Sabbath Chapter 1

שְׁבִיתָה בַּשְּׁבִיעִי מִמְּלָאכָה מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמות לד כא) "וּבַיּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי תִּשְׁבֹּת". וְכָל הָעוֹשֶׂה בּוֹ מְלָאכָה בִּטֵּל מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה וְעָבַר עַל לֹא תַּעֲשֶׂה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים ה יד) "לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה כָל מְלָאכָה". וּמַה הוּא חַיָּב עַל עֲשִׂיַּת מְלָאכָה. אִם עָשָׂה בִּרְצוֹנוֹ בְּזָדוֹן חַיָּב כָּרֵת. וְאִם הָיוּ שָׁם עֵדִים וְהַתְרָאָה נִסְקָל. וְאִם עָשָׂה בִּשְׁגָגָה חַיָּב קָרְבַּן חַטָּאת קְבוּעָה:

La cesación de trabajo en el séptimo día es un mandamiento positivo, como está dicho: “Y en el séptimo día descansarás” (Éxodo 34:21).

כָּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר בְּהִלְכוֹת שַׁבָּת שֶׁהָעוֹשֶׂה דָּבָר זֶה חַיָּב הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב כָּרֵת. וְאִם הָיוּ שָׁם עֵדִים וְהַתְרָאָה חַיָּב סְקִילָה. וְאִם הָיָה שׁוֹגֵג חַיָּב חַטָּאת:

Y todo aquel que realiza en él una labor, anula un mandamiento positivo y transgrede también un mandamiento negativo, como está dicho: “No harás ninguna labor” (Deuteronomio 5:14).

וְכָל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר שֶׁהָעוֹשֶׂה דָּבָר זֶה פָּטוּר הֲרֵי זֶה פָּטוּר מִן הַכָּרֵת וּמִן הַסְּקִילָה וּמִן הַקָּרְבָּן אֲבָל אָסוּר לַעֲשׂוֹת אוֹתוֹ דָּבָר בְּשַׁבָּת וְאִסּוּרוֹ מִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים וְהוּא הַרְחָקָה מִן הַמְּלָאכָה. וְהָעוֹשֶׂה אוֹתוֹ בְּזָדוֹן מַכִּין אוֹתוֹ מַכַּת מַרְדּוּת. וְכֵן כָּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר אֵין עוֹשִׂין כָּךְ וְכָךְ אוֹ אָסוּר לַעֲשׂוֹת כָּךְ וְכָךְ בְּשַׁבָּת הָעוֹשֶׂה אוֹתוֹ דָּבָר בְּזָדוֹן מַכִּין אוֹתוֹ מַכַּת מַרְדּוּת:

Whenever the expression, "one who performs this is not liable" is used, the intent is that he is not liable for karet, for [execution by] stoning, or for bringing a [sin] offering. It is, however, forbidden to perform this act on the Sabbath. In such an instance, the prohibition is Rabbinic in origin and was instituted as a safeguard against [the performance of] labor. A person who performs such an act is given "stripes for defiance."Similarly, whenever the expressions "this should not be performed..." or "it is forbidden to do this on the Sabbath" are used, a person who performs such an act as a conscious act of rebellion is given "stripes for defiance."

וְכָל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר מֻתָּר לַעֲשׂוֹת כָּךְ וְכָךְ הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר לְכַתְּחִלָּה. וְכֵן כָּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר אֵינוֹ חַיָּב כְּלוּם אוֹ פָּטוּר מִכְּלוּם אֵין מַכִּין אוֹתוֹ כְּלָל:

Whenever the expression, "it is permissible to do this" is used, the intent is that, at the outset, one may perform this act. Similarly, whenever the expressions, "one is under no obligation" or "one is not liable at all" are used, one does not receive any punishment at all [for performing such an act.]

דְּבָרִים הַמֻּתָּרִים לַעֲשׂוֹתָן בְּשַׁבָּת וּבִשְׁעַת עֲשִׂיָּתָן אֶפְשָׁר שֶׁתֵּעָשֶׂה בִּגְלָלָן מְלָאכָה וְאֶפְשָׁר שֶׁלֹּא תֵּעָשֶׂה. אִם לֹא נִתְכַּוֵּן לְאוֹתָהּ מְלָאכָה הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר. כֵּיצַד. גּוֹרֵר אָדָם מִטָּה וְכִסֵּא וְסַפְסָל וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן בְּשַׁבָּת וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יִתְכַּוֵּן לַחְפֹּר חָרִיץ בַּקַּרְקַע בִּשְׁעַת גְּרִירָתָן. וּלְפִיכָךְ אִם חָפְרוּ הַקַּרְקַע אֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ בְּכָךְ לְפִי שֶׁלֹּא נִתְכַּוֵּן. וְכֵן מְהַלֵּךְ אָדָם עַל גַּבֵּי עֲשָׂבִים בְּשַׁבָּת וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יִתְכַּוֵּן לַעֲקֹר אוֹתָן. לְפִיכָךְ אִם נֶעֶקְרוּ אֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ. וְרוֹחֵץ יָדָיו בַּעֲפַר הַפֵּרוֹת וְכַיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַשִּׁיר הַשֵּׂעָר. לְפִיכָךְ אִם נָשַׁר אֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ. וְכֵן פִּרְצָה דְּחוּקָה מֻתָּר לְהִכָּנֵס בָּהּ בְּשַׁבָּת אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁמַּשִּׁיר צְרוֹרוֹת. וְכֵן כָּל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּן כְּגוֹן זֶה הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר:

It is permissible to perform an act that is permitted on the Sabbath, despite the fact that it is possible - but it is not an absolute certainty - that, [as a result of one's actions], a forbidden labor will be performed, provided one does not have the intent to perform that labor. What is implied? A person may drag a bed, a chair, a bench and the like [on the ground] on the Sabbath, provided he does not intend to gouge out a groove in the earth while dragging them. Therefore, even if he did gouge out [a groove] in the ground [while dragging them], it is of no consequence, for he did not have this intent in mind. Similarly, a person may tread on grass on the Sabbath, as long as his intent is not to uproot it. Thus, should it be uprooted, that is of no consequence. Also, a person may rub powdered herbs and the like over his hands, provided he does not intend to remove his hair. Therefore, if the hair is removed, it is of no consequence. Based on the same rationale, one may enter a narrow opening on the Sabbath even though, [while doing so,] one causes pieces of the wall to fall. Similarly, it is permissible to perform any act with similar repercussions, provided that one does not have the intent of doing so.

אֲבָל עָשָׂה מַעֲשֶׂה וְנַעֲשֵׂית בִּגְלָלוֹ מְלָאכָה שֶׁוַּדַּאי תֵּעָשֶׂה בִּשְׁבִיל אוֹתוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא נִתְכַּוֵּן לָהּ חַיָּב. שֶׁהַדָּבָר יָדוּעַ שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר שֶׁלֹּא תֵּעָשֶׂה אוֹתָהּ מְלָאכָה. כֵּיצַד. הֲרֵי שֶׁצָּרִיךְ לְרֹאשׁ עוֹף לְצַחֵק בּוֹ הַקָּטָן וְחָתַךְ רֹאשׁוֹ בְּשַׁבָּת אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין סוֹף מְגַמָּתוֹ לַהֲרִיגַת הָעוֹף בִּלְבַד חַיָּב שֶׁהַדָּבָר יָדוּעַ שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר שֶׁיַּחְתֹּךְ רֹאשׁ הַחַי וְיִחְיֶה אֶלָּא הַמָּוֶת בָּא בִּשְׁבִילוֹ. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:

[In contrast,] when one performs a deed that results in the performance of a forbidden labor, and it is a certainty that this deed will cause [that labor] to be performed, one is liable even though one did not intend [to perform the forbidden labor]. What is implied? A person needs a fowl's head to serve as a toy for a child, and therefore cuts off the [fowl's] head on the Sabbath; although his ultimate purpose is not merely to slaughter the chicken, he is liable. It is obvious that it is impossible for the head of a living being to be cut off and for that being to survive. Instead, the [fowl's] death came about because of [this activity]. [Therefore, he is liable.] The same applies in other similar situations.

כָּל הָעוֹשֶׂה מְלָאכָה בְּשַׁבָּת אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְגוּפָהּ שֶׁל מְלָאכָה חַיָּב עָלֶיהָ. כֵּיצַד. הֲרֵי שֶׁכִּבָּה אֶת הַנֵּר מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא צָרִיךְ לַשֶּׁמֶן אוֹ לַפְּתִילָה כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יֹאבַד אוֹ כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִשָּׂרֵף אוֹ כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִבָּקַע חֶרֶשׂ שֶׁל נֵר. מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהַכִּבּוּי מְלָאכָה וַהֲרֵי נִתְכַּוֵּן לְכַבּוֹת וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְגוּף הַכִּבּוּי וְלֹא כִּבָּה אֶלָּא מִפְּנֵי הַשֶּׁמֶן אוֹ מִפְּנֵי הַחֶרֶשׂ אוֹ מִפְּנֵי הַפְּתִילָה הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב. וְכֵן הַמַּעֲבִיר אֶת הַקּוֹץ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים אוֹ הַמְכַבֶּה אֶת הַגַּחֶלֶת כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִזּוֹקוּ בָּהֶן רַבִּים חַיָּב וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְגוּף הַכִּבּוּי אוֹ לְגוּף הַהַעֲבָרָה אֶלָּא לְהַרְחִיק הַהֶזֵּק הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:

Anyone who performs a [forbidden] labor - even if he has no need for the actual labor he performed - is liable for his deed. What is implied? A person extinguished a lamp because he needed [to save] the oil or the wick from being destroyed or from burning or so that the earthenware reservoir of the lamp [that holds the oil] would not break. Since he had the intent of extinguishing the lamp, even though he did not do so for the [usual] purpose of extinguishing, but merely for the sake of the oil, the wick or the earthenware, he is liable. Similarly, a person who moves a thorn four cubits in the public domain or extinguishes a coal so that many people will not be injured by it, is liable. Although the [usual] purpose [served] by extinguishing [the coal] or moving [the thorn] is not important to him, and his intent was merely to prevent injury, he is liable. The same applies in other similar situations.

כָּל הַמִּתְכַּוֵּן לַעֲשׂוֹת מְלָאכָה וְנַעֲשָׂה לוֹ מְלָאכָה אַחֶרֶת שֶׁלֹּא נִתְכַּוֵּן לָהּ פָּטוּר עָלֶיהָ לְפִי שֶׁלֹּא נַעֲשֵׂית מַחֲשַׁבְתּוֹ. כֵּיצַד. זָרַק אֶבֶן אוֹ חֵץ בַּחֲבֵרוֹ אוֹ בִּבְהֵמָה כְּדֵי לְהָרְגָן וְהָלַךְ וְעָקַר אִילָן בַּהֲלִיכָתוֹ וְלֹא הָרַג הֲרֵי זֶה פָּטוּר. הֲרֵי זֶה קַל וָחֹמֶר אִם נִתְכַּוֵּן לְאִסּוּר קַל וְנַעֲשָׂה אִסּוּר חָמוּר. כְּגוֹן שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּן לִזְרֹק בְּכַרְמְלִית וְעָבְרָה הָאֶבֶן לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים שֶׁהוּא פָּטוּר. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה. נִתְכַּוֵּן לַעֲשׂוֹת דָּבָר הַמֻּתָּר וְעָשָׂה דָּבָר אַחֵר כְּגוֹן שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּן לַחְתֹּךְ אֶת הַתָּלוּשׁ וְחָתַךְ אֶת הַמְחֻבָּר אֵינוֹ חַיָּב כְּלוּם. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:

Whenever a person intends to perform a forbidden labor, but instead [through his actions] causes the performance of another forbidden labor for which he had no intent, he is not liable, because his intent was not carried out. What is implied? A person threw a stone or shot an arrow at a colleague or at an animal with the intent of slaying them. Should [the object that he propelled] uproot a tree in its progress and not kill [the intended victim], he is free of liability. How much more so does this principle apply if one had the intent of performing a lesser transgression and one performed a more serious one. For example, a person intended to throw [a stone] into a carmelit, and instead, the stone passed into the public domain. He is not held liable. The same applies in other similar circumstances. Should a person have the intent of performing a permitted act and instead perform another act [which is forbidden], he is not held liable. For example, should he intend to cut produce that was not attached to the ground, and instead cut produce attached to the ground, he is not held liable. The same applies in other similar situations.

נִתְכַּוֵּן לִלְקֹט תְּאֵנִים שְׁחוֹרוֹת וְלִקֵּט לְבָנוֹת אוֹ שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּן לִלְקֹט תְּאֵנִים וְאַחַר כָּךְ עֲנָבִים וְנֶהְפַּךְ הַדָּבָר וְלִקֵּט הָעֲנָבִים בַּתְּחִלָּה וְאַחַר כָּךְ תְּאֵנִים פָּטוּר אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלִּקֵּט כָּל מַה שֶּׁחָשַׁב הוֹאִיל וְלֹא לִקֵּט כַּסֵּדֶר שֶׁחָשַׁב פָּטוּר שֶׁבְּלֹא כַּוָּנָה עָשָׂה שֶׁלֹּא אָסְרָה תּוֹרָה אֶלָּא מְלֶאכֶת מַחְשֶׁבֶת:

Should a person intend to pick black figs and pick white figs instead - or should he intend first to pick figs and then to pick grapes, but instead picked grapes and then figs - he is not liable. He in fact picked everything that he desired, but because he did not pick them in the order that he intended, he is not held liable, since he did not act according to his intent. It is "purposeful labor" that the Torah forbade.

הָיוּ לְפָנָיו שְׁתֵּי נֵרוֹת דּוֹלְקוֹת אוֹ כְּבוּיוֹת נִתְכַּוֵּן לְכַבּוֹת זוֹ וְכִבָּה אֶת זוֹ לְהַדְלִיק זוֹ וְהִדְלִיק אֶת זוֹ חַיָּב שֶׁהֲרֵי עָשָׂה מִן הַמְּלָאכָה שֶׁחָשַׁב לַעֲשׂוֹתָהּ. הָא לְמָה הוּא דּוֹמֶה לְמִי שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּן לִלְקֹט תְּאֵנָה זוֹ וְלִקֵּט תְּאֵנָה אַחֶרֶת. אוֹ לְמִי שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּן לַהֲרֹג אֶת זֶה וְהָרַג אֶת זֶה שֶׁהֲרֵי נַעֲשֵׂית מְלָאכָה שֶׁחָשַׁב לַעֲשׂוֹתָהּ:

When a person had two candles before him and both of them were either burning or extinguished, and he desired to kindle or extinguish one, but instead he kindled or extinguished the other, he is liable, for he performed the [forbidden] labor that he intended to perform. To what can the matter be compared? To a person who intended to pick one fig and picked another instead, or to a person who desired to kill one [living being] and killed another instead. [He is liable,] because the [forbidden] labor which he intended to do was performed.

אֲבָל אִם נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַדְלִיק רִאשׁוֹנָה וּלְכַבּוֹת שְׁנִיָּה אַחֲרֶיהָ וְנֶהְפַּךְ הַדָּבָר וְכִבָּה רִאשׁוֹנָה וְאַחַר כָּךְ הִדְלִיק שְׁנִיָּה אַחֲרֶיהָ פָּטוּר. כִּבָּה זוֹ וְהִדְלִיק זוֹ בִּנְשִׁימָה אַחַת חַיָּב. שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא הִקְדִּים הַהַדְלָקָה הֲרֵי זֶה לֹא אִחֵר אוֹתָהּ אֶלָּא שְׁתֵּיהֶן כְּאַחַת וּלְפִיכָךְ חַיָּב. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה. וְכָל הָעוֹשֶׂה מְלָאכָה בְּמִתְעַסֵּק וְלֹא נִתְכַּוֵּן לָהּ פָּטוּר:

One is, however, freed of liability [in the following instance: There were two candles before a person, one lit and one extinguished.] The person intended to kindle the [one that was extinguished] first and to extinguish the second candle afterwards. Nevertheless, the order [of his actions] became reversed, and instead, he extinguished the candle first and kindled the second candle afterwards. If he extinguished one and kindled the other in a single breath, he is liable. Although he did not kindle the first candle before [extinguishing the other], he did not delay [its lighting], and performed both activities simultaneously. Therefore, he is liable. The same applies in other similar circumstances. Whenever a person performs a [forbidden] labor casually, without specific intention, he is not liable.

כָּל הַמִּתְכַּוֵּן לַעֲשׂוֹת מְלָאכָה וְנַעֲשֵׂית בְּיוֹתֵר עַל כַּוָּנָתוֹ חַיָּב. בְּפָחוֹת מִכַּוָּנָתוֹ פָּטוּר. כֵּיצַד. הֲרֵי שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּן לְהוֹצִיא מַשָּׂא לְאַחֲרָיו וּבָא לוֹ לְפָנָיו חַיָּב שֶׁהֲרֵי נִתְכַּוֵּן לִשְׁמִירָה פְּחוּתָה וְנַעֲשֵׂית שְׁמִירָה מְעֻלָּה. אֲבָל אִם נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהוֹצִיא לְפָנָיו וּבָא לוֹ לְאַחֲרָיו פָּטוּר שֶׁהֲרֵי נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהוֹצִיא בִּשְׁמִירָה מְעֻלָּה וְהוֹצִיא בִּשְׁמִירָה פְּחוּתָה. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:

Whenever a person intended to perform a forbidden labor and performed it more effectively than he had originally intended, he is liable. If [he performs it] less effectively than he had originally intended, he is not liable. What is implied? A person intended to carry a burden suspended behind him and instead, it swung in front of him. He is liable, for he intended to protect it in a less effective manner, and it was ultimately protected in a more effective manner. If, however, he intended to carry a burden suspended before him, and instead it swung behind him, he is not liable, for he intended to protect it in a more effective manner and, it was ultimately protected in a less effective manner.

הָיָה חָגוּר בְּסִנָּר וְהִשְׁלִיךְ הַמַּשָּׂא בֵּין בְּשָׂרוֹ וַחֲלוּקוֹ בֵּין שֶׁבָּא זֶה הַמַּשָּׂא שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לְהוֹצִיאוֹ בַּדֶּרֶךְ הַזֹּאת לְפָנָיו בֵּין שֶׁבָּא לְאַחֲרָיו חַיָּב שֶׁכֵּן דַּרְכּוֹ לִהְיוֹת חוֹזֵר:

[A person who transfers an article from one domain to another is held liable in the following situation]: He was wearing a belt and he placed a burden that is commonly transferred in this manner between his body and his garment. Whether the burden hung in front of him or it had shifted behind him [at the time he transferred it], he is held liable, since it is likely to shift position.

כָּל הַמִתְכַּוֵּן לַעֲשׂוֹת מְלָאכָה בְּשַׁבָּת וְהִתְחִיל בָּהּ וְעָשָׂה כַּשִּׁעוּר חַיָּב. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא הִשְׁלִים כָּל הַמְּלָאכָה שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּן לְהַשְׁלִימָהּ. כֵּיצַד. הֲרֵי שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּן לִכְתֹּב אִגֶּרֶת אוֹ שְׁטָר בְּשַׁבָּת אֵין אוֹמְרִים לֹא יִתְחַיֵּב זֶה עַד שֶׁיַּשְׁלִים חֶפְצוֹ וְיִכְתֹּב כָּל הַשְּׁטָר אוֹ כָּל הָאִגֶּרֶת אֶלָּא מִשֶּׁיִּכְתֹּב שְׁתֵּי אוֹתִיּוֹת חַיָּב. וְכֵן אִם נִתְכַּוֵּן לֶאֱרֹג בֶּגֶד שָׁלֵם מִשֶּׁיֶאֱרֹג שְׁנֵי חוּטִין חַיָּב וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁכַּוָּנָתוֹ לְהַשְׁלִים הַבֶּגֶד הוֹאִיל וְעָשָׂה כַּשִּׁעוּר בְּכַוָּנָה חַיָּב. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:

Whenever a person desired to perform a [forbidden] labor on the Sabbath, began the performance of that labor, and performed an amount of work sufficient to incur liability, he is held liable, even if he did not complete the task he desired to perform. For example, a person desired to write a note or a contract on the Sabbath. We do not say that he is not liable until he completes his desire and writes the entire note or contract. Instead, as soon as he writes two letters, he is liable. Similarly, a person who desires to weave an entire garment is held liable after weaving two strands. Although he intended to complete [the entire garment], he is held liable because he intentionally performed the amount of work sufficient to incur liability. The same applies in all similar situations.

כָּל מְלָאכָה שֶׁהַיָּחִיד יָכוֹל לַעֲשׂוֹת אוֹתָהּ לְבַדּוֹ וְעָשׂוּ אוֹתָהּ שְׁנַיִם בְּשֻׁתָּפוּת בֵּין שֶׁעָשָׂה זֶה מִקְצָתָהּ וְזֶה מִקְצָתָהּ כְּגוֹן שֶׁעָקַר זֶה הַחֵפֶץ מֵרְשׁוּת זוֹ וְהִנִּיחוֹ הַשֵּׁנִי בִּרְשׁוּת אַחֶרֶת בֵּין שֶׁעָשׂוּ אוֹתָהּ שְׁנֵיהֶם כְּאֶחָד מִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף כְּגוֹן שֶׁאָחֲזוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם בְּקֻלְמוֹס וְכָתְבוּ אוֹ אָחֲזוּ כִּכָּר וְהוֹצִיאוּהוּ מֵרְשׁוּת לִרְשׁוּת הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ פְּטוּרִין:

Whenever two people share in the performance of a [forbidden] labor that one of them could have performed by himself, they are [both] free of liability. This applies whether one performed part of the [forbidden] labor and the other performed the remainder - e.g., one removed an article from one domain and the other placed it down in the other domain - or they both performed the [forbidden] labor together from the beginning to the end. For example, they both held a pen and wrote, or they both held a loaf of bread and transferred it from one domain to another.

וְאִם אֵין אֶחָד מֵהֶן יָכוֹל לַעֲשׂוֹתָהּ לְבַדּוֹ עַד שֶׁיִּצְטָרְפוּ כְּגוֹן שְׁנַיִם שֶׁאָחֲזוּ קוֹרָה וְהוֹצִיאוּהָ לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים הוֹאִיל וְאֵין כֹּחַ בְּאֶחָד מֵהֶן לַעֲשׂוֹתָהּ לְבַדּוֹ וְעָשׂוּ אוֹתָהּ בְּשֻׁתָּפוּת מִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף שְׁנֵיהֶן חַיָּבִין וְשִׁעוּר אֶחָד לִשְׁנֵיהֶן. הָיָה כֹּחַ בְּאֶחָד לְהוֹצִיא קוֹרָה זוֹ לְבַדּוֹ וְהַשֵּׁנִי אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהוֹצִיאָהּ לְבַדּוֹ וְנִשְׁתַּתְּפוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם וְהוֹצִיאוּהָ. זֶה הָרִאשׁוֹן שֶׁיָּכוֹל חַיָּב וְהַשֵּׁנִי מְסַיֵּעַ הוּא וּמְסַיֵּעַ אֵינוֹ חַיָּב כְּלוּם. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:

When, however, a single individual cannot perform [the forbidden labor] alone and must be joined by others, [all the individuals involved are held liable]. For example, two people held a beam and transferred it to the public domain. Since neither one of them had the strength to perform this task alone, and they performed it together from the beginning to the end, they are both held liable. The minimum amount of work for which they are held liable is the same as for a single individual who performs such a task. [The following decision applies when] one of them has sufficient strength to transfer the beam alone, but the other is unable to transfer it alone. If they join together and transfer the beam, the one who is capable [of moving it himself] is held liable. The second one is considered [merely] as offering assistance, and a person who offers assistance [in this fashion] is not liable at all. The same applies in other similar situations.

כָּל הַמְקַלְקְלִין פְּטוּרִין. כֵּיצַד. הֲרֵי שֶׁחָבַל בַּחֲבֵרוֹ אוֹ בִּבְהֵמָה דֶּרֶךְ הַשְׁחָתָה וְכֵן אִם קָרַע בְּגָדִים אוֹ שְׂרָפָן אוֹ שָׁבַר כֵּלִים דֶּרֶךְ הַשְׁחָתָה הֲרֵי זֶה פָּטוּר. חָפַר גּוּמָא וְאֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ אֶלָּא לַעֲפָרָהּ הֲרֵי זֶה מְקַלְקֵל וּפָטוּר. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁעָשָׂה מְלָאכָה הוֹאִיל וְכַוָּנָתוֹ לְקַלְקֵל פָּטוּר:

Whenever [a forbidden labor is performed] in a destructive manner, one is not held liable. What is implied? A person who injures a colleague or an animal with a destructive intent, one who rips or burns garments, or one who breaks utensils with a destructive intent is not held liable. A person who dug a pit solely because he needed the earth inside it is considered as having performed a [forbidden] labor with a destructive intent, and is therefore free of liability. Although he performed a [forbidden] labor, he is not held liable because he had a destructive intent.

כָּל הַמְקַלְקֵל עַל מְנָת לְתַקֵּן חַיָּב. כֵּיצַד. הֲרֵי שֶׁסָּתַר כְּדֵי לִבְנוֹת בִּמְקוֹמוֹ אוֹ שֶׁמָּחַק כְּדֵי לִכְתֹּב בַּמָּקוֹם שֶׁמָּחַק אוֹ שֶׁחָפַר גּוּמָא כְּדֵי לִבְנוֹת בְּתוֹכָהּ יְסוֹדוֹת וְכָל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה חַיָּב. וְשִׁעוּרָן כְּשִׁעוּר הַמְתַקֵּן:

Whenever a person carries out a destructive activity for the sake of ultimately performing a constructive activity, he is liable. For example, a person who demolishes [a structure] in order to build [another] in its place, one who erased for the sake of writing [something else] in the place of the erasure, or one who dug a pit in order to place the foundations of a structure within. The same applies in other similar situations. The minimum measure of the destructive activity for which he is held liable is equal to that of the correspondent positive activity.

כָּל הָעוֹשֶׂה מְלָאכָה בְּשַׁבָּת מִקְצָתָהּ בְּשׁוֹגֵג וּמִקְצָתָהּ בְּזָדוֹן בֵּין שֶׁהֵזִיד וּלְבַסּוֹף שָׁגַג בֵּין שֶׁשָּׁגַג וּלְבַסּוֹף הֵזִיד פָּטוּר עַד שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה שִׁעוּר הַמְּלָאכָה כֻּלָּהּ מִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף בְּזָדוֹן וְאַחַר כָּךְ יִהְיֶה חַיָּב כָּרֵת. וְאִם יִהְיֶה בְּעֵדִים וְהַתְרָאָה חַיָּב סְקִילָה. אוֹ שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה שִׁעוּר מְלָאכָה כֻּלָּהּ בִּשְׁגָגָה מִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף וְאַחַר כָּךְ יִהְיֶה חַיָּב חַטָּאת קְבוּעָה:

Whenever a person performs a [forbidden] labor on the Sabbath, partially with intent and partially unintentionally, he is not liable. [This law applies] regardless of whether one began the performance of the [forbidden] labor intentionally and completed it unintentionally, or one began the [forbidden] labor unintentionally and completed it intentionally. One is liable for karet only when one performs the entire minimum measure of a [forbidden] labor intentionally from the beginning to the end. [In such a circumstance,] were witnesses who administered a warning to be present, one would be liable for execution by stoning. Conversely, one is liable to bring a sin offering of a fixed nature when one performs the entire minimum measure of a [forbidden] labor unintentionally from the beginning to the end.