Divorce

A woman may be divorced only by receiving a bill [of divorce]. This bill is called a get. The Torah establishes ten principles as fundamental [for a divorce to be effective]. They are: a) That a man must voluntarily initiate the divorce; b) That he must effect the divorce by means of a written document and through no other means; c) That this document must communicate that he is divorcing [his wife] and releasing her from his domain; d) That it should utterly sever the connection between the husband and his wife; e) That [the get] should be written for the sake [of the woman being divorced]; f) That once [the get] is written, there should be no action [necessary] except its transfer to the woman; g) That he should actually transfer [the get] to her; h) That he should transfer [the get] to her in the presence of witnesses; i) That he should actually transfer it to her for the sake of divorce; j) That the husband or his agent should be the one who gives it to her. The other requirements of a get - e.g., dating it, having it signed by witnesses and the like - are all Rabbinic institutions.

What are the sources that indicate that these ten requirements stem from Scripture itself? [They are derived from Deuteronomy 24:1, which] states: "And if it comes to pass that she does not find favor in his eyes, and he will write a bill of divorce for her, place it in her hand and send her from his home." "If... she does not find favor in his eyes" - this indicates that he divorces her only on his own initiative. If a woman is divorced against her husband's will, the divorce is invalid. A woman may, however, be divorced either voluntarily or against her will.

"And he will write" - this teaches that a woman can be divorced only by means of a written document. "For her" - that it should be written for her sake. "A bill of divorce" - i.e., a deed that severs the relationship between [the husband and his wife], without leaving him any jurisdiction over her. If [the relationship] between them is not entirely severed, the divorce is not effective, as will be explained. "He will... place it in her hand" - this teaches that she is not divorced until the bill of divorce is placed in her hand, in the hand of her agent - which is considered to be her hand - or in her domain - which is considered to be her hand - as will be explained. "And he will... send her" - [the wording of] the get should indicate that he is sending her away and not that he is sending himself away from her.

What is implied? If he writes to her: "Behold you are sent away," "Behold you are divorced," "You are [now] independent," "You are now permitted [to marry] any man," or the like, the divorce is effective. The essence [of the text] of a get is the statement: "You are now permitted to [marry] any man." If, by contrast, he writes to her: "I am no longer your husband," "I am no longer the one who consecrates you," or "I am no longer your man," the divorce is not effective. For "and he will... send her" implies that he should not send himself away from her. Similarly, if a man writes to his wife: "Behold you are free," the divorce is not effective.

The Torah's expression, "And he will... send her from his home," does not mean that the divorce does not become effective until she leaves his home. Instead, the divorce becomes effective when the get reaches [a woman's] hand, even though she still is in her husband's home, as will be explained. "And he will... send her" teaches that if he divorces her, but does not send her away from his home, it is as if he divorced her and then remarried [her]. Therefore, she requires another get, as will be explained.

What is the source that teaches that once [the get] is written, there should be no action [necessary] except its transfer? The [sequence of the verbs] "And he will write..., [and] place," indicating that a get is acceptable only when [the only things] lacking are writing and transfer. This excludes an article that must be detached after it has been written. Therefore, if a man writes a get on the horn of a cow, he must give [his wife] the cow [for the divorce to be effective]. If he cut off the horn after he wrote [the get] on it, it is not effective. Similarly, if he wrote [a get] on a plant that was still attached to its source of nurture, the divorce is not effective. [This applies] even if the witnesses signed after it was detached.

We may not even write the standard text of [a get] on an article that is attached to its source of nurture. If [a scribe] writes the standard text of [a get] on an article that is attached to its source of nurture, and detaches it and afterwards writes the names of the husband and the wife, the date and the words, "Behold, you are permitted [to marry] any man," and the witnesses signed and it was given to her, it is acceptable.

If the husband writes the get on a leaf growing in a flowerpot with a hole at the bottom, the get is unacceptable, even if he gives her the entire flowerpot. [This is] a decree, [lest] one detach [the leaf]. He may, however, write [the get] on the pottery of the flowerpot and give it to her.

What is the source that teaches that [the get] must be given to her for the sake of divorce? It is written: "... a bill of divorce for her, place it in her hand," [implying that] he must place [it in her hand] for the sake of divorce. If, however, he gave it to her as a promissory note or as a mezuzah, or he placed it in her hand while she was sleeping, and she awoke and [discovered] it in her hand, the get is void. If, however, he told her afterwards, "Behold this is your get, the divorce is effective.

[The above principle must be clarified in the context of the following law.] A man tells witnesses, "See the get I am giving her," and then he tells [his wife]: "Take this promissory note," [the get] is effective. For he has told the witnesses that he was giving it to her for the sake of divorce. He told her that it was a promissory note only because he was embarrassed [to face] her.

At the time he gives the get, [a man who] divorces [his wife] must tell her: "Behold, your get," or "This is your get," or the like. If he places the get in her hand without saying anything, the get is not acceptable. When does the above apply? When the husband was not speaking to her about divorce [immediately beforehand]. If, however, he had been speaking to her about divorce [at the time], and he takes the get and places it in her hand without saying anything, the divorce is acceptable.

[The following rules apply when] a get has been placed on the ground, and [the husband] tells [his wife], "Pick your get up from the ground," or it was tied to his hand or to his thigh, and she takes it from him. Even if after it reaches her possession, he tells her, "Behold this is your get," it is void. [The rationale is] that it is written: "And he will... place it in her hand," [implying] that she may not take it on her own accord. And [in these instances,] neither [the husband] nor his agent gave it to her. If, however, he bends his body toward her, or tilts his hand until she takes the get from him and says, "Behold this is your get," the get is [effective].

What is the source that teaches that [a get] must be given in the presence of witnesses? [Deuteronomy 19:15] states: "According to the words of two witnesses or those of three witnesses will the matter be established." It is impossible that on one day a woman will be considered to be forbidden and sexual relations with her punishable by execution, and on the next day she should be permitted [to any man] unless [the divorce is observed by] witnesses. Therefore, if [a husband] gives [his wife] a get in private, or even if the exchange is observed by one witness, the divorce is utterly void.

When does the above apply? When the get is written by a scribe. When, however, the husband writes the get himself, one witness signs it, and [the husband] gives it to her, the get is unacceptable [only by Rabbinic decree,] {and the woman is forbidden to marry a priest}.

It is an ordinance [enacted] by our Sages that witnesses should sign a get, lest a [husband] give [his wife] a get in the presence of two [witnesses], and they die. [In such an instance,] the get she possesses is no more than a shard, for there are no witnesses [to testify to its authenticity]. [To prevent such a situation, our Sages] ordained that the testimony [regarding the authenticity of the get should be contained] within it. Although witnesses [have signed] within, [the husband] must give [the get] to [his wife] in the presence of two [witnesses] - whether the same witnesses who signed it or two others. For in essence, divorce is established by virtue of the witnesses [who observe] the transfer [of the get].

[When] two [witnesses] sign [the get] and [the husband] transgresses an gives [it] to [his wife] in private or it is found that the witnesses [who saw] the transfer were unsuitable [to be witnesses], the [divorce is still] legally effective, since the witnesses were acceptable and the get has been transferred to her [the wife]. There are some among the Geonim who teach that [the get] is ineffective.

If the witnesses [who signed the get] are unsuitable - or even if one was unsuitable and one was acceptable - and [the husband] gave it to her in the presence of two acceptable witnesses, [the get] is unacceptable. It is as if it were a forgery.

If the witnesses signed [the get at a position] more than two lines away from the text [of the get], it is unacceptable. How far may the witnesses sign away from the text? Less than two lines, so that their [names] will be read together with [the text]. When does the [disqualification] mentioned above apply? When the get is in the woman's possession, and there are no witnesses [who observed its] transfer. If, however, [the husband] gave [his wife the get] in the presence of witnesses, [the get] is acceptable even if the witnesses'[signatures] are far removed from the text. [Moreover, this ruling applies] even when there were not any witnesses who signed [the get]. For in essence, divorce is effected by virtue of the witnesses [who observe] the transfer [of the get].

It is required to read the get [aloud] in the presence of the witnesses who observe its transfer. Afterwards, it should be given to her. If it was given to her in their presence first, it should be taken from her and read [aloud] after it was given to her. [The following rule applies when the witnesses] read [the get] while it is the possession of the husband or his agent, and they return it to him. If he encloses it within his hand, [obscuring it from the witnesses' view] and then gives it to her, they should read it again.

[In the latter instance,] if they did not read it, and it is taken and thrown into the sea or into a fire, the divorce is effective. Since [the witnesses] read it first, we do not suspect that it was exchanged [for another document]. Moreover, even if the husband said, "It was another document [that I gave her] and not the get that you read," his word is not accepted and the divorce is effective.

[If, however,] they did not read the get beforehand, the husband gives it to [his wife] in their presence, and then it is thrown into a fire or into the sea, the status of the divorce is doubtful. [This applies] even if the husband says that it was an acceptable get.

If he threw the get into [the woman's] courtyard, among barrels in the presence of witnesses, and when they looked for it they found a mezuzah or another document, we do not suspect that she [has been divorced]. [We assume that] the article that was found was the one that was thrown. If two or three mezuzot or documents were discovered there, and we suspect that perhaps he threw a get and it was dragged away by mice, the status of the woman's divorce is in doubt.

The witnesses who sign the get must know how to read and sign [their names]. If they do not know how to read, we read [the get] in their presence, and they sign, provided they understand the wording of the get. If they do not know how to sign [their names], we write out their signatures for them on the paper with spittle or with other substances that will not leave a permanent mark, and they sign [their names] over these markings. This practice is not followed with regard to other legal documents. It is a leniency adopted with regard to bills of divorce, so that Jewish women will not be forced to live without a marriage partner. [This leniency is granted] because the signature of witnesses on a bill of divorce is a Rabbinic institution, as we have explained.

Although the signature of witnesses on a bill of divorce is a Rabbinic institution, our Sages ordained that the witnesses state their names in the get. Similarly, they ordained that the witnesses to the get must sign in the presence of each other. If either signed without the other, [the get] is unacceptable. Similarly, our Sages ordained that the date of a get and the place where it was written be recorded [within it], as is required with regard to other legal documents. [This was required] lest one's wife also be one's relative and she commit adultery. [Because of the husband's feelings for his wife,] he [might conceivably] write her a get after she had committed adultery and give it to her. If the get was not dated, she could say: "I was divorced before I committed adultery." [To prevent this from happening, our Sages] ordained that gittin be dated.

In all the following instances, [the get] is unacceptable: a) a get signed by witnesses that is not dated, b) one that is predated, or postdated, c) one that was written during the day and signed on the following night; this applies even if they remained involved with the matter [of the divorce until the get was signed], d) the get was written in Jerusalem and [the scribe] erred and wrote [that it was written] in Lod. [For a get to be acceptable,] it is necessary that it be signed at the time it was written and in the place where it was written.

A get is acceptable if [the husband] cut off [the portion of the get that contained] the date and gave it to her, or did not write the date, merely [the week - i.e.,] the first or the second week of a given month, or he specified merely the month or [merely] the year without mentioning the month, or even if he specified merely the seven-year cycle [in which the get was composed]. Similarly, a get is acceptable if [the husband] writes within it: "Today I divorced her." This implies the day on which the get was released.

Similarly, [our Sages] ordained that the year of the ruling kingdom of that time should be mentioned in a get to gain the favor of the ruling authorities. [The following rules apply if] a person writes a get and dated it according to the years of a kingdom other [than that of his locale] or according to the years beginning from the Temple's construction or destruction. If it is customary for people in that locale to date [their documents] in this manner, it is acceptable. If this is not the local custom, it is unacceptable. It has already become the universal Jewish custom to date gittin from the time of creation, or from the crowning of Alexander the Great, which is [the accepted means of dating] for legal documents. If one dates [a get] according to the years of a contemporary kingdom, it is acceptable only in the country over which that kingdom rules.

[The following rules apply when] a person tells two [colleagues]: "Write a get for my wife, sign it and give it to her," and the matter was delayed several days or years, or the get was [discovered to contain an imperfection causing it] to be [considered] void, and it was necessary to write a new get that was acceptable, as will be explained. In such an instance, the date and the place when and where the get was written are recorded, and not the date and place when and where the husband told them to compose the get. What is implied? If the husband told them [to write the get] in Jerusalem, in [the month of] Tishrei, and [the agents] delayed and did not write it until Nisan, at which time they were located in Lod, the get should be dated in Nisan, and Lod [should be recorded as its place], for this is where the get was written. [This is also the practice] with regard to other legal documents.

The Torah's statement [Deuteronomy 24:1], "And he will write a bill of divorce for her and place it in her hand," refers both to [a husband] who writes [the get] with his own hand and to one who tells [another person] to write it for him. Similarly, [the husband] may place it in her hand or tell an agent to give it to her. The verse states, "And he will write," only to teach that divorce is effective only through the medium of a written document. "And [he will] place it" teaches that the woman may not take [the get] herself.

When [a husband] tells two [colleagues]: "Write a get, sign it, and give it to my wife," the two may write it, sign it, and give it to her. They are [the husband's] agents [for the divorce], and they are the witnesses [to it]. Similarly, if [the husband] tells a scribe: "Write a get for my wife for me," and he tells the witnesses to sign, the get may be written, signed and given to [the husband]. He may use it to divorce his wife whenever he desires.

We may write a get for a man even when he is not accompanied by his wife, provided the witnesses and the scribe who wrote and signed [the get] know the identity of the man and his wife. If there are two men in a city whose names are the same and whose wives' names are the same, one may divorce his wife only in the presence of the other. [This safeguard was enacted] lest one [of the men] have a get written and give it to the wife of the other man, causing her to [be considered] to be divorced from [her husband].

In a time of danger, we may write a get [on behalf of a husband] and give it [to his wife], even though we are not aware of [their identities]. It is the woman who always pays the scribe's fee.

The husband himself must tell the scribe to write [the get] and the witnesses to sign [it]. When a court of law or two [colleagues] ask a man: "Shall we write a get for your wife?" and he tells them to write [it and sign it], it is acceptable if they themselves write [the get] and sign it. If, however, they tell a scribe [to write] and he does, and they tell witnesses [to sign] and they do, the get is void, because it was written by someone who was not told to write it by the husband himself. [This ruling applies] even when they give [the get] to the husband, who in turn gives it to his wife in the presence of witnesses.

When [a man] tells two or three [colleagues]: "Tell a scribe to write a get for my wife and tell the witnesses to sign," and they convey these instructions, the get is unacceptable. [The same ruling applies if the husband] tells two [colleagues] to tell a scribe to write a get and tells them to sign it. This matter should be deliberated upon at length, because the get is close to being considered void.

What is the difference between the terms "unacceptable" (pasul) and "void" (bateil)? Whenever this text refers to a get as "void," that means that according to Scriptural law it is void. Whenever the term "unacceptable" is used, it refers to a get deemed unacceptable by Rabbinic decree.

When a husband brings a get that has been signed in his hand and tells [two colleagues]: "Give this get to my wife," they should give it to her [and it is acceptable]. If he tells others to write a get, sign it and give to his wife, and they write it, sign it and give it to her, and then it is discovered that the get is void or unacceptable, they may write another get - or even 100 other gittin - until the woman receives an acceptable get.

If the husband tells [two colleagues]: Write and sign [a get] and give it to an agent to bring to her, and they do as they were charged, but it was discovered that the get was void or unacceptable, they may not write another [get] until they consult the husband. [The rationale is] that [the husband] did not charge them with [effecting the divorce]. Perhaps he wanted merely that they write [the get] and give it to the agent. [If so, their agency was completed,] and nothing remains for them to do, for they have written it and given it [to the agent]. Therefore, they should not write another [get]. If they do write another get that is acceptable and give it to the agent - who in turn gives it to the wife - the status of the divorce is in doubt.

When a person tells two or more [colleagues]: "Write a get and give to my wife," "Divorce her," "Send her away," "Release her," "Discharge her," or "Write a letter and give it to her," [the colleagues] should write an acceptable get and give it to her. If, however, he tells them: "Dismiss her," "Give her what she needs," "Do as our faith requires to her," "Do as the law requires to her," "Do unto her as she deserves," his statements are of no consequence. If [these individuals] write a get and give it to the woman, the get is void.

If he tells them: "Get her out," "Let her go," "Permit her [to remarry]," "Let her be," "Assist her," there is doubt whether or not these terms imply that she should be divorced or whether they have another meaning. Therefore, [these individuals] should not write [a get] for her. If they write a get and give it to her, the status of the divorce is in doubt.

When [a man] says: "Write a get for my wife," [the people he addresses] should write the get, sign it and give it to him. They should not give it to the woman unless he tells them to. If they do give it to the woman, the get is not [effective]. When does the above apply? With regard to a healthy man. If, however, a man is dangerously ill - i.e., he suddenly falls sick and his illness rapidly becomes very severe - or if he is being led away in chains, even for financial matters, or he departs on an ocean journey, or he departs with a caravan [on a desert journey] and he says, "Write a get for my wife," they should write it, sign it and give it to her. For it is clear that his intent was that they should write the get and give it to her.

[The following rules apply when] a healthy person says: "Compose a get for my wife," and [his listeners] write a get, sign it and give it to her. If he commits suicide immediately thereafter - e.g., he throws himself down from a roof or jumps into the sea - the get is acceptable. If, however, he climbs up onto a [high] roof, and he is buffeted by the wind until he falls and dies, the get is void. If there is doubt whether he threw himself down [from the roof] or was buffeted by the wind, the get is valid unless it becomes known with certainty that he was buffeted by the wind. Similarly, if a man was cast into a pit and he said, "Whoever hears my voice should write a get for my wife," [his listeners] should write a get and give it to her, provided they recognize his identity. Even if [afterwards,] they took him out of the pit and could not identify him, [the divorce] is acceptable. For in time of danger, [a get] can be written and given to [a man's wife] even if they do not know his identity. Similarly, when a person suffers many severe blows, to the extent that it is impossible for him to survive - or even if the majority of [his windpipe and gullet] have been cut - and he makes motions and says: "Write a get for my wife," [his listeners] should write [a get] and give it [to her]. Although he will eventually die, he is alive at this time.

[The following rules apply when] a person is troubled by an evil spirit, and at the time when his infirmity begins to take hold of him says: "Write a get for my wife." His statements are of no consequence, because his thoughts are not organized and settled. The same ruling applies to a person who has become as drunk as Lot. If a drunkard has not reached that level [of incapacity], [the status of the divorce] is in doubt.

[The following rules apply when a] healthy [man] says: "Write a get for my wife and give it to her," and afterwards he becomes mentally disturbed. We wait until he becomes healthy again, and then we write the get and give it to her. There is no need to consult with him about the matter again when he regains his heath. If a get is written and given before he regains his health, it is unacceptable.

[The following rules apply when] a person loses his ability to speak, but is of sound mind. We ask him: "Should we write a get for your wife?" If he nods his head affirmatively, we test him with three [questions with different answers]. If he answers those [questions] to be answered affirmatively in the affirmative and those to be answered negatively in the negative, they should write [a get] and give it [to her]. His mental state must be checked thoroughly, lest he not be of sound mind. Similarly, if he writes by hand: "Write a get and give it to my wife," they should write it and give it to her, if [it appears] that he is of sound mind. For the laws governing a person who loses his ability to speak differ from those governing a deaf-mute.

When a person married while sound of mind and became a deaf-mute, he cannot divorce his wife until he regains his mental health. Needless to say, this applies to a person who loses his mental stability. We do not rely on the motions of a deaf-mute or on his writing, even if he is of sound mind. If, however, a deaf-mute married a woman while he was in that state, he may divorce her by making motions, for his consecration of her is not valid according to Scriptural law, as has been explained. Just as he married her by making motions, he may divorce her by making motions.

When a man consecrates a minor via her father's agency and [seeks to] divorce her while she is a minor, her father should accept her get. When the get reaches her father's possession, she is divorced. If [the husband seeks to] divorce [his arusah] when she is a na'arah, the divorce is effective when the get reaches her possession or her father's possession. A na'arah who is consecrated may not appoint an agent to receive her get from her husband during her father's lifetime. A father, by contrast, may appoint an agent to receive a get for his daughter who has been consecrated, whether she is a minor or a na'arah.

[The following rules apply when] a girl's father consecrates her when she is a minor and then [the father] dies. If [the girl] can differentiate between a get and another object, the divorce is effective after the get reaches her possession. If [she is] incapable [of making such a distinction], she cannot be divorced until she becomes capable of making such distinctions. If such a divorce is carried out, it is of no consequence.

When a man whom the law requires to be compelled to divorce his wife does not desire to divorce her, the court should have him beaten until he consents, at which time they should have a get written. The get is acceptable. This applies at all times and in all places. Similarly, if gentiles beat him while telling him: "Do what the Jews are telling you to do," and the Jews have the gentiles apply pressure on him until [he consents] to divorce his wife, the divorce is acceptable. If, however, the gentiles compel him to write [a get] on their own initiative, the get is [merely] unacceptable. The rationale is that the law requires him to give a divorce. Why is this get not void? For he is being compelled - either by Jews or by gentiles - [to divorce] against his will [and a get must be given voluntarily]. Because the concept of being compelled against one's will applies only when speaking about a person who is being compelled and forced to do something that the Torah does not obligate him to do - e.g., a person who was beaten until he consented to a sale, or to give a present. If, however, a person's evil inclination presses him to negate [the observance of] a mitzvah or to commit a transgression, and he was beaten until he performed the action he was obligated to perform, or he dissociated himself from the forbidden action, he is not considered to have been forced against his will. On the contrary, it is he himself who is forcing [his own conduct to become debased]. With regard to this person who [outwardly] refuses to divorce [his wife] - he wants to be part of the Jewish people, and he wants to perform all the mitzvot and eschew all the transgressions; it is only his evil inclination that presses him. Therefore, when he is beaten until his [evil] inclination has been weakened, and he consents [to the divorce], he is considered to have performed the divorce willfully. [Different laws apply when] the law does not require him to divorce his wife, and a Jewish court or simple people compel him to divorce her. This get is deemed unacceptable. Since, however, it was Jews who compelled him, he [is advised] to complete the divorce [in a proper manner]. If, by contrast, gentiles compel him to divorce when it was not required, the divorce is void. Even though he tells the gentiles that he consented and tells the Jews to write and sign [a get], since the law does not require him to divorce, and he was compelled to do so by gentiles, the get is void.

A get that is not written for the sake of the man [initiating] the divorce and for the sake of the woman who is being divorced is not valid. What is implied? A scribe wrote a get to learn [scribal arts] or to teach them, and a husband came and discovered that the get was written with his name; the name of the woman was the same as his wife's name; and the name of the city the same as the name of his city. If he took [this get] and used it to divorce [his wife], the divorce is void.

Furthermore, [a get is also void in the following instance:] [A man] had a get written so that he could divorce his wife and changed his mind. An inhabitant of his city discovered it and told him: "My name is the same as yours, and my wife's name is the same as your wife's." Although [the second man] took it and used it to divorce his wife, it is invalid, despite the fact that it was written in order to effect a divorce.

Furthermore, [a get is also void in the following instance:] [A man] had two wives with the same name, and he wrote a get with the intent of divorcing the older one, and changed his mind and used it to divorce the younger one. The divorce is invalid. Although it was written for the sake of the man [initiating] the divorce, it was not written for the sake of the woman who is being divorced.

Moreover, [in the above situation,] if he tells the scribe: "Write the get, and I will use it to divorce whichever one I desire," and the scribe wrote the get with that intent, and the husband divorced one of his wives, the status of the divorce is a matter of doubt. Whenever a get was not written with the proper intent, it remains void, even if the scribe rewrites the letters with the proper intent.

When a man writes a get [with the intent of] divorcing his wife, but he changes his mind and does not divorce her, he may not divorce her with this same get another time should he so desire, if he entered into privacy with her after [the get] was written. If, however, he did divorce her with this old get, the divorce is effective, and she may remarry on this basis without any qualms. For [the get] was written for her sake and was given to her now in the presence of witnesses, as the law requires. Why at the outset should it not be used for divorce? [This is] a Rabbinic decree, lest [people] say: "Her get preceded [the birth of] her son."

[The following rules apply when a man] tells a scribe, "Write a get for the sake of so and so, and it will remain in my possession. When I marry her, I will divorce her with it." If [the scribe] writes [such a get], and the man marries her and then he divorces her with it, the divorce is void. [The rationale is] that the woman could not be divorced when the get was written. Thus, it is considered not to have been written for the sake of divorce. If, however, [the man] tells [the scribe]: "Write [a get] for the woman who is consecrated to me. After I consummate the marriage, I will divorce her," should he consummate the marriage and divorce her with such [a get], the divorce is binding. If a man had [a get] written for his yevamah, and he divorced her with it after he performed the rite of yibbum, the status of the divorce is doubtful, for she was not his wife in an absolute sense when [the get] was written.

In order to assist scribes, our Sages permitted them to write the standard texts of gittin [beforehand] and leave empty the place for the man's [name], the woman's [name], the time and the place for [the sentence]: "Behold, you are permitted [to marry] any man." Thus, he can write [these parts of the get] for the sake of the man who gives the get and for the sake of the woman who receives it. Afterwards, he should have the witnesses sign for the sake of [the husband and the wife].

[The following rule applies if] a scribe wrote a get for the sake of the husband and the wife as required, and the witnesses signed without having that intent. Since [the husband] gives it to [his wife] in the presence of witnesses who observe the transfer, the get is valid [according to Scriptural law]. It is, however, {unacceptable [by Rabbinic decree]. Why is [it merely unacceptable and] not void?} Because the requirement for witnesses to sign the get [was instituted] only as a measure to aid society. There is an opinion that states that if the witnesses signed without the proper intent, since it as if it were a forgery, the get is void. Similarly, they maintain that if one of the witnesses was unacceptable, or if it was signed by one acceptable witness only, it is void even though it was transferred in the presence of witnesses. This ruling does not appear [correct] to me. For although [the get] resembles a forgery, it is not an absolute forgery. [Hence,] since it was transferred in the presence of acceptable witnesses, it is [merely] deemed unacceptable by Rabbinic decree.

[The following rule applies when a person] bringing a get loses it, and then it is discovered. If he lost it in a place not frequented by caravans - even if he found it after a long time had passed - we presume that the get that he lost is the get that was found and [the woman] may be divorced with it. [However, different rules apply if a get] was lost in a place frequented by caravans. If it was discovered immediately, before any of the passersby had tarried there, or if it was found in the container in which it was [originally] placed, and the agent can recognize the length and the width of the get that was rolled up within, we can presume that [it is the same get], and [the woman] may be divorced with it.

When it was established that there was another man in that place whose name was the same as the name written in the get, if another man passes by the place [the get was lost] - even if he did not tarry there - we suspect that the get that was found belongs to the other person. If the woman is divorced with this get, the status of the divorce is doubtful. If, however, another person has not passed by this place, we presume that [the get that was discovered was the one that was lost], even though there are two people with the same name.

If the witnesses knew of a clearly distinctive sign by means of which they could recognize the get - e.g., they said it had a hole next to a particular letter, or they said: "We signed only one get with these names" - we presume that [the get that was discovered was the one that was lost], and [the woman] may be divorced with it. [This ruling applies] even when [the get] was discovered after a long time had passed, [it was lost in] a place frequented by caravans, and it was established that there were two [men] with the same names.

[The following rules apply when] two men [with the same names] sent gittin together, and they were interchanged [and it is no longer known who sent which get]. Both gittin should be given to each of the women in the presence of witnesses who observe the transfer. [In this manner, both divorces are acceptable.] Therefore, if one of the gittin was lost, the second get is void.

[The following rules apply when] a man has two names and a woman has two names. When a divorce is initiated, [the husband] should write the names that he and his wife use most frequently and that they are most popularly known by. [The get] should say: "So and so, or by whatever names that he is called, divorces so and so or by whatever names she is called." If he writes [the husband's] or [the wife's] nickname, [the get] is acceptable.

If the name that was less popularly known was written [in the get], and it was also written: "or by whatever names he is called," the get is not acceptable. If the name of [the husband] or [the wife,] or the city in which either of them lives is written incorrectly, the get is void, despite the fact that the phrase "or by whatever names he is called" was also written in the get.

All are fit to write a get, with the exception of five: a gentile, a servant, a deaf-mute, a mentally incompetent person and a minor. A woman may even write her get herself. When a Jew becomes an apostate to false gods, or he desecrates the Sabbath in public, he is regarded like a gentile with respect to all matters [and is not fit to write a get].

Why are these five individuals [prevented] from writing gittin? Because a get must be written for the sake of the man initiating the divorce and the woman receiving the divorce, and a gentile writes with his own intent. A deaf-mute, a mentally incompetent person and a minor are not of [sufficient] mental capacity. And the laws of divorce and marriage do not apply to a servant; therefore, [in this area] he is disqualified; he is like a gentile in all respects. If one of these five individuals writes a get, it is void, even if it was signed by acceptable witnesses and given in the presence of acceptable witnesses.

When one of these five individuals writes the standard portion of the get and leaves the essential portions - i.e., the place for the man's [name], the woman's [name], the date and the sentence: "Behold, you are permitted [to marry] any man" - unwritten, and these were written by an adult mentally competent Jew with the proper intent, the get is acceptable.

At the outset, one may allow a deaf-mute, a mentally incompetent person or a minor to write the standard portions of a get, provided they are supervised by a mentally competent adult. A gentile or a servant, by contrast, should not be allowed to write the standard portions of a get at the outset, even when supervised by a Jew. For permission to write the standard portions of a get at the outset was granted only as assistance to scribes, as we have explained.

When a man writes a get on the Sabbath or on Yom Kippur, without knowing of the transgression, and gives it to [his wife], the divorce is effective. If it was written and signed on that day as a willful transgression and given to her, the divorce is not effective. For the witnesses [who signed] are disqualified by Scriptural law. If it was written on a holiday as a willful transgression and given to her in the presence of acceptable witnesses on the holiday, the get is unacceptable [by virtue of Rabbinic decree].

A get may be written only with a substance that leaves a permanent impression - e.g., ink, sikra, kumus, kankantum or the like. If, however, [a get] is written with a substance that does not leave a permanent impression - e.g., beverages, fruit juices or the like - the get is void. If [a get] is written with lead, a stylus or charcoal, it is acceptable. At the outset, however, these substances should not be used.

A priori, we may write with gallnut juice on paper, on a hide or the like. We may not use it to write on parchment that has been treated with gallnut juice, for it will not be distinct. If such a get is written, it is void. The same applies in all similar situations. A get may be written on any substance, even a substance from which one is forbidden to benefit. We may write [a get] on a substance on which an erasure would not be noticed, provided it is given [to the woman] in the presence of witnesses who observe the transfer.

What is implied? If a get is written on paper with erasures, on parchment that has not been fully processed, on a shard, on leaves, on the arm of a servant or on the horn of a cow, [it is acceptable, provided the husband] gives [his wife] the servant, the cow, the paper, the parchment or the like in the presence of witnesses.

When the get is tattooed on the hand of a servant, the signature of the witnesses is also tattooed there, and he is in the possession of [the wife], the divorce is effective, even though there are no witnesses to [the servant's] transfer, for [the tattoo] cannot be forged. Even when it is known to us that the servant [previously] belonged to the husband, the get is tattooed on his hand, and he is in the possession of the woman, and she says: "He was given to me in the presence of witnesses," the status of the divorce is in doubt. For the possession of living beings that can move independently is not considered proof of their ownership.

If a get is engraved on a tablet [with a stylus], and it is signed by witnesses, and [the tablet] is in [the woman's] possession, the divorce is effective. [This applies] even when it is known to us that the tablet [had previously] belonged to [the wife]. For a woman is allowed to write her get herself. The verification of a get is dependent on [the witnesses who] signed it, if there are no witnesses to its transfer.

[The following laws apply when] a get is engraved on a board, on a stone or on a metal plate: If the scribe engraved the form of the letters, it is acceptable. This is considered writing, as [reflected by] the verse, [Jeremiah 17:1]: "Written with a pen of iron" - i.e., hewed out. Similarly, if one engraved the letters from the back of the plate until they projected from the front of the plate [the get is acceptable]. If, however, one hewed out the inside of the letter, [and the area around it,] until the form of the letter protruded on both sides, like the protruding writing on golden dinarim, the get is void, because this is not considered writing.

If one etches out the shape of letters on a hide, or one sketches the form of letters on a hide [the get is acceptable]. A get may be written with any letters and in any language. A get that is written with the letters of one language and whose witnesses sign with the letters of another language is acceptable, provided the witnesses comprehend the language and the letters used.

If one of the witnesses signed the get with letters [from one language], and the other signed with letters of another language, the get is acceptable. If, however, a portion of the get is written in one language, and another portion is written in another language, it is unacceptable.

Regardless of the language in which a get is written, the scribe must be careful that the wording of the get does not allow for two meanings. It should not [leave] the reader [in doubt, wondering]: "Perhaps this was his intention" - i.e., something other than divorce - "or perhaps this was his intention" - i.e., divorce. Instead, [whatever] the language [of the get], the wording should unequivocally state one concept: that so and so divorces so and so.

Similarly, regardless of the letters used, the penmanship [of the scribe] must be clear, so that children who know those letters would be able to read it. [The intent is] children who are not overly bright, nor those who are overly slow, but rather those of average intelligence. The writing should not be crooked, nor incoherent, lest one letter be confused with another, changing the meaning of the text.

If [the wording of a get] has two implications, or its writing is crooked or incoherent to the extent that it is possible to understand a different concept from it, it is unacceptable. [It is not void,] because it may be read as referring to a divorce and its meaning involves divorce. Although a priori it is permissible to write a get in any language, it has already become universal Jewish practice to write gittin in Aramaic, using the following text.

This is the text of the get: On this day of the week, on this day of the month, in this year from creation - or according to the chronology employed for legal documents - according to the reckoning that we keep here in [the name of the place where the get is being given], in the following way, I [the husband's name,] the son of [his father's name], from [the name of his city] or by whatever names or nicknames by which I, my father, my place or his place are called, desire out of independent will without anyone forcing me, to dismiss, to release, to divorce you, [the woman's name,] the daughter of [her father's name], from [the name of her city] or by whatever names or nicknames you, your father, your place or his place is known. [Although] previously, you were my wife, now I am dismissing, releasing and divorcing you, so that you have the license and the authority to go and marry any man whom you desire. No one will protest [your actions] from the present day onward. You are free [to marry] any man. This will serve you as a bill of divorce, a get dismissing you, and a letter releasing you, from me, according to the faith of Moses and Israel. The witnesses sign below, as we explained: [The witness's name] the son of [his father's name], a witness, [the witness's name] the son of [his father's name], a witness.

When a get is written using the above text and wording, [the following rules should be adhered to:] The word ודן should not be written with a yud, so that it might be read as ודין, which might be interpreted as meaning: "There will be a judgment between me and you." The word ואגרת should not be written with a yud, lest it be read as ואי גרת, meaning "If you commit adultery." The word למהך should not be written with a yud, lest it be read as לי מהך - i.e., that it is a joke for me. The words תהוייין and תצבייין should not be written with only two yuddin, lest a reader get the impression that the man is speaking with two women, and rather than divorce the one, he is divorcing two others. Similarly, he should elongate the [latter] vav in the word וכדו lest it resemble a yud, which would cause the word to be read as uch'dei, in which instance, it would mean that "I am divorcing you on this condition." By the same token, he should elongate the vav in the words תרוכין and שבוקין, lest they resemble yuddin, in which instance it would mean that he is telling her that she is releasing and divorcing him. In a similar fashion, care must be taken in every language and with every form of lettering to make certain that [the wording of the get] does not leave the possibility for two implications.

If [a scribe] wrote [a get] using this text and did not elongate the vavin mentioned, did not write the extra yuddin, or wrote the yuddin that we said should not be written, the get is unacceptable. Similarly, [if a get is written] in another language, and imprecise wording or writing is used, it is unacceptable.

[The following rules apply if] a letter or a word of a get was rubbed out or written between the lines. If it is from the standard portion of the get, it is acceptable. If it is from the portions of the get that are of fundamental importance, the get is void. If, however, at the conclusion of the get, it is stated that the particular letter has been written between the lines or has been rubbed out, the get is acceptable, as other legal documents would be, even if [the difficulty] concerns the portions of the get that are of fundamental importance. Similarly, if a get was discovered to be torn [both] horizontally and vertically, as is customary for a court [to tear a legal document], the get is void, as would be other legal documents. If, however, it is torn in a way other than the manner customary for a court [to tear a legal document], it is acceptable.

If [the get] has faded, rotted or become [filled with holes like] a sieve, it is acceptable. [The following rules apply if] it has been rubbed out or the letters have become blurred, but their form remains. If it can be read, it is acceptable; if not, it is void.

When does the above apply? When the woman is in possession of a get that has been signed by witnesses, and there are no witnesses to its transfer. If, however, there are witnesses who testify that the get was transferred in their presence, and at that time it was acceptable, the divorce is binding. [This applies] even if the fundamental portions of the get were written on erased parchment or between the lines, or [the get] was torn [both] horizontally and vertically when it was given to [the woman] in their presence.

[The following rules apply when] five men write a single get to divorce their five wives. The get is acceptable if the wording they use is inclusive - i.e., they wrote "On the day of the week, so and so divorced so and so, and so and so divorced so and so..." - every husband making a statement to his wife. Similarly, each of them told his wife: "so that you have the license to...," including the entire standard portion of the get. Two witnesses must sign below. [This get] must be given to each of the women in the presence of witnesses who observe its transfer. If no witnesses observe its transfer at all, the woman who is in possession of the get is considered to be divorced. [Different rules apply if,] by contrast, [the scribe] wrote: "On the day of the week, so and so divorced so and so...," completing the entire text of the get and then began writing a second get directly under it in the same scroll. [He continued] writing: "On the day of the week, so and so divorced so and so...," and so completed the entire text of the second get and similarly completed all the gittin in this manner [on the same scroll], and the witnesses signed below [the final get]. If this scroll was given to each of the women in the presence of witnesses who observed the transfer, all their divorces are effective. [More stringent rules apply] if there are no witnesses who observed the transfer, and the scroll is in the possession of one of the women: If hers was the last get written on the scroll and the signatures of the witnesses are read together with [that statement], her divorce is effective. If the scroll is in the possession of one of the women whose gittin precede the last one, the status of her divorce is in doubt.

If [the scribe] writes: "We, so and so and so and so, divorce our wives, so and so and so and so,..." and then completes the get, the get is void, even though it was given to each one of them in the presence of witnesses who observed its transfer. [The rationale:] two women cannot be divorced with the same get, as [we can infer from Deuteronomy 24:1]: "And he shall write for her," [implied is:] for her and not for her and her colleague. If after [writing the text as above], he continued and wrote individual statements for each one within the get, stating, "So and so is divorcing so and so, and so and so is divorcing so and so on this date," the divorces are acceptable.

[The following rules apply when a scribe] wrote two gittin in two columns on one scroll side by side. If there are two witnesses [whose signatures] are read [as a continuation of] one get, and two witnesses [whose signatures] are read [as a continuation of] the other get, the get is acceptable. Whichever woman is in possession of the get is divorced.

[In the above instance, if the gittin] were signed by only two witnesses, who signed across the width of both gittin, the divorce is valid only when the scroll is in the possession of the woman under whose get the signatures appear. If the scroll is in the possession of the woman under whose get the signatures of the witnesses do not appear, the get is not acceptable unless it is given to her in the presence of witnesses [who observe the transfer].

[The following rules apply if a scribe] writes two gittin, one above the other, and the witnesses sign between the two gittin - their signatures thus being below the first get and above the second get. If the scroll is in the possession of the woman under whose get the signatures appear, her divorce is valid, and the woman above whose get the signatures appear is not divorced. If the witnesses signed at the top of a get, at its side or on its overside, it is not a get. If it was given to [the woman] in the presence of witnesses, it is acceptable.

If two gittin [were written in an arc,] with the beginning of one get facing the beginning of the other get, and the signature of the witnesses is located between the tops of both gittin, both are void. If they are transferred in the presence of witnesses, both are acceptable.

[The following rules apply if the scribe did not complete the text of the get in one column,] left a portion unwritten and wrote it at the top of a second column. If the witnesses signed below, at the end of the second column, it is acceptable, provided it is obvious that the scroll was not cut off, and it was the scribe's intent to complete the get in the second column. If, however, this is not apparent, the status of the divorce is in doubt, even if the get was given in the presence of witnesses. [The rationale is that] perhaps there were two gittin, and the portion below the get in the first column and a portion above the get in the second column were cut off.

If, after writing the get and completing it, [the scribe] wrote: "Give regards to so and so," "Greetings to you, so and so, my friend," or the like, and afterwards the witnesses signed beneath the greeting, the status of the divorce is doubtful, despite the fact that the woman is in possession of the get. [The rationale is] perhaps the witnesses signed only for the greeting [without paying attention to the get]. If, however, the scribe wrote: "And give regards to so and so," "And greetings to you, so and so, my friend," or the like, the get is acceptable. Since [the greeting] accompanies the get, [we presume that the witnesses] signed with both these thoughts in mind. If [the get] was given to her in the presence of witnesses, it is acceptable in either instance.

The Torah's expression, [Deuteronomy 24:1]: "He will... place it in her hand," need not be interpreted only [according to its strict literal meaning], that the get must be placed in her hand. Regardless of whether the get is placed in her hand, her bosom or her courtyard, or is given to her agent whom she charged that his hand would be as her hand, the same law applies. The same laws apply to a courtyard that she acquired, one that she rented or one that is lent to her. They are all considered to be her property, and once the get reaches her property, the divorce is effective.

[The following laws apply when a man] throws a get for his wife into her courtyard. If she is standing next to her courtyard, the divorce is effective. If she is not standing next to her courtyard, the divorce is not effective until she stands next to her courtyard. [These principles apply] even when the get will be guarded in the courtyard in which [it is placed]. [The rationale is that] divorce is considered to be a liability [and not an advantage] for [a woman]. And a liability may not be invoked against [a person] outside his [or her] presence.

[These rules apply when a get is given in the following situation. A woman] is standing on her roof, and [her husband] is standing in his courtyard that is located below it. He throws a get upwards to her. Once the get reaches the space of the guardrail [to her roof] or comes within three handbreadths of the roof [when her roof does not have a guardrail], the divorce is effective. [This applies provided the get ultimately] comes to rest on her roof. If, however, [the writing of the get] is erased or [the get] is consumed by fire before it reaches her, the divorce is not effective. [This applies] even if the get is erased or consumed by fire after it passes the barriers of the woman's property or after it reaches within three handbreadths of her roof. [The rationale is that] since the get will never come to rest [in a complete state], it is void.

[Different rules apply when] the roof belongs to the husband and he stands on it, while his wife stands below in a courtyard that belongs to her, and he throws her a get. Once the get passes the boundaries of his property and enters the boundaries of her property, where she is standing, the divorce is binding.

If, however, he throws a get into a fire located on the woman's property and it is consumed by the flames, or into water and it is erased or lost, the get is void. If, however, it enters her property (and comes to rest), and afterwards fire comes and consumes it, the divorce is effective.

When the husband tosses the get on top of a reed or a spear implanted in her domain, the divorce is not effective until [the get] comes to rest in a place that is protected by her. [The following rule applies when] there are two courtyards, the inner courtyard belongs to the woman, the outer courtyard belongs to the man, and the walls of the outer courtyard are taller than those of the inner courtyard. If [the husband] throws the get into the space [of the inner courtyard, above its walls, but lower than the walls] of the outer courtyard, the divorce is effective. [The rationale is] the inner [courtyard] is protected by the walls of the outer [courtyard]. This concept does not apply with regard to containers.

What is implied? There are two containers, located one inside the other [and both are located in the husband's domain]. The inner container belongs to her and the outer container belongs to him. If [the husband] throws the get to [his wife] toward the containers, the divorce is not effective - even when the get reaches the space of the inner container - until it comes to rest on the side of the inner container. [Moreover,] the above applies only when [the woman's container] is lying on its side and does not have a bottom. If it has a bottom, even if [the get] comes to rest on that bottom, the divorce is not effective. For when a container belonging to a woman is located in the domain of the husband, the woman may not acquire a get by means of it unless the husband is not concerned about the place it occupies.

When [a husband] throws a get to his wife while she is located in his house or in his courtyard, the divorce is not effective until the get reaches the woman's hand or a container that belongs to her, to whose presence within his domain the husband does not object - e.g., a small bottle or basket or the like. Similarly, if the get reaches a couch belonging to her on which she is sitting that is ten handbreadths high, the divorce is effective. For [the couch] is considered to be a separate domain, and the husband does not object to the place taken by its legs.

[The following rules apply when] the husband lends his wife a place in his courtyard [for the purpose of receiving her get], without defining its borders. If he throws her the get and it reaches within four cubits of where she is standing, the divorce is effective. When [in the above instance, the get] rolled away [from the place where the woman is standing,] and fell on a beam or on a rock further removed from her, [the following rules apply]. If the place where [the get] fell is not four cubits by four cubits, nor is it ten [handbreadths] high, nor does it have a separate name of its own, it is not considered to be a distinct entity, and it is as if [the get] and [the woman] were in the same place. [Therefore, the divorce is effective.] If the place is characterized by any of these three factors, it is considered to be a distinct entity. [Since] the husband lent the woman one place, but not two places, the divorce is not effective until the get reaches her hand.

If [the husband] throws the get to her [while she is in her domain], and [the get] passes through the domain and falls outside her domain [the divorce is not effective]. Even if the get passes within three [handbreadths] of the ground, the divorce is not effective until [the get] comes to rest in her domain.

[The following rule applies when a woman] is standing on her roof, [her husband] throws her [a get], and [instead of reaching her,] it falls on a roof [belonging to another person]. If the woman can stretch out her hand and take it, the divorce is effective. [The rationale is that] although the domains are divided above as they are divided below, [and thus the get is located on a domain that does not belong to the woman, this is not significant,] for people are not concerned with [a neighbor's making use of] their property in such a manner.

[The following rules apply if a woman holds] her hand at an incline, [her husband] throws a get to her hand, and it falls to the earth. If it falls within four cubits of where she is standing and comes to rest there, the divorce is effective. When, [however, the get] falls into the sea or into a fire, the divorce is not effective, if she is standing next to the water or the fire [when the get is thrown to her]. [The rationale is] that, at the outset, it would be destroyed as it fell.

[The following rules apply when a husband] throws a get to [his wife] in the public domain or in a domain that does not belong to either of them. If [the get] is "close to him," the divorce is not effective. If [the get] is partially "close to him," and partially "close to her," the status of the divorce is in doubt unless it is definitely close to her. If [the get] is close enough to her that she can bend down and pick it up, the divorce is unacceptable [according to Rabbinic decree]. [Only when] the get reaches her hand may she remarry on this basis a priori.

What is meant by "close to him"? That he could protect the get while she could not. If both are able to protect [the get], or both are unable to protect it, it is considered to be partially "close to him," and partially "close to her."

[If a husband] comes to a place first and stands there, and then [his wife] comes and stands opposite him, the divorce is not effective if he throws her [a get] and [it falls] within his four cubits, even if she can bend down and pick it up. If she comes to the place first and stands, and then he comes and stands opposite her and throws it to her, even when [the get] is partially "close to him" and partially "close to her," the get is [merely] deemed unacceptable [by virtue of Rabbinic decree] because it is within her four cubits. [Only when] the get reaches her hand [is the divorce effective a priori].

[The following rules apply when a husband] throws a get that is tied with a string into [his wife's] hand and he remains holding the other end of the string. If he can pull [the get from her hand] and bring it back to him, the divorce is not effective until he snaps the string. If he cannot pull [the get from her], the divorce is effective.

[The following rules apply when a husband] gives [a woman's] get to a servant belonging to her. If he is awake, he is bound and she is guarding him, the divorce is effective. It is considered to be as if [the get] were placed in a courtyard belonging to her and she is standing at its side. If [the servant] is not bound, the divorce is not effective. If [the husband] places [the get] in the servant's hand while he is sleeping, and [the woman] is guarding him, the get is unacceptable [by virtue of Rabbinic decree]. If [the servant] is bound, the divorce is acceptable.

[The following rules apply if a husband] writes a get, places it in the hand of a servant belonging to him and writes a deed for the woman, giving her the servant as a present. If the servant is bound, the divorce is effective, for when she acquires the servant she also acquires the get. If the servant is unbound and awake, [the woman] acquires the servant; the divorce, however, is not effective until the get reaches her hand. Similarly, if [a man] placed a get in a courtyard belonging to him and sold or gave the courtyard to [his wife], the divorce is effective once she acquires the courtyard by virtue of the transfer of a deed or money, or by manifesting her ownership over it.

An agent who is appointed by a woman to receive her get from her husband is called a receiving agent (sh'liach kabbalah). When the get reaches this agent's hand, the divorce is completed, as if it has reached the hands of the woman herself. [The agent] must be appointed in the presence of two witnesses, and two witnesses must be present when the get is conveyed to the agent. Even if the second pair of witnesses is the same as the first pair, or one of them is from the first pair, they are acceptable as witnesses.

When does the above apply? When the get is lost or torn. If, however, the get is in the possession of the sh'liach kabbalah, there is no need for witnesses. This applies whether the get was given by the husband in private, or it was given in the presence of witnesses. The presence of the get in the possession of the agent is equivalent to its presence in the possession of the woman. Nevertheless, a priori, the get should be given only in the presence of witnesses who observe its transfer, as is the case with regard to [a get given to] the woman herself.

A husband may not appoint an agent to receive a get for his wife. He may, however, appoint an agent to deliver a get to his wife. Such an agent is referred to as a delivery agent (sh'liach holachah).

Similarly, a woman may appoint an agent to fetch her get for her from her husband. Such an agent is referred to as an agent who fetches (sh'liach hava'ah). Neither a sh'liach holachah nor a sh'liach hava'ah need [be appointed in the presence of] witnesses.

A woman is not divorced through the medium of a get sent by her husband or brought by a sh'liach hava'ah [whom she appointed] until the get reaches her hand. Whenever the term agent is used with regard to a get without any further explanation, the intent is a sh'liach holachah or a sh'liach hava'ah.

Anyone is acceptable to act as an agent with regard to a divorce, whether as a sh'liach kabbalah, a sh'liach holachah or a sh'liach hava'ah, with the exception of five individuals: a gentile, a servant, a deaf mute, a mentally incompetent individual and a minor. If one of these individuals brings or receives [a get], the divorce is not effective.

Even women, relatives and individuals who are disqualified [from serving as witnesses] because of the violation of Rabbinic law are acceptable to serve as agents for a divorce. Individuals who are disqualified because of the violation of Scriptural law, by contrast, are not acceptable [to serve as agents] to deliver a get. If they bring it, the divorce is unacceptable. When does the above apply? When the signatures on the get have been verified. If, however, we must rely only on the words of an individual who is disqualified because of the violation of Scriptural law, the divorce is void entirely.

If the agent was a minor when he was given the get, and he attained majority when he brought it [to the woman], [or he was a] deaf mute and gained the ability to hear and speak, [or he was] mentally incompetent and gained competence, [or he was] a gentile and converted, or a servant and was freed, the divorce is void. If, however, the husband gives [an agent] a get while [the agent] is able to hear and speak, [or the agent then] becomes a deaf mute and afterwards regains his ability to hear and speak, or [the agent] was mentally competent, he lost his competence and then regained it when he brought it to the woman, the get is acceptable, for at the outset and at the conclusion, [the agent] was of sound mind.

When a woman appoints an agent in the presence of witnesses and tells him: "Take my get and keep it for me in your possession," the person is a sh'liach kabbalah. It is as if she told him: "Receive my get for me." A woman may appoint a sh'liach kabbalah to receive her get for her from an agent appointed by her husband. A girl below the age of majority may not appoint a sh'liach kabbalah. Although she may acquire property by virtue of her courtyard in the same manner as an adult woman [she does not have the privilege of appointing an agent]. The rationale is that [the appointment of] a sh'liach kabbalah requires witnesses, and witnesses may not testify with regard to a minor, because she is not of complete mental competence.

[The following laws apply] when a woman has appointed a sh'liach kabbalah and her husband told him: "I do not want you to receive the get for her. Instead, here is her get. Bring it to her." The husband has this prerogative, and the person becomes a sh'liach holachah, rather than a sh'liach kabbalah. If, however, the husband tells [the woman's agent]: "Receive the get for her," "Here it is," or "Acquire it for her," he has not revoked the agency [with which] the sh'liach kabbalah [was charged]. But if [the husband] tells [the agent]: "Bring it to her," he has revoked the agency [with which] the sh'liach kabbalah [was charged] and has made him the agent of the husband. Similarly, if the husband said: "Bring it and give it to her," he has revoked the agency [with which] the sh'liach kabbalah [was charged].

[In the following situation, although the get reaches the woman's hand, the divorce is not effective because of the confusion in the delegation of agency.] An agent appointed by a woman came to receive her get from her husband. The agent told the husband: "I am a sh'liach kabbalah." The husband responded: "Bring the get [in the capacity] in which she appointed you" - i.e., he did not revoke his agency. Instead, it is as if he had said: "Whether she appointed you to be a sh'liach kabbalah or a sh'liach hava'ah, you remain in that capacity." The agent brought [the woman] the get, but she told him: "I did not appoint you to be a sh'liach kabbalah, but rather to be a sh'liach hava'ah." Even if the agent gives her the get, the divorce is not effective, for in speaking to the husband, the agent revoked the agency that he was granted. It is as if he had told him: "I was never appointed a sh'liach hava'ah on her behalf."

[A different ruling applies in the following instance.] The agent told the husband, "I am a sh'liach hava'ah," and the husband told him, "Bring [the get in the capacity] in which she appointed you." The agent brought [the woman] the get, but she told him: "I appointed you to be a sh'liach kabbalah." When the get is delivered to the woman, the divorce is effective, for he did not revoke the agency that he was granted. He merely reduced [her dependence on him]. For she appointed him [as an agent] to receive [the get], and he said: "I will merely bring it."

[The following rules apply when] a husband sends a get to his wife, and when the agent attempts to give it to her, she refuses to take it and tells him in the presence of witnesses, "Hold the get in safekeeping," or "You are an agent to receive it for me." Until the get is given to the woman, the status of the divorce is in doubt. Once it reaches her possession, the divorce is definitely binding.

When an agent brings a get, he must give it to the woman in the presence of two [witnesses]. These two [witnesses] must read [the get] and then have it given in their presence. For the laws applying to the exchange between the agent and the woman are the same as those applying to her exchange with her husband, for the agent is taking his place. Accordingly, if the agent gave [the get] to her without having it read by the witnesses who observed its transfer, and the woman took it and threw it into the ocean, the status of the divorce is in doubt.

When an agent transgresses and gives [a woman her] get in private, he should take it back from her and give it to her in the presence of two [witnesses]. If he dies [and thus this is no longer possible], and the signatures of the witnesses on the get that the woman possesses have been verified, the divorce is acceptable.

Even when a get is delivered to the woman [for whom it is intended], it can be nullified [in the following instances]: The agent took the get, but the husband changed his mind before it reached the woman and told him or her: "The get that I sent you is void," he sent another agent to nullify [the get], or he told others, "The get that I sent to my wife is void." When [a husband] nullifies the get in the presence of other people, there must be at least two people present. If the get has already been delivered to the woman or to a sh'liach kabbalah, the husband can no longer nullify it. [This applies] even if he nullifies the get within a very brief time [after appointing the agent]; since [the get] was nullified after being delivered to the woman, to [her] sh'liach kabbalah or to her courtyard, it is not void, and the divorce is effective.

Although [a husband] was seeking to appoint an agent to nullify [a get], or he was seeking two individuals so that he could nullify [the get] in their presence, and during the time he was searching for these individuals the get reached the woman's hand, and afterwards he nullified it, it is not void. Despite the fact that he was trying to nullify it before it reached her hand [the divorce is effective].

If [the husband] told ten men: "Write a get and give it to my wife," he may nullify [the get] in the presence of one of the ten, although the others are not present. And he may nullify it in the presence of two other people [who were not involved originally]. If he sent the get via two [agents], he may negate one of the agents although the other is not present. Even when there are ten agents, when he negates [the agency] in the presence of one of them, the get is void.

Similarly, when a person tells two [witnesses], "The get that I [am intending to] write for my wife is nullified," although he has a get written afterwards and gives it to her in the presence of two other [witnesses], the divorce is void. This is referred to as lodging an objection with regard to a get. Similarly, if [the husband] were to tell two [witnesses]: "Any get that so and so will write for me is nullified," "Any get that I will have written in the court of so and so is nullified," or "Any get that I will have written in the next twenty years is nullified," the get is nullified. Similarly, if he told two [witnesses]: "Any get that I write for so and so, my wife, is nullified. And any statements that I make to nullify this objection are nullified," the get is void, although he had it written and given to her, despite the fact that he nullified his objection before having the get written.

How can the latter situation be corrected? The witnesses should tell [the husband] before the composition of the get: "Affirm in our presence that any statements that you have made that when verified would cause [this] get to be nullified, are themselves nullified." [The husband] must answer "Yes." Afterwards, he should instruct them to write the get, sign it and give it to his wife. We do not let [the husband] leave until the get is delivered [to his wife], lest he go out and nullify [the get]. Neither a person who lodges an objection [to a get], nor one who seeks to nullify such an objection needs [to have his statements affirmed by] an act of contract.

When a person has sent a get via an agent and [later] nullifies [the giving of] the get, he may divorce the woman with [this get] whenever he desires. He did not nullify the get as a get; he merely nullified the agency. Therefore, if the get was in the possession of the husband and he nullified it - e.g., he said: "This get is nullified" - he may never use it for a divorce. It is like a broken shard, and if it is used for a divorce, the divorce is not effective. Similarly, if the get was entrusted to the agent, but the husband made an explicit statement, saying: "The get that I sent is nullified [and may not] serve as a get," he may never use it to effect a divorce.

Which wording can be used to nullify a get? [The husband] says: "It is nullified," "I cannot abide by it," "May this get not be effective," "[May it] not permit [her]," "[May it] not release [her], "[May it] not send [her] forth," "[May it] not divorce [her]," "May it be a shard," "May it be like a shard," or "Behold it is like a shard" - If he used any of these expressions or a similar one, he has negated it.

If, however, [the husband] says: "This get is not a get," "It is unacceptable," "It is not effective," "It does not permit [her]," "It does not release [her], "It does not send [her] forth," "It does not divorce [her]," "It is a shard," his statements are not effective. This wording does not [indicate his desire to] nullify [the get]. Instead, they are statements of fact, and in this instance, statements of incorrect fact. It is as if someone said that a forbidden entity were permitted or that an impure object were pure.

If he says, "This get is nullified," [it is possible that] the implication is the use of the past tense, as in the phrase [Song of Songs 5:6]: "He turned away and was gone." Thus, there is a question concerning the matter. Therefore, if [a woman] has been divorced with this get [after such statements were made], the status of the divorce is in doubt.

[As reflected in the following instance, an explicit statement must be made to nullify the get: A man] sent a get to his wife [via an agent]. The agent returned to him and said: "I could not find her," or "She did not want to receive it." Although the husband answered: "Blessed be He who is good and does good," or made other statements that imply that he no longer wants to divorce her, and that he is happy that the get was not delivered, the get is not nullified. Instead, he may give it to her and the divorce will be effective. [For the get to be nullified,] he must explicitly say "Do not give it to her," or he should explicitly nullify it [using one of the above expressions].

A person who sent a get to his wife [via an agent] and then nullified [the get] in the presence of two other people, and similarly, a person who issued an objection [nullifying] a get, should be given stripes for rebelliousness, because he makes it possible for illegitimate children to be conceived. Since a get reached [the woman], [it is possible that] she will marry on this basis. [Only] afterwards, when the witnesses in whose presence the husband nullified the get or issued an objection before the get was written appear [will she realize the difficulty]. Thus, a child [conceived in her second marriage] will be illegitimate.

When an agent brings a get and gives it to a woman, we do not suspect that the husband nullified it. Instead, he should give it to the woman under the presumption that it is acceptable, and the woman may marry on this basis. If it is discovered afterwards that [the husband] negated it, [the woman] must leave [her second husband], and any children conceived are illegitimate. Similarly, when [a husband] has a get written and gives it to his wife, we do not suspect that perhaps he lodged an objection regarding this get. Instead, we operate under the conception that the get is acceptable, and the woman is allowed to marry on this basis.

Similarly, when an agent brings a get [that was sent by] a man who was sick or elderly, he may give it to the woman under the presumption that the husband is still alive. If, however, the husband was in his death throes when [the agent left], even when he gives the get to the woman the status of the divorce is in doubt. For the majority of those in their death throes will die, and a get given after death is not effective. Similarly, when a city is surrounded by an army and held under siege, a ship is in distress at sea, or a person is taken out to be judged [with regard to a capital case], we presume that any person in such a situation is alive. If a person in such a situation has sent a get [to his wife] via an agent, he may give it to her, and the presumption will be that the divorce is effective.

When, by contrast, a city has been conquered by an attacking army and [its wall] broken, a ship is lost at sea, a person is being taken out to be executed by a gentile court, or he is being dragged by a beast of prey, swept away by a river or an avalanche has fallen upon him, the stringencies applying to both the living and the dead, are followed. If [a person in one of these situations gave] a get to an agent, the agent should not give it to the husband's wife. If, however, he gives it to her, the status of the divorce is in doubt. If it is known that the husband died before the get reached his wife, the divorce is void.

When a husband sends his wife a get, he is obligated to provide her with support and fulfill the other stipulations of the marriage contract, until the get reaches [his wife] or a sh'liach kabbalah she has appointed.

[The following rules apply when] an agent brings a get from one place to another in Eretz Yisrael. Although [the agent] did not witness the writing of the get and does not know who the witnesses are, but rather the get was given to him by the husband, who instructed him to give it to his wife, [the agent] may give [the woman the get] in the presence of witnesses. Although the identity of the witnesses [who signed the get] is unknown to us, [the woman] is considered divorced, and she may remarry on this basis.

If the husband came and protested, saying: "I never divorced her. The get she was given is a forgery," the signatures [of the witnesses] should be verified. If this is impossible, and the witnesses are not known at all, she must leave [her second husband], and [any children born to them] are considered illegitimate, for [we assume that] she has not been divorced. If the get has been lost, the status of the divorce is in doubt. For this reason, women who we presume hate each other are not trusted to bring a get to one another in Eretz Yisrael. [We suspect that] it might be a forgery, because one desires that the other remarry and be forbidden to her husband[s].

These are the women who we presume hate each other: A mother-in-law, the daughter of a mother-in-law, another woman married to the same man - this applies even if this woman has since remarried - her yevamah - this applies even if she was her sister - and her husband's daughter [from another marriage]. All other women are acceptable [to act in this capacity].

When a man brings a get from one place to another place in Eretz Yisrael and becomes sick or is prevented from fulfilling his agency because of factors beyond his control, he may send the get via a second agent. Similarly, if the second agent becomes sick, he may send it via another agent. Indeed, even 100 agents [may be appointed in this manner]. There is no need for the agent to appoint the second agent in the presence of witnesses. The final agent to whom the get is given should give it to the woman in the presence of two witnesses, and the divorce is effective. [This applies] even when the first agent dies [before the divorce takes effect].

[The following rules apply when] an agent brings a get from one place to another in the diaspora, from Eretz Yisrael to the diaspora or from the diaspora to Eretz Yisrael. If the agent was present at the time of the composition and signature of the get, he should say, in the presence of two witnesses, "It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence." Afterwards, it should be given in her presence, and the divorce takes effect, even though the identity of the witnesses is not known to us. Even if the witnesses' names resemble the names of gentiles, we do not suspect [that there is any difficulty].

If [afterwards,] the husband came and protested [that the get is a forgery], his words are of no consequence. Therefore, even women who we presume hate each other are relied upon to bring a get in such a situation and state that it was written and signed in their presence.

Similarly, when an agent who brings a get in Eretz Yisrael says: "It was written and signed in my presence," although he is not required to do so, if the husband comes and protests [that the get was forged], [the husband's] words are of no consequence. [With regard to a get sent to or from the diaspora,] if the agent was not present at the time of the writing or signing of the get, it may not be given to the woman unless the signatures [of the witnesses] were verified. The agent himself may serve as [one of] the three [judges] who verify the signatures of the witnesses. If [the signatures] were not verified, and the get was given to the woman, the divorce is unacceptable until [the signatures] are verified. If the husband comes and protests, and the signatures are not verified, we consider her not to be divorced. If the get has been lost, the status of the divorce is in doubt.

Why did [our Sages] require [the agent] to say: "It was written and signed in my presence" in the diaspora? So that the woman would not have to have [the signatures] verified if the husband comes and protests. [Our Sages did not desire that she be faced with such a predicament,] because witnesses are often not available to verify signatures [on a document that has been taken] from one place to another in the diaspora.

When a husband brought explicit proof that a get concerning which [an agent] said: "It was written and signed in my presence" is a forgery, [the get] is void. For [our Sages] accepted the statements of one person only in the face of a protest raised by a husband that was not accompanied by substantial proof. When, however, this person's statements are contradicted by witnesses, [his statements] are not accepted.

The rivers in Eretz Yisrael and the islands in the Mediterranean Sea that are within the boundaries of Eretz Yisrael are bound by the rules pertaining to Eretz Yisrael. [The islands] that are outside these boundaries are bound by the rules pertaining to the diaspora. The boundaries of Eretz Yisrael are described in Hilchot Terumot. With regard to gittin, [the rules pertaining to] Eretz Yisrael also pertain to Babylonia.

When a get was written in Eretz Yisrael and signed in the diaspora, [the agent] is required to say: "It was written and signed in my presence." If it was written in the diaspora and signed in Eretz Yisrael, [the agent] is not required to say: "It was written and signed in my presence."

When a portion of the get is written in [the agent's] presence, and all the signatures were executed in his presence, he may say: "It was written and signed in my presence," provided it was the initial portion - even one line - [that was written in his presence]. [Moreover,] even if he merely heard the noise [made by the scribe's] pen [writing], and the witnesses signed in his presence, he may say: "It was written and signed in my presence." Similarly, even if the scribe went out to the marketplace and then returned and completed the get, [the agent] does not fear that another [man] found [the scribe] and told him [to write a get for him], and he [completed] writing the get for another person. Instead, [the agent] may say: "It was written and signed in my presence."

If [the agent] said: "It was written in my presence," but did not say, "It was signed in my presence," [if he said,] "It was signed in my presence," but did not say, "It was written in my presence," or [if he said,] "The entire [get] was written in my presence, and one witness signed [in my presence], but not the other witness," even if he himself was the other witness, the signature of the witnesses must be verified. Only then, may [the get] be given to her. If he and another person testify with regard to [the signature of] the second witness, who did not sign in his presence, [the get] is acceptable and may be given to her. Needless to say, if two other [witnesses] testify with regard to [the signature of] the second witness, [the get] is acceptable.

When two agents bring a get from the diaspora, they may give it to [the woman], causing the divorce to be effective, even though it was not written and signed in their presence. Since the husband gave it to them to give to his wife, his protests regarding this get are of no consequence. Although [the signatures of the witnesses] have not been verified, the agents he [appointed] serve as witnesses [to its authenticity]. For if these witnesses said, "She was divorced in our presence," the divorce would be effective, even though there is no get present.

When does the above apply? When the get is in the possession of both of them. If, however, the get is not in the possession of both of them, they must say: "It was written and signed in our presence." Accordingly, if one agent says, "It was written in my presence," and the second says, "It was signed in my presence," or they both say, "It was written in our presence," and one says: "It was signed in my presence," since it is not in the possession of both of them, it should not be given to the woman unless the authenticity of the signatures has been verified.

If one person said: "It was written in my presence," and two people say: "It was signed in our presence," [the get] is acceptable. [This applies] even when they are not in possession [of the get], because the signatures [of the witnesses] have been verified.

[The following rules apply when] an agent brings a get in the diaspora and gives it to the woman in private, or gives it to her in the presence of two witnesses, but does not tell her: "It was written and signed in my presence." Even if she has married, he should take the get back from her and then give it to her in the presence of two witnesses and say: "It was written and signed in my presence." If he does not take it back from her, the divorce is unacceptable until the signatures [of the witnesses] are verified.

If [the agent] gave a woman a get and did not suffice to say: "It was written and signed in my presence," before he lost the power of speech, the signatures [of the witnesses] should be verified. Afterwards, he may give it to her.

A blind person may not bring a get from the diaspora, because he is unable to say: "It was written and signed in my presence." Accordingly, if [the get] was written and signed in his presence while he possessed the power of sight, and he became blind afterwards, he may say in the presence of three [men]: "It was written and signed in my presence," and give [the get] to her. Similarly, when a woman brings a get from the diaspora, she must say: "It was written and signed in my presence," in the presence of three [men]. The provision to make these statements in the presence of two men applies only when the agent is acceptable to serve as a witness. In such an instance, he joins the other two and serves as one of the three who verify the get, based on his statements. For a witness may serve as a judge in matters of Rabbinic law.

When an agent becomes ill or is prevented from carrying out his agency by forces beyond his control, he should approach a Jewish court and tell them: "This get was written and signed in my presence." [The court, then, appoints] another agent and sends [the get to the woman] with him. The second agent does not have to say: "It was written and signed in my presence." Instead, he says: "I am an agent of the court," and then he gives [the get to the woman] in the presence of witnesses.

If the second agent becomes ill or is prevented from carrying out his agency by forces beyond his control, he should appoint another agent in the presence of the court. [Indeed,] even 100 [agents can be appointed in this manner]. [Before transferring the get,] the final agent says: "I am an agent of the court." He should then give the woman [the get]. [The get can be given] even if the first agent died. Why must [the appointment be made] in court? Because [the first agent] must say: "It was written and signed in my presence." If, however, the signatures [of the witnesses] were verified, although one agent gives it to another in private - even if 100 agents are appointed in this way - the get is acceptable when it reaches the woman. Although the husband did not explicitly tell the agent: "Send [the get] via another person if you are hindered by forces beyond your control," the agent may [appoint another agent] if he becomes ill or is hindered by forces beyond his control.

Whenever a person appoints an agent, the agent does not have to be present in court with him. Even if the agent is not present, he may tell [the court]: "So and so is my agent." Similarly, an agent may appoint an agent when the latter is not present. [Indeed,] even 100 [agents can be appointed in this manner].

A husband [may appoint] his wife [as an agent to transport her get to another place]. After having it written and signed in her presence, he gives her the get and tells her: "You are an agent to bring it to the court of so and so. They will appoint an agent, who will give you this get and thus effect the divorce." Should the woman say: "It was written and signed in my presence," [when delivering the get to the court], her statements are accepted. [The court] should take the get from her and give it to the agent so that he can give it to her as the husband instructed.

When does the above apply? When the husband [explicitly] made this stipulation. But if this stipulation is not made, but instead the husband [merely] gave her the get and it is in her possession, she is not required to make any statements [to the court]. We assume that she is divorced, for she is in possession of a get that is written according to law and that is signed by witnesses. Although we do not recognize the signatures of the witnesses, and [their authenticity] has not been verified, we do not suspect that [the woman] forged them, for she would not cause her own ruin. Moreover, it is considered as if the witnesses who signed the get had testified in court, until a protest is raised. Therefore, we assume that the get was written according to law and [grant the woman permission to] marry, as we assume that a get brought by an agent [in Eretz Yisrael] is acceptable until the husband raises a protest or until he brings proof that it is a forgery or that it is void. For if we had suspicions concerning these matters and the like, we would have to suspect that perhaps when a husband gave a get in our presence, he nullified it before he gave it; perhaps the witnesses who sign it are unacceptable, causing it to be regarded as a forgery; or perhaps it was not written for the sake [of the man or the woman being divorced]. Just as we do not entertain suspicions concerning these factors and assume that the get [is acceptable] until it is discovered that it is void, so too, we do not entertain suspicions concerning an agent or a woman when a get is in their possession. [The rationale is] that the laws governing prohibitions differ from those governing financial transactions.

When [a man] divorces [his wife] according to a conditional arrangement, and the condition is fulfilled, the divorce is effective. If the condition is not fulfilled, the divorce is not effective. All the laws governing conditional agreements have been explained in Hilchot Ishut, Chapter 6. There it is explained that when [a man] divorces [his wife] according to a conditional arrangement, and the condition is fulfilled, the divorce is effective from the time the condition is fulfilled, and not from the time the get is given to her. As such, a husband may nullify a get, add to his conditions or add a further condition, until the original condition is fulfilled although [the woman] has already been given the get. If the husband dies [before the condition is fulfilled], or the get is lost or consumed by fire before the condition is fulfilled, the divorce is not effective. A priori, [the woman] should not remarry until the condition is fulfilled. If, however, she has already married, she need not leave [her second husband], unless she is no longer able to fulfill [the condition]. [For since] the condition is nullified [the divorce is void.] There it is explained that if [the husband] tells [his wife]: "You are divorced from the present time - or from today - on the following condition," or "You are divorced on the condition that this and this be done," when the condition is fulfilled the divorce becomes effective retroactively from the time the get reaches the woman. Therefore, once the get reaches the woman's possession, [the husband] can no longer nullify the get, add to his conditions or add a further condition. If the get is lost or consumed by fire, or even if the husband dies before the condition is fulfilled, she should fulfill the condition after his death, and the divorce is considered effective from the time the get was given to her. A priori, [the woman] may remarry even before the condition is fulfilled. We do not suspect that she will not fulfill the condition, because it was stated using the wording "From this time" or "On the condition that...."

Whenever [a man] divorces [his wife] conditionally - whether he states, "from this time onward," or makes [a repeated statement of the condition, as required] - he should not enter into privacy with his wife throughout the entire time the condition remains unfulfilled. Instead, [all his dealings with her should be] in the presence of [at least one] witness. Even a servant or a maid-servant can serve this purpose, with the exception of her [private] maid-servant or her young son. For she is not embarrassed to enter into marital relations in the presence of these people. It is well known that if [the husband] enters into privacy [with his wife] in the presence of two witnesses at the same time, the status of the divorce is doubtful, even if the condition was fulfilled. [We suspect] that he engaged in marital relations [with her], and nullified the get, as will be explained in these laws.

How should a man divorce [his wife] conditionally? He should not say: "Write a get for my wife on this condition," or "Write a get and give it to her on this condition." Needless to say, he should not write in the get: "So and so divorces so and so on the [following] condition." What procedure should instead be followed? He should instruct the scribe to write [a get] and the witnesses to sign. They should write an acceptable get that does not mention any condition at all. Afterwards, he should give her the get and tell her: "This is your get..." or "Behold you are divorced on the following condition." Or he should tell [the witnesses] or his agent: "Give her this get on the following condition."

If [a husband] had a condition written in the get after the essential portion of the get was written, the get is acceptable, regardless of whether [the condition] was written before the signature of the witnesses or after their signature. If, however, [the condition] was written before the essential portion of the get - even if he used the wording, "on the following condition" - the status of the divorce is doubtful, for the husband retains rights in the essential matter of the get. Similarly, if he verbally stated a condition before the essential portion of the get was written, the status of the divorce is doubtful.

[These rules apply when a man] divorces his wife and [makes the following conditions] whether verbally or in writing, after the essential portion [of the get] has been written,. If he tells her: "Behold, you are permitted [to marry] any man aside from so and so," or "...with the exception of so and so," [the ruling would depend on the identity of the individual specified]. If that individual is a gentile, a servant or a person with whom the woman is forbidden to engage in marital relations - e.g., her father, her brother, his father or his brother - the get is acceptable. If, however, the individual is one who could consecrate her [as a wife], the get is void, even if there is a negative prohibition [that is not punishable by death - neither at the hand of G-d nor the court - involved in such relations] or that individual is a minor. [The rationale is that by making such a condition,] the husband retained certain rights with regard to the divorce, and [the bond between the couple] is not [entirely] severed. If [the individual mentioned] is the husband of the wife's sister, the status of the divorce is in doubt. For although at present relations between the wife and that man are forbidden, if her sister dies, she will become permitted to marry him.

The status of the divorce is in doubt when [a husband divorces his wife and] tells her: "Behold, you are permitted [to marry] any man, aside from a man who will be born in the future, who does not exist at present," "...aside from promiscuous relationships" - i.e., it is as if he said: "Behold, you are permitted to marry any man, but with regard to promiscuous relations, it is as if you remain forbidden like a married woman." [This ruling also applies if he tells her:] "You are permitted to any man who will engage in relations with you in the ordinary manner, but with regard to anal intercourse, you remain prohibited," "You are permitted [to marry] any man, aside from one who consecrates you with a legal document" - i.e, the woman may be consecrated by [a gift of] money or via sexual relations, but if one consecrates her with a legal document, she is forbidden like a married woman - or "You are permitted [to marry] any man, with the exception of [the right to] nullify your vows" - i.e., [I] retain none of the rights of the marriage relationship except [the right to] nullify your vows; in that regard, it is as if you remained my wife. [Similarly, if the husband desires that the woman be considered as if she were married with regard to her right] to partake of terumah, or with regard to his right to inherit her property if she dies [in his lifetime, the status of the divorce is in doubt].

[If a husband] tells [his wife]: "You are permitted [to marry] any man aside from Reuven and Shimon," and then tells her: "You are permitted [to marry] Reuven or Shimon," the divorce is acceptable. For he has nullified his condition, permitting his wife [to marry] the men [concerning whom] the condition was made.

[If, after telling his wife that she is permitted to marry any man aside from Reuven and Shimon, the husband] tells her: "You are permitted [to marry] Reuven," the divorce is void, because he has not nullified the condition [preventing her from marrying] Shimon. If he tells her: "You are permitted to [marry] Shimon," or "You are even permitted to [marry] Shimon," the status of the divorce is in doubt. We suspect that perhaps he permitted her only to Shimon, and she is still forbidden to Reuven. By saying "even to Shimon," he meant "to everyone, even to Shimon." [Nevertheless, the divorce is not void, for] perhaps he permitted her to everyone, and by saying "even to Shimon," he meant "to Shimon and also to Reuven." [This is plausible,] for Shimon was mentioned after Reuven in his condition.

If [a husband] makes a condition, saying; "Today you are not my wife, but tomorrow you will be my wife," the divorce is not effective. Although the connection between the couple is severed on the day [of the get, it is renewed afterwards]. For this reason, in the wording of the get, is written the phrase: "from the present day onward."

[If a husband tells his wife:] "This is your get on the condition that you never drink wine for the rest of your life," the divorce is not effective, for [the relationship between them] has not been severed. If the condition states "for as long as I live" or "for as long as so and so lives," the divorce is effective, for the relationship between the couple is severed. When that person dies, [the woman] will no longer have any connection with [her previous husband].

[If a husband tells his wife:] "This is your get on the condition that you do not go to your father's house for 30 days, the divorce is effective. "...That you never go to your father's house," the divorce is not effective, for [the relationship between them] has not been severed. [Similarly, if a husband] tells [his wife:] "This is your get on the condition that you never eat meat," or "...that you never drink wine," the divorce is not effective, for [the relationship between them] has not been severed. "...[that you not eat meat or drink wine] for 30 days, the divorce is effective.

[If a husband tells his wife:] "This is your get on the condition that you never marry so and so," the divorce is not effective. To what can this be compared? to his telling her: "This is your get on the condition that you never drink wine," "...that you never go to your father's home," or "[that you not go to your father's home] for the rest of your life." If, however, he tells her: "[This is your get] on the condition that you do not marry so and so for fifty years," the divorce is effective; she may not marry the person during the time specified. If she marries him, the divorce is nullified retroactively. If [the woman] engages in promiscuous sexual relations with the man specified, any child born to her is legitimate, and the divorce remains acceptable. For [the husband's] condition mentioned only marriage.

[If a husband tells his wife:] "This is your get on the condition that you marry so and so," if she marries him [the divorce is effective], as it would be if other conditions were involved. Nevertheless, our Sages said that she should not marry either the man specified or any other man. She should not marry the man specified, lest the people say: "They are giving their wives as presents to each other." Nor should she marry anyone else, for the get is effective only when the condition is fulfilled. If she transgresses and marries the man specified, she need not be divorced. If she marries another person before she marries the man specified, the get is nullified, and she must leave her second husband. Any child she bears [the second husband] is illegitimate. He must, however, divorce her with a get.

[If a husband tells his wife:] "Behold, this is your get, but the paper belongs to me," the divorce is not effective, for [the relationship between them] has not been severed. "...On the condition that you give me the paper," the divorce is effective, [provided] she gives [him the paper].

If he engraved a get on a plate of gold and gave it to her, telling her: "This is [both] your get and [the money due you by virtue of] your ketubah, [the divorce is] acceptable and she is considered to have received the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, provided the plate is worth the value of her ketubah. If it is not, he should compensate [for the difference].

[The following rules apply when a man] divorces [his wife] conditionally, including a stipulation that causes the divorce to be considered void - e.g., that she never eat meat or drink wine for the rest of her life, or that she be free to marry any man with the exception of a particular individual, or that he mentioned other conditions before the essential portion of the get was written: If the condition was written in the get, and he rubbed it out and gave it to her, the status of the divorce is in doubt. If the condition was stated verbally, he should take the get from her and give it to her again without mentioning a condition, or mention a condition that is acceptable.

What is implied? [A man] gave a get to his wife and told her, "Behold, you are divorced with this [get] and are free [to marry] any man aside from so and so." If he took [the get] from her and gave it to her and said: "Behold you are free [to marry] any man," or "This is your get," the divorce is effective. The same applies in other similar situations.

When [a man] gives a get to his wife on the condition that she give him two hundred zuz, and afterwards establishes a second condition in the presence of witnesses that she serve his father for two years, his latter statement did not nullify his original one. Instead, it is as if he told her: "Fulfill one of the two conditions." If she desires, she may serve his father, or if she desires, she may give [him the money]. One of the witnesses to the first condition cannot join with one of the witnesses to the second condition [to testify that the get was given on a conditional basis]. If, however, [the husband] made a condition that the woman must give him 200 zuz, and afterwards made a condition in the presence of two [witnesses] that she must give him 300 zuz, the condition of 200 has been nullified, and she must give [him] 300 zuz. The same principle applies in all similar situations.

If [a husband] makes a condition that his wife must perform a specific activity without stating a duration of time, it is considered as if he stated that she should perform this activity for one day. For he did not specify any amount of time. What is implied? If he told her: "This is your get on condition that you perform work for me," "...on condition that you serve my father," or "...on condition that you nurse my son," if she performs work for him or serves his father for one day or nurses his son for one day during the time when a child [usually] nurses - i.e., within his first 24 months [of life] - the get is effective.If the son or the father dies before she nurses him or serves him, the get is not effective.

If [the husband] tells her: "[This is your get] on condition that you nurse my son..." or "...serve my father for two years," [for the divorce to be effective] she must complete the time specified. If the son or the father dies within this period, or the father says: "I don't want you to serve me," the get is not effective, for the condition has not been fulfilled. The same principles apply in all similar situations.

[The following rules apply when a husband] tells [his wife]: "[This is your get] on condition that you give me 200 zuz within 30 days." If she gives him [the money] within 30 days with his consent, the divorce is effective. If she gives [it] after 30 days, the divorce is not effective. If she gives it to him against his will, and he refuses to accept it, the divorce is unacceptable until he willingly accepts it. If he tells her within the 30 days, "I am willing to forego [the money on your behalf," the divorce is not effective, because the condition was not fulfilled. If he dies within the 30 days, since the 30 days are completed without her giving [him the money], the divorce is not effective.

If he tells her, "[This is your get] on condition that you give me 200 zuz," without specifying a time period, and he dies before she gives [him the money], she cannot give [the sum] to his heirs; the condition was that it be given to him. [In this instance, however,] the get is not nullified [by the husband's death], since a definite time period was not specified. Therefore, even if the get was lost or ripped before he died, [the woman] should not marry another man until she performs the rite of chalitzah.

[If the husband tells her:] "This is your get on condition that you give me this particular utensil," or "...this particular garment," and that utensil or garment is lost or stolen, even if she gives him 1000 zuz in compensation for [the desired object], the divorce is not effective until she gives him the specified utensil or garment, or until he nullifies the condition.

[The following rules apply when a woman] is divorced conditionally, and another man consecrates her before the condition is fulfilled. If the condition is fulfilled [afterwards], she is consecrated. If, however, the condition is not fulfilled and the get is nullified, she does not require a get from the second husband, for [in this situation] she cannot be consecrated. If, however, she marries [a second husband], the condition is not fulfilled, and the get is nullified, she must also be divorced by the second [husband], as explained above.

[When a man] divorces his wife and [asserts that the divorce] will not take effect until a specific time passes, the divorce takes effect when that time arrives. Thus, this resembles [a get given on] a conditional basis, and yet it is not a conditional get. It resembles [a get given on] a conditional basis because the divorce takes effect when the specified time arrives [as in the case of a conditional get, which is completed when the condition is fulfilled]. Nevertheless, it is not considered a conditional get because a person who divorces [his wife] conditionally has already performed the divorce, and in this instance, the man has not divorced her until the time arrives. For this reason, a person who gives a conditional get must restate the condition [in both a positive and negative form], while this person does not have to restate his words. Nor must he comply with the other requirements of conditional agreements that we have explained..

What is implied? [When a husband] tells his wife: "This is your get, but the divorce does not take effect until 30 days pass," she is not divorced until after the passage of 30 days. If her husband dies, or the get is lost or consumed by fire in the interim, she is not divorced.

[When the woman] went and placed [the get] in [a place] at the side of the public domain, and after 30 days passed it was stolen or lost, the divorce is effective. Since the get existed on the day when it took effect, and it was set aside in a designated place that is not public domain [it can serve as the medium for the divorce]. [The governing principle is that the area at] the sides of the public domain is not the same as the public domain itself.

Similarly, if the husband makes the divorce dependent on an action, the same rules that govern a get that takes effect after a specific time apply. For example, [a husband] said to [his] wife: "This is your get, but the divorce does not take effect until you give me 200 zuz." After [the woman] gives [the money], the divorce takes effect. In this instance [as well], there is no need to restate the condition [in both a positive and negative form], nor to comply with the other requirements of conditional agreements that we have explained. For this person has not divorced [his wife] conditionally - he has not yet divorced her at all. Instead, he made the divorce dependent on a specific action, and after [that action is completed], the divorce will take effect.

What is the difference between a conditional divorce and a divorce that will take effect only after a fixed time, or a divorce dependent on an action? With regard to a conditional divorce, the divorce is a fact; it is, however, not completed until the condition is fulfilled. Therefore, when the condition is fulfilled, the divorce takes effect as long as the get exists, even if it is not in the woman's possession. When the condition is fulfilled, there is no need for [the woman] to pick up [the get] or take possession, for it was given to her for the purpose of divorce. If she married before the condition was fulfilled, she need not leave [her second husband], as explained. With regard to a divorce that will take effect only after a fixed time or a divorce dependent on an action, by contrast, she was not given the get for the [immediate] purpose of divorce. Instead, it is considered to be an entrusted object until the specified time arrives or she performs the action. Therefore, it is necessary that the get be in her possession at that time, that she take [possession of it], or that it be in a place that she designated for it even though it is not in her domain, as we have explained. Only then, is she divorced by virtue [of this get]. If she marries before the specified time arrives, or before she performs the action on which the divorce is dependent, she must leave her second husband, and any child [born of their union] is considered illegitimate. For she is a married woman, and the divorce is not [yet] effective.

When [a man] gives his wife a get and tells her: "If you do not give me 200 zuz, this get is not effective," or "...you are not divorced," he is not considered to have performed a divorce at all. For the get was not given on a conditional basis, nor was it made dependent on an action. The same [ruling applies] in all similar situations.

When a person would like to give a conditional divorce, with the condition being that the divorce not take effect until a particular time, he should express the concept in a conditional statement, making the condition dependent on his departure or return at a specific time. What is implied? He tells her: "If I do not return between the present time and 30 days, this get is effective. If I do return within 30 days, this get is not effective." He [then] gives her the get. Alternatively, he should tell her: "This is your get on condition that I do not return to this country within 30 days." The same [ruling applies] in all similar situations.

When a person divorces [his wife] on the condition that he not return to this country within 30 days, and he set out to return within 30 days, but became ill or was prevented [from returning by a flooding] river and did not return until after 30 days, the get is effective. Even if he protests, "I am being held back by forces beyond my control" [the get is effective]. [The rationale is that the claim,] "I was prevented by forces beyond my control," is not accepted with regard to gittin, even if the husband makes it evident that he does not desire that the divorce take effect.

[The following rules apply when a man gives a] divorce on the condition that it become effective if 30 days pass without [his seeing his wife's] face. If he repeatedly came [and appeared before her], but never entered into privacy with her, and then 30 days [passed without his seeing her], the get is effective. Although he came [and appeared before her] within 30 days [after the get was given], since he did not enter into privacy with her, [once the condition was fulfilled,] the get is effective. When does the above apply? When he made the condition and said: "I accept her word with regard to [whether or] not I appeased her." If, however, he did not accept her word, we suspect that perhaps he placated her when he came and visited her, she was willing to forego [her desire to be with him], and he nullified the get. For this reason, the get is unacceptable [even] after 30 days [pass without the husband seeing her]. Similarly, when a man tells a woman: "This is your get and [it becomes effective] after twelve months pass," if he lives in the same city as she does, we suspect that he appeased her, unless he said: "I accept her word that I did not appease her."

A similar [principle applies with regard to] all conditions that are dependent on her will, and the get would be nullified if she was willing to forego these conditions in favor of her husband. We suspect that perhaps he appeased her, unless he said: "I accept her word...." When does the above apply? When the woman is divorced after nisu'in, for he is familiar with her. When, however, [a husband] divorces [his wife] after [merely] consecrating her, we do not suspect that he appeased her.

[When a man gives his wife a get and tells her:] "This is your get [and it is effective] from the present time onward if I do not return within twelve months," we do not suspect that perhaps he returned in secrecy, for people do not generally come in secrecy. [Therefore,] if the time period he specified passes without his coming, the divorce is effective. If he dies within the twelve months, although the divorce [will become] effective, for there is no way that he can come, if she would have been obligated to perform the rite of yibbum, she should not marry until the twelve months pass and the condition is fulfilled.

When a healthy person [divorces his wife] on the condition that the get take effect if he dies, and when a sick person [divorces his wife] on the condition that the get take effect if he dies from the illness afflicting him, their statements are of no consequence. The expression "if I die" implies [that it takes effect] after his death. [Alternatively,] the intent is that [it take effect] retroactively [if he dies]. [Because of the doubt involved,] if [a man] uses the expression "If I die...," it is considered as if he said "after my death." [The get is therefore void, because] there is no concept of divorce after a person's death.

If, [however, the husband] tells her: "This is your get. If I die, [it is effective retroactively] from the present time," or "...If I die, [it is effective retroactively] from the present day," the get is valid. When he dies, [his wife] is divorced.

[If a husband] says: "This is your get. If I die, [it is effective retroactively] from the present time - or from the present day - after my death," when [the husband] dies, the status of his wife's divorce is in doubt. [We suspect that] perhaps, after saying "from the present time," he changed his mind and [did not desire that the get become effective] from the present time, and instead take effect after his death. And there is no concept of divorce after a person's death.

[If a husband] says: "This is your get. [It becomes effective] when the sun emerges from its shield," it is not effective if he dies that night. [If he gave the get] on the condition that the sun shine and he dies that night, the get is effective, for when the sun shines [on the following day], the condition that he established becomes fulfilled. If [the husband gives a get and] establishes a condition: "If the sun shines, the get is effective. But if it does not shine, it is not effective," [the get] is not effective if he dies at night. For the condition was not fulfilled until after he died, and there is no concept of divorce after a person's death.

When a person who is mortally ill has a get written for his wife and divorces her and then recovers, he cannot retract the divorce. A divorce [performed by a person in such a state] is not [governed by] the same laws as a present he gives. [The rationale for this distinction is] that if he were given the prerogative of retracting, the divorce would appear to take effect after death, in the same way that a present he gives is not legally transferred until after death.

[If a husband says:] "This is your get. [It is effective retroactively] from the present day if I die from this illness," and his house collapses upon him, he is bit by a snake, devoured by a lion or dies because of other similar causes, the divorce is not effective.

[If, by contrast,] he tells her: "...if I do not arise from this sickness," and his house collapses upon him, he is bit by a snake or devoured by a lion, the status of the divorce is in doubt. [The following rules apply when a husband tells his wife:] "Here is your get. [It is effective retroactively] from the present day if I die from this illness," and then rises [from his sickbed], walks in the marketplace, and afterwards falls ill and dies. We make an assessment. If he died from the first illness, the divorce is effective. If not, it is not effective. If he progresses from one illness to another illness, and does not arise [and walk] in the marketplace, the divorce is effective. There is no need to make an assessment.

With regard to all the conditions [mentioned above], during the days between the giving of the get and his death [with its consequent] fulfillment of the condition, she is considered to be a divorced woman with regard to all matters, provided he does not enter into privacy with her, as explained.

[The following rules apply when] a sick person desires to divorce his wife conditionally, so that if he dies she will not be obligated to perform the rite of yibbum, but if he recovers, the divorce will not be effective; he does not desire that the get take effect [retroactively] from the time he gives it, lest the matter be overly disturbing for him. He should write the following in the get after writing the essential portion; alternatively, he should make these statements when he gives [his wife] the get: "If I do not die, this get will not be effective. If I die, this get will be effective. If I do not die, this get will not be effective." In this manner, the conditional factor is repeated. The positive factor is stated before the negative factor, and the person's opening remarks do not speak of misfortune. [If a get is given with such a condition,] the divorce will take effect when [the husband] dies, provided that the get reaches the woman before his death.

When a husband tells a colleague: "Acquire this get on behalf of my wife, so that she will not be required to fulfill the rite of yibbum," and gives him the get, but the husband dies before the get reaches [the woman], the status of the divorce is in doubt. [Although there are times when a woman would be willing to marry the yavam,] it is to the advantage of most women not to be required to fulfill the rite of yibbum. Therefore, even though the get did not reach the woman, since another person acquired it on her behalf, the status of the divorce is in doubt.

When [a man] tells witnesses: "Write a get for my wife after twelve months," or "Write a get for my wife and give it to her after twelve months," they should write [the get] and give it to her after the time he specified. If they write it within the time he specified, it is void, even if they do not give it to the woman until afterwards. If they write it after the time he specified, but [the husband] dies before they give it to her, it is void. If it is not known whether he died before the get was given, or the get was given before he died, the status of the divorce is in doubt.

[If a husband] instructs [agents]: "Write a get for my wife and give it to her after the Sabbatical cycle," they must write it within the first year after the conclusion of the Sabbatical cycle. If he told them: "...after a year," they must write it during the first month of the coming year. If he told them: "...after a month," they must write it during the first week of the coming month. If he told them: "...after the Sabbath," they must write it before the end of Tuesday. If he told them: "...before the Sabbath," they must write it between Wednesday and the end of Friday.

If they delayed and did not write and give the get at the time he specified - e.g., he told them "after a month," and they wrote the get and gave it to her after two weeks had passed in the second month, the get is unacceptable.

If [the husband] entered into privacy with [his wife] after he told [agents] to write [a get], sign it and give it to her, they should not write it. One can make an [obvious] inference. If a get that he gave her is disqualified when he enters into privacy with her, lest they have engaged in marital relations, how much more so should a get that was not yet written [be left unwritten]. If [the agents] wrote the get and gave it to her after he entered into privacy with her, the get is void.

[If a man] tells ten people: "Write a get for my wife," one of them should write it on behalf of all of them. [If he tells them:] "All of you, write it," one should write it in the presence of all of them. [If he tells them:] "Bring this get to my wife," one of them should bring it to her on behalf of all of them. [If he tells them:] "All of you, bring this get to my wife," one should bring it [to her] in the presence of all of them.

[If a man] tells ten people: "Write a get, sign it and give it to my wife," one of them should write it, two should sign it, and one should give it to her. It is acceptable even if one person writes it, he serves as one of the two witnesses who signs it, and he serves as the agent who gives it to her. If [the husband] tells them: "All of you sign it," they must all sign it. If the husband counted the people - whether he counted all of them or merely some of them - and told them to sign it, it is considered as if he told all of them to sign it. The two who sign it at the outset act as witnesses, while the others [should sign it to complete] the stipulation [the husband] made. Accordingly, if the remaining witnesses were unacceptable, or one signed it on the day the get was written and the others on subsequent days - even several days after [the get was written], the get is acceptable. If one of them died before signing it, the get is void. If one of the first witnesses who signed it was unacceptable, the get is unacceptable, lest it be said that an unacceptable witness may sign other legal documents when many witnesses sign. The only reason [our Sages] accepted [such signatures] with regard to a get signed by many witnesses is that the witnesses who observe the transfer are of fundamental importance.

Our Sages established the [following] rules with regard to a person who tells many people to write, sign, or bring a get for his wife. With regard to writing, he should tell them: "Any one of you may write a get for my wife." Similarly, with regard to bringing [the get], [he should say]: "Any one of you may bring...." With regard to signing, he should tell them: "Any pair of you should sign this get and give it to my wife."

Why did our Sages state that the witnesses to a get should sign only in each other's presence? [This is] a decree, [instituted] lest a person tell many others: "All of you sign [as witnesses]." If it were possible for witnesses to sign outside the presence of the other witnesses, two witnesses might sign the get, and the woman might take it and think that it does not require any more witnesses, [when in fact] the condition that [the husband made] was not fulfilled.

If [a man] tells three people, including a father and a son, "Two of you should write a get for my wife, sign it and give it to her," the get is acceptable whether the son signs with the other person or the father signs with the other person. [The son may serve in this capacity] because a person may appoint a son as an agent instead of his father.

When [a man] tells two [colleagues]: "Write [a get], sign it and give it to so and so to bring to my wife," or "...give it to [my] agent to bring to her," one of them should write it, and they should both sign it and give it to the agent. If they bring it to the woman themselves, the divorce is not effective, for they were not appointed as agents to effect the divorce. What should they do [if in error they gave it to the woman]? They should take it back from her and give it to the agent, who should in turn give it back to the woman in their presence or in the presence of other [witnesses]. My teachers issued a ruling with regard to such a get that does not appear to be appropriate, because of a flaw that existed in the versions [of the Talmud] that they possessed.

[Our Sages ruled that] the status of a divorce is in doubt [in the following situation: A husband] tells a scribe: "Write me a get for my wife." [The scribe] wrote it and gave it to the husband, without this being observed by witnesses. The husband took it, gave it to an agent, and told him: "Give this get to my wife in the presence of witnesses." The agent [carried out the instructions] and gave it to [the woman] in the presence of witnesses. [The rationale is] that since he is only a single witness, an agent's statements would not be accepted [as grounds] to permit a woman who was [previously] forbidden to marry, except for the fact [that his statements are supported by] the written statements of the witnesses who signed the get. [For the witnesses' statements] are considered as if they were testimony given in court until [the husband] lodges a protest, as we have explained. If there are two witnesses who observed the husband giving the get to the agent and instructing him to use it for the divorce, the divorce is binding.

[When a husband] tells an agent: "Give this get to my wife in this and this place," the divorce is not effective if he gives it to her in another place. "...She is in this and this place," and the agent gave it to her in another place, [the get] is binding; he is merely pointing out the place. Similarly, if he tells [the agent]: "Do not give it to her [anywhere] except in the house," and he gives it to her in the loft; "Do not give it to her except with your right hand," and he gives it to her with his left; "Give it to her on this and this day," and he gives it to her before that date; the divorce is not effective. "Do not give it to her except on this and this day," the divorce is not effective if he gives it to the woman before or afterwards, for he indicated that he wanted the get to be given on that date. Similar rulings apply in all analogous situations.

Similarly, when a woman tells her agent: "Receive my get for me in this and this place," and he receives it for her in another place, the divorce is not effective. [When she tells him:] "Bring me my get in this and this place," the get is acceptable if he brings it to her in another place.

When [a man] tells an agent: "Bring this get to my wife," the agent may send the get with another person if he becomes ill or is otherwise prevented [from bringing it to her] by forces beyond his control. [This applies] regardless of whether he told him: "Bring it [to her]," or "You bring it [to her]." If, however, [the husband] told [the agent]: "Take the following article from her and give her this get," the agent should not send the get via another individual. If [the agent] did send [the get] via another individual, and the woman came out to greet the agent and she gave him the article, and afterwards he gave her the get, the divorce is binding.

If the agent - i.e., [either] the first [or the second] agent - gave the woman the get first and then she gave him the article, the divorce is not effective. [The rationale is] that [the agent] violated the husband's instructions with regard to a matter which, in general, would cause people to object. For the husband told him: "Take the article first and then give her the get," and he gave [the get] first and then took [the article].

[If the husband] told the agent: "Give her the get and take this and this article from her," [the agent] should not send the get via another person, for [the principal] would not desire that his article be entrusted to a person [other than the one he appointed]. If, however, the agent sent it with another person, the divorce is binding. [This applies] regardless of whether she gave the article before [receiving the get] or afterwards.

[If the husband] gives an agent a get and tells him: "No one other than you should give it to her," the divorce is not effective, if the agent gives [the get] to another person who gives it to the woman. Similarly, [if the husband] told the agent: "Do not give it to her yourself. Give it to so and so, and he will give it to her," the divorce is not effective if the first agent gives it to the woman. For he was not appointed as an agent to effect the divorce.

[A husband] gave [an agent] a get and told him: "Bring this get to my wife." The agent told him: "I do not know who she is." The husband replied: "Give it to so and so. He knows who she is." The [first] agent has not been appointed as an agent to effect the divorce. All he can do is give the get to the person whom the husband designated. That person is the agent appointed to effect the divorce. He must bring [the get to the woman] or send it via another agent if he becomes ill or is prevented from doing so by forces beyond his control.

When [a husband] gives an agent a get and tells him: "Do not give this get to my wife until after 30 days," [the agent] may send it to her via a second agent [whom he appoints] within the 30 days, if he becomes ill or is prevented from giving it to her by forces beyond his control. [The rationale is that] even though at the time [he appoints the second agent] he is not charged with effecting the divorce, since he will function in that capacity after 30 days pass, he has the authority to appoint a second agent within the 30 days.

When does the above apply? When the husband was not in the same city as his wife, or he was divorcing her after consecration,[but before the marriage bond has been consummated]. If, however, the marriage bond has been consummated, we suspect that perhaps the husband appeased her. Therefore, the agent should not appoint another agent within the 30 days unless the husband said: "I accept the word of my wife if she says that I did not appease her." After 30 days pass, [the agent] should give her the get. However, we suspect [that perhaps it was nullified], as explained, unless [the husband] said, "I accept the word of my wife if she says that I did not appease her."

Whenever in this text we have used the terms "the get is void," or "the divorce is not effective," the intent is that the get is void according to Scriptural law. The woman is married in the full sense of the term. If she remarries, she must leave [her second husband]; any child she bears him is illegitimate. If the husband [of a woman who receives such a get] is a priest, she is not forbidden to him as a divorced woman, with one exception: a person who divorces his wife and tells her: "You are divorced from me, but you are not permitted to marry anyone else." Although such a divorce is not binding, according to Rabbinic law such a woman is forbidden to marry a priest, as [implied by Leviticus 21:7]: "[They may not take] a woman divorced from her husband." Our Sages interpreted this to mean: "Even if she is divorced only from her husband and not permitted to marry any one else, she is forbidden to the priesthood. This is the "wisp of a get" that disqualifies [a woman] from [marrying a member of] the priesthood by Rabbinic decree.

Whenever, in this text, we have used the term "the get is unacceptable," the intent is that the get is unacceptable merely according to Rabbinic decree. Thus, according to Scriptural law, the woman is forbidden to the priesthood. A priori, she should not remarry. If, however, she has remarried, she need not leave [her second husband]. Children born [from her second marriage] are legitimate. A second get that is acceptable should be given to her, while she remains married to her [second] husband. Should it be impossible to have a second [get] composed, if her second husband is scrupulous and voluntarily divorces her this is praiseworthy, provided she has not borne [him] children. If, however, she has borne him children, he should not divorce her because of [our Sages'] disqualification of her get, lest this cause his sons' reputation to be sullied.

Whenever, in this text, we have used the term "the status of the divorce is in doubt," the woman should not remarry. If she has remarried, she must leave her second husband, and there is a doubt regarding the legimitacy of any children that she bears [her second husband], for her own status is in doubt, and she may be forbidden to engage in marital relations. If [a man] divorces his wife with an unacceptable get, or the status of [their] divorce is in doubt, and he desires to remarry her, she is permitted to her husband. He does not have to renew the marriage, recite the seven marriage blessings, or write her a new marriage contract, unless she has been divorced in a manner that is binding.

Our Sages ordained that whenever [a woman] who was given a get that is void remarries, she must be divorced by her second husband, lest people say: "A married woman has been allowed to remarry without [receiving] a get." And she must receive a [second] get from her first husband, so that she be permitted to marry anyone else. She is forbidden to remarry both her first and second husband forever. [This applies] even if she entered into marital relations [with her second husband] without knowing of the prohibition involved. [This prohibition was instituted] lest people say: "The man remarried his divorcee after she was married [to another man]." If one of the two transgressed and remarried her, he should be compelled to send her away.

A similar law applies when a woman remarries [after] witnesses testified that her [first] husband died, and later her first husband returns. [This applies] regardless of whether her [first] husband was a mentally sound individual or a deaf-mute, or whether she remarried a mentally sound person or a deaf-mute, who cannot establish a marriage bond in a complete sense. She must be divorced by both of them; both must give her a get, and she is forbidden to engage in marital relations with either of them again.

If [after witnesses testified that a woman's husband died or that she was given a get], she was consecrated [but the marriage bond was not yet consummated], and then her first husband returned, or it was discovered that the get was void, she is permitted to her first husband. Nor must she be divorced by the second husband, for a marriage bond cannot be established with a woman who is forbidden because of a severe prohibition. [In this instance, we do not require a divorce out of fear that] someone say: "A married woman is being released without a get." Since the marriage was not consummated, the person will rationalize: "The consecration was made on condition, and that condition was not fulfilled."

[The following laws apply when] a woman married, and afterwards it was discovered that her get was void, or [it had been reported that her first husband died,] and he returned. Neither her first nor her second husband is entitled to an ownerless object that she discovers nor to the profits from her work. Neither can he annul her vows. None of the benefits that either of them received after she married [her second husband] should be expropriated from them. Neither of them is obligated to pay her the money due her by virtue of her marriage contract, nor to fulfill any of the stipulations of the marriage contract. Neither of them is required to pay for her sustenance. If she took [money or property for this purpose] from either of them, she must return it. Neither of them is held responsible for any of the property she brought to the marriage that became worn out or was lost, even nichsei tzon barzel. A child born to [the second husband] is illegitimate. If the first husband engages in relations with her before she is divorced by the second husband, a child born of this union is illegitimate by virtue of Rabbinic decree. If the second [husband] divorced her and she received the money due her by virtue of her marriage contract, and afterwards her [first] husband came or it was discovered that the divorce was void, we do not expropriate the money she received for her sustenance or by virtue of her marriage contract.

Similar laws apply when one of two brothers consecrated a woman. The brother who consecrated the woman departed, and afterwards it was reported that he died. The other brother performed the rite of yibbum, marrying his brother's wife, and then the brother returned. The woman must be divorced by both husbands, receiving a get from both of them, and all the stringencies mentioned above apply to her. Similarly, if a man consecrated a woman, she journeyed to another country, the husband heard that she died and married her sister, and afterwards it was discovered that she had not died: he must divorce both women, and all the stringencies mentioned above apply to both of them.

[Different rules apply, however, if a man] married a woman who journeyed to another country, he heard that she died, he married her sister, and then it was discovered that his [first] wife was alive. The sister does not require a get, and his [first] wife is permitted to him. Similar laws apply with regard to other women forbidden by severe prohibitions who were married under the assumption that the marriage was permitted, and it is discovered that the prohibition still applied. They do not require a divorce, for a marriage bond cannot be established with a woman forbidden by such a severe prohibition.

Why did they require that the sister of the woman whom the man consecrated be given a get? Lest people say that the [first] kiddushin were given conditionally, [the condition was not fulfilled,] and thus the law would allow marriage to her sister. Since the [first] woman's sister was divorced with a get, she - i.e., the man's first arusah - is forbidden [to him], lest people think that he married his divorcee's sister.

A scribe composed [a get], but erred and gave the get to the husband and the receipt [for the woman's marriage contract] to the woman, or the man and wife erred, and the husband took the get and the wife the receipt, and thus they thought they were divorced. [The following rules apply] if afterwards the get is discovered in the possession of the man. If the woman has not remarried, she is considered as if she has not been divorced; it [appears to] have been revealed that the divorce did not ever take place. The husband should give her the get in the presence [of witnesses], and the divorce takes effect from the time the get is given. If, however, she had [already] remarried, and afterwards the husband produces the get, claiming that she has not been divorced, for he is in possession of the get and it never reached her, we do not accept his claim. She is not forbidden to her [second] husband. Instead, we operate under the presumption that she has been divorced, the get fell from her hand and was found by [her first husband], who desires to cause her to be forbidden to her second husband.

When a person divorces his wife because of unsavory reports, or because she is indiscriminate with regard to vows, he is told: "Inform her that you are divorcing her to chastise her, and know that you will never be able to remarry her." Why is [a man forbidden] to remarry such a woman? This is a decree, [instituted] lest she marry another man, repent and live chastely with him. Her first [husband] may then say: "If I had known that this would be the case, I would not have divorced her." Thus, it resembles a divorce given on a condition that was not fulfilled, in which case, retroactively, the get would be void. Therefore, we tell him: "Make a firm resolve to divorce her, knowing that you will never remarry her." If, however, he transgresses and remarries her before she is consecrated to another man, he need not divorce her.

Similarly, if [a man] divorces his wife because she is an aylonit or because she always experiences menstrual bleeding in the midst of sexual relations, he should never remarry her. [This is a decree, instituted] lest she marry another man and have children if she was an aylonit, or her condition be healed if she suffered from menstrual bleeding. [Her first husband] may then say: "If I had known that this would be the case, I would not have divorced her." Thus, [it would appear] that her get is void and her children illegitimate. If, however, he transgresses and remarries her [before she is consecrated to another man], he need not divorce her.

When an agent brings a get from the diaspora and says, "It was written and signed in my presence" [to validate the signatures to the get], he should not marry her. We fear that perhaps he was attracted to her and therefore testified on her behalf. [For this same reason,] when one witness testifies that a woman's husband died, and she [is given license to] marry on the basis of his testimony, he should not marry her. Similarly, a sage who ruled that a woman is forbidden to her husband because of a vow should not marry her. Similarly, when a man is reputed to have had relations with a maid-servant, and afterwards she was granted her freedom, or when [a man is reputed to have had relations] with a gentile woman, and afterwards she converted, he should not marry her. Similarly, if a gentile or a servant had relations with a Jewish woman, and afterwards the gentile converted or the servant was freed, he should not marry this woman. In all these instances, if a couple transgress and marry, they should not be forced to separate.

In all the above instances, if these men had wives and their wives died, or they divorced their wives at their wives' initiative, they are permitted to marry [the women mentioned above]; there is no need for hesitation. Similarly if these women married other men and became widowed or were divorced, they are permitted to marry [the men mentioned above]; there is no need for hesitation.

All these women are permitted to marry [any relatives of the men involved]. [A woman may marry] the son of the witness who testified on her behalf, the son of the sage who declared that she was forbidden to her husband, the son of the man with whom she was reputed to have had relations, or any other relative of theirs. [The rationale for this leniency is that] a person will not commit a sin so that another person will benefit. A woman is permitted to marry one of [the two witnesses] to her divorce or to her mi'un, or to marry one of the judges in whose presence she performed the rite of chalitzah. Our suspicions are aroused only when [the woman's license to marry depends on] the testimony of one witness. A person should always shy away from serving as a witness to mi'un, and make himself available [as a witness to enable] the rite of chalitzah [to be performed].

When a man divorces his wife and then engages in relations with her in the the presence of witnesses before she marries another man, we assume that since she was [originally] his wife, he remarried her and engaged in relations with the intent of consecrating her, and not as a licentious act. [The above rule applies] regardless of whether they were divorced after marriage, or only after consecration. And this applies even if we saw that he paid her money. For it is an accepted presumption that a person will not enter into sexual relations with his wife with a licentious intent, when he has the possibility of having these relations considered to be a mitzvah. For this reason, this woman is definitely considered to be consecrated, and requires a second divorce [in order to marry another man].

[There is an extension to the above principle.] If a man entered into privacy with his divorcee in the presence of witnesses, the two witnesses observed [their conduct] simultaneously, and [the couple] had been married previously, we suspect that they engaged in sexual relations. The witnesses to their entrance into privacy are thus considered to be witnesses to sexual relations. For a person who consecrates his wife via sexual relations need not engage in relations in the presence of witnesses. [All that] is necessary that [the couple] enter into privacy in the presence of witnesses and engage in relations in privacy, as explained. Since [it is possible that the couple engaged in relations], the status of the woman is in doubt, because we suspect that she has been consecrated. Because of this suspicion, she requires a [second] get. If, however, the woman had merely been consecrated and was divorced [before she was married], we do not suspect [that they engaged in sexual relations], because they did not share such familiarity.

Some of the Geonim have taught that any woman with whom [a man] has had sex before witnesses requires a get, [because of] the presumption that a person will not have licentious sex. They extended this principle until it occurred to them to teach that when a person has a child with his maidservant, we take it into consideration and his wife cannot perform yibbum [should the man die childless], lest he had freed the maidservant and after that had sex with her. There are those who teach that [we can assume that] he certainly freed her, because a person will not have licentious sex. All of these rulings stray, in my opinion, from the paths of Torah and it is not appropriate to rely on them. The Sages only used this presumption with regard to [a man's] wife whom he had divorced or [a man] who married a woman conditionally and then had sex with her unconditionally. For indeed she is his wife [in these situations] and with regard to a man's wife we assume that he will not have licentious sex with her unless he explicitly states [that he intends to engage in] licentious sex or if he has sex with a condition. But for other women, [we do not rely on this presumption]. If [a man has sex with] a prostitute, [there is] a presumption that he had sex in the name of licentiousness until such a time as he makes explicit his intention to marry her. Needless to say [this applies with regard to] a maidservant or a non-Jewish woman, because she cannot be married [according to Jewish law] and we do not suspect at all [that he intends to marry her]. The son [that results] from [having sex with these women] is presumed to be a non-Jew or a slave until it is definitively known that his mother was freed or converted.

When it has been assumed that a woman is either married or consecrated, and a rumor is spread in [her] city that she has been divorced, [the rumor] is not given credence, and we continue to operate under the assumption [that there was no change in her status]. [This applies] even if the majority, or even the entire city spread this rumor. [Different rules apply, however, in the following instance.] A rumor was spread through the city that a woman was consecrated, and that rumor was reported in court, in which case we suspect that the woman was consecrated, as explained. Afterwards, a rumor was spread that she was divorced from those kiddushin; we consider her to be divorced. [Since] she was forbidden on the basis of a rumor, she is permitted on the basis of a rumor.

[A man] should not marry a woman if he intends to divorce her. Nor should he maintain her as a wife and live with her, if he intends to divorce her. A man should not divorce his first wife unless he discovers an incident of sexual misconduct,, as [Deuteronomy 24:1] states: "When he finds evidence of sexual misconduct...." One should not hurry to divorce one's first wife. With regard to a second wife, by contrast, if one hates her, one may send her away.

It is a mitzvah to divorce a woman who possesses unsavory character traits and does not conduct herself modestly, as is the practice of proper daughters of Israel, as [implied by Proverbs 22:10]: "Drive away the scoffer, and contention will depart." When a woman has been divorced for loose moral conduct, it is not fitting for a proper man to marry her, lest people say: "This one sent away this wicked woman, and this one brought her home."

When a man's wife becomes a deaf-mute, he may divorce her, [by giving her] a get, and the divorce is effective. If, however, [his wife] loses control of her mental or emotional faculties, he may not divorce her until she regains stability. This is a prescript ordained by our Sages so that she will not [be divorced and left] unattended, [and be violated] by immoral people, for she is unable to care for herself. Therefore, [her husband] should provide a place for her, provide her with food and drink from her own resources, and marry another woman. He is not obligated to provide her with her sustenance, garments and conjugal rights. [For although our Sages compelled the husband to remain married to such a woman, they did not compel him to live with her as man and wife,] because a mentally sound individual cannot endure living with a mentally incapable person in one dwelling. [The husband] is not obligated to provide her with medical treatment, nor to redeem her if she is taken captive. If he divorces her, the divorce is binding. He should remove her from his home, and he is not obligated to care for her.

One should not marry a girl below the age of majority. When a man marries an orphan girl below the age of majority, and [before she attains majority] she [decides that] she does not desire [to remain married to] this husband, she rejects [the marriage] and departs; a get is not required, because a consecration effected by a minor does not establish a marriage bond in the full sense, as explained. [The annulment of a marriage in this manner is referred to as mi'un.] Similarly, when a girl below majority was married at her father's initiative, but was then widowed or divorced while still a minor, she is considered to be an orphan, although her father is alive. If she marries again while she is below the age of majority, she may annul her marriage through mi'un.

Although the marriage of a woman who is a deaf-mute is a Rabbinic institution like that of a minor, our Sages did not give her the right to annul it through mi'un, so that men would not refrain from marrying her.

A minor can annul her marriage via mi'un whether she has been merely consecrated or [even if] the marriage has been consummated. [She can exercise this privilege] in her husband's presence, or outside his presence. Just as she can annul her marriage to her husband, she can annul her relationship to a yavam. Just as she can annul one marriage through mi'un, so too, she can annul a second marriage or a third marriage. Indeed, [she can exercise this privilege] any number of times. As long as she is a minor, she has the right to annul her marriage through mi'un. When a minor does not exercise the right of mi'un and becomes consecrated to another man despite the fact that she was married, [the consecration is binding]. Becoming consecrated is [obviously] a rejection [- and thus an annulment - of her previous marriage].

Until when may a girl annul her marriage through mi'un? Throughout the entire time she is a minor, until she becomes a na'arah, or until it is known that she becomes classified as an aylonit. When does the above apply? When her husband did not engage in marital relations with her after she became twelve years and one day old. If, however, the couple engaged in relations after she reached this age, since these relations consecrate her according to Scriptural law, as explained, she no longer has the right to annul her marriage through mi'un. Similarly, [when the woman reaches this age, we assume that she has lost her right to annul her marriage through mi'un]. She need not be checked for signs of physical maturity, for it is assumed that she has manifested them.

If she has undergone a physical inspection, and no signs of maturity were discovered, but she engaged in marital relations after the age when she could have manifested signs of maturity, we suspect that pubic hairs had grown and later fell off. Because of the doubt, the marriage must be dissolved with a get. If a woman [who engaged in marital relations with her husband after reaching the age of twelve attempts to] annul her marriage through mi'un after undergoing a physical examination, and then is consecrated by another person, [her second husband also] must dissolve their relationship with a get, because of the doubt involved. If she married [the second husband], she must be divorced by both husbands and there is a doubt concerning the legitimacy of a child born to either of them [after her consecration to her second husband].

When a minor does not exercise her right to mi'un and attains majority, she no longer has this privilege. [This applies] even when she did not engage in marital relations with her husband after reaching the age of twelve years and one day. Since she has attained majority, it is a Rabbinic decree that a divorce is required [if the marriage must be dissolved]. [The rationale for this ruling is as follows:] The couple did not engage in marital relations after she reached the age of na'arut, in which instance it would be necessary to suspect that she manifested signs of physical maturity, and accordinly, there would be a doubt whether or not a marriage bond had been established. Nor did they engage in relations after she attained majority, in which instance she would become a married woman in all regards. Accordingly, the only reason she requires a get is the fact of her marriage as a minor, which is a Rabbinic institution. Based on the above, if another man consecrated her after she attained majority, [when she had not engaged in marital relations with her first husband from the age of twelve onward,] the second man's consecration is binding. As such, if her first husband divorces her, her second husband may consummate the marriage. If, however, her second husband divorces her, her first husband may not continue his marriage with her. [This is a decree, instituted] lest people say: "He remarried his divorcee after she was consecrated." If her second husband engaged in marital relations with her before her first husband divorced her, she must be divorced by both men. [This is a decree instituted] because [the situation] resembles an instance in which a woman heard that her husband died, she married, and then her first husband returned. [The laws governing the two situations are not entirely analogous. In this instance,] a child fathered by the second husband is not illegitimate. But if her first husband engages in relations with her before her second husband divorces her, any child born is illegitimate.

In which instances must a minor perform the rite of mi'un [to nullify her marriage]? [Our Sages established the following guidelines.] If she was between six and ten [when she was consecrated], we investigate the extent of her sagacity. If she knows to guard [the money given to her to effect] the kiddushin, appreciates that it was given for that purpose and will guard it differently from the way in which she would guard a nut, a date or the like, she must perform the rite of mi'un [to nullify her marriage]. If she does not know to guard [the money given to her to effect] the kiddushin, she need not perform the rite of mi'un [to nullify her marriage]. Instead, she returns to her mother's home as if she had never been consecrated. If she is less than six, even if she knows [how to guard the money given her,] she need not perform the rite of mi'un. If she is more than ten, even if she is very inept, she must perform the rite of mi'un. Whenever a girl's brother, mother or relatives arranged for her marriage without telling her of the identity of the groom, she need not perform the rite of mi'un [to nullify her marriage].

What does the rite of mi'un entail? She tells two witnesses: "I no longer desire my husband so and so," "I no longer desire to be consecrated [to the man] to whom my mother - or my brother - consecrated me," or the like. [The above applies] even if the two individuals are guests dining in her husband's home and she is serving them. If she tells them, "I no longer desire my husband so and so," she has performed mi'un.

The two individuals in whose presence the minor performs the rite of mi'un should write the following for her: "On this and this day, _______________the daughter of _____________ rejected her husband." They sign the document and give it to her. This is the essential portion of a deed of mi'un. A deed of mi'un does not resemble a bill of divorce, in which the giving of the bill effects the divorce. It need not be written with the proper intent, nor must it be transferred, nor do any of the laws required for a bill of divorce apply with regard to it. The wording used for a get is not used for it, lest it appear to be a get. It is merely a legal record.

The two individuals before whom a girl makes a statement of mi'un must know the identity of the girl and her husband. Therefore, whoever sees [a girl] make a statement of mi'un [in the presence of two other people] and hears that statement, is entitled to write a legal record of this statement, even though he was not aware of [the girl's] identity beforehand. It has become customary for the Jewish people to write a legal record of a statement of mi'un, employing the following text.

A legal record of a statement of mi'un: On this day of the week, and on this day of the month, in this year according to the following reckoning, so and so, the daughter of so and so (her father's name) issued a protest in our presence, saying: "My mother or my brother misled me and had me married - or consecrated - to so and so, the son of so and so (his father's name) while I was a minor. I am now making a statement in your presence that I do not desire him, nor can I live with him." We have had so and so undergo a physical examination, and it has been established that she is still a minor. [Hence,] we have written and signed this [legal document] and have given it to her to serve as support and clear evidence. So and so, the son of so and so (his father's name), a witness; So and so, the son of so and so (his father's name), a witness.

When a man divorces his wife, and she becomes consecrated to another man, she is forbidden to her first [husband], even though she has not engaged in marital relations [with her second husband]. If her first [husband] remarries her and engages in sexual relations with her, he [transgresses a negative commandment, and] is punished by lashes. He is forced to divorce her, as [implied by Deuteronomy 24:4]: "Her first husband, who sent her away, may not [return and remarry her]."

If she engaged in promiscuous relations with another man while she was divorced, she is permitted to remarry her husband, for it is written [Deuteronomy 24:2]: "And she departed from his home and went and became another man's [wife]." It is "becom[ing] another man's [wife]" - i.e., being consecrated - which causes her to become forbidden to remarry her [first] husband.

Included in this prohibition is that every woman who engaged in adulterous relations becomes forbidden to her husband. He is punished by lashes [for engaging in marital relations with her],as [implied by the inclusion of the phrase] "after she has become tainted" in [Deuteronomy 24:4]: "And [an adulterous woman] has been tainted." There is one exception: the wife of an Israelite who was raped. Therefore, whenever a woman becomes forbidden to her husband, because she violated his warning against entering into privacy with another man, and he engages in relations with her, he is punished by stripes of rebellion. If after divorcing his wife [for such reasons], the husband transgresses and remarries her, he must divorce her.

A deaf-mute may divorce his wife with signals, as explained. [If such a woman] went and became consecrated to another deaf-mute [and is then divorced], she is forbidden to be remarried to her first husband. Needless to say, [this applies if her second husband] was a mentally competent individual. If, however, a woman who had been married to a mentally competent individual and was divorced, married a deaf-mute and was divorced, she is permitted to remarry her first husband.

A girl who leaves her husband by virtue of the rite of mi'un is not considered to be divorced by him. The laws applying to her relations with her husband whom she rejected are the same as those applying to a man who has never consecrated her. She is permitted to marry his relatives. He is permitted to marry her relatives. Nor is she disqualified from marrying into the priesthood. If she married another man and was divorced or widowed, or she nullified her relationship with him through mi'un, she is permitted to remarry him. Moreover, even if her first husband divorced her [while she was still a minor], remarried her, she then nullified their relationship via mi'un and married another man and was divorced by him, she may remarry her first husband. [The rationale is that] whenever a girl leaves a marriage via the rite of mi'un, it is considered as if she had never been divorced via a get, and she may remarry her first husband. [This applies] even if she was once divorced [by this man] before mi'un. When, by contrast, a man divorces his wife - who is a minor - with a get, she marries another man and then nullifies the marriage through mi'un, she may not remarry her first husband, because although her final marriage was terminated by mi'un, her marriage [to her first husband] was terminated by a divorce. Needless to say, this applies if the second husband divorced her or he died. Similarly, she is forbidden to the father of her first husband, his son and his brothers, as are other divorced women. [This applies despite the fact that] she terminates her marriage to her second husband via mi'un.

When a girl nullifies her connection to a yavam through mi'un, she remains forbidden to his father, for she appears to be his daughter-in-law, since [that was her status] when his son died. She is, however, permitted to marry [her late husband's] other relatives. Thus, although she rejected a potential yavam with mi'un, she is permitted to marry his brother.

Whenever a woman is divorced or widowed, she should neither marry nor be consecrated until 90 days pass between the day she was divorced or her husband died and the day on which she became consecrated. [This interval was required] to see whether or not she is pregnant, and thus to differentiate between the seed of the first husband and the seed of the second husband.

We count [these 90 days] from the day the get is written; [this applies] even when it was written on a conditional basis, or it did not reach the woman until years afterwards. [The rationale is] that from the time [a get] is written, [a woman's husband] no longer enters into privacy with her.

[Included] in this decree of our Sages is that even a woman who is not fit to give birth, and even one who was divorced or widowed after merely being consecrated, must wait 90 days. I.e., even a minor, an elderly woman, a barren woman or an aylonit, even a woman whose husband was overseas, sick or imprisoned, and indeed, even a woman who is a virgin despite being consecrated, must wait 90 days.

A maidservant who was freed and a non-Jewish woman who was converted are required to wait 90 days [before they marry]. Even a gentile and his wife who convert together are required to separate for 90 days to differentiate between seed that was conceived in holiness and seed that was not conceived in holiness. Similarly, although the Torah prescribed only [an interim of] 30 days for her own sake, a yefat to'ar must wait 90 days [to marry her captor] for the sake of the definition of her child's [status]. The 30 [days mentioned by the Torah] are included in the 90-day interim.

A girl who annuls her marriage through mi'un need not wait [before remarrying]; our Sages' decree applied only to a divorcee. Similarly, a woman who has promiscuous relations need not wait, for she guards herself against becoming pregnant. Similarly, a woman who was raped or seduced need not wait.

[The following rule applies when] a girl below the age of majority who is not fit to give birth was married under a mistaken conception, discovered that she is forbidden to remain married to her husband and was forced to separate by the court. She need not wait, for this is an unlikely occurrence, and our Sages did not apply their decrees to situations that are out of the ordinary.

When, within this 90-day period, [a man] consecrates [a woman who is required to wait], he is placed under a ban of ostracism. If he consecrates the woman and then temporarily flees [to a distant country], he is not placed under a ban of ostracism. If he consummates the marriage within the 90-day period, the couple are forced to separate until the conclusion of the interval, at which time they are allowed to live together as man and wife.

Similarly, our Sages decreed that a man should not marry a woman who is pregnant with a child conceived by another man, or a woman who is nursing a child conceived by another man, even though the parentage of the fetus is known. [The restriction concerning] a pregnant woman [was instituted,] lest [the other man] harm the fetus during sexual relations, for he is not concerned about his colleague's child. [And the decree concerning] a nursing mother [was instituted], lest the woman's milk spoil and her second husband fail to show concern for restoring her ability to nurse, by providing her with a diet that will remedy her difficulty.

For how long is the woman considered to be a nursing mother? For twenty-four months. This does not include the day the child was born, nor the day the woman becomes consecrated.

Just as it is forbidden to marry such a woman, it is forbidden to consecrate her until this time period passes. Even if [a woman] gives her child to a nursemaid or weans him during these 24 months, she should not marry. If her son dies, she is permitted to marry. We do not fear that perhaps she will kill [her son for this reason].

If a man transgresses and marries a pregnant or nursing woman during this period, he should divorce her, even if he is a priest. If the man is an Israelite, he may remarry her after the 24 months of nursing pass. If [a man] marries [such a woman] and then flees and returns after [the prescribed] period and lives together with his wife, there is no difficulty. [A man who] consecrates a pregnant or nursing woman is not forced to divorce her. He may not, however, consummate the marriage until the nursing period passes or until the child dies.

When a woman comes and says, "I was married, and now I am divorced," her word is accepted, because the source for the statements [on which basis the woman was] forbidden [states that she is] permitted. If the prevailing assumption is that a woman was married, and she comes and says, "My husband divorced me," her word is not accepted [as a basis] for her to be allowed to be remarried. She has, however, disqualified herself [from marrying into] the priesthood forever. If her husband dies [childless], we suspect that there might have been truth to her words, and she performs the rite of chalitzah, rather than the rite of yibbum.

When a woman has two witnesses who state that she has been divorced, she is permitted to marry a priori, although she does not possess her get. If she produces a get that was in her possession and says: "My husband divorced me with this," her word is accepted, and she is permitted to marry, even though [the signatures of the witnesses to the get] have not been verified as we have explained.

[The following laws apply] when the husband comes and protests. If he states, "I never gave it to her. It fell from me and she found it," his statements are not accepted, because he admits that he wrote it for her sake, and it is now in her possession. If, however, the husband says: "[The get] was given conditionally," "It was entrusted to her for safekeeping," or "I never wrote such [a document]; it is a forgery," [the woman] must have the signatures of the witnesses verified or have the witnesses to its transfer testify, as explained. If the signatures of the witnesses are not verified, she is not considered to be divorced with regard to the right to marry others. She has, however, disqualified herself [from marrying into] the priesthood, as stated. For she has disqualified herself by virtue of her own statements and caused herself to be considered as a forbidden object.

If she comes together with her husband and says, "My husband divorced me, but I lost my get," and the husband says, "I did not divorce her," her word is accepted, even though it has been assumed that she is his wife. [The rationale is:] it can be assumed that a woman would not make such brazen statements in the presence of her husband [if they were not true].

If a husband says: "I divorced my wife," his word is not accepted. Nevertheless, we suspect that it might be true, and therefore, the woman is considered to be one whose divorce is of doubtful status. Even when the woman also admits that she was divorced, his word is not accepted. We fear that he is seeking to create difficulties for her, or that he divorced her with a get that was void, and she is not aware of the fact, or perhaps she will brazenly [state that she has been divorced, although that is not the case,] because he accepts her word, or because she is not aware of the seriousness of the prohibition. Therefore, we tell the husband: "If it is true [that you divorced her,] you are both here, divorce her again in our presence."

When two [individuals] say [that a woman] was divorced, and two others say [that] she was not divorced, she is still presumed to be married. [This ruling applies] even if her husband is present, and she tells him, "You divorced me." Since the witnesses support her, it is possible that she will speak brazenly [to her husband]. Therefore, if she remarries [in such a situation], she is compelled to leave [her second husband], and a child [born to them] is considered illegitimate.

When does the above apply? When the witnesses say: "She was divorced in the immediate past." For in such a situation, we tell her, "If it is true that you were divorced, produce your get." If, however, the witnesses say: "She was divorced several days ago," there is the possibility that the get was lost. [Therefore, different laws apply.] Since she claims that she was definitely divorced, and two witnesses support her claim, although there are two witnesses who deny it, if she marries one of the witnesses, she is not compelled to leave [her second husband]. [The rationale is] that she and her husband, [the witness,] certainly know whether she is permitted [or not], and we assume that they would not create difficulties for themselves. Accordingly, [different rules apply] if she marries another person. Since he cannot be certain concerning the matter - and similarly, if she herself is uncertain about the matter, even if she marries one of her witnesses - she should be compelled to leave [her second husband]. The legitimacy of a child born to them is a matter of question.

[The following rules apply when] two [individuals] say, "We saw that she was divorced," and two others say, "We did not see this." If they all lived in a single courtyard, she should not marry. If, however, she marries, she need not leave [her second husband], and we do not doubt the legitimacy of a child born to them. [The rationale is that] people often divorce in privacy.

[The following rule applies when] we there is no existing presumption that a woman was married, one witness comes and says, "She was married, but divorced," and another witness states, "She was not divorced." Since they both are testifying that she was married, and [only] one witness says she was divorced, she should not marry [a second man]. [The rationale is that] the statements of one [witness] are of no consequence [when they must counteract a definition of status established] on the basis of the testimony of two [witnesses]. If she remarries, she should be compelled to leave [her second husband].

[The following ruling is rendered when] a woman and two men come from another country. One [of the men] says: "This is my wife, and this is my servant," the other says: "This is my wife, and this is my servant," and the woman says: "They are both my servants." The woman is free to marry anyone. For although two witnesses testified to her being married, since each one of them gave testimony that concerns himself, their statements are not accepted.

When an agent charged by the woman with receiving her get takes out a get that was in his possession, and the husband states that the get is a forgery, the authenticity of the get should be verified via the signatures of the witnesses, or via the witnesses who observed the transfer, as we have explained. If the husband says: "I gave him [the get] for safekeeping," and the agent says, "He gave it to me for the sake of divorce," the agent's word is accepted. A similar rule applies if the woman is in possession of the get and she says, "This agent gave it to me," the agent corroborates her statements and says that it was given to him by the husband for the purpose of divorce. The agent's word is accepted, even if the husband protests that he gave it to him for safekeeping, and the woman is considered to be divorced.

When the get is lost, [more stringent rules apply]. Even if the husband says that he gave it to an agent for the sake of divorce, and the agent says that he gave it to the woman, the status of the divorce is a matter of question. For our prevailing assumption is that the woman is married, and it is only [the statements of] one witness and her husband [who are contradicting that]. Even if the woman herself says, "In my presence, [my husband] gave the get to the agent for the purpose of divorce, and he divorced me," [the ruling remains unchanged]. Since her husband and the agent support her, it is possible that she will speak brazenly and in fact, she was not divorced.

[The following rule applies when] an agent appointed by the woman to receive her get receives it from [her husband] and sends it to her, [giving it to an agent to give to her] in the presence of two witnesses. Although the woman does not know whether [the get] was sent to her by her husband, her agent or her husband's agent, she is divorced, as has been explained.

[In the above situation,] if the husband comes and protests that he did not write [the get], or that the get is void, the signatures [of the witnesses] should be verified. [This is sufficient to counter the husband's protest, the rationale being that] there are witnesses that [the get] was in the possession of the agent of the woman, and his aegis is considered to be equivalent to her own. Although she did not know [the purpose for which the get was given to the original agent], the witnesses knew. If, however, the signatures [of the witnesses] cannot be verified, the divorce is not effective.

[The following rules apply when] the prevailing presumption is that a woman is married, and she and her husband travel overseas at a time when their relationship is peaceful, and peace abides in the world at large. If she comes and says, "My husband died," her word is accepted and she is granted permission to marry or to perform the rite of yibbum on this basis. [The rationale is that] we assume that a woman will not bring difficulties upon herself, causing herself to be forbidden to both her first and her second husbands, causing herself to lose the right to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah from both husbands and causing her children to be deemed illegitimate when the matter is likely to become openly revealed, and when she will not be able to deny the matter or offer any argument in her defense. For if her husband is alive, he will ultimately return, or [at least,] it will become known that he is alive. Similarly, if one witness comes and testifies that the woman's husband died, she is granted permission to marry by virtue of his testimony, because [the truth of] the matter will ultimately be revealed. Similarly, the testimony of a servant, a woman, a maid-servant or a witness testifying on the basis of statements he heard from others is accepted regarding a person's death. On the basis of such testimony, the man's wife is granted permission to remarry or perform the rite of yibbum.

Any person who offers testimony is believed with regard to matters of this nature, with the exception of five women, who are presumed to hate each other. Their testimony is not [accepted] with regard to the death of the other's husband, lest they intend to cause her to be forbidden to him, although he is still alive.They are the woman's mother-in-law, the daughter of her mother-in-law,[her husband's] other wife, her yevamah, her husband's daughter [from another marriage]. [Indeed, with regard to such testimony,] a gentile's statements delivered in the course of conversation are accepted and can serve as the basis for a woman to remarry, as will be explained. If the gentile makes his statements with the intent that they serve as testimony, his word is not accepted.

Similar laws apply to a person who is disqualified [from serving as a witness] by Scriptural law, because of the commission of a sin. If he comes to give testimony on behalf of a woman, [saying] that her husband died, his word is not accepted. If he makes these statements in the course of conversation, his word is accepted, for he is not regarded as less than a gentile. A person who is disqualified [from serving as a witness] by Rabbinic law, by contrast, may give testimony regarding [the death of] a woman's [husband].

[The following rules apply if] one witness came and testified that a woman's husband has died, and she was granted permission to remarry on the basis of his testimony, and afterwards another witness came and contradicted the testimony of the first, saying that he did not die. The woman's status is not changed, and she is still permitted to remarry. [The rationale is that] the testimony of one witness is accepted with regard to [the death of] a woman's [husband] in the same way as is the testimony of two witnesses with regard to other matters. [This testimony is being challenged by the testimony of one witness,] and the words of one witness are not considered when there is [testimony from] two [witnesses].

If two [witnesses] come at the same time, one saying "he died," and the other saying, "he did not die," or a woman says, "he died," and another woman says, "he did not die," she should not marry. And if she marries, she should leave her second husband, for the matter is one of doubt. If, however, she marries the witness who testified on her behalf, and she herself says, "I am certain that he died," she need not leave her second husband. If two witnesses come and say that her first husband did not die, [a more stringent ruling is delivered]. Even though she married, she must leave her second husband.

When does the above apply? When the one witness upon whose testimony [the woman was granted permission to] marry was equivalent to the two witnesses who contradicted his testimony. For example, she married based on the testimony of one man, and two men came and said that her husband did not die. Or she married based on the testimony of one woman or on the basis of her own testimony, and two women or two men who were disqualified from serving as witnesses by Rabbinic law testified that her husband did not die. If, however, one acceptable witness says that her husband died, and many women or men who were disqualified from serving as witnesses by Rabbinic law testify that her husband did not die, the situation is considered to be equally balanced. Thus, if she marries one of the witnesses who testified on her behalf, and she herself says, "I am certain that he died," she need not leave her second husband.

When one woman testifies that [her husband] died, or she herself says that [her husband] died, and afterwards, one acceptable witness comes and says that he did not die, [the woman] should not remarry; and if she remarried, she should leave her second husband.

When one woman says that [a man] did not die, and two women say that he did die, [his wife] may remarry. Similarly, if ten women say that [a man] did not die, and eleven women say that he did die, [his wife] may remarry. For we say, "two [witnesses] are considered as 100," only with regard to acceptable witnesses. With regard to witnesses whose testimony would ordinarily be disqualified, by contrast, [the law is that we] follow the majority, whether this leads to a more lenient ruling or a more stringent ruling.

When two [witnesses] say that [a man] died, and two other witnesses say that he did not die, [his wife] may not remarry. If she has remarried, she should leave [her second husband], because the matter is one of doubt. If she marries one of the witnesses who testified on her behalf, and she herself says, "I am certain that he died," she need not leave her second husband.

[The following laws apply when] a person has two wives and one of them comes and says, "My husband died." She may marry on the basis of her own testimony, as we have explained. Her husband's other wife is forbidden to marry, for one of a man's wives may not testify on behalf of the other. Even if the woman [who said that her husband died] married first, [the other wife is still forbidden to marry]. We do not say that if her husband had not actually died, she would not cause herself to be forbidden to him. [Instead, we suspect that] perhaps her hatred for the other wife is so great that she desires for them both to become forbidden to him. If one says, "My husband died," and her husband's other wife denies this, saying that he did not die, [the wife who testifies that he has died] may remarry. Just as the other wife's testimony does not cause her to be permitted, it does not cause her to be forbidden. If one says, "[My husband] died," and the other says, "He was killed," they both are granted permission to remarry, for they both are testifying that he is no longer alive.

[The following rules apply with regard to] a woman who told her husband: "You divorced me in the presence of so and so and so and so," and those witnesses came and denied her statements. If afterwards, she and her husband departed [for a far-removed country] while peace prevails in the world at large, and then she returns and says, "My husband died," her word is not accepted. [The rationale is] that she is considered to be a liar, who desires to free herself from her ties to her husband. If one witness comes and testifies on her behalf that her husband died, she should not [be granted permission to] marry; we fear that perhaps she hired him. If, however, she marries, nevertheless, she need not leave [her second husband], for there is a witness who supports her.

Similarly, when there is a state of war in the world at large, if [a woman] comes and says, "My husband died in the war," her word is not accepted, even where the couple's relationship is peaceful. [The rationale is that we fear that] she will rely on a situation in which the likelihood is that he will die - e.g., the people in the front and at the rear were killed, and her husband is in the center. She might think, "Since these were killed, and those were killed, he was killed surely together with them." For this reason, her word is not accepted, even if she says, "He died in the war, and I buried him." If, however, she says that he died in bed, her word is accepted.

If we are not aware of a war raging in the world, and a woman comes and says: "There was a war in a particular county and [my husband] died in that war," a priori, she should not marry. If, however, she marries, she need not leave [her second husband].

Similarly, if a woman says, "My husband died in a landslide," her word is not accepted. In the same vein, if an area was overrun by swarms of snakes and scorpions, and she says, "He was bitten by a snake - or a scorpion - and died," her word is not accepted. [The rationale is] that she might rely on the fact that most men die because they were bitten in this manner, [and make a statement without knowing for certain whether or not her husband died].

If [a woman] says, "They filled the house - or the cave - [in which we were hiding] with smoke; he died, but I was saved," her word is not accepted. [It is possible that] just as she [was saved] by a miracle, he could have been [saved by a miracle]. If it is a year of famine, and she says: "My husband died," her word is not accepted. [If she says,] "He died and I buried him," her word is accepted.

If [a woman] says, "Gentiles - or thieves - attacked us. He was slain, and I was saved," her word is accepted, because it is not common for attackers to kill women. Thus, [it is not fitting] to say: Just as she was saved, he was saved.

If an epidemic was raging throughout the world, and [a woman] says, "My husband died," her word is accepted. For [there is no widely accepted likelihood] with regard to a plague; everyone knows that in a time of plague some die and some live. And it is possible that strong young men will die from the plague, and elderly infirm people will be saved. And therefore, we do not suspect that she relied on the likelihood that most people died.

It has already been stated that a witness who [did not see evidence of the person's death himself, but who] testifies after hearing the statements of another person is acceptable with regard to [the verification of the death of] a woman's [husband]. When does this apply? When the person heard a mentally competent adult - even a servant or a maid -servant - say that so and so died. If, however, a person heard from a mentally incompetent person or from a minor that an individual died, he may not testify [to that effect], nor do we rely on their statements.

[There is an exception to the above principle.] If a person heard children saying: "We just came from so and so's funeral. These and these many people recited eulogies. The sage so and so and these and these others followed the bier. And this and this is what happened to the bier," the person may offer this as testimony [regarding a man's death], and on this basis permission is granted for [the deceased's] wife to remarry.

When a Jew says, "I killed so and so," [the man's wife] is allowed to remarry on the basis of his testimony. [The rationale is] a person's own testimony cannot be used to incriminate him. [Therefore, he is not disqualified, and] he did testify that [the husband] died.

It has already been stated that statements made by a gentile in the course of conversation can be used as a basis to grant [a woman] permission to remarry. What is implied? If a gentile exclaimed: "How terrible is it that so and so died! He was so nice! He did so much for me!" Or if the gentile was talking and said, "We were traveling on our way, and to our amazement, so and so who was traveling with us fell down and died. We all were amazed that he died so suddenly." If he makes statements of this nature that indicate that he has no intention of giving testimony, his word is accepted.

When a Jew hears a gentile [say] in the course of conversation [that a man died], he may testify that he heard these statements, and the man's wife may be granted permission to remarry on this basis. When does the above apply? When there is no rationale to explain [why the gentile would make these statements if they were not true]. If, however, there could be a reason for the gentile's statements, and he is making them with another intent in mind [his word is not accepted]. For example, [a gentile] told a Jew, "Do such and such for me, or else I will kill you, as I killed so and so," he is not making these statements in the course of conversation, for his intent is to cast fear upon his listener.

Similarly, if a person heard the gentile legal authorities say, "We executed so and so," their word is not accepted. For they will use falsehood to reinforce their position and to cast fear [among the populace]. The same applies in all similar instances.

When, at first, a gentile made statements in the course of conversation, and afterwards was asked questions [by Jews] until all the details [of the person's death] were disclosed, his statements are accepted, and the woman is granted permission to remarry on this basis.

It has already been stated that a witness who testifies: "I heard that so and so died," is acceptable with regard to testimony [concerning] a woman's [husband], and the woman may remarry on this basis. [This applies even when] he heard the statements from a woman or from a servant. If, however, a witness, a woman or a servant says: "So and so died; I saw that he died," the witness should be asked: "What did you see? How do you know that he died? " If the witness responds with clear [testimony], his word is accepted. If the witness replies, describing a situation in which it is highly likely that the person would have died, we do not grant his wife license to remarry. For testimony concerning a man's death [can be accepted] only when [the witness can say] with certainty that he saw the man die, and there is no doubt concerning the matter.

What is implied? If a man was seen falling into the sea, even if he fell into the ocean, testimony should not be offered that the man died, because it is possible that he was cast away or escaped [from the sea] from an [unseen] place. If he fell into a body of water with definite boundaries - e.g., a cistern or a cavern in which a person standing [at the edge] could see the entire periphery - testimony that the man died may be offered, and license may be granted for his wife to remarry, provided [the witnesses] remained there for a period of time beyond which it was impossible for the man to live, and saw that he did not ascend [from the body of water]. Similarly, if he was cast into the sea and a net was cast in after him, and a limb that a person would not be able to live without was raised up, testimony may be offered that he died, and his wife may [be granted license] to remarry.

If [a man] fell into a lair of lions, leopards or the like, testimony that he died may not be offered, for it is possible that they will not eat him. If he fell into a pit of snakes and scorpions, into a furnace, or into a boiling caldron filled with wine or oil, or his esophagus and windpipe were slit - either in their majority or in their entirety - testimony may be offered that he died, even if he arose and fled. For [in these situations], he ultimately will die. Similar laws apply in all situations in which it is impossible that the person will live, but rather will die shortly afterwards. Testimony may be offered that he [died].

If we see a man hanging and a vulture eating from his body, testimony may not be offered that he died. [This applies] even if he was stabbed with a lance, or arrows were shot at him. If, however, we see the vulture eating from a place that would cause him to die - e.g., his brain, his heart or his intestines, one may offer testimony that he died.

[The following laws apply when] one witness testifies, "I saw that he died in a war or in a landslide, or that he drowned in the ocean and died," or mentioned other causes that would probably lead to death. If he says, "I buried him," his statements are accepted, and she may be granted permission to remarry. If he did not say, "I buried him," she should not be granted permission to remarry. If, however, she remarries, she need not leave [her second husband].

Similarly, if one witness testifies that a woman's husband drowned in the sea or in a body of water that does not have a defined periphery, he did not emerge [from the water], all traces of him have disappeared, and his existence has been forgotten, the woman should not [be granted license to] remarry on this basis, as we have explained. If, however, she remarries, she need not be forced to leave her second husband. Even if a gentile said in the course of conversation, "So and so drowned at sea," and on this basis [the man's wife] remarried, she need not be forced to leave her second husband. Nevertheless, [in the above instances,] the sage who gave permission for her to remarry should be placed under a ban of ostracism.

[The following rules apply when the body of a man who was] slain or died of natural causes is discovered. If his forehead, his nose and his facial features are intact, and his identity can be established based on them, testimony concerning his death may be offered. If, however, any of these identifying factors is missing, even if there are signs [through which he can be identified] on his body and on his personal artifacts, even if one of those signs is a mole, testimony concerning his death should not be offered. When does [the leniency mentioned in the first clause] apply? When the corpse was seen within three days of his murder or death. After three days have passed, testimony concerning his death should not be offered, because his facial features [may have] become distorted.

[The following rules apply when a man] drowned at sea and was cast out onto dry land. Although several days have passed, if his facial features and his nose can be identified, testimony may be offered with regard to his [death], for in water the features of a corpse do not become distorted until an extremely long period of time has passed. If the corpse lay on dry land for twelve hours after being cast out of the sea and the corpse became bloated, testimony may not be offered because [his features] have been distorted. When we look at the form [of a corpse] in order to identify [a man] to offer testimony with regard to his [death], [it is acceptable if] we look at [the corpse] even by candlelight or by moonlight.

[The following rule applies when] we see a person at a distance and he says that he is so and so, the son of so and so, or so and so from a particular place, and that he has been bitten by a snake and is dying. Even if we go [to the place where he was standing], find [the corpse and discover] that its features have changed to the extent that it is no longer distinguishable, we may, nevertheless, [grant license for] his wife [to] remarry.

[A person's testimony is effective in the following instance.] A person came and said: "A court - or people - told me, when you arrive at this and this place, tell them that Yitzchak, the son of Michael, died." When this person came to that place and delivered the message - although he is not aware of the identity [of the deceased] - since [the people at that place] do know his identity, [the deceased's] wife [may be granted] permission [to remarry]. We do not presume that perhaps it was another person named Yitzchak, the son of Michael, who died.

When a Jew and a gentile left from our [location] for a different destination, and the gentile came and said in the course of conversation: "The man who left [this city] with me died," [the deceased's] wife [may be granted license to] remarry. [This applies] even when the gentile does not know the identity of the man, provided he says: "I buried him."

Similarly, when ten men were taken together while shackled in chains or tied by heavy ropes used to lead camels or the like, from one place to another, and a gentile came and said in the course of conversation that all ten men who went out while tied died, and he buried them, their wives [may be granted license to] remarry.

If a Jew says: "A Jewish man died in our company in this and this place. These and these were his facial features. These and these were signs of identification," we do not make a guess and say that it was probably so and so. Rather [the person is not considered to have died] until a witness mentions his name and the name of his city. If, however, [a person] says: "One of the inhabitants of the city of so and so journeyed out in our company and died," we check in that city. If only one man left the city, his wife [may be given permission to] marry.

[The following rule applies if] a document was found saying: "So and so, the son of so and so, died," or "So and so, the son of so and so, was killed": If it can be determined that this was written by a Jew, [the man's] wife [may be given permission to] marry. Similarly, when a person has lost the power of speech, and he was tested, as he would be tested with regard to a get, and it is proven that he is mentally sound, if he writes that so and so died, we may rely on his writing, and [the deceased's] wife [may be given permission to] marry. We do not follow the standard process of interrogation with regard to witnesses who testify [concerning the death of] a woman's [husband]. For our Sages did not speak about establishing stringencies regarding such matters. [Indeed, their approach was characterized by] leniency in order to permit a woman without a husband [to remarry].

Do not wonder at the fact that our Sages discharged the prohibition [against a married woman], which is considered a very severe matter, on the basis of the testimony of a woman, a servant or a maidservant, statements made by a gentile in the course of conversation, a written statement or [testimony] that was not investigated by the ordinary process of interrogation, as we have explained. [These leniencies were instituted] because the Torah requires only testimony of two witnesses, and all the other details of the laws of witnesses with regard to matters that cannot be verified definitively except via witnesses and their testimony - e.g., that one person killed another, or that one person lent money to another. When, by contrast, the matter may be verified definitively without the testimony of a witness, and the witness cannot justify [his statements] if they are not true - e.g, when one testifies that a person died, the Torah did not necessitate [that the requirements of formal testimony be met in these instances]. For it is unlikely that a witness will testify falsely. For this reason, our Sages [extended] the leniency with regard to this matter and accepted the testimony of a single witness that is based on the testimony of a maidservant, [testimony] from a written document, and [testimony] that was not investigated by the ordinary process of interrogation. [These leniencies were accepted] so that the daughters of Israel will not be forced to remain unmarried. Blessed be the Merciful One, who grants assistance.