of the fee, he is required to pay him the entire amount. For the owner can tell him: "Bring me the wine that you specified and I will transport it for you." He must, however, deduct compensation for the difficulty for half the journey, for a person who works to sail a ship cannot be compared to someone who is idle. The following rules apply if the owner told the renter: "I am renting you this ship," and the renter mentioned a specific shipment of wine. If the renter already paid the owner his fee, he cannot require him to return it. If the renter did not pay it, he need not. The rationale is that the owner cannot bring that ship, nor can the renter bring that wine. If the rental agreement did not specify the ship or the wine, the fee should be divided between them.

When a person rents a ship and unloads in the midst of the journey, he must pay the fee for the entire journey. If, however, the renter finds another person who will rent the ship in his place until the location he originally agreed, he may rent it out to him. The owner of the ship has, however, a complaint against him. Similarly, if the renter sold all the merchandise on the ship to another person in the middle of the way and descended, and the purchaser ascended in his place, the owner of the ship takes half the rent from the first one and half from the second. The owner has a complaint against the renter, because he required him to accommodate the opinion of another person with whom he is not familiar. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

From this, I conclude that when a person rents a house from a colleague for a specific period and the renter desires to sublet the house to another person until the end of the lease, he may, provided there are the same number of people in the subletter's household as in his own. If, however, there are four in his own household, he should not sublet it to a household of five. The rationale is that our Sages' statement that a renter may not sublet the object that he rents applies only with regard to movable property. The motivating principle for that restriction is that the owner may tell the renter: "I do not desire that my object be entrusted to the hands of another person." With regard to landed property or a ship, by contrast, its owner is with it at all times, and this objection is not relevant. Similarly, I conclude that if the owner of the home tells the renter: "Why should you trouble yourself to rent my house to others? If you do not desire to continue dwelling within it, leave and leave it alone; I am freeing you from the rent," the renter may not sublet it to anyone else. For in such an instance, the charge: "Do not withhold good from its owner" applies. For instead of renting it out to someone else, the tenant should leave this person his own home. There are those who rule that the renter may not sublet the dwelling at all and must pay the rent until the appointed time. To me, this does not appear a true ruling.

When a person tells a colleague: "I am renting you this house," and after he rented it to him, it fell, he is not required to rebuild it for him. Instead, he should calculate the amount of rent due for the time during which he used it and return the remainder of the rent. If, however, the owner tears down the house, he is obligated to provide another home for the renter or rent a similar dwelling for him. Similarly, if after renting the house to this person, he rented it or sold it to a gentile or to a person who does not abide by the law who supplanted the rental of the first person, the owner is obligated to rent a similar house for him. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

If a person rented a house to a colleague without specifying the house, and afterwards the house fell, the owner is required to build it for him or provide him with another house. Even if the new house he gives him is smaller than the house that fell, the renter cannot prevent him from giving him this one, provided it is called a house. If, however, he told him: "I am renting you a house like this," the owner is obligated to provide him with a house that it is the same length and width as the house that he originally showed him. He cannot tell him: "My intent was only that the house should be close to the river," "... to the marketplace," or "... to the bathhouse, as this one is." Instead, he is obligated to provide him with a house of that size and shape. Therefore, if it was large, he should not make it small. If it was small, he should not make it large. If it was a one-room apartment, he should not make it two. If it was a two-room apartment he should not make it one. He should not reduce the number of windows that it possessed, nor should he add to them unless they both agree.

When a person rents out a loft without any specifications, he is required to provide any such structure for the renter. If the owner tells him: "I am renting you the loft on top of this house," he made the house subservient to the loft. Therefore, if four handbreadths or more of the loft become ruined, the owner is obligated to fix it. If he does not fix it, the renter may descend and dwell in the house together with the owner until he fixes it. The following rules apply when there are two lofts, one on top of the other: if the upper loft becomes ruined, he may dwell in the lower one. If the lower one becomes ruined, there is a doubt whether he has the right to dwell in the upper loft or the house. Therefore, he should not dwell in either of them. If, however, he dwells in one of them, he cannot be forced to leave. An incident occurred when a person told a colleague: "I am renting you this vine that is draped over this peach tree," and then the peach tree became uprooted from its place. The question was brought to the Sages and they told the owner: "You are obligated to provide the peach tree for him for as long as the vine exists." Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

He who lets a house to another for an unspecified term may not dispossessed the lessee from the house unless he notifies him 30 days in advance, so as to enable him to find a place and prevent his being thrown into the street. The 30 day period is applicable only during the warm season. In the rainy season, from Sukkot to Pesach, the lessor may not dispossess the lessee.

When a person rents out his courtyard without making any specific statements, we assume that he did not rent out the barn located within it.

When a person rents a house to a colleague, he is obligated to provide doors for him, to open any windows that have been damaged, to strengthen the roof, to support a beam that is broken, to make a bolt and a lock, and to provide any other necessity that requires a craftsman's work and that is a fundamental necessity when dwelling in a home and courtyard. The renter is required to make a guardrail, affix a mezuzah and prepare the place for the mezuzah from his own resources. Similarly, if he desires to build a ladder, fix a slanted roof, or plaster the roof, he should do this from his own resources.

When a person rents out a loft to a colleague and its floor becomes opened for four square handbreadths or more, the owner is obligated to fix the ceiling of the lower apartment and the plaster upon it, for the plaster is support for the ceiling.

The dung in the courtyard belongs to the renter. Therefore, he is responsible to make the effort of clearing it out. If, however, there is a prevailing local custom, it takes precedence. When does the above apply? When the animals that made the dung belong to the renter. If, however, the animals belong to other people, the dung belongs to the owner of the courtyard. For a courtyard that belongs to a person acquires property on his behalf without his knowledge, even when it is rented out to another person.

When a person rents out a house, a courtyard, a store or another property for a fixed time, the owner has the right to compel the renter to leave at the end of the prescribed period. He is not required to wait even one hour for him. When a person rents a house to sleep in without making any specifications, the minimum is one night. If he rents it for the Sabbath, the minimum is two days. If he rents it for a marriage, the minimum is 30 days.

When a person rents a house to a colleague without specifying the termination of the contract, he may not force him to leave the home unless he notifies him 30 days in advance, so that he can look for another place and will not be homeless. After 30 days, however, he must leave. When does the above apply? In the summer. In the winter, by contrast, he may not force him to leave from Sukkot until Pesach. When the owner gives the renter 30 days notice before Sukkot, if even one day from the 30 is after Sukkot, the owner may not compel him to leave until after Pesach. And he must notify him 30 days previously. When does the above apply? In small towns. In large cities, by contrast, whether in the summer or the winter, the owner must notify the renter twelve months in advance. Similarly, with regard to a store, whether in a large city or in a small town, the owner must notify the renter twelve months in advance.

Just as the owner is obligated to notify the renter, the renter is obligated to notify the owner 30 days before leaving in a small town and twelve months before leaving in a large city, in order for the owner to be able to look for a tenant so that his house will not be empty. If he does not notify him, he may not leave unless he pays rent regardless.

Although the owner may not send away the renter, nor may the renter leave the dwelling until one notifies the other a proper time beforehand, if the price of renting homes increases, the owner can raise the rent and tell the renter: "Either rent it at its present value or depart." Similarly, if the price of renting homes decreases, the renter may decrease the rent, telling the owner: "Either rent me your home at its present value, or I am leaving it for you." If the house in which the owner is living falls, he may compel the renter to leave his house, telling him: "It is not appropriate that you dwell in my home until you find a dwelling while I am homeless. You have no greater right to this home than I do."

The following rules apply when the owner gives the house to his son to hold a wedding with his wife. If he knew that his son was getting married at this and this time and he could have notified the tenant earlier, but failed to do so, the owner may not force the tenant to leave. If, however, the marriage came about suddenly and the son is wedding the woman in the immediate future, the owner may compel the renter to leave the home. For it is not appropriate that the renter dwell in the owner's home while the owner's son must rent a home in which to make the wedding.

If the owner sold the dwelling, gave it as a present or died and it was transferred as part of his inheritance, the new owner may not compel the renter to leave unless he notifies him 30 days or twelve months beforehand. For the renter may tell the new owner: "You have no greater privileges than the person from whom you acquired the home."

Just as a person may make any stipulation that he desires with regard to a purchase or a sale; so, too, may he make any stipulation he desires with regard to a rental. For a rental is a sale for a limited amount of time. Whenever a person's sale of his property is upheld, the rental of his property will also be upheld. Conversely, when a person is not granted power to sell his property, he may not rent out that property. The only exception is when all he owns is the right to the produce of the property. In such an instance, he may rent out the property, but he may not sell it.

When a person rents out a house to a colleague for a year, and a leap year is declared, the extra month is granted to the tenant. If, by contrast, the agreement is made according to months, the extra month is granted to the owner. If the rental agreement mentions both months and years, the extra month is granted to the owner. This applies regardless of whether the owner said: "A dinar every month, twelve dinarim a year," or "Twelve dinarim a year, a dinar every month." The rationale is that the land is in the possession of its owner and we may not expropriate anything from the owner of the land without a clear proof. Similarly, when the owner of a home says: "I rented out the house for a specific time," and the tenant says: "I rented it without any specifics," or "for a longer period," the renter must prove his claim. If he does not prove his claim, the owner may support his claim with a sh'vuat hesset and have the tenant removed from the home.

The following rules apply when the tenant claims: "I paid the rent that I was obligated for the house," and the owner claims: "I have yet to collect it." The same rules apply whether the agreement was recorded in a contract or observed by witnesses. If the owner demands payment within 30 days of the beginning of the rental, the burden of proof is on the renter. Alternatively, he must pay. He may then have a ban of ostracism issued against anyone who took money from him. Or the tenant may lodge a suit against the owner for the money he originally gave him as a separate claim and require the owner to take a sh'vuat hesset. If the owner demanded payment after 30 days passed or even on the thirtieth day, the owner must bring proof that he was not paid. Otherwise, the tenant may take an oath that he already paid him the rent and thus be released from any obligation. Similarly, if when the tenant rented the property, he stipulated that he would pay him the rent annually - if the owner demands payment within the year, the tenant is obligated to bring proof that he already paid. If he demands payment after the year - even if he demands payment on the twenty-ninth day of Elul - the owner is obligated to bring proof that he was not paid.

The following rules apply when a person rents out a house to a colleague for ten years, has a rental contract composed, but does not date that contract. If the tenant claims: "Only one year passed from the time the document was composed," but the owner claims: "The entire period of the rental agreement has passed, and you have dwelled in the house for ten years," the tenant is required to bring proof to support his claim. If he does not do so, the owner may take a sh'vuat hesset and compel him to leave the dwelling.

The following rules apply when a person rents an orchard - or it was entrusted to him as security - for ten years and it dries up. The tenant should sell the trees, purchase land with the proceeds, and benefit from the produce of that land until the conclusion of the rental contract or the period for which the security was entrusted. As a safeguard against the violation of the prohibition against taking interest, both the owner of the orchard - the borrower and the creditor are prohibited against taking the trees themselves that became dried out or were cut down.

The following rules apply when a contract for rental or security mentions "years" without stating the number of years. If the tenant claims that the agreement was for three years, and the owner of the land claims that it was for two years, and the renter - or the creditor - came and made use of the produce of the third year, we assume that the produce belonged to the person who made use of it unless the owner of the land brings proof that this is not so. A difficulty could arise if the tenant or the creditor derived benefit from the property for three years and the legal record became misplaced. If he said: "I am entitled to the produce for five years," and the owner of the land says, "The agreement was only for three," we tell the concerned parties: "Show the legal record." If the owner says: "It was lost," the tenant's claim is accepted, for if he would have claimed that he had purchased it, his claim would also be accepted since he derived benefit from it for three years.

The following rules apply when a person brings his produce into his colleague's property without his consent or beguiled him into allowing him to bring in his produce and then left it and departed. The owner of the property may sell that produce in order to pay for workers to take it away and bring it to the market place. It is pious conduct for the owner of the property to notify the court and rent a storage place with part of the funds in order to prevent the destruction of his colleague's property, even if that colleague acted in an improper manner.

The following rules apply when a person rents a mill from a colleague on the condition that the renter will grind 20 se'ah of grain for the owner every month as rent and afterwards, the owner of the mill became wealthy. Since he no longer needs to have his grain ground there he asks the renter to pay him the equivalent of the wage he would earn for grinding the 20 se'ah. If the renter has wheat of his own or of others that he can grind instead, we compel him to pay the owner the wage he receives for grinding 20 se'ah. Not to pay him would be an expression of the qualities of Sodom. If the renter does not have wheat of his own or customers, he may tell the owner: "I don't have the funds. I am prepared to grind grain for you, as stated in the rental agreement. If you don't need this, sell the ground wheat to others." Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

The same laws apply when a person rents a field from a colleague to sow, or a vineyard to benefit from its fruits and agrees to pay him money or agrees to pay him a fixed amount of produce - e.g., he rented a particular field for 20 kor of grain a year or a particular vineyard for 20 jugs of wine a year. A person who rents property and agrees to pay in produce is called a chocher.

The man who rents a field or an orchard to cultivate and to spend money on it, giving the landowner one-third or one-fourth of the produce, or anything they have stipulated, is called share-cropper. Whatever is spent on fencing the land, the landowner is required to pay ; and whatever is spent on extra precaution, the tenant or share-cropper is required to pay.—

When a person rents or makes a sharecropping agreement with regard to a colleague's field for only a few years, he should not sow flax. If he rents it or enters a sharecropping agreement for seven years, he may sow flax for the first year. The Sabbatical year is not included in this reckoning. If he rents it or enters a sharecropping agreement for a seven-year period, the Sabbatical year is included in this reckoning.

The following laws apply when a person rents or makes a sharecropping agreement with regard to a colleague's field that is parched and requires irrigation, and the spring used to irrigate the field dries up, but the larger river has not ceased to flow, and it is possible to carry water from it in a bucket. The renter may not reduce his payments. If this is a problem that affects the entire region - e.g., the river itself dried up - he may reduce his payments. Similar laws apply if one rents an orchard and the trees of the orchard are cut down. Different rules apply when the owner was standing in his field and told the renter: "I am renting you this parched field," or "I am renting you this orchard." If the spring dries up or the tree is chopped down, he may reduce his payments. Since he was standing in the property when he made that statement, we assume that by saying: "this field" or "this orchard," his intent was: "I am renting it to you in its present condition." Therefore, when the owner is not standing in his field and told the renter: "I am renting you this parched field," or "I am renting you this orchard." If the spring dries up or the tree is chopped down, he may not reduce his payments.

The following rules apply when a person rents or makes a sharecropping agreement with regard to a colleague's field, and the crops are eaten by locusts or destroyed by drought. If this condition prevailed among the majority of the fields of that city, he may reduce his payments according to the extent of the loss that he suffered. If this blight did not prevail among the majority of the fields, he may not reduce his payments. This law applies even though all the fields belonging to this land owner were ravaged. If all the fields of the renter or the sharecropper were ravaged, even though the blight also affected most of the other fields, he may not reduce his payment. For the loss is dependent on the renter's bad fortune, as evidenced by the fact that all his fields were ravaged. If the owner stipulated that the renter should sow the field with wheat, and he sowed it with barley, did not sow it at all or sowed it and nothing grew, the renter may not reduce his payments even though locusts or a drought came and the majority of the fields were ravaged. Until when must he till it and sow it a second time if the first crop does not grow? Until the time when it is fit to sow in that place.

The following rules apply when a person rents or makes a sharecropping agreement with regard to a colleague's field. If it is customary in that locale to cut down the crops, the renter should cut them down. He is not permitted to uproot them. If it is customary to uproot the crops, the renter should uproot them. He is not permitted to cut them down. Either of them can prevent the custom from being changed. In a locale where it is customary to plow after the harvesting, the renter should plow. In a locale where it is customary to rent trees together with land, they are considered to have been rented out. This applies even though the owner rented the property for a price that is lower than usual. In a locale where it is not customary to rent trees together with land, they are not considered to have been rented out. This applies even though the owner rented the property for a price that is higher than usual. Everything follows the local custom.

When a person rents a field from a colleague for ten kor of wheat and it suffered blight, he may pay the owner from the wheat of that field. Conversely, if it produces extremely high quality wheat, he should not tell the owner: "I will purchase wheat for you from the marketplace." Instead, he must give him the wheat from the field. If a person rents a vineyard for ten baskets of grapes and they become sour after they were harvested, the renter may give the owner the grapes from the vineyard. A similar ruling applies to sheaves of grain that became ruined after they were harvested. If, however, a person rents a vineyard for ten jugs of wine, and the wine becomes sour, he is obligated to provide the owner with good wine. The following rules apply when a person rented a field for 100 sheaves of cattle fodder, sowed another crop and then plowed the field and sowed it with cattle fodder. If it suffered blight, the renter may not give the owner the cattle fodder growing in it. Instead, he must give him high quality fodder, for he deviated from the terms of the initial agreement. Similar rules apply even if he sowed it with fodder at the outset, plowed it and then sowed it again and it suffered blight or in any other situation where the damage to the crops comes after the renter deviates from the initial agreement.

The following rules apply when a person rents a field from a colleague, but does not desire to weed it. Although the renter tells the owner: "What will you suffer? I will give you the amount stipulated regardless," his words are not heeded. For the owner may respond: "Ultimately, you will leave it, and it will grow weeds for me." Even if the renter says: "At the end I will plow it," his words are not heeded.

When a person rents a field with the stated intent of sowing barley, he should not sow wheat, because wheat saps the nutrients of the land more than barley. If he rented it with the intent of sowing wheat, he may sow barley. If his original intent was to sow legumes, he may not sow grain. If his original intent was grain, he may sow legumes. In Babylon and lands of that nature, he should not sow legumes, for legumes sap the nutrients of the land.

When a person rents a field from a colleague for a few years according to a sharecropping agreement, the sharecropper does not receive a share of the wood that grows from the wild fig trees and the like, nor in the appreciation in the value of the field due to the trees growing in the field. We do, however, consider the place of the trees as if it were filled with the type of crop that was planted in the field. This applies provided the trees grew in a place that is fit to sow. If, however, they grow in a place that is not fit to sow, the sharecropper is not given any consideration. If the sharecropper rents the field for seven years or more, he is entitled to a share of the wood that grows from the wild fig trees and the like. If at the time the sharecropper's lease runs out, there are plants in the field that have not reached the stage at which they are fit to be sold, or they have reached that stage, but the market day has not come yet, they should be evaluated and the sharecropper given his share by the owner of the land. In the same manner as the sharecropper and the owner divide the grain; so, too, they should divide the straw and the stubble. In the same manner as they divide the wine; so, too, they should divide the twigs. Different rules apply with regard to the rods that are placed beneath the vine for support. If they were purchased in partnership, they should be divided in the same manner. If they were purchased by one party, they belong to the one who purchased them. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.

When a person rents a field from a colleague according to a sharecropping agreement in order to plant vines, the owner accepts the possibility that there will be ten non-productive vines in an area sufficient to grow a se'ah of grain. If there are more non-productive vines, the sharecropper must pay for the entire area as if all the vines were productive.

The following rules apply when a person rents a field from a colleague under a sharecropping agreement and the field does not produce a significant yield. If its yield appears sufficient to produce at least two se'ah more than the investment made in it, the sharecropper is obligated to take care of it. For in the sharecropping agreement, he promises the owner of the land: "I will rise, plow the land, sow it, reap it, tie it in sheaves, thresh it and make a grain heap before you, and you will receive half - or whatever other portion they agreed upon - and I will receive the remainder as payment for my work and the expenses that I undertook."

The following rule applies when a person rents a field from a colleague under a sharecropping agreement, and after taking possession of the field decides to leave it fallow. We evaluate the amount the field could be expected to produce and require the sharecropper to give the owner the portion agreed upon. For in the sharecropping agreement, he promises the owner of the land: "If I leave it fallow and do not till it, I will pay according to its best yield." The same rule applies if he left only a portion of it fallow. Why is the renter obligated to pay? Because he did not stipulate that he would pay a fixed amount, in which instance we would say that it is an asmachta, but instead promised to pay the field's best yield. Therefore, he made a binding commitment. If, however, he stipulated: "If I leave it fallow, I will pay you 100 dinarim" this is considered an asmachta and he is not obligated to pay that amount. Instead, he should give the owner only his share of what the field would be expected to produce.

The following rule applies when a person rents a field from a colleague under a sharecropping agreement with the intent of sowing sesame seeds, but instead, sows wheat. If the field produces a crop of wheat that is worth the same as the yield of sesame seeds could have been expected to be worth, the owner may have no more than complaints against him. If the field produces a crop of wheat that is worth less than the yield of sesame seeds could have been expected to be worth, the sharecropper must pay the amount the crop of sesame seeds could have expected to yield. If the field produces a crop of wheat that is worth more than the yield of sesame seeds could have been expected to be worth, they should divide the crop according to their original stipulation although the owner of the land profits.

The following rule applies when a person hires workers and tells them: "Get up early and work late." In a place where it is not customary for workers to get up early and work late, he cannot compel them to keep the times he desires. In a place where it is customary for an employer to provide his workers' meals, he must provide their meals. If it is customary for him to provide dried figs, dates and the like for the workers, he must. Everything follows the local custom.

When a person hires a worker and tells him: "I will pay you like any other worker in the city," we check the lowest wage paid and the highest wage paid and arrive at an average.

The following rules apply when a person tells his agent: "Go out and hire workers for me for three zuz," and the agent hires them for four. If the agent told them: "I am responsible for your wage," he must pay them four. He receives three zuz from the employer, and forfeits one zuz of his own. If he told them: "The employer is responsible for your wages," the employer should pay them according to the local custom. If there are some in that city who are hired at three and others at four, he is not required to pay them more than three. They have, however, justified complaints'3 against the agent. When does the above apply? When it cannot be determined that they invested extra effort in their work. If, however, it is obvious that they invested extra effort in their work, and it is worth four zuz, the employer must pay them four. For had the agent not told them four, they would not have worked harder and produced work that is worth four. If the employer told the agent: "Hire workers for me at four," and the agent goes and hires them at three, they receive no more than three. This applies even when their work is worth four. For they accepted the lower amount. They do, however, have a complaint against the agent. If the employer told the agent three zuz, and the agent hires them for four, but the workers say: "We will work for what the employer says," their intent is that the employer will pay them more than four zuz. Therefore, we evaluate their work. If it is worth four, they should receive four zuz from the employer. If the value of their work is not obvious or it is not worth four, they may be paid only three. If the employer told the agent to hire workers at four zuz, and he hired them at three, but they say: "We will work for what the employer says," they may be paid only three. This applies even if their work is worth four, for they heard the agent say three and agreed.

When a person hires workers and the workers hoax the employer or the employer hoaxes the workers, all they have is complaints against each other. When does the above apply? When the workers did not go to the appointed place. Different rules apply, however, if donkey drivers went to the appointed place and did not find any grain, workers went to a field and found that the ground was wet, or the employer hired workers to irrigate his field and they discovered that it was filled with water. If the owner checked the area that required work on the previous evening and saw that the workers were necessary, the workers are not entitled to any reimbursement. What could the owner have done? If, however, he did not check the land where he wants the work to be performed beforehand, he must pay them as an idle worker. For a person who comes carrying a burden cannot be compared to someone who comes empty-handed, nor can a person who performs labor be compared to someone who does not. When does the above apply? When they did not begin doing work. If, however, the worker began doing his work different rules apply. A worker may quit his work even in the middle of the day. This is derived from Leviticus 25:55: "The children of Israel are servants to Me" - i.e., to Me alone. They are not servants to servants. What is the law that applies to a worker who quits after having started work? We evaluate the work that he performed and he is paid that amount. If he is a contractor, we evaluate the work that still must be performed. Whether the price of labor was low at the time he was hired or it was not low, whether it was reduced afterwards or whether it was not reduced, we evaluate the work that must be performed. What is implied? A person agreed to harvest standing grain for two selaim. He harvested half of the grain, but left half unharvested. Similarly, a person agreed to weave a garment for two selaim. He wove half of the garment, but left half unwoven. If the remainder would cost six dinarim to complete, the original contractor is paid a shekel or he is given the option of completing his work. If the remainder was worth only two dinarim, the owner need not pay the contractor more than a sela, because he did not perform more than half the work. When does the above apply? With regard to work that does not involve an immediate loss. If, however, the work involves an immediate loss - e.g., he hired the workers to remove flax from the vat, or he hired a donkey to bring flutes for a funeral or for a wedding or the like - neither a worker nor a contractor may retract unless he is held back by forces beyond his control -e.g., he became ill or a close relative died. If the worker is not held back by forces beyond his control, and he retracts, the owner may hire others on their account or deceive them.What is meant by deceiving them? He tells them: "I agreed to pay you a sela; take two so that you will complete your work." Afterwards, he is not required to give them anything more than he originally agreed. Moreover, even if he gave them two, he can compel them to return the additional amount. What is meant by hiring others on their account? He hires other workers who complete their task so that he will not suffer a loss. Whatever he must add to pay these later workers beyond the amount the first workers agreed upon, he may take from the first workers. To what extent are the first workers responsible? For their entire wage. Moreover, if they have property that is in the employer's possession, the employer can use that property to hire workers to complete their work until he pays each worker 40 or 50 zuz a day although he originally hired the worker at three or four zuz. When does the above apply? When there are no workers available to hire at the wage to be paid the original workers. If, however, such workers are available and the original workers tell the employer: "Go out and hire from these to complete your work so that you will not suffer a loss," whether a worker or a contractor is involved, the employer has only complaints against them. To determine the wage that should be paid, we follow these guidelines: For a worker, we calculate the work he already[ performed and for a contractor, we calculate the work that must be performed.

When a person hires a worker, but [the worker is then taken to perform the king's service, the worker need not be paid for a full day's work. Instead, the employer should pay him only for the work he performed.

The following rules apply when a person hires a worker to irrigate his field from a particular river, and that river dried up in the middle of the day. If the river does not ordinarily dry up, the workers need only be paid for the work they performed. Similarly, if the inhabitants of the city frequently dam the river, and they stop its flow in the middle of the day, the workers need only be paid for the work they performed. The rationale is that the workers know the pattern of this river. If, however, the river often dries up on its own accord, the employer must pay the workers their entire wage. For it was his responsibility to inform them. If a person hires workers to irrigate a field and it rains and completes the watering of the field, the workers need only be paid for the work they performed. If a river rises and irrigates the field, they should be paid their entire wage. From heaven, they were granted help. When does the above apply? With regard to a worker. Different rules apply, however, when a person stipulates with a sharecropper that if he waters a field four times a day, he will receive half the crop, in contrast to other sharecroppers who water the field twice a day and receive a fourth of the crop. If rain comes and he does not have to draw water to irrigate the crop, he still receives half the crops, as he stipulated. The rationale is that a sharecropper is considered to be a partner, not a worker.

The following rules apply when a person hires a worker to perform work for an entire day and he completes it in half the day. If the employer has another task that is as - or less - difficult, he may have the worker perform it for the remainder of the day. If he does not have a task for him to perform, he should pay him as an idle worker. When the worker is one who digs, labors in the field or performs heavy labor of this nature and hence will become ill if he does not work, the employer must pay him his entire wage even if he is idle.

When a person hires a worker to bring him an object from one place to another, and the worker goes to the designated place but cannot find the object specified, the employer is obligated to pay him his entire wage. If a person hires a worker to bring rods to use as supports for a vineyard, but the worker can not find them, and hence does not bring them, the employer must pay the worker his wage. If he hired him to bring cabbage or prunes for a sick person, the worker went and when he returned, the sick person either died or recovered, the employer should not tell the worker: "Take what you brought as your payment." Instead, he must pay him the entire wage he promised him. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.

When a person hires a worker to perform work in his own field, but shows him a field belonging to a colleague and has him perform work there, he must pay him his entire wage. Afterwards, he may require his colleague to reimburse him for the benefit he received from this work.

When a person hires a worker to work together with him with straw, stubble and the like, he is not given the option of telling the worker: "Take what you did as your payment." If, however, he made such an offer, and the worker agreed, he is not given the option of changing his mind and telling the worker: "Take your wage and I will take my straw."

An ownerless object discovered by a worker belongs to him. This law applies even when the employer told him: "Work for me today." Needless to say, it applies if he told him: "Hoe for me." If, however, he hired him to take possession of ownerless objects - e.g., a river dried up and he hired him to collect the fish in a nearby marsh -whatever he finds, even a wallet filled with silver coins, belongs to the owner.

The following rules apply when a person gives a loan to a colleague and takes security in return. He is considered to be a paid watchman. This applies regardless of whether he lent him money or lent him produce, and regardless of whether he took the security at the time when he gave him the loan or afterwards. Accordingly, if the security is lost or stolen, he is responsible for its value. If the security was lost because of causes beyond the lender's control -e.g., it was taken by armed thieves or the like - the lender must take an oath that it was lost due to forces beyond his control, and the owner of the security must repay his debt until the last p'rutah.

Whenever a person tells a colleague: "Watch my article for me and I will watch your article for you," it is considered as if the owner was employed by the watchman. If, however, he tells his colleague: "Watch an article for me today, and I will watch an article for you tomorrow," "Lend an article to me today and I will lend an article to you tomorrow," "Watch an article for me today, and I will lend an article to you tomorrow," or "Lend an article to me today and I will watch an article for you tomorrow," they are each considered to be paid watchman for the other.

All craftsmen are considered to be paid watchman. Whenever a craftsman says: "Take your article and pay for it," or "I have completed it," and the owner does not take the article, the craftsman is considered to be an unpaid watchman from that time onward. If, however, the craftsman says: "Bring money and take your article," he is considered a paid watchman as before.

If a person gives an article to a craftsman to fix and the craftsman ruins it, the craftsman is liable to make restitution. What is implied? If a person gives a carpenter a chest, a box or a closet to place a nail into, and he breaks the article he must make restitution. Similarly, if a person gives a carpenter the wood to make a chest, a box or a closet, and he breaks them after he completes making them, the carpenter must pay the employer for a chest, a box or a closet. The rationale is that the craftsman does not acquire a share in the increase in the value of the article. If a person gives a craftsman wool to dye, and the vat in which he dyes it boils until the water evaporates, thus destroying the wool, the dyer must reimburse the owner for his wool. The following rules apply in the ensuing situations: The dyer dyed the wool unattractively, the owner asked him to dye it red and he dyed it black, he asked him to dye it black and he dyed it red, or he gave wood to a carpenter to make an attractive chair, and he made a poor chair or a bench. In all these instances, if the increase in the value of the article exceeds the cost, all the owner of the article is required to pay is the cost. If the cost exceeds the increase in the value of the article, all the owner of the article is required to pay is the increase in the value of the article. If the owner of the article says: "I do not desire this dispensation. I would prefer that he give me the value of the wool or the value of the wood," we do not heed his request. Conversely, if the craftsman says: "Here is the cost of your wool or your wood, depart," he is not heeded. The rationale is that the craftsman does not acquire a share in the increase in the value of the article.

When a person brings raw materials to a professional and he ruins them, the professional is liable to reimburse the owner for their value, for he is like a paid watchman. For example, a person gave wheat to a miller to grind and he did not soak it. Hence the flour came out as bran or coarse flour. A person gave flour to a baker and he made bread that crumbles, or a person brought an animal to a slaughterer and he slaughtered it unacceptably. They are all liable to make restitution. Therefore, if an expert slaughterer slaughters an animal without charge and he caused it to be unacceptable, he is not liable to make restitution. If he is not an expert, even if he works without charge, he is required to make restitution. Similar rules apply when a person shows a coin to a money changer and he says that it is acceptable, and it is discovered to be unacceptable. If he charged for his services, he is obligated to pay even though he is an expert and does not require further training. If he did not charge, he is not liable, provided he is an expert and does not require further training. If he is not an expert, he must reimburse the questioner even when he does not charge for his services. The above applies when the questioner tells the money changer: "I am relying upon you," or it is obvious from the situation that he is relying on his opinion and is not seeking another opinion. When a ritual slaughterer slaughtered an animal without charge, but rendered it unfit, a money changer said that a coin was acceptable, and it was not, or in any similar situation, the person who caused the damage must supply proof that he is an expert. If he cannot supply proof, he is required to make restitution.

The following rules apply in a place where it is customary for a person who plants trees to receive half of the increase in value, and for the owner of the land to receive half of the increase in value. If he planted trees in a portion of the land and increased the value, but planted other trees in another portion of the land and caused a loss, we calculate the half of the profit that is due the planter and deduct the entire loss he caused. He then receives the remainder. Even if he stipulated that if he causes a loss in a certain portion of the land, he will not receive any profit at all, his words are not heeded and only the loss he actually caused is deducted from his profits. The rationale is that this stipulation is an asmachta. When the person who plants trees terminates his relationship with the owner before reaping the crop, he bears the responsibility for his actions. To illustrate this principle: The local custom is that the person who plants receives half of the profits and the owner of the land, the other half. A sharecropper receives a lesser share, one third of the crop. The person who planted the trees caused the land to increase in value and then wished to terminate his relationship with the owner, forcing the owner to employ a sharecropper. The owner of the land may employ a sharecropper. Even so, the owner of the land receives half of the profits; he does not suffer a loss. The sharecropper receives a third and the remaining sixth is given to the person who planted the trees. Since he willingly terminated his relationship, he suffers the consequences.

The following principle applies with regard to a person who plants trees on behalf of all the members of a city who caused a loss; similarly, a ritual slaughterer of a village who rendered an animal unacceptable for consumption, a blood-letter who caused an injury, a scribe who erred in composing a legal document, a teacher who was negligent with the children and did not teach them or taught them in error, or any other professional who made an error that cannot be corrected. They may be removed from their positions without warning, for the warning for them to perform their work carefully is self evident. They must faithfully apply themselves to their tasks, for they were appointed by the community to discharge this responsibility.

It is a positive commandment to pay a worker his wage on time, as Deuteronomy 24:15 states: "On the day it is due, pay him his wage." If an employer delays payment, he violates a negative commandment, as that verse continues: "Do not let the sun set without him receiving it." Lashes are not given for the violation of this prohibition, for he is liable to pay. This principle applies to the wage of a person or the fee for hiring an animal or a utensil. In all these instances, one is obligated to make payment when due, and if one delays payment, one violates a negative commandment. The obligation to pay a wage when due applies to a resident alien, but one does not transgress a negative commandment if one delays paying him.

Whenever a person withholds the payment of a worker's wage, it is as if he takes his soul from him, as Deuteronomy 24:15 continues: "Because of it, he puts his life in his hand." He violates four admonitions and a positive commandment: He transgresses the commandments not to oppress a colleague, not to steal, not to hold overnight the wage of a worker and not to allow the sun to set before having paid him, and the positive commandment to pay him on time. When are a worker's wages due? A person who is hired to work during the day should collect his wages at any time throughout the following night. With regard to him, Leviticus 19:13 states: "Do not hold the wage of a worker in your possession overnight until the morning." A person who is hired to work during the night should collect his wages at any time throughout the following day. Concerning him, it is written: "On the day it is due, pay him his wage." A person who is hired to work several hours during the day should collect his wage during the remainder of the day. A person who is hired to work several hours during the night, should collect his wage during the remainder of the night. The following principles apply with regard to a person hired for a week, for a month, for a year or for a seven-year period. If he leaves his work during the day, he should collect his wage during the remainder of the day. If he leaves his work during the night, he should collect his wage during the remainder of the night.

If a person gives his garment to a tailor, and the tailor completes it and notifies him, the owner does not transgress this commandment as long as the garment is in the possession of the tailor. This applies even if he delays paying him for ten days. If the tailor returned it in the middle of the day, once the sun sets, the employer transgresses the commandment for holding the worker's wage past its due date. For contracting work is governed by the same laws as hired labor, and the craftsman must be paid when his wage is due.

The following rules apply when a person tells his agent: "Go out and hire workers for me," and the agent tells them: "The employer is responsible for your wages." They both do not transgress the prohibition against delaying payment of the worker's wages. The owner is not culpable, because he did not hire them, and the agent is not culpable, because he does not benefit from the workers' activity. If, however, the agent did not tell them: "The employer is responsible for your wages," the agent is considered to be transgressing the prohibition. The employer does not transgress this prohibition unless the worker demanded payment and he did not give it to him. If, however, the worker did not demand payment or he demanded payment and the employer did not have the money to pay him, or he directed the worker to another person who accepted the responsibility of paying him, the employer is not culpable.

When a person delays payment of a worker's wages until after they are due, he is liable to pay him immediately, although he has already violated the positive and the negative commandment mentioned above. Throughout the time he delays payment, he transgresses a Rabbinic commandment, as alluded to by Proverbs 3:28: "Do not tell your colleague, 'Go and return for tomorrow I will pay.'"

The following rules apply whenever a worker who was hired in the presence of witnesses demands payment from his employer at the appointed time, the owner claims to have paid the wage, and the worker claims not to have received it. Our Sages ordained that, while holding a sacred object, the worker should take an oath that he did not receive his wage. He may then collect it according to the laws governing all those who take oaths and then collect their due. The rationale for this ruling is that the employer is busy managing his workers and the worker is pinning his soul on his wage. Even if the worker is a minor, the worker may take an oath and collect his wage. Different rules apply when the employer hired the worker without witnesses observing. Since the employer could say: "Such a thing never happened; I never hired you," we accept his claim when he says: "I hired you, and I paid you." Hence, the employer must take a sh'vuat hesset if he denies owing anything to the worker or a Scriptural oath if he admits a portion of his claim, as applies in all other suits. If there is one witness who testifies that the worker was hired, it is of no consequence. Similarly, if the worker demands payment after the day on which his wage is due, we follow the principle: "A person who wishes to expropriate money from a colleague must prove his claim." This applies even if there are witnesses that the employer hired him. If he does not prove his claim, the employer may support his claim with a sh'vuat hesset and be freed of liability. If the worker proves that he has been continually demanding payment, he may take an oath and collect his wage on the day on which he demands payment. What is implied? The worker performed labor for the employer on Monday until the evening. The time he should be paid is Monday night. On Tuesday, he can no longer take an oath and collect his wage. If he brings witnesses who testify that he demanded his wage throughout Monday night, he may take an oath and collect his wage throughout the day on Tuesday, but from Tuesday night onward, we follow the principle: "A person who wishes to expropriate money from a colleague must prove his claim." Similarly, if he has witnesses who testify that he had demanded his wage until Thursday, he may take an oath and collect his wage throughout the day on Thursday.

The following rules apply when there is a difference between the employer and the worker with regard to the wage promised - e.g., the employer states "I promised you two zuz" and the worker states: "You promised me three." In this instance, our Sages did not entitle the worker to support his claim with an oath. Instead, they applied the principle: "A person who wishes to expropriate money from a colleague must prove his claim," If the worker did not prove his claim, even though the employer already gave him the two zuz he admits owing him or says: "Here is your money," the employer must take an oath holding a sacred object. This oath was ordained by the Sages so that the worker will not depart with an unsatisfied soul. When does the above apply? When the employer hired the worker in the presence of witnesses who did not know the wage they agreed on, and also when the worker demanded his wage on time. If, however, the employer hired the worker without this being observed by witnesses or the worker demanded payment after the time for payment passed, the employer is required to take only a sh'vuat hesset that he agreed to pay him no more than he already gave him or no more than he admits to owe him and told him that he was willing to pay, as is true with regard to all other claims.

The following rules apply when a person gives a garment to a tailor to mend, and a difference of opinion arises concerning the payment due the tailor. The tailor says: "You promised me two zuz," and the owner says: "I promised to pay only one." As long as the garment is in the possession of the tailor, and he would be able to claim that he purchased it, the tailor is given the opportunity of taking an oath while holding a sacred object and collecting the amount he claims. He may claim up to the amount of the article's worth as his wage. Once the garment has departed from his possession, or in a situation when we would not presume that he is the owner and he cannot claim that he purchased the garment, we follow the principle: "A person who wishes to expropriate money from a colleague must prove his claim." If he does not bring proof of his claim, the owner of the garment is required to take a sh'vuat hesset if he denies owing the tailor anything more than he paid him or a Scriptural oath if he admits a portion of the tailor's claim, as is the law with regard to other claims. Such a situation is not governed by the special leniencies granted with regard to the laws applying to a worker.

When a worker comes to take an oath, we do not deal severely with him, nor is he required to take an oath with regard to other claims based on the principle of gilgul sh'vuah. Instead, he takes an oath that he did not receive payment and collects his due. We are not lenient with any other people who come to take oaths, with the exception of a worker. In his case, we are lenient and invite him to take the oath, saying: "Do not cause yourself exasperation. Take the oath and collect your due." Even when his wage is only a p'rutah, if the owner claims to have paid him already, he should collect it only after taking an oath. Similarly, whenever a person takes an oath and collects his due, even if the claim is only one p'rutah, he may not collect it unless he takes an oath resembling one required by Scriptural Law.

When workers are performing activities with produce that grows from the earth, but the work required for it has not been completed, and their actions bring the work to its completion, the employer is commanded to allow them to eat from the produce with which they are working. This applies whether they are working with produce that has been harvested or produce that is still attached to the ground. This is derived from Deuteronomy 23:25, which states: "When you enter the vineyard of your colleague, you may eat grapes as you desire," and ibid.:26, which states: "When you enter the standing grain belonging to your colleague, you may break off stalks by hand." According to the Oral Tradition, we learned that these verses are speaking solely about a paid worker. For if the owner of the produce did not hire him, what right does the person have to enter his colleague's vineyard or standing grain without his permission? Instead, the interpretation of the verse is that when you enter the domain of your employer for work, you may eat.

What are the differences in the application of this mitzvah between a person who performs work with produce that has been reaped and one who works with produce that is still attached to the ground? A person who performs work with produce that has been reaped may partake of the produce as long as the work necessary for it has not been completed. Once the work necessary for it has been completed, he may not eat. By contrast, a person who performs work with produce that is still attached to the ground - e.g., a harvester of grapes or a reaper of grain - may not partake of the produce until he has completed his work. For example, a person harvests grapes and puts them into a large basket. When the basket is filled, it is taken away and emptied in another place. According to Scriptural Law, the worker may eat only when the basket has been filled. Nevertheless, in order to prevent the owner from suffering a loss, the Sages ruled that the workers may eat while they are walking from one row to another and while they are returning from the vat, so that they will not neglect their work to sit down and eat. Instead, they were granted permission to eat while they are performing their work, so that they will not neglect it.

When a person neglects his work and eats or eats when he has not completed his work, he transgresses a negative commandment, as Deuteronomy 23:26 states: "You shall not lift a sickle against your colleague's standing grain." According to the Oral Tradition, it is explained that as long as the worker is involved in reaping, he should not lift a sickle in order to partake of the produce himself. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. Similarly, a worker who carries home produce with which he had worked or who takes more than he can eat himself and gives to others transgresses a negative commandment, as ibid.:28 states: "You may not place in your containers." The violation of these two prohibitions is not punishable by lashes, because a person who ate when one should not have or took produce home is liable to make financial restitution.

A person who milks an animal, one who makes butter, and one who makes cheese may not partake of that food, for it is not a product of the earth. When a person hoes around onion heads and garlic heads, even though he removes small ones from the larger ones, or the like, he may not partake of them, because this activity does not constitute the completion of the task. Needless to say, watchmen over gardens, orchards and fields where any crops are grown - e.g., cucumber gardens and gourd gardens - may not partake of the produce growing there at all.

A person who separates dates and figs [that have already been harvested and are stuck together] may not partake of them, for the work that obligates the performance of the mitzvah of tithing has been completed. A person who works with wheat and the like after they have been tithed - e.g., a person was hired to remove pebbles from grain, to sift the kernels or to grind them - may partake of them, for the work that obligates the performance of the mitzvah of challah has not been completed. When, however, a person kneads dough, bastes loaves or bakes, he may not partake of the food, because the work that obligates the performance of the mitzvah of challah has become completed. And a worker may not partake of produce except when the work that obligates the performance of the mitzvah of tithing or challah has not been completed.

If the cakes of figs belonging to a person become broken up, his barrels of wine become open, or his gourds become cut, and he hires workers to tend to the produce, they may not partake of it, for the work necessary for them has been completed and they have become obligated to be tithed. Indeed, they are tevel. If, however, the owner did not notify the workers, he must tithe the produce and allow them to partake of it. Workers may not partake of the crops in a field that was consecrated to the Temple treasury. This is derived from Deuteronomy 23:25, which speaks of "your colleague's vineyard."

When a person hires workers to work with produce that is neta reva'i, they may not partake of it. If he did not inform them that it was neta reva'i, he must redeem it, and allow them to partake of it.

Workers who reap, thresh, winnow, separate unwanted matter from food, harvest olives or grapes, tread grapes, or perform any other tasks of this nature are granted the right to partake of the produce with which they working by Scriptural Law.

Watchmen for vats, grain heaps and any produce that has been separated from the ground, for which the work that obligates tithing has not been completed may partake of the produce because of local convention. They are not granted this privilege according to Scriptural Law, because a watchman is not considered to be one who performs an action. If, however, a person works with his limbs whether with his hands, his feet or even with his shoulders, he is entitled to partake of produce according to the Torah.

A worker who is working with figs may not partake of grapes. One who is working with grapes may not partake of figs. These laws are derived from Deuteronomy 23:25, which states: "When you enter the vineyard of your colleague, you may eat grapes." When a person is working with one vine, he may not eat from another vine. Nor may he partake of grapes together with other food; he should not partake of them together with bread or salt. If, however, the worker set a limit concerning the quantity that he may eat, he may eat the produce with salt, with bread or with any other food that he desires. It is forbidden for a worker to suck the juice from grapes, for the verse states: "And you shall eat grapes." Neither the worker's sons nor his wife may roast the kernels of grain in a fire for him. This is implied by the above verse, which states: "You may eat grapes as you desire." The implication is that you must desire the grapes as they are. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

It is forbidden for a worker to eat an inordinate amount of the produce with which he is working. This is implied by the above verse, which states: "You may eat... as you desire, to your satisfaction." It is permitted, however, for him to delay eating until he reaches the place of higher quality grapes and eat there. A worker may eat even a dinar's worth of cucumbers or dates even though he was hired to work only for a silver me'ah. Nevertheless, we teach a person not to be a glutton, so that he will not close the doors in his own face. if a person is guarding four or five grain heaps, he should not eat his fill from only one of them. Instead, he should eat an equal amount from each one.

Workers who have not walked both lengthwise and laterally in a vat may eat grapes but may not drink wine, for at that time they are still working solely with grapes. When they have treaded in the vat and walked both lengthwise and laterally, they may eat grapes and drink the grape juice, for they are working with both the grapes and the wine.

When a worker says: "Give my wife and my children what I would eat," or "I will give a small amount of what I have taken to eat to my wife and my children," he is not given this prerogative. For the Torah has granted this right only to a worker himself. Even when a nazarite who is working with grapes says, "Give some to my wife and children," his words are of no consequence.

When a worker - and his wife, his children and his slaves - were all employed to work with produce, and the worker stipulated that they - neither he nor the members of his household - should not partake of the produce, they may not partake of it. When does the above apply? When they are past majority, because they are intellectually mature, responsible for their decisions, and willingly gave up the right the Torah granted them. If, however, the children are minors, their father cannot pledge that they will not eat, for they are not eating from his property or from what the employer grants them, but rather from what they were granted by G-d.

An animal should be given the opportunity to eat whenever it works with produce, whether the produce is still attached to the ground or has been harvested. Similarly, it may partake of produce from the burden it is carrying until it has been unloaded, provided that the person caring for the animal does not take the produce in his hand and feed it.

Whoever prevents an animal from eating while it is working should be punished by lashes, as Deuteronomy 25:4 states: "Do not muzzle an ox while threshing." The prohibition applies to an ox and to all other species of animals and beasts, whether a kosher animal or a non-kosher animal. Similarly, it applies with regard to threshing and all other types of work with produce. The Torah speaks about an ox threshing only to mention the most common instance. An employer is not liable if he muzzles a worker. He is, however, liable for muzzling an animal. This applies whether he muzzles the animal while he is working with it or muzzles it beforehand and works with it while muzzled. He is liable even if he "muzzles it" with his mouth. When a person rents an animal, muzzles it and then threshes with it, he receives lashes and must pay the owners the value of four kabbin of grain for a cow, and three kabbin for a donkey. Although generally a person does not receive both lashes and a financial penalty for the same transgression, an exception is made in this instance, because the renter was obligated to provide the animal with its sustenance from the time he pulled it after him, and he is not liable for lashes until he threshes with the animal while muzzled.

When a Jew threshes with a cow belonging to a gentile, he is subject to violating the prohibition against muzzling. When, by contrast, a gentile threshes with an ox belonging to Jew, he is not subject to violating this prohibition. If a Jew tells a gentile: "Muzzle my ox and thresh with it," a thorn becomes lodged in the ox's mouth and he threshes with it so it does not eat, he places a lion outside the threshing floor, he places the animal's son outside the threshing floor, he does not provide the animal with drink when it is thirsty, or spreads a hide over the grain so that it will not eat - all of these and similar acts are forbidden, but the person does not receive lashes. When the produce with which the animal is working is bad for its digestion and will damage the animal's health or when the animal is sick and eating will cause it to become diarrheic, it is permitted to prevent the animal from eating. The rationale is that the Torah enacted this prohibition so that the animal would benefit, and in such an instance it does not benefit.

When a priest is threshing grain that is terumah or grain that is definitely terumat ma'aser with a cow that belongs to an Israelite, he is not subject to violating the prohibition against muzzling them. This law also applies when cows thresh grain that is ma'aser sheni and when cows veer from the path. Nevertheless, because of the impression that might be created, when the cows are threshing grain that is terumah or ma'aser sheni the worker should bring that type of grain and place it in the food sack hanging below their mouths.

When a person muzzles a cow that is threshing produce that is ma'aser sheni which is demai terumat ma'aser which is demai or produce that grew from terumah he violates the prohibition against muzzling the animal.

The owner of an ox is permitted to make his animal hungry and aggrieve it so that it will eat a large quantity of the grain that it is threshing. Conversely, the renter of the ox may feed it hay so that it will not eat a large quantity of the grain that it is threshing. Similarly, an employer may provide his workers with wine so that they will not eat many grapes. Conversely, the workers may dip their bread in brine so they will eat many grapes. A worker may not, however, perform work at night and then hire himself out during the day, or work with his ox in the evening and then rent it out in the morning. Similarly, he should not starve and aggrieve himself and give his food to his sons, because this leads to stealing from the work due his employer, for his energy will be sapped and his thinking unclear, and he will not be able to perform his work robustly.

.....Just as the employer is cautioned to not steal wages from the poor and not to withhold them, so too are the poor cautioned to not "steal" from the work of his employer by being idle a little here and a little there until he has spent the whole day in deception. Rather, he is obligated to be punctilious with himself regarding time. After all (the sages) were punctilious in the matter of the fourth blessing of the grace after meals, that the employee should not recite it (so as not to take him away from his work), so too the employee is obligated to work with all his strength. Behold, Jacob the righteous said "with all my strength I worked with your father" (Genesis 31:6) he therefore received reward for it, even in this world, as it is stated "and the man profited very much" (Genesis 30:43)