Rebels

The Supreme Sanhedrin in Jerusalem are the essence of the Oral Law. They are the pillars of instruction from whom statutes and judgments issue forth for the entire Jewish people. Concerning them, the Torah promises Deuteronomy 17:11: "You shall do according to the laws which they shall instruct you...." This is a positive commandment. Whoever believes in Moses and in his Torah is obligated to make all of his religious acts dependent on this court and to rely on them.

Any person who does not carry out their directives transgresses a negative commandment, as Ibid. continues: "Do not deviate from any of the statements they relate to you, neither right nor left." Lashes are not given for the violation of this prohibition, because it also serves as a warning for a transgression punishable by execution by the court. For when a sage rebels against the words of the court, he should be executed by strangulation, as the following verse states: "A person who will act deliberately...." We are obligated to heed their words whether they: a) learned them from the Oral Tradition, i.e., the Oral Law, b) derived them on the basis of their own knowledge through one of the attributes of Biblical exegesis and it appeared to them that this is the correct interpretation of the matter, c) instituted the matter as a safeguard for the Torah, as was necessary at a specific time. These are the decrees, edicts, and customs instituted by the Sages. It is a positive commandment to heed the court with regard to each of these three matters. A person who transgresses any of these types of directives transgresses a negative commandment. This is derived from the continuation of the above verse in the following manner: "According to the laws which they shall instruct you" - this refers to the edicts, decrees, and customs which they instruct people at large to observe to strengthen the faith and perfect the world. "According to the judgment which they relate" - this refers to the matters which they derive through logical analysis employing one of the methods of Biblical exegesis. "From all things that they will tell you" - This refers to the tradition which they received one person from another.

There can never be any difference of opinion with regard to matters received through the Oral Tradition. Whenever there arises a difference of opinion with regard to a matter that shows that it was not received in the tradition from Moses our teacher. The following principles apply with regard to matters derived through logical analysis. If the entire body of the Supreme Sanhedrin agrees with regard to them, their consent is binding. If there is a difference of opinion, we follow the majority and decide the matter according to the majority. Similarly, with regard to the decrees, edicts, and customs, if a portion of the judges perceived that it was necessary to issue a decree, institute an edict, or establish a custom for the people, and a portion perceived that it is not appropriate to issue this decree, institute this edict, or establish this custom, the judges should debate the matter back and forth. Afterwards, a vote is called, and we follow the majority and execute the matter according to the decision of the majority.

When the Supreme Sanhedrin was in session, there was never any prolonged differences of opinion among the Jewish people. Instead, if a doubt arose in a Jew's mind over any law, he would inquire of the court in his city. If not, the questioner and that court - or its agents - ascend to Jerusalem and ask the court which holds sessions on the Temple Mount. If they know, they will reply to him, if they do not know, everyone comes to the court that holds sessions at the entrance to the Temple Courtyard. If they know, they will reply to him, if they do not know, everyone comes to the Chamber of Hewn Stone, to the Supreme Sanhedrin, and presents the question. If the matter that was unresolved by all the others was known to the Supreme Sanhedrin - either as part of the Oral Tradition or because of its derivation through the principles of exegesis - they relate the decision immediately. If, however, the decision was unclear to the Supreme Sanhedrin, they deliberate about the matter at that time and debate it back and forth until they reach a uniform decision, or until a vote is taken. In such a situation, they follow the majority and then tell all the questioners: "This is the halachah." The questioners then all depart. After the Supreme Sanhedrin was nullified, differences of opinion multiplied among the Jewish people. One would rule an article is impure and support his ruling with a rationale and another would rule that it is pure and support his ruling with a rationale. This one would rule an article is forbidden and this would rule that it is permitted.

The following rules apply when there are two sages or two courts that have differing opinions in an age when there was no Supreme Sanhedrin or during the time when the Supreme Sanhedrin was still undecided concerning the matter - whether in one age or in two different ages - one rules that an article is pure and one rules that it is impure, one forbids an article's use and one permits it. If one does not know in which direction the law tends, should the matter involve a question of Scriptural Law, follow the more severe opinion. If it involve a question of Rabbinic Law, follow the more lenient opinion.

When, using one of the principles of exegesis, the Supreme Sanhedrin derived a law through their perception of the matter and adjudicated a case accordingly, and afterwards, another court arose and they perceived another rationale on which basis, they would revoke the previous ruling, they may revoke it and rule according to their perception. This is reflected by Deuteronomy 17:9: "To the judge who will be in that age." This indicates that a person is obligated to follow only the court in his own generation.

The following rules apply when a court issued a decree, instituted an edict, or established a custom and this practice spread throughout the Jewish people and another court arose and sought to nullify the original order and eliminate the original edict, decree, or custom. The later court does not have this authority unless it surpasses the original court in wisdom and in its number of adherents. If it surpasses the original court in wisdom, but not in the number of adherents, or in the number of adherents, but not in wisdom, it cannot nullify its statements. Even if the rationale for which the original court instituted the decree or the edict is nullified, the later court does not have the authority to negate their statements unless they are greater. How is it possible that the later court will surpass the original court in number? For every Supreme Sanhedrin consists of 71 judges. The intent is the number of sages in the generation who consent and accept the matter stated by the Supreme Sanhedrin without opposing it.

When does the above apply? With regard to matters that were not forbidden to create a safeguard for the words of the Torah, but rather resemble other Torah laws. A different principle applies, by contrast, with regard to matters which the court sought necessary to issue a decree and create a prohibition as a safeguard. If the prohibition spread throughout the Jewish people, another Supreme Sanhedrin does not have the authority to uproot the decree and grant license even if it was of greater stature than the original court.

A court may, however, suspend the application of such decrees temporarily, even if it is of lesser stature than the original court. The rationale is that these decrees should not be considered as more severe than the words of the Torah itself, and any court has the authority to abrogate the words of the Torah as a temporary measure. What is implied? If a court sees that it is necessary to strengthen the faith and create a safeguard so that the people will not violate Torah law, they may apply beatings and punishments that are not sanctioned by Torah. They may not, however, establish the matter for posterity and say that this is the halachah. Similarly, if they saw that temporarily it was necessary to nullify a positive commandment or violate a negative commandment in order to bring people at large back to the Jewish faith or to prevent many Jews from transgressing in other matters, they may do what is necessary at that time. To explain by analogy: Just like a doctor may amputate a person's hand or foot so that the person as a whole will live; so, too, at times, the court may rule to temporarily violate some of the commandments so that they will later keep all of them. In this vein, the Sages of the previous generations said: "Desecrate one Sabbath for a person's sake so that he will keep many Sabbaths."

When a court sees it necessary to issue a decree, institute an edict, or establish a custom, they must first contemplate the matter and see whether or not the majority of the community can uphold the practice. We never issue a decree on the community unless the majority of the community can uphold the practice.

If a court issued a decree, thinking that the majority of the community could uphold it and after the decree was issued, the majority of the community raised contentions and the practice did not spread throughout the majority of the community, the decree is nullified. The court cannot compel the people to accept it.

Sages issued a decree and thought that it spread among the entire Jewish people and the situation remained unchanged for many years. After a long duration of time, another court arose and checked throughout the Jewish community and saw that the observance of this decree had not spread throughout the Jewish community, it has the authority to negate the decree even if it is of lesser stature than the original court in wisdom and in number of adherents.

Whenever a court releases two decrees, it should not rush to release a third decree.

Since the Beit Din has the capacity to declare laws and prohibit what is permissible, and its prohibitions last for generations, and similarly they have the capacity to permit that which is prohibited in the Torah for a specific situation. What does this mean that the Torah warns us (Deuteronomy 13:1) “Do not add to it and do not subtract from it”? That one should not add on to what is in the Torah and should not subtract from it, and make that thing set forever as something that is from the Torah, whether the Written Torah or the Oral Torah. How so? It is written in the Torah (Exodus 23:19) “Do not cook a kid in its mother’s milk.” From the interpretation they learn that this verse prohibits the cooking and eating of meat in milk, both the meat of a domesticated animal and the meat of a wild animal, but the meat of fowl is permissible in milk according to the Torah. If the Beit Din came and permitted wild animals in milk, this would be subtracting [from the Torah]. And if it prohibited the meat of fowl and said that it is included in [the wording of] “a kid,” and it is therefore prohibited according to the Torah, this would be adding on [to the Torah]. But if it [the Beit Din] said: “Meat of fowl is permitted from the Torah and we have prohibited it,” and we inform the people that this is a ruling that does not originate from that which is obligatory [in the Torah], they [the people] will say just as fowl is permissible [with milk] since it is not specified [in the Torah], so to [meat of a] wild animal is permissible [with milk] since it is not specified [in the Torah]. And then another will come and say that [meat of a] domesticated animal is permissible [with milk, according to the Torah], except for goat [meat]. And another will come and say that even meat of a goat is permissible with milk of a cow or a sheep, for the verse only says “its mother” who is of the same species [i.e. don’t cook a kid in its mother’s milk]. And another will come and say that even milk of a goat that is not its mother [i.e. the kid’s mother] is permissible [according to the Torah], for it only said “its mother.” Therefore, all meat in milk was prohibited, even meat of fowl. This is not adding to [the Torah] but is creating a fence around the Torah. And similarly anything like this.

A person who does not acknowledge validity of the Oral Law is not the rebellious elder mentioned in the Torah. Instead, he is one of the heretics and he should be put to death by any person.

Since it has become known that such a person denies the Oral Law, he may be pushed into a pit and may not be helped out. He is like all the rest of the heretics who say that the Torah is not Divine in origin, those who inform on their fellow Jews, and the apostates. All of these are not considered as members of the Jewish people. There is no need for witnesses, a warning, or judges for them to be executed. Instead, whoever kills them performs a great mitzvah and removes an obstacle from people at large.

To whom does the above apply? To a person who denied the Oral Law consciously, according to his perception of things. He follows after his frivolous thoughts and his capricious heart and denies the Oral Law first, as did Tzadok and Beitus and those who erred in following them. The children of these errant people and their grandchildren whose parents led them away and they were born among these Karaities and raised according to their conception, they are considered as a children captured and raised by them. Such a child may not be eager to follow the path of mitzvot, for it is as if he was compelled not to. Even if later, he hears that he is Jewish and saw Jews and their faith, he is still considered as one who was compelled against observance, for he was raised according to their mistaken path. This applies to those who we mentioned who follow the erroneous Karaite path of their ancestors. Therefore it is appropriate to motivate them to repent and draw them to the power of the Torah with words of peace.

However, the rebellious elder that is spoken of in the Torah is a wise man from the sages of Israel that has received the tradition, adjudicates and teaches Torah, just like the other sages adjudicate and teach. When he disputes any law of the laws with the large beit din, and does not rescind his words in favor of the decision of the beit din, rather he continues to argue against them and continues to teach and to act against their decision, the Torah has decreed upon him death. If he confesses, he has a place in the World to Come. Even though he is a judge and they are judges and he has received the tradition just as they have, the Torah has given them the measure of honor. If the beit din wanted to forego their honor and let him live, they may not, so that disputes will not be plentiful among the people Israel.

A "rebellious elder" is not liable for execution unless he is a sage, erudite enough to issue halachic judgments who has received semichah from the Sanhedrin and who differs with that court with regard to a matter whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering or with regard to tefillin. He must direct others to act according to his ruling or act according to his ruling himself, and differ with the Sanhedrin while they hold session in the Chamber of Hewn Stone. When, by contrast, a student who has not attained a level of erudition that enables him to issue halachic rulings, but, nevertheless, issues a ruling, he is not liable. This is derived from Deuteronomy 17:8 which states: "If a matter of judgment exceeds your grasp...." Implied is that the passage concerns only a scholar who is unable to grasp something which is exceedingly difficult to comprehend.

If there were an outstanding sage, on of the court that disagreed and repeated his own position and taught it to others, but did not teach them to do as he says, he is exempt; As it says "the man that does it on purpose" It does not say 'the man that says it on purpose' rather it emphasizes that he must instruct it to be done or do it himself.

If he found the Supreme Sanhedrin outside their place and rebelled against their ruling, he is not liable. This is derived from ibid.:8 which states: "And you shall arise and ascend to that place," implied is that the place is the cause for capital punishment. All of the individuals mentioned above who are not executed and anyone who acts in a similar manner, although they are not liable for execution, the Supreme Sanhedrin should place them under a ban of ostracism, separate them from the community, subject them to corporal punishment, and prevent them from teaching their interpretation of the matter.

How is the law applying to a rebellious elder adjudicated? When a matter is undecided because of its difficulty and a sage who is erudite enough to issue rulings whether with regard to a matter which he arrived at through his own reasoning or which he received from his teachers. He and the sages who differ with him ascend to Jerusalem and come to the court which holds sessions at the entrance to the Temple Mount. The court tells them: "This is the law." If the elder listens and accepts the ruling, it is desirable. If not, they all go to the court which holds sessions at the entrance to the Temple Courtyard. They also say: "This is the law." If the elder listens and accepts the ruling, they go their ways. If not, they all go to the Supreme Sanhedrin in the Chamber of Hewn Stone from which the Torah emanates to the entire Jewish people, as Deuteronomy 17:10 states: "From that place which G-d has chosen." The Supreme Sanhedrin tell them: "This is the law" and they all depart. If the elder returns to his city and continues to interpret the law as he did previously and teaches this interpretation to others, he is not liable. If he gave a directive for action or acted according to his conception himself, he is liable for execution. There is no need for a warning. Even if he offers a rationale to explain his conduct, we do not heed him. Instead, once witnesses come and testify that he acted according to his own directive or that he directed others to perform a deed, we sentence him to death in his local court. We take hold of him and bring him from that place to Jerusalem. For we do not execute him in the presence of his local court, nor in the presence of the Supreme Sanhedrin who left Jerusalem, but instead, bring him to the Supreme Sanhedrin in Jerusalem. Until the next pilgrimage festival, he is kept under watch. During the pilgrimage festival, he is executed by strangulation, as implied by ibid.:13: "And all Israel shall hear and become fearful." This indicates that his execution must be announced. There are four transgressors whose execution must be announced publicly: a rebellious elder, lying witnesses, a person who entices others to worship idols, and a wayward and rebellious son. For with regard to all of them, the Torah states: "so that they will hear and become afraid."

A rebellious elder who differed with the Supreme Sanhedrin concerning a matter whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering is liable for execution. This applies whether the court forbids the matter and he permits it or the court permits the matter and he forbids it. Even if he bases his statements on the received tradition, saying: "This is the tradition I received from my masters," and they say: "This is what appears to us as appropriate on the basis of logical analysis," since he differs with their ruling and performs a deed or directs others to do so, he is liable. Needless to say, this applies if they also rule on the basis of their having received teachings through the Oral Tradition. Similarly, he is liable for execution if he differs with them with regard to a decree that they issued to safeguard a prohibition whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering is liable for execution. For example, if he permits the consumption of leaven on the fourteenth of Nissan during the sixth hour or forbids deriving benefit from it in the fifth hour, he is worthy of execution. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

The above applies whether the rebellious elder disputes a matter whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering or he disputes a matter which leads to a situation involving a prohibition whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering. What is implied? If they disputed whether relations with a woman are adulterous or incestuous, if a shade of blood would render a woman ritually impure or not, if a woman is impure because of birth or not, if a woman is a zavah or not, if this fat is forbidden or permitted and the like, their difference of opinion involves a prohibition whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering. What is meant by a matter that will lead to a prohibition whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering. For example, the Sages differed concerning the declaration of a leap year, if the leap year must be declared before Purim or may be declared throughout Adar, he is liable. For this leads to partaking of chametz on Pesach. Similarly, if they differed with regard to a matter of financial law or with regard to the number of judges able to adjudicate matters of financial law, he is liable. For according to the opinion which maintains that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff, everything which he expropriated from him was expropriated according to law and according to the decisions of the court. But according to the opposing view, whatever he expropriated is stolen property. If he uses it to consecrate a woman, she is not consecrated. And yet according to the opinion that the person expropriated his own property, the consecration is valid. If another person engages in relations with her willfully, he is liable for kerait and if he engages in relations with her inadvertently, he is liable to bring a sin offering. Thus their difference of opinion led to a matter whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering. Similarly, if their difference of opinion concerned lashes, if one person was liable to receive lashes or not, or they differed with regard to the number of judges in whose presence lashes must be administered, he is liable. For according to the opinion who says that he should not be lashed, the court is injuring him and the judges are liable to make financial restitution. Anything expropriated from them is taken according to law. But according to the opinion which says that he is liable for lashes, everything he expropriates from them is stolen property. If he uses it to consecrate a woman, she is not consecrated. Similarly, if they differed with regard to whether or not a person is obligated to pay after making an endowment evaluations or interdicted property, he is liable. For according to the opinion that says that he is not liable to pay, if it is taken from him, it is stolen property and if it is used to consecrate a woman, the consecration is not valid. Similarly, he is liable if he differed with the majority concerning the redemption of consecrated property, had they been redeemed or not. For according to the opinion that the redemption is invalid, if he used that article to consecrate a woman, the consecration is not valid. Similarly, if they differed with regard to bringing an eglah arufah, whether a city is obligated to bring or not, he is liable. For according to those who say that city is obligated to bring the calf, it is forbidden to derive benefit from it and if he uses it to consecrate a woman, the consecration is not valid. Similar concepts apply if they differed with regard to orlah. And similar concepts apply with regard to leket, shichechah, and pe'ah, if they differ whether it belongs to the poor or to the owner, he is liable. For according to the opinion which says that it belongs to the owner, it is stolen property in the hands of the poor and if one consecrates a woman with it, she is not consecrated. Similarly, if the rebellious elder differs with the court with regard to a category of factors that impart ritual impurity, e.g., blemishes on the skin, blemishes on homes, or blemishes on garments, he is liable. For according to the opinion that the person is pure, he is permitted to enter the Temple and partake of consecrated foods, but according to the opinion that he is impure, if he enters the Temple or partakes of consecrated food willfully, he is punishable by kerait, and if he does so inadvertently, he is liable for a sin offering. Similar concepts apply if they differed with regard to the purification of a person afflicted by tzara'at, if he can be purified or not. Similarly, he is liable if they differ with regard to the obligation to make a sotah drink the water which conveys the curse: Is a woman required to drink the water or is she not required? For according to the person who says that she must drink, if her husband dies before she drinks, she is forbidden to her yevam, while according to the person who says that she is not required to drink, she may perform the rite of yibbum. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. It is necessary to investigate and examine whether a difference of opinion will lead to these consequences. If it will lead to another consequence - which after a series of even 100 consequences - that will bring about a situation involving a prohibition whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering, the rebellious elder is liable. This applies regardless of whether he ruled leniently and the others ruled stringently or he ruled stringently and they ruled leniently.

If the difference of opinion between the rebellious elder and the court will not lead to such a situation, the rebellious elder is not liable for execution unless the difference of opinion concerns tefillin. What is implied? If the rebellious elder gave a directive to add a fifth compartment to tefillin or he himself made tefillin with five compartment, he is liable. This applies provided he first made four compartments as required by law and then made a fifth compartment and attached it to the outer compartment. For when an outer compartment is not exposed to the open space at all times, it is unacceptable. The obligation of a rebellious elder in such a matter is a law transmitted by the Oral Tradition. If, however, they differed with regard to other mitzvot, e.g., he disputed one of the laws concerning a lulav, tzitzit, or a shofar, one claiming that it is unacceptable and the other claiming that it is acceptable, one claiming that the person fulfilled his obligation and the other claiming he did not fulfill his obligation, or one says: "He is pure," and the other says: "He is impure two degrees removed," the elder is not liable for execution. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

A person who curses his father and mother should be executed by stoning, as Leviticus 20:9 states: "He cursed his father and his mother; he is responsible for his death." He is stoned to death whether he curses them while alive or after they died. It is necessary that his act be observed by witnesses and they warn him as is required with regard to other individuals executed by the court. The above applies to both a man and woman, and also to a tumtum and an androgynus, provided they reached majority, the age when they can be subjected to punishment.

A person is not liable for execution by stoning unless he curses his parents with one of G-d's unique names. If he cursed them with another term used to refer to Him, he is not liable for execution by stoning. He should, however, be lashed, as he would be lashed for cursing any other proper Jew.

Similarly, a person who curses his paternal and maternal grandfather is considered as if he cursed any other person.

What is the source which serves as a warning against cursing one's father and one's mother? We have heard the punishment explicitly stated, the warning, however, is not stated explicitly. Instead, it can be inferred from Leviticus 19:14: "Do not curse a deaf-mute." Since a person is warned not to curse any Jew, his father is also included, for he is also Jewish.

A person who strikes his father or mother should be executed by strangulation, as Exodus 21:15 states: "One who strikes his father or his mother should certainly die." It is necessary that his act be observed by witnesses and they warn him as is required with regard to other individuals executed by the court. The above applies to both a man and woman, and also to a tumtum, and an androgynus provided they reached majority, the age when they can be subjected to punishment. A person is not liable for strangulation until he wounds his parents. If he does not wound them, it is as if he strikes another Jew. If he strikes them after their death, he is not liable.

When a person strikes his father on his ear and causes him to become deaf, he is liable for execution. The rationale is that it is impossible for him to become deaf without there being an internal wound. Instead, we can be certain that at least a drop of blood was released within the ear and that caused him to become deaf.

When a person lets blood for his father, or if he was a doctor and amputated flesh or a limb, he is not liable. Even though he is not liable, the initial and preferred option is for him not to perform the operation. Nor should he remove a thorn from the flesh of his father or mother lest he cause a bruise. When does the above apply? When there is another person there who is capable of performing these actions. If, however, there is no one else there capable of doing this but him and they are suffering, he may let blood or amputate according to the license that they grant him.

What is the source which serves as a warning against striking one's father and one's mother? We have heard the punishment explicitly stated, the warning, however, is not stated explicitly. Since a person is warned not to strike any Jew, his father and mother are also included.

A shituki is liable for cursing or striking his mother, but not his father. Although his mother is questioned and she says: "He is the son of so-and-so," he should not be executed by stoning or strangulation because of her testimony. A person who is conceived through relations between a Jew and a maid-servant or a gentile woman, by contrast, is not liable for cursing or striking his father or his mother. Similarly, a convert - even if he was conceived outside the faith, but born within the faith - is not liable for cursing or striking his father.

Just as such a person is not liable for cursing or striking his father, he is not liable for cursing or striking his mother. This is derived from Exodus 21:17: "One who curses his father and mother shall die." Implied is one who is liable for cursing his father is liable for cursing his mother. Since such a person is not liable for his father, he is not liable for his mother.

A convert is forbidden to curse or to strike his gentile father or to degrade him, so that people will not say: "They came from a more severe level of holiness to a lesser level of holiness, for this person degrades his father."66 Instead, he should offer him certain measures of honor. A servant, by contrast, has no connection to his natural parents. His natural father is as if he was not his father with regard to all matters. This applies even if they were both freed.

When a person's father and mother are absolutely wicked and violate transgressions - even if they were sentenced to death and being taken to their execution - it is forbidden for a son to strike them or curse them. If he curses them or wounds them, however, he is not liable. If they repent, even if they are being taken to their execution, he is liable and is executed because of them. To whom does the above apply? To the convicted person's son. If, however, an unrelated individual struck or cursed a person after he was sentenced to death, even though he repents, he is not liable, for that person will be executed. If, however, he embarrasses him, he is liable to pay a fine for embarrassing him.

If a person's father or mother committed a transgression punishable by lashes and the son is a court attendant, he should not lash them. Similarly, if they were obligated to be placed under a ban of ostracism, he should not be the agent to apply this ban. Nor should he push them or degrade them while acting as the emissary of the court even though it is fit to do this to them and they have not repented.

A son should not serve as an agent to strike or curse his parents except if they entice others to worship idols. For concerning such a person, the Torah Deuteronomy 13:9 states: "Do not have pity and do not cover up for him."

In any situation where a person is obligated to take an oath to his son, we always saw that he never obligated him to take an oath that involves a curse. Instead, he should have him take an oath that does not involve a curse. We already explained, that when a father kills his son, none of the slain person's brothers becomes "the redeemer of the blood." The Torah showed concern not only for striking or cursing one's parents, but also for shaming them. Anyone who shames his parents, even with words alone or merely with an insinuation, is cursed by the Almighty, as Deuteronomy 27:16 states: "Cursed be he who degrades his father and his mother." And Proverbs 30:17 states: "The eye that mocks a father and scorns the training of a mother, the ravens... will gouge it out." The court has the right to administer stripes for rebellious conduct because of this and to punish in the manner they see fit.

A mamzer is obligated to honor his father even though he is exempt from [the prohibitions regarding] striking him or cursing him. Even if his father were a wicked sinner, he would honor and revere him. If he sees his father transgress a Torah law, he does not say to him "Father, you transgressed this Torah law!" Rather, he says to him, "Father, is it written in the Torah that such-and-such...?" as if to ask him and not to reproach him.

A person who curses his father or mother is executed by stoning and a person who blasphemes G-d is executed by stoning. Thus the punishment for the two is equated. A father is mentioned before a mother with regard to honor and a mother is mentioned before a father with regard to fear to teach that they are both equal with regard to fear and honor.

What is meant by fear and what is meant by honor? Fear is expressed by not standing in his place, not sitting in his place, not contradicting his words, nor offering an opinion that outweighs his. He should not call him by name, neither during his lifetime or after his death. Instead, he should say: "My father and my master." If his father or his teacher had the same name as others, he should call those other people by a different name. It appears to me that one should be careful only with regard to this matter with regard to a name that is unusual which is not used frequently by people. With regard to the names which people are generally called, by contrast, e.g., Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, and the like, one can call others by that name in any language and at any time outside his father's presence without thinking anything of the matter. What is meant by honoring them? One should bring them food and drink, clothe them and cover them from their resources. If a father does not have financial resources and a son does, the son is compelled to sustain his father and his mother according to his capacity. He should bring him out and bring him home and serve him in all the ways one serves a teacher. Similarly, he should stand before him as one stands before a teacher.

When a father was the student of his son, the father need not stand in the presence of the son. The son, by contrast, must stand before his father even if he is his student. A son is obligated to honor his father in other matters when he is carrying out his business and seeing to his concerns. What is implied? If a person went to a place because of his father's words, he should not say: "Hurry and free me on my own account," or "Let me go on my own account," instead "Hurry and free me because of my father," "Let me go because of my father." Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. He should always include in his words statements that indicate that he is concerned with his father's honor and that he fears him.

A son is obligated to honor his father even after his death. What is implied? If he repeats a teaching in his father's name, he should not say: "This is what my father said." Instead, he should say: "This is what my father, and teacher - may I serve as atonement for him - said." When does the above apply? Within twelve months of his passing. After twelve months, he says of him: "May he be remembered for the life of the world to come."

Both a man and a woman are obligated to honor and fear their parents. It is only that the man has the capacity to do this and a woman is subject to another's influence. Therefore if she is divorced or widowed, they are both equal.

To what degree does the mitzvah of honoring one's father and mother extend? Even if one's parent takes his purse of gold and throws it into the sea in his presence, he should not embarrass them, shout, or vent anger at them. Instead, he should accept the Torah's decree and remain silent. To what degree does the mitzvah of fearing them extend? Even if one was wearing fine garments and sitting at the head of the community, if one's father and mother came, ripped the clothes, struck him on the head, and spit in his face, he should not embarrass them. Instead, he should remain silent and fear the King of kings who commanded him to conduct himself in this manner. Were a mortal king to decree something which would cause him even more suffering he would not be able to move a limb in protest. Certainly, this applies when the command emanates from He who spoke and caused the world to come into existence as He desired it.

Although these commands have been issued, a person is forbidden to lay a heavy yoke on his sons and be particular about their honoring him to the point that he presents an obstacle to them. Instead, he should forgo his honor and ignore any affronts. For if a father desires to forgo his honor, he may.

A person who strikes a son who has attained majority should be placed under a ban of ostracism, for he is transgressing the charge, Leviticus 19:14: "Do not place a stumbling block in front of the blind."

When a person's father or mother lose control of their mental faculties, their son should try to conduct his relationship with them according to their mental condition until G-d has mercy upon them. If it is impossible for him to remain with them because they have become very deranged, he should leave them, depart, and charge others with caring for them in an appropriate manner.

A mamzer is obligated to honor and fear his father even though he is not liable for striking him or cursing him until he repents. Even when his father was a wicked person who violated many transgressions, he must honor him and fear him. If he sees his father violate Torah law, he should not tell him: 'Father, you transgressed Torah law.' Instead, he should tell him: 'Father, is not such-and-such written in the Torah?', as if he is asking him, rather than warning him.

When a person's father tells him to violate the words of the Torah - whether he tells him to transgress a negative commandment or not to fulfill a positive commandment, even if all that is involved is a point of Rabbinic Law - he should not listen to him, as can be inferred from Leviticus 19:3: 'A person must fear his mother and his father and keep My Sabbaths.' Implied is that all are obligated in honoring Me.

The following laws apply when a person's father tells him: 'Draw water for me,' and he has the opportunity to perform a mitzvah. If it is possible for the mitzvah to be performed by others, they should perform it and he should concern himself with honoring his father. For we do not negate the observance of one mitzvah, because of the observance of another mitzvah. If there are no others able to perform the other mitzvah, he should perform the mitzvah and neglect his father's honor. For he and his father are obligated to perform the mitzvah. Torah study surpasses honoring one's father and mother.

If a person's father tells him: 'Bring me a drink of water,' and his mother tells him: 'Bring me a drink of water,' he should overlook his mother's honor and honor his father first. For both he and his mother are obligated to honor his father.

A person is obligated to honor his father's wife even though she is not his mother throughout his father's lifetime, for this is included in honoring his father. Similarly, he should honor his mother's husband throughout her lifetime. After her death, however, he is not obligated to honor him. It is a Rabbinical decree that a person is obligated to honor his oldest brother as he is obligated to honor his father.

It is explicitly stated that the wayward and rebellious son described in the Torah should be stoned to death. Now the Torah does not administer a punishment unless a warning was issued first. Where was the warning issued? In Leviticus 19:26: "Do not eat upon the blood," which can be interpreted to mean: "Do not partake of food that will lead to the shedding of blood." This refers to the meal eaten by the wayward and rebellious son who is executed only because of the hateful feast of which he partook as Deuteronomy 21:20 states: "He is gluttonous and a lush." According to the Oral Tradition, we learned that this was interpreted to mean that he ate meat and drank wine in a ravenous manner.

There are many particulars involved in the meal for which he is liable for eating. All of these are conveyed by the Oral Tradition. He is not liable for stoning until he steals from his father and buys meat and wine at a cheap price. He must then eat it outside his father's domain, together with a group that are all empty and base. He must eat meat that is raw, but not entirely raw, cooked but not entirely cooked, as is the practice of thieves. He must drink the wine as it is thinned as the alcoholics drink. He must eat a quantity of meat weighing 50 dinarim in one sitting, and drink half a log of this wine at one time. If he stole from his father and partook of such a meal inside his father's domain, or stole from others and partook of this hateful meal in his father's domain or in another's domain, he is not liable. If the meal involves a mitzvah, even a mitzvah of Rabbinic origin, or the meal involves a transgression, even a transgression of Rabbinic origin, he is not liable. This may be inferred from the phrase (Ibid.): "He does not heed our voice"; i.e., through eating this meal, he violates only his parents' command. This excludes one who through this meal violates the words of the Torah or who partakes of it for the sake of a mitzvah. What is implied? If he partook of such a hateful meal together with a wicked company for the sake of a mitzvah, or he partook of the second tithe in Jerusalem, even if they eat a meal comforting the bereaved which is a mitzvah of Rabbinic origin, he is not liable. Similarly, if he ate meat from animals that were not ritually slaughtered or which were trefe, teeming animals or crawling animals, and even if he ate on a communal fast day, a transgression of Rabbinic origin, he is not liable for execution.

If he partook of any type of food, but did not partake of meat, even if he partook of fowl, he is not liable. If he partook of this meal from meat, but reached the sum of 50 dinarim by including fowl, he is liable. If he drank other beverages, but did not drink wine, he is not liable.

When he ate raw meat and undiluted wine, he is not liable. The rationale is that this is an occasional occurrence and not something that a person will be drawn after. Similarly, if he ate this meal of salted meat on the third day after it was salted, or drank fresh grape juice, he is not liable. For a person will not be drawn after such matters.

For this transgression, the Torah does not punish a child who has not come to the age where he is responsible for the observance of mitzvot. Similarly, a man who has matured and is independent is not stoned to death, because he ate and drank such a hateful meal. What is implied? According to the Oral Tradition, we learned that this law concerns a youth of thirteen between the time he grew two pubic hairs and the time at which his entire male organ is surrounded by pubic hair. After the entire male organ is surrounded by pubic hair, he is considered as independent and is not executed by stoning.

The entire period for which a "wayward and rebellious son" is liable is only three months from the time he manifests signs of physical maturity. For it is possible that his wife will conceive and her fetus will be recognizable within three months. This is derived from Deuteronomy 21:18: "If a person will have a wayward and rebellious son..."; a son, and not a "wayward and rebellious father." Thus one may conclude that if one's pubic hair surrounds the entire organ before the three months are completed, he is not liable.

How is the judgment of a "wayward and rebellious son" adjudicated? First, his father and mother bring him to a court of three judges and tell them: "Our son is wayward and rebellious." They bring two witnesses who testify that he stole from his father and bought meat and wine with what he stole and partook of the meal described above after being warned. This is the first testimony. He receives lashes as are administered to all of those who are obligated to be lashed, as Deuteronomy 21:20 states: "they chastise him, but he does not heed them." Should he steal from his father a second time and partake of such a meal, his father and mother bring him to a court of 23 judges. They bring two witnesses who testify that he stole and partook of this meal after being warned. This is the second testimony. It is acceptable if the first two witnesses also deliver the latter testimony. After their testimony is heard, the youth is examined to see if his pubic hair surrounded his entire male organ. If that is not the case and it is not three months after he became thirteen, he complete the judgment against him as is done with all those executed by the court and he is stoned to death. He is not stoned to death unless the three judges who originally sentenced him to be lashed are present. This is implied by the phrase: "This son of ours," i.e., the one that was lashed in your presence."

If his father and his mother forgave him before he was sentenced, he is not liable.

If he fled before he was sentenced to death and afterwards, his pubic hair surrounded his organ, he is not liable. If he fled after he was sentenced, even if he grows old, whenever he is discovered, he should be stoned to death. For whenever a person has been sentenced to death, it is as if he has already been slain and he has no blood.

If his father desires to convict him and his mother does not desire, or his mother desires and his father does not desire, he is not judged as a "wayward and rebellious son," as implied by Deuteronomy 21:19: "His father and mother shall take hold of him." If one of the parents has had his arm amputated, was lame, dumb, blind, or deaf, the son is not judged as a "wayward and rebellious son." These concepts are derived as follows: "His father and mother shall take hold of him" - This excludes parents with amputated arms" "And bring him out" - this excludes the lame. "They say" - this excludes the dumb. "This son of ours" - This excludes the blind. "He does not heed our voice" - This excludes the dumb.

It is a scriptural decree that a wayward and rebellious son be executed by stoning. But the daughter is not convicted in this legal ruling since her mannerism is not to persist in eating and drinking like a man does. As (Deuteronomy 21:18) says "son" and not daughter and not 'tumtum' [indiscernable gender] and androgyne.

When an operation is performed on a tumtum and it is discovered that he is a male, he is not judged as a "wayward and rebellious son." The rationale is Deuteronomy 21:18 states: "If a person will have a wayward and rebellious son...." Implied is that he must be a son at the time he receives the warning.

An announcement must be made concerning the execution of a "wayward and rebellious son." What type of announcement is made? A declaration is written and sent to the entire Jewish people: "In this-and-this court, we stoned so-and-so because he was a "wayward and rebellious son.'

A "wayward and rebellious son" is like all others executed by the court; their estate is inherited by their heirs. Even though the person's father caused him to be stoned to death, the father inherits all of his possessions. Blessed be G-d who grants assistance.