Oaths

There are four types of oaths [for which one may be liable]: sh'vuat bitui, sh'vuat shav, sh'vuat hapikadon, and sh'vuat ha'edut. Sh'vuat bitui is referred to in the Torah [by Leviticus 5:4]: "When a soul will take an oath, expressing with his lips, whether he will do harm or do good." [This category] subdivides into four groupings: two [involving statements made] concerning the future and two [involving statements made] concerning the past. For example, he took an oath concerning a past event that it occurred or did not occur, or concerning a future event, that he will do it or that he will not do it.

[The concept of] a sh'vuat bitui applies with regard to deeds that a person could perform whether in the past or in the future. What is implied? With regard to the past: "I ate," "I cast a stone into the sea," or "So-and-so spoke with so-and-so"; "I did not eat," "I did not cast a stone into the sea," or "So-and-so did not speak with so-and-so." With regard to the future: "I will eat" or "I will not eat," "I will..." or "I will not cast a stone into the sea." Thus there are two groupings concerning the past and two groupings concerning the future.

If a person takes an oath concerning one of these four categories and does the opposite, he has taken a false oath. For example, he took an oath not to eat and he ate, that he would eat and he did not eat, that he ate, when he did not or that he did not eat, when he had eaten. With regard to these matters, [Leviticus 19:12] states: "Do not swear falsely in My name." If he willfully swears falsely, he is liable for lashes. If he does so inadvertently, he must bring an adjustable guilt offering, as [ibid. 5:4] states: "And it became concealed from him and he did not know and became guilty."

[The prohibition against taking] a sh'vuat shav, an oath taken in vain, also subdivides into four categories: the first, a person took an oath concerning a known matter that was not true, e.g., he took an oath that a man was a woman, a woman was a man, that a marble pillar was gold, or concerning other similar factors.

The second: that one takes an oath on a known matter concerning which no one has a doubt, e.g., one took an oath that the sky was the sky, that a stone is a stone, on two [objects] that they are two, and the like. Even though there is no doubt about the matter for a person of sound mind, one takes an oath to strengthen [the appreciation of] the matter.

The third is one who takes an oath to nullify a mitzvah. What is implied? One took an oath not to wrap himself in tzitzit, not to put on tefilin, not to dwell in a sukkah throughout the holiday of Sukkot, not to eat matzah on Pesach night, that he would fast on the Sabbaths and the festivals, or concerning other analogous instances.

The fourth - that one took an oath concerning a matter that he is unable to perform. What is implied? He took an oath that he would not sleep for three consecutive days and nights, he would not eat for seven consecutive days or concerning any analogous matter. Whenever a person takes an oath in vain by taking one of these four types of oaths, he transgresses a negative commandment, as [Exodus 20:7] states: "And you shall not take the name of G-d your Lord in vain." If he [takes the oath] willfully, he is liable for lashes. If he does so inadvertently, he is exempt entirely.

What is meant by a sh'vuat hapikadon, [an oath concerning an entrusted object]? [It applies] when a person has money belonging to a colleague in his possession - whether it be an entrusted article or a loan, he stole from him, withheld his wages, he found a loss object belonging to him and did not return it, or any similar situation. If his colleague claims the money that he has in his possession and he denies the claim, he violates a negative commandment, as [Leviticus 19:11] states: "You shall not deny..."; this is a warning [not to] deny a monetary [claim]. One is not liable for lashes for this transgression. If one took a false oath with regard to the financial claim that he denied, he transgresses another negative commandment, as [the above verse] continues: "A person may not lie to his colleague." This is a warning against swearing [falsely] when denying a financial [obligation].

What is a person's liability for taking a false sh'vuat hapikadon? He must pay the principle that he denied plus an additional fifth and bring a definite guilt offering as a sacrifice. [This applies] whether he [transgressed] intentionally or unintentionally, as indicated by Leviticus 5:21-23 which] states: "And he will deny his [obligation to] a colleague concerning an entrusted object, a [financial] deposit, a robbery... when he will sin and become guilty." [The verse] does not say: "And it will become concealed from him," indicating that one who transgresses willfully is liable just as [one who transgresses] inadvertently.

The above applies when the person willfully accepted the entrusted object or the money that he was obligated and knew about it at the time of the oath. If, however, he acted unintentionally, forgot that he had the money in his possession, therefore denied it and took an oath, and then discovered the matter, he is considered [to have transgressed because of] factors beyond his control and is not liable at all. Similarly, if the person did not know that it was forbidden to take a false oath in denial of a financial claim, he is considered [to have transgressed because of] factors beyond his control and is not liable.

If so, what is meant by acting inadvertently with regard to a sh'vuat hapikadon? For example, he forgot that one is liable to bring a sacrifice for [taking such a false oath], but knew that it was forbidden to do so and that he has the other person's money in his possession. This is considered the inadvertent transgression [of this prohibition]. Willful transgression is when he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice [because of the transgression].

What is meant by sh'vuat ha'edut? Witnesses know testimony associated with a monetary claim and the person affected by the testimony demanded that they testify on his behalf. The witnesses deny knowledge of testimony, do not testify, and take an oath that they do not know any testimony concerning him. This is referred to as a sh'vuat ha'edut. For taking a [false] oath of this nature, one is liable for an adjustable guilt offering, [This applies] whether he [transgressed] intentionally or unintentionally, as [indicated by Leviticus 5:1 which] states: "When a person will sin: If he heard a demand for an oath and he had witnessed...." [The verse] does not say: "And it will become concealed from him," indicating that one who transgresses willfully is liable just as [one who transgresses] inadvertently.

What is meant by acting inadvertently with regard to a sh'vuat ha'edut? For example, he forgot that one is liable to bring a sacrifice for [taking such a false oath], but knew that this oath was forbidden and that he would be swearing falsely. Willful transgression is when he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice [because of the transgression]. If he did not know that [taking such an oath] is forbidden or forgot the testimony and took an oath and later it was discovered that he knew testimony and took a false oath, he is considered [to have transgressed because of] forces beyond his control and he is not liable to bring a sacrifice.

Whether one takes one of these four oaths [falsely] on his own initiative or he is placed under oath by another person and answers Amen to his statements, he is liable. [This applies] even if he is placed under oath by a gentile or a minor and responds Amen. [The rationale is that] anyone who responds Amen or makes a statement equivalent to responding Amen, e.g., he says "Yes," "I am obligated in this oath," "I accept this oath upon myself," or the like in any language is considered to have taken an oath with regard to all matter, whether it be liability for lashes or for a sacrifice.

[The same laws apply whether] one took an oath - or another person administered an oath to him - with G-d's ineffable name - or with one of the descriptive terms used to refer to Him, e.g., he took an oath "on He whose name is Gracious," "on He whose name is Merciful," or "on He whose name is Patient," regardless of the language he used. The statement is considered an oath in the full sense of the term. Similarly, a statement with the terms eleh or erur is considered as an oath, provided one mentions one of G-d's names or one of the terms used to describe Him. What is implied? When a person said: "May one who eats this-and-this entity be cursed unto G-d," or "...cursed unto He whose name is Gracious," "...cursed unto He whose name is Merciful" and then ate that entity, he has taken a false oath. Similar concepts apply with regard to the other types of oaths.

Similarly, one who says: "[I am taking] an oath by G-d...," or "...by One whose name is Gracious that I will not eat," and he ate, "...that this is a woman," and it was a man, "...that I do not owe you anything," and he does, "that I do not know any testimony involving you," and he does, he is liable.

If a person uses the term eleh or erur or an oath and does not mention G-d's name or a term describing Him, he is bound by a prohibition with regard to the entity concerning which he [desired to] take the oath. He is not, however, liable for lashes or for a sacrifice if he violated his oath unless it included one of G-d's names or a term describing Him as explained.

Not only the term sh'vuah, but [the use of] any idiom used to refer to an oath is considered as [taking] an oath. For example, people in a given place were inarticulate and would call an oath shabutah or shakukah, or they were Aramites for whom the term for oath in their language is momata, and the inarticulate idiomatically refer to it is mohah. When a person makes a statement whose intent and meaning is that he is taking an oath, he is liable as if he used the term [in Lashon Hakodesh].

Similarly, when a person says: "No, no," repeating the negative twice as if he is taking an oath or "Yes, yes," and mentions G-d's name or a term used to describe Him, it is considered an oath. Similarly, if he says: "[By G-d's] right hand," it is an oath, or "[By G-d's] left hand," it is an oath, as [implied by Isaiah 62:5] "G-d swore by His right hand and by the arm of His strength." Similarly, when someone says "Mivtah that I will not do such-and-such," and mentions G-d's name or a term used to describe Him, it is considered an oath.

When one says: "It is forbidden for G-d's [sake]" or "...for [the sake of] He whose name is Gracious that I will do..." or "...that I will not do [such-and-such]," it is considered an oath, because the wording he used has that implication.

If he heard his colleague take an oath and said: "I am like him," he is not liable, for he did not utter an oath, nor did his colleague administer an oath to him. This is "appending" to an oath for which one is not liable.

Similarly, if he took an oath and said: "I will not eat this meat," and then said: "This bread is like this meat," he is not liable for the bread, because he did not explicitly take an oath regarding it. Instead, he appended [the prohibition concerning it to his existing oath]. Although he is exempt from lashes and from a sacrifice, he is forbidden to partake of the bread that he appended to his oath.

[Although] a person has the intent to take an oath and resolves in his heart not to eat on that day or not to drink and has the intent for that activity to be forbidden for him by oath, [if] he does not actually make such a statement, he is permitted [to eat or drink], as [implied by Leviticus 5:4]: "expressing with his lips." [Implied is that] a person who takes an oath is not liable until he explicitly states the matter the oath concerns with his lips.

Similarly, if he resolved within his heart to take an oath and erred and uttered a statement that did not fit the intent in his heart, [the activity] is permitted. What is implied? A person had the intent that he would not eat in Reuven's [home], but when he actually came to state the oath explicitly, he swore not to eat in [Shimon's] home. [In such a situation,] he is permitted to eat in Reuven's [home] for he did not explicitly [swear not to eat there]. [And he is permitted to eat] in Shimon's [home] for he did not have the intent [to prohibit that].

Similarly, with regard to the other types of oaths, one is not liable until his mouth and his heart are in concord. Therefore [the following law applies if] a person took an oath in our presence that he would not eat and ate. He was given a warning [before he ate] and he responded: "My intent was that I would not depart today. I had a slip of the tongue and mentioned eating although that was not my intent." is not liable for lashes unless, before he eats, he admits in the presence of witnesses that [his intent in] taking the oath was [not] to eat. Alternatively, [he is liable for lashes] if he accepted the warning and did not protest that he erred at the time of the warning. Even though he protested afterwards, we do not pay attention to him. Similarly, [he is liable] if they warned him and he said: "I never took an oath - or a vow - concerning this matter." Despite the fact that after they give testimony that he took an oath or vow, he says: "Yes, that is true, but my mouth and heart were not in concord," or "In my heart, I had a stipulation in mind concerning the vow," we do not heed him and he is liable for lashes.

Similarly, if [witnesses] told him: "Your wife took a vow," and he said: "My intent was to nullify the vow and I did so," we heed his statements. If he is told, "She took a vow," and he denies it, but when he saw them testify against him, he said: "My intent was to nullify [the vow]," his word is not heeded.

If he resolved within his heart not to partake of bread made from wheat, but took an oath not to partake of bread without qualifying his statement, he is forbidden to partake of bread from wheat. For when bread [is mentioned without qualification, the meaning] is bread from wheat.

When a person takes an oath, saying: "[I am taking] an oath that I will not eat today and my oath is dependent on your intent," he cannot [later] say: "I had these-and-these thoughts in my heart." [The rationale is] that the person did not take the oath dependent on his own intent, but rather on the intent of others. Since his statements did concur with the intent of those on whose intent he took the oath he is liable. [The intent in] the heart of those individuals takes the place of his own intent. [This concept also applies] with regard to other types of oaths.

Therefore when judges administer an oath to a person, they tell him: "We are not administering the oath dependent on your intent, but dependent on our intent.

[The following law applies when a person] took an oath and his statements and his intent concurred at the time he took the oath, but after he becomes forbidden [in the particular activity mentioned in the oath], he changes his mind immediately, directly after he spoke. [The latter term has a specific halachic definition]: the time it takes a student to tell his teacher: Shalom Elecha Rabbi. [If, in this interim, the person says:] "This is not an oath," "I changed my mind," "I retract," or the like, i.e., statements that imply that he seeks to release the prohibition he took on [himself], it is permitted. The oath is eradicated, for this resembles one who made a statement in error.

Similarly, if others tell him: "Retract," "It is permitted for you," or the like and he accepts their view within the above measure of time by saying: "Yes," or "I retract," he is permitted. After this measure of time, he cannot retract.

If a person took an oath and retracted within his heart within the above measure of time, it is of no consequence. Similarly, if others told him: "Retract," "It is permitted for you," or "It is absolved for you," and he accepted their words in his heart within the above measure of time, it is of no consequence. He must state his retraction explicitly like his oath.

Whenever a person takes one of these four types of oaths under compulsion, he is exempt from all liability. This applies to a person who at the outset took a false oath because of factors beyond his control as we explained, one who took an oath and then was subjected to compulsion and was not given the opportunity to fulfill his oath, or he was compelled to take an oath by a man of force. Therefore one may take an oath when compelled to by robbers, potential murders, and tax collectors.

To which tax collector did we refer? To a tax collector that assumed the position on his own, who takes money without the license of the king or who takes money with the king's license, but takes more for himself than the fixed measure, as explained in Hilchot Gezelah.

When a person is compelled to take an oath, to be exempt, while taking the oath, he must have the intent in his heart for the oath to apply to something for which he is exempt. Although generally, words in a person's heart are of no consequence, since he cannot express his intent because of the forces beyond his control, he can rely on the intent in his heart.

What is implied? One took an oath to a man of force that he would not eat meat without qualifying his statement, it is permitted if in his heart, he had the intent that he was saying that he would not eat the meat of pigs, or that he would not eat meat that day. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

Similarly, one is not liable for oaths involving exaggerations or unintentional oaths. What is meant by oaths involving exaggerations? A person saw vast armies and tall walls and he took an oath that "I saw the armies of King So-and-So and they are as vast as those who left Egypt," "I saw the wall of this-and-this city and it was as high as the heavens," or the like. He is exempt, because he did not resolve within his heart that this was the measure of the subject in question, no more and no less. His intent was only to describe the height of the wall or the multitude of the people.

What is meant by an oath taken inadvertently? With regard to a sh'vuat hapikadon or a sh'vuat ha'edut, it refers to a situation where the person forgot about the entrusted article or the testimony. He is entirely exempt, as we explained. With regard to an oath taken in vain, it refers to a situation where the person took an oath not to wear tefilin, but did not know that tefilin are a mitzvah. With regard to a false oath, it refers to a situation where the person took an oath that he did not eat and then remembered that he did in fact eat, he took an oath that he would not eat and then forgot and ate, he took an oath that he would not give any satisfaction to his wife because she stole his wallet or beat his son and afterwards, he found out that she did not steal it or beat him. Similar concepts apply in all analogous situations.

If so, what is a sh'vuat bitui taken inadvertently for which one is liable to bring an adjustable guilt offering with regard to the past? One took an oath that he did not eat although he knew that he in fact had eaten and he knew that it is forbidden to have taken this false oath, but he did not know that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. This is the inadvertent violation for which one is liable to bring an adjustable guilt offering for taking a sh'vuat bitui with regard to the past.

What is meant by an inadvertent violation for which one is liable for an adjustable guilt offering for breaking an oath involving the future? For example, one took an oath that he would not eat bread from wheat and forgot and thought that he had taken an oath that he would eat bread from wheat and then ate it. In this instance, he became unaware of the content of the oath although he remembered the article concerning which he took the oath. This is an inadvertent violation of a sh'vuat bitui involving the future which obligates him to bring a sacrifice.

If, however, he took an oath that he would not eat bread from wheat and he ate bread from wheat thinking that it was made from barley, he is considered to have transgressed due to forces beyond his control and he is exempt. For he did not become unaware of the oath, but instead of the article concerning which he took the oath.

If he lost awareness of the oath he took and he lost awareness of the article concerning which he took the oath, he is not liable for a sacrifice. What is implied? For example, one took an oath that he would not eat bread from wheat and thought that he had taken an oath that he would eat bread from wheat and ate bread from wheat thinking it was barley. He is not liable, because he became unaware of both the oath and the article it concerned. It is considered as if he he transgressed due to forces beyond his control.

The following laws apply if a person took an oath concerning a loaf of bread, swearing that he would not eat it and then suffered discomfort because of it. Should he eat the loaf because of his discomfort, because he thought that it is permitted for him to eat it because of discomfort, he is considered to have transgressed inadvertently. He is exempt from bringing a sacrifice, because he is not repenting because of his new knowledge. Instead, he knew that it was forbidden and ate it in error.

When a person takes an oath that he will not eat anything on that day and he ate less than an olive-sized portion of food, he is not liable. For "eating" does not involve a quantity less than an olive-sized portion. It is as if he partook of less than the minimum measure of a nevelah, a trefe, or the like. If he said: "[I am taking] an oath that I will not eat this substance," and he ate it, he is liable even if the substance concerning which he took the oath is one mustard seed or smaller.

If he took an oath that he would not taste anything and partook of even the smallest amount of food, he is liable.

When a person takes an oath that he will not eat on a specific day and drinks, he is liable, because [a prohibition against] eating includes drinking. Therefore, if he both ate and drank, he is liable only for one set of lashes if he acted willfully or one sin offering if he transgressed inadvertently.

When a person took an oath not to drink on a given day, he is permitted to eat, because [a prohibition against] drinking does not include eating. How much must he drink for him to be liable? It appears to me that he is not liable unless he drinks a revi'it as is the case with regard to other prohibitions.

When a person takes an oath that he will not eat on a particular day and partook of many types of food, or he takes an oath that he will not drink on a particular day and partakes of many types of beverages, he is only liable once. Even if he said: "[I am taking] an oath that today I will not eat meat, bread, or beans," and he eats all [these types of food]. He is only liable once. All [of these foods] can be joined together to reach the measure of an olive-sized portion.

When a person takes an oath that he will neither eat nor drink and then eats and drinks, he is liable twice. Although drinking is included in eating, since he specifically said: "And I will not drink," he revealed his intention not to include drinking in eating. Thus it is as if he took an oath on this independently and this independently. Therefore he is liable twice.

Similarly, if a person said: "[I am taking] an oath that I will not eat bread from wheat, bread from barley, or bread from buckwheat," he is liable for each one individually if he partakes of them. He mentioned "bread" three times to make a distinction and cause him to be liable for each one individually.

[The following laws apply when a person's] colleague was persistently imploring him to eat at his [home], telling him: "Come and drink with me, wine, milk, and honey." If he answers: "[I am taking] an oath that I will not drink wine, milk, and honey," he is liable for each one individually if he partakes of them. [To be liable only once,] he should have said: "[I am taking] an oath that I will not drink anything," or "...[that I will not drink] what you said." Since he repeated the phrase, stating each one individually, he revealed his intention that he obligated himself with an oath for each and every type [of beverage] individually. Therefore [the beverages] are not combined with each other [to reach the minimum measure] and the person is liable only when he eats the minimum measure from each one individually. Since a sin offering is required for each one individually, they are like fat and blood which cannot be combined for [the measure of] an olive-sized portion as explained in Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot.

[When one says: "I am taking] an oath that I will not eat this loaf," or "...that I will not eat it," once he eats an olive-sized portion of it, he is liable. [If he says:] "[I am taking] an oath that I will not eat it up," he is not liable until he eats the entire loaf. If he says: "[I am taking] an oath that I will not eat this loaf; [I am taking] an oath that I will not eat it up," should he eat it, he is liable only once.

Similarly, if one said: ["I am taking] an oath that I will not eat today," and then took an oath concerning a loaf that he would not eat it up, [even though] he eats the entire [loaf] that day, he is not liable only once. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. [The rationale is that] an oath does not take effect when another is already in effect. If, however, one took an oath that he would not eat up a loaf and afterwards, took an oath that he would not eat anything or that he would not eat this loaf, he is liable twice. [The rationale is that] at the time he took the oath that he would not eat it up, he would not be liable unless he ate the entire loaf. Thus when he took a second oath that he would not eat anything or that he would not eat the loaf, he is liable [for the latter oath,] when he eats an olive-sized portion. And when he eats the entire [loaf], he is liable for his first oath.

[When a person takes] an oath not to eat figs and afterwards, takes an oath not to eat figs and grapes, he is liable twice for [eating] figs. [The rationale is that] he included the figs which were forbidden in the first oath with grapes that were permitted. Since the second oath took effect with regard the grapes, it also took effect with regard the figs and he becomes liable for two oaths, as we explained in Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot.

[If one said: "I am taking] an oath that I will not eat eight [of this item]," "...an oath that I will not eat nine," and "...an oath that I will not eat ten," he is liable only once whether he ate eight, nine, or ten.

[If one said: "I am taking] an oath that I will not eat ten," "...an oath that I will not eat nine," and "...an oath that I will not eat eight," if he eats ten, he is liable three times, one for each oath. Similarly, if he eats nine, he is liable twice. If he eats eight, he is liable once.

[The following rules apply when a person says: "I am taking] an oath that I will not eat figs," and then takes another oath that he will not eat figs and grapes together. If he forgot, ate figs, and set aside a sacrifice, afterwards, forgot, and ate grapes, he is not liable for the grapes. [The rationale is that] this is like half the measure [for which one is liable] and one does not bring a sacrifice for half the measure.

Similar [laws apply if] one took an oath that he would not eat ten, and then took an oath that he would not eat ten and nine. If he ate ten, separated a sacrifice, and then forgot and ate nine, this is like half the measure and one does not bring a sacrifice for half the measure. For the final oath concerned not eating nineteen.

[When a person says: "I am taking] an oath that I will not eat this large loaf if I eat this small loaf," if he forgets this stipulation when he eats the smaller loaf and afterwards willfully eats the larger [loaf], he is liable [for lashes].

If he ate the small one while he remembered the stipulation and knew that by eating it, the larger one would become forbidden and then forgot and ate the larger one while thinking that it was not forbidden yet, he is exempt. If he ate both of them unintentionally, he is exempt. [If he ate them] both willfully, he is liable, regardless of whether he ate the larger one first or last.

Similarly, if he made the two loafs dependent on each other, taking an oath saying: "[I am taking] an oath that I will not eat one of these [loaves] if I eat the other." If he forgot the stipulation and ate one of them and then willfully ate the other, he is liable.

If he ate the first one willfully, but the second one inadvertently, he is exempt. [If he ate them] both willfully, he is liable.

[When a person says: "I am taking] an oath that I will eat this loaf today," and the day passes without him eating it, should he have acted unintentionally, he must bring an adjustable guilt offering. If he acted willfully, he is not liable for lashes, because he did not perform a deed, even though he violated [the prohibition against] taking a false oath.

Why is a person who took an oath that he ate liable for lashes [if] he did not eat and one [who took an oath] that he did not eat [liable] if he did eat, even though he did not perform a deed. Because at the time he took the oath, he was taking a false oath. If, however, a person takes an oath that he will perform [a particular activity], it is not a false oath at the time it was taken.

[The following laws apply when] a person tells a colleague: "[I am taking] an oath that I will not eat at your [home]," or [his colleague] was persistently imploring him to eat at his [home] and he refuses. If he takes an oath and says: "My oath [will take effect] if I eat at your [home]," or if he says: "There will be no oath if I do not eat at your [home]," these all bring about prohibitions. [It is considered that] he took an oath that he would not eat at his [home]. If he used all of these expressions [together] and transgressed and ate, he is only liable once.

When a person takes an oath that so-and-so threw a stone into the sea and he did not do so, or [he took an oath that] he did not throw it and he did, he is liable for taking a [false] sh'vuat bitui. [This applies] even though there is no [possibility of him taking such an oath] with regard to the future. For he cannot take an oath that so-and-so will throw [an article] or will not throw it. [Indeed,] any person who takes an oath with regard to other people's [conduct - that they will or will not perform a particular activity is not liable for taking a [false] sh'vuat bitui. [This applies even if the person concerned] is his son or wife. For it is not within his potential to keep or nullify the oath. He is given stripes for rebellious conduct since it is not within his potential to keep this oath. Thus he is causing an oath to be taken in vain.

Why isn't he liable for lashes for taking an oath in vain? For it is possible for those other people to heed his [words] and keep his oath. Thus when he is given a warning at the time he takes the oath, the warning is of doubtful status. In such an instance, one is not given lashes because of it unless the prohibition is explicitly stated in the Torah, as will be explained in Hilchot Sanhedrin. Other people are not bound to fulfill the words of the person who took the oath unless they responded Amen, as we explained.

If they fulfilled his words, they are praiseworthy, for [in this manner,] they did not habituate [the person who took the oath] to take an oath in vain.

When does the above apply? When he took an oath concerning a matter that was not in his domain. For example, Reuven took an oath that Shimon would not go on a commercial journey, not eat meat, or the like. [Different laws apply,] however, should Reuven take an oath that Shimon may not enter his home and may not derive any benefit from his property. If Shimon transgressed and entered Reuven's house and benefited from his property without Reuven's knowledge, Reuven is exempt, for [his oath was violated] due to forces beyond his control. Shimon is liable, for he performed a deed prohibited to him. For Reuven took an oath only with regard to a matter within his property. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

[When a person says: "I am taking] an oath that I will not eat," and he ate, but he ate articles that were not fit to be eaten or drank beverages that were not fit to be drunk, he is exempt. If he partook of foods that are forbidden to be eaten by the Torah, for example, he ate an olive-sized portion of a nevelah, a trefe, teeming animals, or creeping animals, he is not liable for a [false] sh'vuat bitui. [When a person says: "I am taking] an oath that I will eat," and he ate articles that were not fit to be eaten or drank beverages that were not fit to be drunk, or he partook of a nevelah, a trefe, or the like, he is not liable for a false sh'vuat bitui. He is considered to have fulfilled [his commitment to] eat. Since they are important in his eyes, eating them is considered as eating.

[When a person said: "I am taking] an oath that I did not eat," and he ate articles that were not fit to be eaten or he partook of a nevelah or a trefe, he is liable. Eating them is considered eating, because they are important to him, as evidenced by his having eaten them. With regard to the future, by contrast, i.e., he took an oath that he would not eat and then in an extraordinary instance, he ate them, this is not considered eating, as we explained [above].

[When a person says: "I am taking] an oath that I will not eat even the slightest amount of a nevelah or a trefe," and he ate less than an olive-sized portion, he is liable for taking a [false] oath, for he is not bound by an oath from Mount Sinai for half the measure [which makes him liable].

[When a person says: "I am taking] an oath that I will eat even less than an olive-sized portion of a nevelah or a trefe," he may be liable for taking a false sh'vuat bitui. [When a person says: "I am taking] an oath that I will not eat earth and the like from substances that are not fit to be eaten," if he eats an olive-sized portion, he is liable. If he ate less than an olive-sized portion, there is a doubt [concerning the ruling]. Perhaps he is liable even for [eating] the smallest amount. Since these substances are not usually eaten so that a full measure must be eaten [for him to be held liable].

Similarly, when one takes an oath that he would not eat grape seeds and he eats less than an olive-sized portion, there is a doubt [concerning his liability]. If the one taking the oath was a nazirite who is forbidden to eat an olive-sized portion of grape seeds, he is not liable for a [false] sh'vuat bitui if he ate less than an olive-sized portion. [The rationale is that] his intent in taking the oath is only concerning the olive-sized portion for which he is already liable and [hence] the oath does not take effect. Therefore if one said: "[I am taking] an oath that I will not eat even one grape seed," and ate it, he is liable.

[When a person says: "I am taking] an oath that I will not eat dates, a nevelah or a trefe," and he ate an olive-sized portion of a nevelah or a trefe, he is liable also for [taking] a [false] sh'vuat bitui. For he included forbidden entities together with permitted entities. Since the oath took effect with regard to the dates, it also takes effect with regard to the forbidden entities, as we explained.

If, however, a person took an oath that he would not eat a nevelah, a trefe, or the like, regardless of whether he partook of [the forbidden substance] or not, there is no obligation for an oath at all, neither a sh'vuat bitui, nor an oath taken in vain.

When a person takes an oath that he will partake of a nevelah, a trefe, or another similar substance forbidden by the Torah, he is liable for lashes for taking an oath in vain whether he partook of the substance or not.

[When a person says: "I am taking] an oath that I will eat this loaf. [I am taking] an oath that I will not eat it," the second oath is an oath taken in vain, for he is commanded to eat it. He is liable for lashes for the second oath whether he partakes of [the loaf] or not. If he does not eat it, he is liable also for [not fulfilling] a sh'vuat bitui.

[When a person says: "I am taking] an oath that I will not eat this loaf. [I am taking] an oath that I will eat it," the second oath is an oath taken in vain, for he is forbidden to eat it. He is liable for lashes for the second oath whether he partakes of [the loaf] or not. If he eats it, he is liable also for [not fulfilling] a sh'vuat bitui. Similarly, whenever one takes an oath to neglect a mitzvah and does not neglect it, he is exempt for [violating] a sh'vuat bitui. He is, however, liable for lashes for taking an oath in vain. He should perform the mitzvah that he took an oath to neglect.

What is implied? For example, a person took an oath that he would not make a sukkah, he would not put on tefillin, he would not give charity, he is liable for lashes for taking an oath in vain. Similarly, [one is liable] if he takes an oath for a colleague that he will not give testimony that he knows or that he will not testify if he will know testimony, for he is commanded to testify. Similarly, if he tells a colleague: "[I am taking] an oath that I will never know testimony concerning you," it is an oath taken in vain, for it is not within his capacity [to be certain] that he will never know of testimony concerning him. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

When a person takes an oath to fulfill a mitzvah and fails to fulfill it, he is not liable for not fulfilling a sh'vuat bitui. What is implied? A person took an oath to make a lulav or a sukkah, to give charity, or to testify on behalf [of a colleague] if he knew testimony [that could affect him]. If he did not make [these articles], give [the charity], or testify, he is exempt for [not fulfilling his] sh'vuat bitui. For a sh'vuat bitui takes effect only with regard to matters left to one's choice - [i.e., matters that] if he wants to, he may perform and if he does not want to, he need not perform, as implied by [Leviticus 5:4]: "whether he will do harm or do good." Therefore whenever anyone takes an oath to harm another person, he is exempt from a sh'vuat bitui, e.g., he takes an oath to strike so-and-so, to curse him, steal his money, or deliver him to the control of a man of force. [The rationale is that] he is commanded not to do [these things]. It appears to me that he is liable for lashes for taking an oath in vain.

If a person took an oath to harm himself, e.g., he took an oath to inflict injury upon himself, the oath takes effect even though he is not allowed to do so. If he does not harm himself, he is liable for [not fulfilling] a sh'vuat bitui. If he took an oath to help others with regard to a matter with which he could help them, e.g., to speak to the ruling authorities or to show him honor, the oath takes effect. If he transgresses and does not carry out [his promise], he is liable for [not fulfilling] a sh'vuat bitui.

One who takes an oath not to eat matzah for a year or two is forbidden to eat matzah on the nights of Pesach. If he eats it, he is liable, for violating a sh'vuat bitui. This is not considered as an oath taken in vain, since he did not take an oath [specifically] not to eat matzah on the nights of Pesach. Instead, he included the times when eating matzah is a matter of choice together with those when it is a mitzvah. Since the oath takes effect with regard to the other days, it also takes effect with regard to Pesach. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations, e.g., one took an oath not to sit in the shade of a sukkah forever, or not to wear a garment for a year or two.

If one took an oath that he put on tefillin that day or did not put them on, or wrapped himself in tzitzit or did not wrap himself in them, he is taking a sh'vuat bitui with regard to the past. For he is describing something which happened. He is not taking an oath whether to fulfill or not to fulfill a mitzvah.

If a person took an oath that he will not sleep for a three-day period, he will not eat for seven days, or the like, it is an oath taken in vain. We do not say that the person should remain awake until he is overcome by pain or fast until he is overcome by pain and [only] when he no longer has the strength to bear [the suffering], eat or sleep. Instead, he is liable for lashes immediately for taking an oath in vain. He may eat and sleep whenever he desires.

When a person takes an oath that he saw a camel flying in the sky and when questioned: "How could you have taken an oath in vain?", he responded: "I saw a huge bird and because of its size, I called it a camel. This was my intent," [his words] are of no consequence. For when all people mention a camel that is their intent. His intention is nullified because of that of people at large and he is liable for lashes. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

It is a known matter to the sages who are masters of wisdom and knowledge that the sun is 170 times greater than the earth. [Nevertheless,] if one of the common people takes an oath that the sun is greater than the earth, he is not liable for taking an oath in vain. For even though this is the fact, this concept is not known to people at large, only to great sages. One is liable [for an oath taken in vain] only when he takes an oath concerning a matter that is known and obvious to three ordinary people, e.g., [an oath that] a man is a man or a stone is a stone. Similarly, when he takes an oath that the sun is smaller than the earth, he is not liable for lashes [for an oath taken in vain] although this is not the reality. For this matter is not known to all people. Such a person is not comparable to one who takes an oath that a man is a woman. For he took the oath according to his perception, for the sun looks small. Similar laws apply to other comparable concepts from the reckoning of the factors determining the calendar, astronomy, geometry, and other abstract concepts of the like that can be perceived only by other people.

[The following rules apply when] a person took a sh'vuat bitui and [then] regretted having taken the oath. If he sees that he will suffer if he upholds this oath and his intent changes or a factor occurred that was not in his intent originally when he took the oath and he changed his mind because of this, he may appeal [to be released from his oath] from one sage - or from three ordinary people in a place where there are no sages. His oath is repealed and he is permitted to perform the matter that he took the oath not to do or not to do the matter that he took an oath to do. This is called the release of an oath.

This provision has no source in the Written Law. Instead, we learned from Moses our teacher through the Oral Tradition that the phrase [Numbers 30:3]: "He should not desecrate his word" means that he himself should not abuse it in a frivolous and brazen manner, as [Leviticus 19:13] states: "[For] you will desecrate the name of Your G-d." Nevertheless, if a person changed his mind and retracted, a sage may release him [from the oath].

It is not possible for a person to release himself from his own oath. A person does not have the license to release an oath or a vow in a place where there is a person whose knowledge surpasses his own. In a place where his teacher is found, he may only release a vow with the consent of his teacher.

The person who took the oath - whether male or female - must himself come before the sage to be released. He may not appoint an agent to seek that he be released from his vow. A husband may, however, become an agent to express his wife's regret and we release [the oath] for her. [This applies] provided the three judges had already gathered together. He should not, however, gather them together at the outset to release her [oath]. Nor may he serve as an agent to have his wife's vow released.

How do we release [an oath]? The person who took the oath must come before the distinguished sage or three ordinary people if there is no expert. He says: "I took an oath concerning this and this and I have changed my mind. If I knew that I would feel such discomfort concerning this, I would not have taken the oath. If, at the time of the oath, my understanding was as it is now, I would not have taken the oath." The wise man or the foremost among the three asks: "Have you already changed your mind?" He answers: "Yes." He then tells him: "It is permitted for you," "It is released for you," "It is absolved for you," or the like with this intent in any language. If, however, he says: "[The oath] is nullified for you," "Your oath is uprooted," or anything with that intent, his statements are of no consequence, because only a husband or a father can nullify an oath. A sage, by contrast, may use only an expression conveying release or absolution.

Relatives are acceptable to release vows and oaths. [Oaths and vows] can be released at night and while standing, for this release is not a judgment. For this reason, one may request a release of an oath or a vow on the Sabbath if it is necessary for the Sabbath, for example, to release his oath so that he can eat and drink today. Even if the person had the opportunity to have his oath or vow released before the Sabbath [and did not], he may have it released on the Sabbath, because it is necessary for the Sabbath.

When Reuven administered an oath to Shimon and [Shimon] answered Amen or accepted the oath, if Shimon [later] regrets the oath and asks for it to be released, it should not be released except in the presence of Reuven who administered it to him. Similarly, if Reuven took an oath or a vow not to benefit from Shimon or that Shimon may not benefit from him and changed his mind and appealed to a sage [for the oath or vow to be released], we do not release him from it except in the presence of Shimon from whom he had vowed not to benefit. Even if Shimon was a minor or a gentile, [the oath or vow] is released only in his presence so that the person concerning whom the vow was taken will know that the person had his vow or oath released and thus he will benefit from him.

Both a person who took an oath in private and one who took one in public - even one who took an oath in G-d's ineffable name, [swearing] by G-d, the Lord of Israel - may appeal for a release of his oath if he changes his mind. If, however, one took an oath or a vow based on the understanding of many others, it may not be released except for a purpose associated with a mitzvah.

What is implied? One took an oath and made his oath dependent on the understanding of others that he would not benefit from so-and-so at all and the people of that city needed someone to teach them the Torah, to circumcise their sons, or to perform ritual slaughter on their behalf and they only found this person, he may ask a sage or three ordinary persons [to release him from his oath]. We release his oath. He may perform these mitzvot on their behalf and he may receive his wage from the people concerning whom he had taken an oath that he would not benefit from them.

[The following laws apply when] a person took an oath, did not regret it, and came to the court to carry out his oath. If the judges saw that releasing this oath will lead to a mitzvah and to peace between a husband and his wife or between a man and his associates and carrying it out will lead to transgression and strife, they encourage him [to take] the option [of having the oath released]. They discuss the matter with him, pointing out the consequences of his oath until he regrets [having taken it]. If he changes his mind because of their words, we release his oath. If he does not change his mind and persists in his stubbornness, he must carry out his oath.

What is implied? A person took an oath that he would divorce his wife, that Jews would not benefit from his property, that he would not eat meat or drink wine for thirty days or the like, they tell him: "My son, if you divorce your wife, you will cause malicious gossip to circulate concerning her children [for people] will say: 'Why was their mother divorced?' In the future, they will be called: 'the children of the divorcee.' [Moreover,] perhaps she will marry someone else and you will never be able to remarry her" and the like. [And they say:] "The oath you took that Jews should not benefit from your property [is not to your advantage]. Tomorrow, someone may be in need and [by maintaining your oath,] you will violate [the commandments]: "And your brother will live with you and you shall support him" [Leviticus 25:35-36] and "You shall surely open [your hand to him" [Deuteronomy 15:8]. [And they say:] "The oath you took not to eat meat or drink wine for thirty days [is not to your advantage]. [Within that time,] you will encounter a festival and nullify the happiness of the festivals and the pleasure of the Sabbath." If he says: "Were I to have known this, I would not have taken the oath," we release him [from the oath]. If he says: "Nevertheless, I have not changed my mind and I desire all of this," we do not release him [from the oath].

We do not encourage one [to take] the option [of having the oath released] because of something that had not occurred [at the time the oath was taken]. What is implied? One took an oath not to derive benefit from so-and-so and that person became the city scribe. Since the person did not regret taking the oath, we do not encourage him [to take] the option [of having the oath released]. Even if he himself said: "If I knew that [he would be given this position], I would not have taken this oath," we still do not release him from it. For he does not regret [having taken the oath]. Instead, his desire is that he should not derive benefit from him, but that person not to be appointed the scribe. If, however, on his own initiative, he regretted because of what took place and his intent changed, we do release the oath. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

When a person takes an oath concerning a matter and then takes a [second] oath that he will never ask to have the [first] oath repealed, [if] he changes his mind, he must first ask that the second oath - that he would never ask to have the oath repealed - be repealed. Afterwards, he may ask that the first [oath] be repealed.

[The following laws apply if] one took an oath that he would not speak to so-and-so and afterwards, took an oath that if he asks for the repeal of this oath and has it released, he will be forbidden to drink wine forever. If he changes his mind, he must first ask for the repeal of the first oath and have it released. Afterwards, he may ask for the repeal of the second oath. For we may not have a vow or an oath repealed before it takes effect. Accordingly, if during Nisan, a person took an oath that he will not eat meat for thirty days beginning at Rosh Chodesh Iyar, [should] he change his mind, he may not have the oath repealed until [the month of] Iyar begins.

If a person takes an oath that he will not benefit from so-and-so and that he will not benefit from the sage who releases him from this oath, first he must ask for the repeal of the first [oath] and then for that of the second.

If a person takes an oath that he will not benefit from so-and-so and that he will become a nazirite if he asks for the repeal of this oath, first he must ask for the repeal of his oath and then for that of his nazirite vow. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

[The following rules apply when a person says:] "I am taking [an oath that I will not eat today, [I am taking] an oath that I will not eat today, [I am taking] an oath that I will not eat today," or "With regard to this loaf, [I am taking] an oath that I will not eat it, [I am taking] an oath that I will not eat it, [I am taking] an oath that I will not eat it." If he asks for the repeal of the first oath and it is released, he is, nevertheless, liable for the second oath. Similarly, if he asks for the repeal of the second oath, he is liable for the third oath. If he asks for the repeal of only the third oath, he is liable for the first and second. [Similarly,] if he asks for the repeal of the second oath, he is liable for the first. If so, what is the meaning of the statement: "An oath cannot take effect [when the matter it concerns is already forbidden] by an oath"? That if the person did not repeal [any of] the oaths and ate [the forbidden article], he would be liable only once, as we explained.

When a person takes a sh'vuat bitui regarding the future and violated his oath, e.g., he took an oath that he would not eat a loaf of bread and ate it, if he changes his mind, he may ask a sage to repeal it after eating it before bringing his sacrifice if he [ate it] inadvertently or before he was lashed if he did so willingly. [If the sage] releases the oath, he is exempt from the sacrifice or from the lashes. Moreover, even if they bound him [in preparation for lashes], he asked for the repeal of the oath and it was released before they began to administer lashes, he is exempt.

When a person issues a financial claim against a colleague which would require the latter to pay were he to admit [liability] and [the colleague] denies [his obligation] and takes an oath or the plaintiff administers an oath to him and he denies [any obligation]. [If he is lying,] the defendant is liable for an oath concerning a sh'vuat hapikadon. [The above applies] even if [the defendant] does not respond Amen. For with regard to a sh'vuat hapikadon, one is liable whether he took the oath on his own initiative or another person administered the oath to him and he denied [any obligation], even though he did not respond Amen. For denying the claim after the plaintiff administered the oath is equivalent to responding Amen.

[This does not apply] when [the plaintiff] lodges a claim which if acknowledged by the defendant, i.e., if he would admit that it is true, would not require him to make payment, e.g., he lodged a claim concerning a k'nas. For a person is not required to pay a k'nas based on his own admission. [In such an instance,] if a person denied [an obligation], he is exempt from a sh'vuat hapikadon, but liable for a sh'vuat bitui.

Similarly, if [the plaintiff] lodged a claim concerning landed property, a servant, or a promissory note, and [the defendant] denied [the claim] and took an oath, he is exempt from a sh'vuat hapikadon, but liable for a sh'vuat bitui, for he took a false oath.

Why is one [who took an oath concerning such claims] exempt from [the obligations of a false] sh'vuat hapikadon? Behold, were he to have acknowledged [his obligation], he would have been held liable and [required] to pay what he denied. Because [Leviticus 5:21-22] states: "Concerning an entrusted object, a [financial] deposit, a robbery; he oppressed his colleague, or discovered a lost object." All of this concerns movable property which if he would admit his liability he would have to make financial restitution from his own domain. This excludes landed property for it is not movable property. For landed property is always revealed before its owner and is always in their possession. [Similarly,] it excludes servants, for an equation is established between servants and landed property. And it excludes promissory notes, for their actual substance is not of financial value.

[The above laws apply] whether one took an oath after the plaintiff lodged a claim against him or whether he took it on his own initiative even though a claim was not lodged against him. What his implied? He took the initiative and said: "Why are you following me? Do I have any money belonging to you? I am taking an oath that I am not in possession of any of your money." Since he denied [an obligation] and took an oath, [he is liable,] even though [the plaintiff] did not lodge a claim against him.

[One is liable] whether he took an oath to the person to whom he owes the money or to his agent who was given power of attorney. For a person's agent is equivalent to his own self.

One is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon unless he requires him to take an oath in a language that he understands.

When a person consciously takes a sh'vuat hapikadon, even though he takes a false oath and is warned by witnesses at the time he takes the oath, he is not liable for lashes, but instead must merely bring a guilt offering. For the Torah excluded him from those who are liable for lashes and obligated him to bring a guilt offering whether he transgressed willfully or inadvertently, as we explained.

If one denied [an obligation] and took an oath [concerning it] four or five times or the plaintiff administered an oath to him four or fives times and he denied each one of them, he is liable for a guilt offering for each individual oath. [This applies] whether this took place in a court or outside the court. [The rationale is that] were he to have admitted his obligation after making his denial, he would be liable to make restitution even though he made the denial in a court. Thus with each denial, he is making himself exempt from payment. Hence, he is liable for each individual oath.

If five different people were lodging claims against him and telling him: "Give us the entrusted article of ours that you have in your possession," and he responds: "[I am taking] an oath that I do not have anything of yours in my possession," [should his oath be false,] he is liable for only one sacrifice. [If he answers: "I am taking] an oath that I don't have anything of yours, or of yours,... or of yours, in my possession," he is liable for each [statement].

If his colleague told him: "Give me the entrusted object, [financial] deposit, stolen object, and lost object [of mine], that you have in your possession," and he responds: "[I am taking] an oath that I do not have anything of yours in my possession," [should his oath be false,] he is liable for only one [sacrifice]. Even if the total of all the claims is [merely] a p'rutah, they are all included together and he is liable.

[If he answers: "I am taking] an oath that I don't have an entrusted object, [financial] deposit, stolen object, and lost object of yours in my possession," he is liable for each [statement].

[If the plaintiff says:] "Give me the wheat, barley, and buckwheat of mine that you have in your possession," and [the defendant responds]: "[I am taking] an oath that I do not have anything of yours in my possession," [should his oath be false,] he is liable for only one [sacrifice]. [If he answers: "I am taking] an oath that I don't have any wheat, barley, and buckwheat of yours in my possession," he is liable for each [statement].

If five different people were lodging claims against him and telling him: "Give us the entrusted article, [financial] deposit, stolen object, and lost object [of mine], that you have in your possession," and he responds to one of them: "[I am taking] an oath that I don't have an entrusted object, stolen object, lost object, and [financial] deposit of yours, or of yours,... or of yours in my possession," he is liable for each claim [made] by each individual. Thus he is liable for 20 guilt offerings.

If [the defendant] claims that he lost an entrusted object or denies [receiving it], he took an oath, and afterwards admitted [that it was in his possession], and then claimed that it was lost, took an oath, and then admitted [that it was in his possession], he must pay the principal and an additional fifth for each oath that he took. [This is derived from Leviticus 5:24 which literally translates as] "its fifths," [implying that] the Torah took into account several fifths for [one sum of] principal. What is implied? The principal was [worth] four [zuz]. One denied [receiving an entrusted article], took an oath, and then admitted [that he possessed it]. Afterwards, he claimed that it was lost, took an oath and then made a second admission, and then claimed that it was lost, took an oath and then made an admission another time. He is required to pay seven [zuz]. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

A value less than a p'rutah is not considered as financially significant. Hence, if a person lodges a claim against a colleague for less than a p'rutah or for articles worth less than a p'rutah and [the defendant] denied the obligation and took an oath, he is exempt with regard to a sh'vuat hapikadon and liable for a sh'vuat bitui.

A person is exempt [from liability for] a sh'vuat hapikadon [in the following situation]: He stole an ox belonging to a colleague and slaughtered it or sold it. His colleague lodged a claim against him, telling him: "You stole my ox and you slaughtered it or sold it." [The defendant] responded: "I stole it, but did not slaughter it or sell it" and took an oath to support his claim. [The reason for his exemption is that] were he to have acknowledged that he slaughtered or sold [the ox] on his own accord, he would not have been required to pay four and five times its worth for this is a fine, as explained in Hilchot Genevah. Thus it is as if he did not deny a financial obligation. Therefore he is exempt [from liability for] a sh'vuat hapikadon, but liable for a sh'vuat bitui, for he took a false oath, saying that he did not slaughter [the ox], when [in fact] he did.

Similarly, a person is exempt [from liability for] a sh'vuat hapikadon [in the following situations]. A person lodged a claim against him saying: "Your ox killed my servant," and he denied the incident and took an oath. A servant lodged a claim against his master saying: "You knocked out my tooth" or "You blinded my eye." For if he acknowledged the claim, he would not be obligated to pay because it is a fine. He is, however, liable for a sh'vuat bitui. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

When a person lodges a claim against a colleague concerning a matter that involves both a fine which he would not be obligated to pay if he admits his liability on his own initiative as explained [above] and a financial claim which he is liable to pay on his own admission, he denies the entire claim, and takes an oath, he is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon. What is implied? A person lodged a claim [against a colleague,] telling him: "You raped or you seduced my daughter." [The defendant] responded: "I did not rape or seduce her" and took an oath to this effect, he is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon. For although he would not be required to pay the fine were he to have admitted [his guilt], he is obligated to pay for the embarrassment and damages even on his own admission. Similarly, if a person tells a colleague: "You stole my ox," and he says, "I did not steal it" and takes an oath, he is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon. Although he would not obligated to make the double payment [for a stolen object] on the basis of his own admission, he would be obligated to pay the principal on the basis of his own admission.

When a person tells a colleague: "You inflicted a wound upon me," and [the defendant] denies it, or "Your ox killed my ox," and [the defendant] denies it, taking an oath, [the defendant] is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon. Had he admitted [his act], he would be obligated to make restitution.

[A watchman] is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon [in the following instance]: A person entrusted his ox to an unpaid watchman, the ox died, and he lodged a claim against the watchman, saying: "Where is the ox I entrusted to you?" The watchman responded: "You did not entrust anything to me," "You entrusted it, but it was stolen," or "...lost" and took an oath [to that effect]. [The rationale is] that had he admitted and related the matter as it occurred, he would not have been liable to make financial restitution, because he is an unpaid watchman. He is, however, liable for a sh'vuat bitui, for he took a false oath. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

[Similarly, a person] is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon [in the following instance]: A person lent his ox to a colleague and then demanded its return, saying: "Where is the ox you borrowed from me?" Now the ox had died, but the borrower said: "It was stolen" or "...lost" and took an oath to this effect. [The rationale is that] he did not free himself from making restitution by his denial and is nevertheless liable to pay whether the animal died, was stolen, lost, or taken captive because he was a borrower, as will be explained in the appropriate place. He is, however, liable for a sh'vuat bitui, for he took a false oath. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

This is the general principle: Whoever does not free himself from financial responsibility unless he makes this denial is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon if he takes an oath. [This applies] whether he took the oath on his own initiative or the plaintiff administered the oath and he stated his denial even though he did not answer Amen nor utter the oath himself.

[A thief] is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon [in the following instance]: He stole his colleague's ox. [The colleague] demanded payment, telling him: "You stole my ox." [The thief] responded: "I did not steal it." Why, then, is it in your possession?" "You entrusted it to me [for safekeeping]" and he took an oath to that effect. [The rationale is that] had he admitting stealing it, he would have been liable to pay the value in any case. By saying now that it is an entrusted object, he exempts himself from liability for theft and for loss, i.e., were the ox to be lost or stolen after this admission, he is not obligated to pay.

Similarly, if he were to claim that he rented it and took an oath to that effect, he is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon, for he freed himself for liability in the cases of injury or death. Similarly, if he claimed: "You lent it to me" and took an oath to that effect, he is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon, for he freed himself for liability if it dies while performing its work, as will be explained in Hilchot Sheilah.

Therefore if one says: "I did not steal it. Instead, you entrusted it to me...", "...hired me to watch it...", or "...lent it to me. Here is your ox. Take it." If he took an oath to that effect, he is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon, for he admitted owing the principle and did not exempt himself from any liability with this denial.

Similarly, he is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon if he uses any of the following excuses and takes an oath to that effect: "You sold it to me, but I have not paid for it yet. If you want, take the money for it. If not, here is your ox," "You gave it to me as payment for work which I will perform for you. If you desire, I will perform the work. If you do not desire, take it and depart," "I found it wandering on the road and did not know that it was yours. Now that I know, take it and depart," or "It chased after my ox. Here, it's yours." He is, however, liable for a sh'vuat bitui, for he took a false oath.

When a person is financially obligated to two partners, one demands payment from him, he denies his obligation and takes an oath, he is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon for he denied a financial obligation. If they both demanded payment from him and he admitted the entire obligation to one of them, but said: "I borrowed only from this one," should he take an oath to this effect, he is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon, for he did not free himself from any liability. He is, however, liable for a sh'vuat bitui.

Similarly, if there was a person who owed a debt supported by a promissory note, but he denied it and took an oath to that effect, he is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon. [The rationale is that because of] the promissory note, [the person's] landed property is placed under lien. Thus the person is denying [an obligation involving] landed property. And as we have already explained, a person who denied a claim involving landed property is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon. He is, however, liable for a sh'vuat bitui, for he took a false oath.

If a person owed a debt to which there were witnesses, he denied [his obligation], and took an oath [to that effect], he is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon. For by denying his obligation, he freed himself from the liability of paying immediately. When the witnesses will come, he will be obligated to pay and thus his denial will not be effective. It is, however, effective in that perhaps the witnesses will not come, they will come and their testimony will not be substantiated, or they will be disqualified. Therefore he is liable.

When a plaintiff demands that witnesses testify concerning a matter that through their testimony alone will obligate the defendant to pay this plaintiff a financial claim involving moveable property, [the witnesses] denied [knowing] testimony and took an oath to this effect - whether in a court of law or outside of it - they are liable for sh'vuat haedut, for they caused the plaintiff a financial loss through their denial. Similarly, if the plaintiff administered an oath to them and they denied the matter, [they are liable] even though they did not take an oath or answer Amen to the oath he [administered]. Since they denied the matter, they are liable, provided he administered the oath to them in court.

The witnesses are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut unless they deny [knowing testimony] in court. Whether they took the oath or the oath was administered to them in court or outside the court, the denial must be in court alone, as [can be derived from Leviticus 5:1]: "If he will not testify, he will bear his sin." [Implied is that] in the place he will testify and [that testimony] will have an effect, there, if he does not testify, he will be liable.

When the plaintiff demands [that the witnesses] testify concerning a claim that does not involve a financial obligation, concerns landed property, servants, or promissory notes, they deny [knowing testimony], and take an oath to that effect, they are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut. For they are liable when denying testimony concerning financial claims that resemble an entrusted object, a [financial] deposit, a robbery, or a lost object which the verse mentions in this passage. This refers to moveable property which is itself of financial worth that were they to testify on [the plaintiff's] behalf, [the defendant] would have to pay.

Similarly, when one administers an oath to witnesses who [can testify regarding] a fine and they deny [knowledge] of the matter, they are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut. [The rationale is that] were the defendant to come and acknowledge his liability for the fine first, he would not be liable to pay even though the witnesses came afterwards and testified accordingly. Thus the witnesses did not make him liable through their testimony alone. Instead, it was their testimony together with the denial of the defendant that made him liable. Since their testimony would not be effective if he acknowledged [his liability], if they denied [knowing of] the matter and took an oath, they are not liable.

[When a plaintiff administers an oath to witnesses, saying:] "I am making you take an oath that you come and testify on my behalf that so-and-so owes me a double payment" or a four- or five-fold payment and the witnesses deny [knowledge of the matter], they are liable for a sh'vuat haedut because of the principal which is a financial obligation, but not because of the double payment which is a fine. Similarly, if he administered an oath that they testify that so-and-so raped or seduced his daughter and they deny [knowledge of the matter], they are liable for a sh'vuat haedut because of the [payment due] for embarrassment and damages. For if the defendant acknowledged his obligation, he would have to pay these obligations, but not because of the fine. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

Witnesses are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut until they deny [knowledge of the matter] and take an oath after the plaintiff or his agent demand [that they testify]. If, however, they take an oath first, before a demand is made of them, they are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut.

What is implied? [The witnesses] saw the plaintiff following after them, they told him: "Why are you following us? We are taking an oath that we do not know any testimony involving you," they are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut. [The rationale is that] the plaintiff did not make a demand of them. Instead, they took the oath first on their own initiative. Similarly, if the defendant administered an oath to them that if they knew testimony involving the plaintiff they should come and testify and they deny [knowledge of the matter], they are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut unless the plaintiff makes them take the oath. Needless to say, if he administered an oath that they should come to testify that so-and-so owes so-and-so money and they deny [knowledge of the matter], they are not liable. For the person making this demand is not the plaintiff himself. Similarly, if the oath preceded [their knowledge of] the testimony, they are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut, as [implied by Leviticus 5:1]: "And he heard the voice of an oath [when] he was a witness." [It can be inferred that knowledge of] the testimony preceded the oath and not that the oath preceded the knowledge of the testimony.

What is implied? [The plaintiff says:] "I am administering to you an oath that if you will know of testimony concerning me that you come and testify," and the witnesses responded Amen and afterwards they observed a matter concerning him. If he demands that they testify and they deny [knowledge of the matter], they are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut.

Witnesses are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut until the plaintiff singles them out and administers an oath to them or they take an oath. What is implied? A person stood up in a synagogue and said: "I am administering an oath to anyone who knows testimony concerning me to come and testify on my behalf." They all - including his witnesses - responded Amen. Afterwards, he demanded of his witnesses that they testify and they denied [knowledge of the matter]. They are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut, because he did not single out the witnesses individually. If, however, he said: "I am administering an oath to all of those standing here that if they know testimony concerning me to come and testify on my behalf." [If] his witnesses were among those present and [then] they denied [knowledge of the matter], they are liable for a sh'vuat haedut, because he singled them out among the others.

Similarly, if he told the witnesses: "Come and testify on my behalf that so-and-so owes me a maneh" and then stands in a synagogue and said: "I am administering an oath to anyone who knows testimony concerning me to come and testify on my behalf," should they not come and testify, they are liable, because he made a demand of them previously. [This applies] provided they are present in the synagogue and a court is also there. If a court was not present, they are liable for a sh'vuat haedut if they answered Amen and deny [knowledge of the matter] while in a court of law. If they did not answer Amen, they are not liable.

Whether one administers an oath to his witnesses or tells them "I am commanding you with an oath" or "I am binding you with an oath," they are liable provided he administers the oath with G-d's name or with one of the terms used to describe Him as explained.

The witnesses are not liable unless the oath is administered to them in a language that they understand.

Thus you have learned that witnesses are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut unless ten conditions are [met]. They are: a) [The witnesses] must be charged [with testifying] by the plaintiff; b) [The matter] must involve a financial claim; c) It must involve movable property; d) Their testimony alone, had it been given, would be sufficient to require the defendant to pay; e) They must deny [knowledge of the matter] after the plaintiff charges them; f) They must issue their denial in court; g) G-d's name or a term used to describe Him must be mentioned in the oath; h) The knowledge of the matter must precede the oath; i) The witnesses must be singled out at the time of the oath or at the time they are charged; j) The oath must be in a language that they understand.

Whenever we have used the expression "they are not liable" [in this chapter], the intent is that they are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut. They are, however, liable for a sh'vuat bitui, provided they take the oath or answer Amen to an oath administered by a colleague, because they took a false oath. When, by contrast, one is liable for a sh'vuat haedut, he is only liable for a sh'vuat haedut and is not liable for a sh'vuat bitui, even though he took a false oath and did so intentionally. [The rationale is that] the Torah removed a sh'vuat haedut from the category of sh'vuat bitui to make a person who deliberately [takes a false oath] liable for a sacrifice for its violation just as one who took it inadvertently. He is not, however, liable for lashes, as [can be derived from Leviticus 5:5 which] states: "For one of these." A person who takes a [false] oath is liable for one type of oath, but not two. [We do not hold him liable for both] a sh'vuat haedut and a sh'vuat bitui.

[When the plaintiff says: "I am administering] an oath to you unless you come and testify that so-and-so has an entrusted object, a [financial] deposit, stolen property, and a lost object of mine in his possession," [and the witnesses respond: "We are taking] an oath that we do not know of any testimony concerning you," they are liable for only one [sacrifice]. [If they say: "We are taking] an oath that we do not know of any testimony concerning an entrusted object, a [financial] deposit, stolen property, and a lost object of yours in so-and-so's possession, they are liable for each [statement].

[When the plaintiff says: "I am administering] an oath to you unless you come and testify that so-and-so has wheat, barley, and buckwheat of mine in his possession," and [the defendant responds]: "[We are taking] an oath that we do not know of any testimony concerning you," they are liable for only one [sacrifice]. [If they answer: "We are taking] an oath that we do not know of any testimony concerning any wheat, barley, and buckwheat of yours in his possession," he is liable for each [statement].

Similarly, if many people charged them with testifying and they said: "[We are taking] an oath that we do not know of any testimony concerning you," they are liable for only one [sacrifice]. [If they said:] "...concerning you, and you, and you," they are liable for each [statement], as explained with regard to sh'vuat hapikadon.

When a person administers an oath to a colleague that he knows testimony concerning him and ultimately, it is discovered that he does not know testimony, [the colleague] is not liable, neither for a sh'vuat haedut, nor for a sh'vuat bitui. [The rationale is that] a sh'vuat bitui involves only matters that have both a positive and negative dimension. Were the person to have said: "I am taking an oath that I do not know testimony concerning you," that would not be a sh'vuat bitui, but instead a sh'vuat haedut. Hence since the negative dimension of the statement is not a sh'vuat bitui, the positive dimension, taking an oath that one knows testimony, is not a sh'vuat bitui.

It is clear that when a person takes an oath to a colleague that he testified on his behalf and he did not testify or that he did not testify and he testified, he is liable for a sh'vuat bitui; there is no connection to a sh'vuat haedut at all.

If [both] or one of [the plaintiff's] witnesses was unacceptable, a relative, or even one of those disqualified from testifying by Rabbinic decree, the king - who is not fit to give testimony - was one of his witnesses, or the witnesses heard the testimony from other witnesses, [although] they both denied [knowing testimony] and took an oath, they are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut, for had they testified, they would not have obligated [the defendant] to pay.

[If the plaintiff said:] "I am administering an oath to you that you come and testify on my behalf that so-and-so promised to give me 200 zuz, but he did not," and [the witnesses] denied [knowledge of the matter] and took an oath, they are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut. For even if they would testify concerning the matter, the defendant would not be liable financially because of his statement. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

If one charged [witnesses] with testifying that he was a priest or a Levite, or that he was not the son of a woman who underwent divorce or chalitzah, and [the witnesses] denied [knowledge of the matter] and took an oath, they are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut. For this is not a financial claim.

[Similarly, although the witnesses] denied [knowledge of the matter] and took an oath, they are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut [if the plaintiff] charges them with testifying [with regard to the following claims]: his son inflicted a wound upon him, so-and-so kindled his grainheap on the Sabbath, so-and-so raped or seduced his virgin daughter who had been consecrated. [The rationale is that] if they were to give this testimony the defendant would be liable for execution by the court and not for making financial recompense as we explained in Hilchot Na'arah. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

If there was [only] one witness, he denied [knowledge of a financial claim], and an oath was administered to him, he is not liable for a sh'vuat haedut. [The rationale is that] the testimony of one witness does not obligate financial payment.

If one charged two witnesses with testifying that his wife committed adultery and they denied [knowledge of the matter] and took an oath to that effect, they are liable for a sh'vuat haedut. For if they had testified, they would have caused her to forfeit [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. Thus the one who charged them with testifying would be freed from liability. Hence the witnesses have denied a financial claim.

If [a husband] charges witnesses - [either witnesses] who observed him administering a [sotah] warning or those who observed her entering into privacy with the man concerning whom she was warned - with testifying, and they denied [knowledge of the matter] and took an oath to that effect, they are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut. [The rationale is that] even if they had testified, [the testimony] would not result in a financial claim only in the obligation to have her drink [the sotah] waters. Although this testimony [can] cause her to forfeit [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah if she does not drink [the sotah waters], a matter that could lead to a financial claim is not considered as a financial claim. For it is possible that she will drink the waters and not invalidate her ketubah.

[A witness] is liable for a sh'vuat haedut [in the following situation. A man] issued a [sotah] warning to his wife. She entered into privacy [as observed by] two witnesses and then committed adultery, [as observed by] one witness after being warned and entering into privacy. If [the husband] administered an oath to this witness that he come and testify and he denied knowledge [of the matter], he is liable. Although he is only one witness, if he would have delivered this testimony, the woman would have been divorced without receiving [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah as explained in Hilchot Sotah.

Similarly, in any other instance where the testimony of one witness creates a financial obligation, if that witness denies knowledge [of the matter] and took an oath or an oath was administered to him in court supporting his denial, he is liable for a sh'vuat haedut.

What is implied? Both the plaintiff and the defendant were reputed [to take false] oaths and hence they are not given the opportunity to take oaths, [the plaintiff] administered an oath to one witness that he should come and testify that so-and-so owes him a maneh and he denied [knowledge of the matter], he is liable for a sh'vuat haedut. For were he to have testified, the defendant would have been required to pay because of his testimony, as will be explained in Hilchot To'en. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

When a woman administers an oath to one witness that he testify regarding the death of her husband and he denies [knowledge of the matter], he is liable for a sh'vuat haedut. Were he to have testified, she would have married and received [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.

When does the above apply? When she could have collected [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from movable property. If, however, she could only have collected [this sum] by expropriating landed property, [the witness] is not liable for a sh'vuat haedut. This also applies if there are two witnesses, for when one administers an oath [to witnesses for claims] involving landed property, they are not liable [for a sh'vuat haedut,] as we explained.

When a person administers an oath to witnesses in a court and both denied [knowledge of the matter] at once, e.g., the second witness began his denial immediately after the statements of his colleague, they are both liable for a sh'vuat haedut. Each one of them must bring a sin offering for his oath. If the first one denied [knowledge of the matter] and the second witness waited longer than the appointed time period and then denied [knowledge of the matter], the first [witness] is liable for a sh'vuat haedut and the second is exempt. For even if the second had acknowledged [the obligation], his testimony would not have obligated [the defendant] financially.

If one of the witnesses acknowledged [the claim] and the other denied [knowledge of it], the one who denied is liable whether he made his denial before [the other witness' acknowledgement] or afterwards. If they both denied [knowledge of the matter] at the same time and then one took the initiative and acknowledged [the matter] immediately thereafter, he is exempt and the witness that persists in his denial is liable for a sh'vuat haedut.

When a person administered an oath to two pairs of witnesses who are both fit to deliver testimony and the first group denied [knowledge of the matter] and then the second pair denied knowledge of the matter, the first are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut. [The rationale is that] they are relying on the testimony of the second pair and that testimony is sufficient to expropriate money. Hence the defendant would not be liable to make financial restitution because of the testimony of these [witnesses] who denied [knowledge of the matter] alone. If the second pair of witnesses were related to the plaintiff or to the defendant by marriage and their wives were on their deathbeds, the first pair of witnesses are also liable. For at the time the first pair made their denial, the second pair were not fit to give testimony even though they will soon be fit to give testimony when [the women] on their deathbeds die. If the second pair make their denial after their wives die, they are liable for a sh'vuat haedut.

When a person charges his witnesses with testifying on his behalf and they deny [knowledge of the matter], he administers an oath and they answer Amen, he administers an oath four or five times and they respond to each oath outside the court, and when they come to the court, they acknowledge [the matter] and testify, they are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut, as we explained. If [when] they came to court, they persisted in their denial, they are liable for every one of the oaths [administered] outside the court.

When does the above apply? When they answered Amen. If, however, they did not answer Amen, but [merely] denied [knowledge of the matter] after every oath, they are not liable unless the oath is administered in court, as we explained. [The rationale is that] they did not utter the oath themselves or answer Amen.

If [the plaintiff] administered an oath to [the witnesses] in court and they denied [knowledge of the matter] and then he administered an oath again four or five times and they deny [knowledge of the matter] each time, they are liable only once for a sh'vuat haedut. [This applies whether the oath was administered] in court or outside the court and even if they answered Amen or took the oath on their initiative time after time. [The rationale is that] after they denied [knowledge of the matter] in court, were they to retract and admit [knowledge of it], their testimony would no longer be effective.

It can thus be derived that all the oaths that they take after denying [knowledge of the matter] in court involve a denial of testimony that would not obligate [the defendant] financially. [In that instance, the witnesses] are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut, but they are liable for a sh'vuat bitui, as we explained.

Just as there is a negative commandment forbidding an oath taken in vain and a false oath, so, too, there is a positive commandment for a person who is obligated to take an oath in court to take that oath in G-d's name, as [Deuteronomy 6:13] states: "And you shall take an oath in His name." This is a positive commandment. For taking an oath in His great and holy name is one of the paths of His service. It is a great measure of glorification and sanctification to take an oath in G-d's name.

It is forbidden to take an oath on any other matter together with G-d's name. Whoever combines another matter with the name of the Holy One, blessed be He, in an oath will be uprooted from this world. For there is no one who is fit to give honor by taking an oath in his name except the [Absolute] One, blessed be He.

It is permitted for a person to take an oath to fulfill a mitzvah in order to encourage himself [toward its performance]. Although he is under oath [to observe] it from Mount Sinai [onward], [he may take an oath, as implied by Psalms 119:106]: "I took an oath and I will uphold it - to observe Your righteous judgments."

The oath which the judges administer to individuals who are obligated to take an oath is called: "The oath of the judges." [This applies whether the person] is liable for an oath according to Scriptural Law or according to Rabbinic Law.

There are three types of oaths for which one is obligated according to Scriptural Law: a) A claim involving movable property was lodged against a person by a colleague. He admitted liability for a portion and denied liability for a portion. b) [The defendant] denied liability for all the movable property, but one witness testifies against him, contradicting his statements. These two oaths come in response to a definite claim and a denial. c) When a watchman claims that the article entrusted to him was lost, stolen, died, or the like, he is required to take an oath, because of the doubt, for the owner of the entrusted article does not know if the watchman is making a true claim or not. This oath is of Scriptural origin, as [Exodus 22:10] states: "The oath of G-d will be between them."

All oaths which the judges require aside from these three are of Rabbinic origin. They are also called "the oath of the judges." Within these oaths of Rabbinic origin, there are also two categories: a) Oaths administered because of a definite claim and denial: e.g., the oath [taken by] a hired worker, [the oath taken by] one who impugns his promissory note, and the like. b) Oaths taken when [the plaintiff] has a claim of a doubtful nature, e.g., the oaths taken by partners, sharecroppers, and the like. In the laws of financial matters, the obligation of all these types of oaths and the associated laws will be explained.

There is also another oath which was ordained by the Sages of the Talmud. It is called a sh'vuat heset. Although it is administered by the court in the present era, it is not referred to by the term "the oath of the judges."

An oath of the judges, whether of Scriptural or Rabbinic origin, whether stemming from a definite or an indefinite claim is [administered in] the following [manner]: The person taking the oath holds a Torah scroll in his arm. He must stand and take the oath or recite a curse using G-d's name or one of the terms used to describe Him. [Either] he pronounces the oath himself or it is pronounced by the judges. My masters ruled that an oath of the judges is administered only in Lashon HaKodesh.

What is meant by an oath pronounced by [the defendant] himself? For example, he says: "I am taking an oath by G-d, the Lord of Israel...", "...by He whose name is graciousness...", "...by He whose name is mercy that I am not liable to this person at all." Similarly, if he says: "May one be cursed to G-d..." or "...cursed to He whose name is graciousness if I owe anything to that person."

What is meant by an oath pronounced by the judges? For example, they tell him: We are administering an oath to you by G-d, the Lord of Israel...", "...by He whose name is graciousness that you are not liable to this person at all" and [the defendant] answers Amen. Or they say: "May so-and-so be cursed to G-d..." or "...cursed to He whose name is graciousness if he owes money to that person and does not acknowledge the debt" and [the defendant] answers Amen. This is the oath of the judges.

When the judges administer an oath without the defendant holding a [sacred] article in his hand, they have made an error. He must take the oath again while holding a Torah scroll in his hand. If he was holding tefillin when they administered the oath to him, he is not required to take the oath again. For he held [an article equivalent to] the Torah in his hand, for they are like a scroll. If they administered the oath while [the defendant] was sitting, he does not have to take the oath again.

At the outset, an oath should be administered to a Torah scholar while seated and while holding tefillin. He need not hold a Torah scroll. Holding tefillin in his hand [fulfills the requirement of] a sacred article. He takes an oath in Lashon HaKodesh, as we explained.

There is no difference between a sh'vuat heset and an oath of the judges except that [the latter] must be taken [while] holding a sacred article and a person who takes a sh'vuat heset does not hold a Torah scroll. Instead, an oath is administered to him by G-d's name or using one of the terms used to describe Him, either an oath or a curse which he utters or which the court states, as is the practice with regard to the oath of the judges. It has already become the universal custom for the synagogue attendant or another person to hold a Torah scroll while a sh'vuat heset is being administered to cast fear [into the heart of the defendant].

The judges administer the oath to the person taking it in any language that he understands. The Geonim ruled in this manner. My masters, however, ruled that an oath should be administered only in Lashon HaKodesh. This ruling should not be relied upon. Although it has become customary to administer oaths in Lashon HaKodesh, the person taking the oath should be familiarized with the matter until he understands the wording of the oath. [The rationale is that] the oath of the judges is a sh'vuat hapikadon itself. People have even adopted the custom of administering a sh'vuat heset in Lashon HaKodesh.

Everyone who is obligated to take an oath of the judges that comes about because of a definite claim and denial, whether it is of Scriptural or Rabbinic origin, is subjected to an admonition, as will be explained. Everyone who is obligated to take an oath, whether of Scriptural or Rabbinic origin, because of a doubtful claim need not be subjected to an admonition.

How is an admonition administered to the person taking the oath? We tell him: Know that the entire world trembled at the time the Holy One, blessed be He, told Moses [Exodus 20:7]: "Do not take the name of G-d, your Lord, in vain." For with regard to all the transgressions in the Torah, as [Exodus 20:7] states: "[G-d] will not cleanse one who takes His name in vain." With regard to all the transgressions in the Torah, retribution is exacted from him [alone], but with regard to [a false oath], retribution is exacted from him and from his family who conceal the matter for him. Moreover, this causes retribution to be exacted from "the enemies of the Jews," for the entire Jewish people are responsible for each other, for [Hoshea 4:2-3] states: "Swearing, denying, murdering.... Therefore the land will mourn and all who inhabit it will be forlorn." With regard to all the transgressions in the Torah, [retribution] is suspended for two or three generations if he possesses merit, but with regard to [a false oath], retribution is exacted immediately, as [Zechariah 5:4] states: "'I have let loose [the curse],' declares G-d, the Lord of Hosts, 'It will come into the house of the thief and the house of he who took an oath in My name falsely.'" "I have let loose" implies immediately. "It will come into the house of the thief" - this refers to deceiving people, i.e. one who does not have money owed to him by a colleague and yet lodges a claim against him to require him to take an oath. "He who took an oath in My name falsely" - this should be interpreted literally. [The verse continues:] "It shall destroy it, its wood, and its stones." Entities that cannot be destroyed by fire and water will be destroyed by a false oath.

The concept [conveyed] by this admonition is told [to the person taking the oath] entirely in a language that they understand, so that they will understand the matter and the sinner will repent and correct [his conduct]. If he says: "I am not taking the oath," he is released, but he must pay what his colleague demands. Similarly, if the plaintiff says: "I will not subject him to an oath and I release him," they may depart.

If [the defendant] says: "I will take the oath," and [the plaintiff] persists in the claim, the people there say to each other: "Turn away from the tents of these wicked men." [The court] tells [the defendant]: "We are not administering the oath to you according to your understanding, but according to our understanding and the understanding of the court."

Although this admonition is not administered for an oath taken because of a claim involving a doubt or a sh'vuat heset, the judges should implore the litigants exceedingly [before administering these oaths] perhaps they will retract and so there will be no oaths taken at all.

It is a clear and obvious fact that anyone who takes an oath of the judges or a sh'vuat heset falsely, is liable for taking a [false] sh'vuat hapikadon, the details of which have already been explained. Even though he willfully [took the false oath], he does not receive lashes. [Instead,] he is obligated to pay what he owes plus an additional fifth. [The fifth] is one fourth of the principal, so that the principal and the fifth are equal to five. And he must bring a guilt offering if the oath was taken in court, as we explained.

Although a person who took a false oath or an oath in vain is given lashes, and similarly, one who takes a [false] sh'vuat haedut or sh'vuat hapikadon brings a sacrifice, they do not receive complete atonement for the sin of taking a [false] oath, as [Exodus 20:7] states: "G-d will not cleanse [one who takes His name in vain]." He will not be absolved from the judgment of heaven until he receives retribution for his desecration of [His] great name, as [Leviticus 19:12] states: "[You shall not take a false oath in My name, for] you will desecrate the name of Your G-d." Therefore a person must be very careful with regard to this sin, more than with regard all other sins.

This sin is considered one of the severe transgressions, as explained in Hilchot Teshuvah. Although it does not involve kerait or execution by the court, it involves the desecration of [G-d's] holy name which is more severe than all other sins.

When a person takes an oath by the heaven and earth, by the sun, or the like, this is not an oath, even though his intent is He who created them. Similarly, one who takes an oath by one of the prophets or by one of the texts of the Holy Scriptures, this is not an oath, even if his intent is He who sent the prophet or gave the commandments in this text. Although these are not oaths, those who take them are subjected to a severe warning and we teach the people not to act frivolously in this manner. [Indeed,] we make it look as if these are oaths and give them an opening [to ask for their absolution] and absolve them.

When does the above apply? With regard to other holy texts. [Different rules apply,] however, when one takes an oath by the Torah. If one takes an oath by what is written in [the Torah], his intent is by the names of G-d [it contains]. If one takes an oath by it without any further definition, his intent is on the parchment [of the scroll] and it is not considered as an oath. If he took [the scroll] in his hand and took an oath by it, it is as if he took an oath by what was written in it and [the matter] is forbidden.

[The following rules apply when] a person takes an oath by the Torah without any further definition. If he is a Torah scholar, he does not need to be released by a sage. If he is a common person, it is necessary that he asked to be released by a sage so that he will not treat oaths frivolously.

When a servant takes an oath, his master does not have to compel him [to break the oath to nullify it]. Instead, his [status] is the same after taking the oath as it was before he did so. [The rationale is that] his body is not his property for the oath he takes to be effective. With regard to oaths, [Numbers 30:3] states: "To forbid something upon one's soul." [Implied is that the verse applies to] someone whose soul is his property. It excludes a servant who is someone else's property. Thus [a servant's taking an oath] is comparable to taking an oath regarding someone else's property.

Minors who take an oath are not obligated [to maintain their commitment, even though] they understand the significance of an oath. [Nevertheless,] we compel them to uphold their word to train them [in the observance of mitzvot] and to impress them with fear so that they do not act frivolously with regard to oaths. If the matter concerning which they took the oath is such that a minor could not maintain without suffering injury, e.g., he took an oath that he would fast or that he would not eat meat for a long time, his father or his teacher should beat him and rebuke him, and create the appearance that his oath [took effect, but] was released, so that he will not be habituated to treat oaths frivolously.

We must be very careful with children and train them to speak words of truth without [resorting to] an oath so that they will not be habituated to swear at all times like gentiles do. This matter is tantamount to an obligation for their parents and for those who teach young children.

When one hears a colleague mention G-d's name in vain, take a false oath in his presence, or recite a blessing that is unnecessary in which instance [his colleague] transgresses because he takes G-d's name in vain, as we explained in Hilchot Berachot, he must place him under a ban of ostracism. If he does not, he himself should be ostracized. The ban should, however, be lifted immediately so that it will not present an obstacle to others, for they will not know that he was placed under a ban. And if one would say, "Make it known that he [is under ostracism]," the entire populace will be under ban for [people] have already habituated their tongues to iniquity and oaths at all times.

When does the above apply? When the person taking this oath or reciting this blessing in vain does so intentionally? If, however, he does so inadvertently or does not know that this is forbidden, [a listener] is not obligated to place him under a ban of ostracism. Indeed, I maintain that it is forbidden to place him under a ban of ostracism, for the Torah did not [prescribe] punishment for an inadvertent transgressor. Instead, one should caution him and warn him not to repeat [the transgression].

It is not only a false oath that is forbidden. Instead, it is forbidden to mention even one of the names designated for G-d although one does not take an oath. For the verse [Deuteronomy 28:58] commands us, saying: "to fear the glorious and awesome name." Included in fearing it is not to mention it in vain. Therefore if because of a slip of the tongue, one mentions [G-d's] name in vain, he should immediately hurry to praise, glorify, and venerate it so that it will not have been mentioned [entirely] in vain. What is implied? If he mentions G-d's name, he should say: "Blessed be He for all eternity," "He is great and exceedingly praiseworthy," or the like so that it will not have been [mentioned entirely] in vain.

It is permitted to approach [a sage] to have an oath released as we explained and there is no fault [in doing so]. [Indeed,] one who has hesitations about the matter is [showing] traces of heresy. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to show care in this regard. One should not respond [to a request] to release [an oath] unless it involves a matter concerning a mitzvah or a great need. It is of great benefit for a person never to take an oath at all.If, however, one transgressed and took an oath, he should endure great difficulty and keep his oath, as [Psalms 15:4-5] states: "One who takes an oath to his own detriment and does not nullify it..., he who acts in this manner will never falter." Blessed be G-d who grants assistance.