Marriage

Before the giving of the Torah, it would be that if a man happened upon a woman in the marketplace and they wanted to marry each other, he would bring her into his house and consummate the marriage between them privately, and she would be his wife. Once the Torah was given, Israel was commanded that if a man wanted to marry a woman, he would acquire her first through witnesses, and afterwards she would be his wife, as it says, "When a man takes a woman and comes to (sleeps with) her..." (Deuteronomy 22:13).

And taking a wife as such is a positive commandment of the Torah. And a woman is acquired through three means: money, a contract, or through intercourse. Marriage through intercourse and by contract is from the Torah, and by money is Rabbinical [lit. "the words of the Scribes"]. And this acquisition is what is called "Kiddushin" or "Eirusin" in several places. And a woman who is acquired through one of these three means is called a "Mekudeshet" or "Meureset".

And since the woman had been acquired and had been made set apart, even though there was no consummation and she did not enter her husbands house, she is a married woman! And anyone who has intercourse with her, other than her husband, shall be liable for execution by the Jewish court. And if a divorce is sought-after, a bill of divorce is required.

Before the giving of the Torah, a man would meet a woman at the market and, if both of them wanted to, he would give her her wages and have intercourse with her and thereafter be on his way. Such a woman is called a cult-prostitude. Since the giving of the Torah, the cult-prostitude has become forbidden, for it says "There shall be no cult-prostitude among the daughters of Israel". Therefore, if one has intercourse after the manner of prostitution, without a legal and legitimate marriage, he shall receive Torah lashes because he had had intercourse with a prostitute.

All for whom intercourse is forbidden according to the Torah and is punished upon such intercourse with karet, and these are stated in the Torah portion Acharei Mot (Leviticus 16:1), are called Arayot and each one of them is called an Erva. For example, one's mother, sister, daughter, and similar.

There are other women that are forbidden by the received tradition and are forbidden according to Rabbinic law. These are called "seconds" since they are second to the [primary] Arayot. Each one of them is called a "second". There are twenty such women and they are: 1) One's mother's mother, and this has no interruption and even one's mother's mother's mother's mother, upward forever, is forbidden. 2) Ones father's mother’s mother only. 3) One's father's mother, and this has no interruption and even one's father's mother's mother's mother, upward forever, is forbidden. 4) One’s father's father’s mother only. 5) One's father's father’s wife, and this has no interruption and the wife of Jacob our father is forbidden to any one of us. 6) One's father's mother’s wife only. 7) One's father's maternal brother’s wife. 8) One's mother's maternal or paternal brother’s wife. 9) One's son's daughter-in-law, and this has no interruption and even the daughter-in-law of one’s son’s son’s son’s son, forever, is forbidden; even the wife of any one of us is [forbidden as] a second to Jacob our father. 10) One’s daughter’s daughter-in-law only. 11) One’s son’s daughter’s daughter only. 12) One’s son’s son’s daughter. 13) One’s daughter’s daughter’s daughter only. 14) One’s daughter’s son’s daughter only. 15) One’s wife’s son’s son’s daughter only. 16) One’s wife’s daughter’s daughter’s daughter only. 17) One’s wife’s father’s mother’s mother only. 18) One’s wife’s mother’s father’s mother only. 19) One’s wife’s mother’s mother’s mother only. 20) One’s wife’s father’s father’s mother only. Thus, there are four seconds for which there is no interruption: one’s mother’s mother and upward, one’s father’s mother and upward, one’s father’s father’s wife and upward, and one’s son’s son’s wife and downward.

Intercourse prohibitions according to the Torah for which there is no punishment of karet are called “negative prohibitions”. They are also called “holy prohibitions”. There are nine [such prohibitions] and they are: a widow to a high priest, a divorced woman or zona or ḥalala to a high priest or to an ordinary priest, a mamzeret to an Israelite man, an Israelite woman to a mamzer, an Israelite woman to an Ammonite or Moabite man, an Israelite woman to one with crushed [genitals], or severed [genitals], one’s ex-wife after she has remarried, one’s yevama who married a stranger while still under the yavam’s control. A ḥalutza is like a divorced woman and is forbidden to a priest according to Rabbinic law. The Gibeonites are like mamzerim, whether male or female, and they are prohibited according to Rabbinic law. The Gibeonites will be explained in the Laws of Forbidden Intercourse.

There are some intercourse prohibitions [that are inferred] from a positive commandment and are not among the negative prohibitions. There are three of them: a first or second generation male or female Egyptian or Edomite, and a non-virgin to a high priest. Since it is not written regarding these that “one may not come” or “one may not take”, but rather [concerning an Egyptian or Edomite] “they may join the congregation of G-d in the third generation” (Deuteronomy 23:9), you may infer that first and second generation [Egyptians and Edomites] are forbidden to join [the congregation of G-d]; and since it is stated [concerning a high priest] “he must marry a virgin” (Leviticus 21:13) you may infer that [a high priest] may not marry a non-virgin. And a negative prohibition that is inferred from a positive commandment has the status of a positive commandment.

A girl from the day of her birth until twelve complete years of age is called a minor and is [also] called a child. And even if she has grown several hairs within this time, they are merely like a mole. But if she has grown two hairs below on her body in places known for hair growth, and she is [at least] twelve years and one day old or more, she is called a young woman.

The growth of two hairs during this time is called the “lower sign”. After the appearance of the lower sign, she is called a young woman for the next six complete months. And from the day beginning the conclusion of [these] six months and afterwards, she is called a woman of age. The length of time between becoming a young woman and a woman of age is only six months.

Once she reaches twelve years and one day old and has not grown two hairs, even though signs of barrenness have appeared in her, she is still considered a minor until she is twenty years old. And from the time she grows two hairs, even during the twentieth year, she is called a young woman for the next six months. Afterwards, she is called a woman of age.

If she was twenty years old less thirty days and has not grown two hairs, and there has appeared in her (all) the signs of a barrenness, she is considered a barren woman. But if there has not appeared in her (all) the signs of barrenness, she is still considered a minor until she grows two hairs or until she is thirty-five years and one day old.

If she has reached this age [of thirty-five] and has not grown two hairs, she is called a barren woman, even though there has not appeared in her a sign of barrenness. You may thus infer that a barren woman does not have any days of young-womanhood but rather, passes immediately from the status of a minor to that of a woman of age.

These are the signs of barrenness: if she does not have breasts, or feels pain during intercourse, or does not have a sloped abdomen as women do, or who has a deep voice that cannot be distinguished between a man or woman. A young woman, woman of age, and barren woman are each considered an adult.

A girl may have certain signs in the upper [parts of her body] and these are called the “upper signs”. And they are: when she can stretch her hand behind her and a fold forms (near the breasts), or when the nipple darkens, or when one presses a hand on the nipple and it sinks and delays returning, or when the protrusion of the breast splits off and forms a small ball, whereas my Rabbis explained when the protrusion itself splits off, or when the breasts tilt away, or when the breasts [are large enough] to be shaken, or when the crown is formed, which is the fatty tissue above the genitals near the abdomen, or when this tissue softens and is no longer hard.

These [upper] signs are thus eight in number. If in a girl appeared one of these [upper] signs or all of them and she is twelve years old or less, we ignore them and she is [still] considered a minor. When she turns twelve years and one day old and there appeared in her a lower sign, then we ignore any of these [upper signs]. If there has not appeared in her a lower [sign] but there has appeared in her one of these [upper signs], then there is a doubt as to whether she is a considered a young woman or a minor and we judge her in a stringent manner. And if there has appeared in her all of these [upper signs] but no lower sign, then she is considered a definite adult, since it is impossible that all of the [upper signs] would appear unless the lower sign already appeared but fell off.

A girl that gave birth after twelve years of age, even though she has not brought forth any signs whether lower or upper, is considered as an adult. Childbirth is considered like signs.

A boy from birth until thirteen years of age is called a minor and is [also] called a child, and even if he has brought forth several hairs during this time, it is not a sign but a mole. Once he brings forth two hairs below in the places known for hair growth, and he is thirteen and one day old or more, then he is called an a adult and is [also] called a man.

If he has reached this age [thirteen and one day] but has not brought forth two hairs, even though there has appeared within him signs of impotence, he is considered a minor until twenty years less thirty days in age. When he has reached this time but has not brought forth two pubic hairs, nor has he brought forth two hairs in the beard, if there appears within him one of the signs of impotence, then he is considered an impotent man and has the status of an adult for all matters. But if there has not appeared within him signs of impotence, then he is still considered a minor until he brings forth two hairs below in the proper place or until he is thirty-five years and one day old.

If he has reached this age [thirty-five and one day] but has not brought forth [two pubic hairs], he is considered an impotent man even though there has not appeared within him one of the signs of impotence. If he reaches twenty years less thirty days in age but has not brought brought forth two pubic hairs but has brought forth two hairs in the beard, then even if there has formed within him one of the signs of impotence, he is not considered an impotent man. Rather he is still considered a minor until there appears within him all the signs of impotence or if he reaches thirty-five and one day in age.

These are the signs of impotence: any man who does not have a beard, or his hair is defective, or his skin is smooth, or his urine does not release foam, or when he urinates he does not make an arch, or his semen has a thin consistency, or his urine does not ferment, or when he washes in the rainy season his skin does not release steam, or his voice is defective and cannot be distinguished between a man or woman.

This type of impotent man is called “impotent by the sun” in all places. But a boy whose member or testicles were severed or crushed, as is done by the idolaters, is called “impotent by man”. And when he turns thirteen years and one day old, he is considered an adult since he will never bring forth a sign.

A thirteen year and one day old boy that has not brought forth a lower sign but there has appeared within him all the upper signs is in doubt between an adult and a minor. If he has not been checked for lower [signs], then once there appears within him upper signs of adulthood, he is considered an adult.

Whenever the term "two pubic hairs" is mentioned with regard to a male or a female, the intent is that the hairs are long enough to be bent in half, with their point touching their base. If they grow to the extent that they can be cut by scissors, but are not [long enough] that they can be bent in half with their point touching their base, [there is doubt regarding the decision], and the more stringent ruling is always followed. Therefore, when a boy's or girl's pubic hairs have grown to the point that they can be cut by scissors, the individual is considered to be an adult with regard to those matters concerning which the ruling would be more stringent if he or she were so classified. And with regard to those matters concerning which the ruling would be more stringent if he [or she] were classified as a minor, the individual is so classified because the pubic hairs are not long enough to be bent in half with their point touching their base.

These two hairs must be located in the pubic area. The entire pubic area is appropriate for the signs to be located. There is no difference whether they are located in the upper area, the lower area or on the sexual organ itself. The two hairs must be located in a single place, and there must be a follicle at their base. If both of them stem from the same follicle, it is acceptable. If two follicles are located next to each other without hairs growing from them, they are, nevertheless, considered a sign. We follow the presumption that a follicle will not exist without hair. [Surely,] there were hairs [that grew from the follicle], and they fell.

As we have explained, when a girl grows two pubic hairs before she is twelve, or a boy grows two pubic hairs before he is thirteen, they are considered to be merely hairs growing from a mole. Even if these hairs remain in their place after the boy reaches the age of thirteen, or the girl reaches the age of twelve, they are not considered signs of physical maturity.

When does the above apply? When the child was inspected [before attaining the age of majority], and the hairs were deemed to be hairs growing from a mole. If, however, no such inspection was made until they reached the age of majority, and afterwards an inspection was made and two hairs were discovered, they are considered acceptable signs of physical maturity. We do not say that perhaps the hairs grew before the child reached majority, and they are merely hairs growing from a mole.

Whenever a girl is inspected for [signs of physical maturity] - whether during her twelfth year, after she became twelve or when she is older - the inspection is carried out by trustworthy, ethical women. Even when an inspection has been conducted by one woman, her word is accepted with regard to whether or not [the girl has manifested signs of physical maturity].

Whenever the term "years" is mentioned with regard to [the age of] a male or a female, endowment evaluations, or any other matter, the intent is not lunar years, nor solar years, but rather the years as reckoned by the Jewish court to [juxtapose the solar and lunar calendars], whether ordinary years or leap years, as established by the [Jewish] court, as explained in Hilchot Kiddush HaChodesh. This is the intent whenever the subject of years is mentioned with regard to religious matters.

We do not rely on the testimony of women regarding a child's age, nor on that of relatives. Instead, the matter is determined by the testimony of two men who are fit to testify in court.

When a father says, "My son is nine years and one day old," or "My daughter is three years and one day old," his word is accepted with regard to the obligation of bringing a sacrifice [if sexual relations were carried out without knowledge of the sin involved], but not with regard to administering stripes [for rebellion] or other punishments. If the father says, "My son is thirteen years and one day old," or "My daughter is twelve years and one day old," his word is accepted with regard to vows, endowment evaluations, property forsworn [and transferred to the priests], or the consecration of property, but not with regard to administering lashes or other punishments.

A person who possesses both a male sexual organ and a female sexual organ is called an androgynous. There is doubt whether such a person should be classified as a male or as a female; there is no physical sign that can ever enable such a distinction to be made.

A person who possesses neither a male sexual organ nor a female sexual organ, but instead, his genital area is a solid mass, is called a tumtum. There is also doubt with regard [to this person's status]. If an operation is carried out and a male [organ is revealed], he is definitely considered to be a male. If a female [organ is revealed], she is definitely considered to be a female. When a tumtum or an androgynous reaches the age of twelve years and one day, they are assumed to be adults. Whenever these terms are mentioned, the intent is individuals of this age.

Whenever the terms cheresh and chereshet are used, they refer to a male or female deaf mute, respectively. If, however, a person can speak but cannot hear, or can hear but cannot speak, he is considered to be an ordinary person. A male or a female who is intellectually competent, being neither a deaf mute nor emotionally disturbed, is referred to as a pike'ach or a pikachat, respectively.

We have thus defined twenty terms in these two chapters: kiddushin, ervah, sh'niyah, issurei lavin, issurei aseh, k'tanah, na'arah, bogeret, aylonit, gedolah, lower sign of maturity, upper sign of maturity, katan, s'ris chamah, s'ris adam, gadol, androgynous, tumtum, chershim, pik'chim. Keep these terms in mind at all times; do not forget their meaning, so that their intent will not have to be explained whenever they are mentioned.

How is a woman sanctified (for engagement)? If one choses to do so with money (or its equivalent), it can not have less than the value of a "Peruta". He says to her, "Behold, you are sanctified to me", "Behold, you are engaged to me", "Behold, with this, you are to be my wife", and he gives her the object in front of witnesses. The man must be the one to say words that have the meaning of an acquisition, and it must be he that is giving her the money.

If she gives the money and says, "I am sanctified to you", "I am engaged to you", "I am a wife to you" or any other acquisition term, she is not sanctified. So too if she gives the money and he speaks, she is not sanctified. If he gives and she speaks, this is a questionable sanctification.

If he sanctified with a document, he writes it on paper or clay or of earth, or on anything he desires. "Behold, you are sanctified to me", "Behold, you are engaged to me" and so on (other terms), and gives her the document in front of witnesses.

The document must be written for the sake of the woman who is being married, as must a bill of divorce, and it must be written with her consent. If it was not written for her sake, or if it was written for her sake, but was written without her consent, the marriage bond is not established. [This applies] even when he gives her [the document] with her consent in the presence of witnesses.

If the man consecrates through sexual relations, he should tell the woman, "You are consecrated unto me...," "You are betrothed to me...," or "You become my wife through these relations," or choose a similar statement. He must enter into privacy with her in the presence of witnesses and engage in relations. When a person consecrates through sexual relations, one may assume that his intent is on the conclusion of the relations; when the relations are concluded, the marriage bond is established. Regardless of whether the couple engage in vaginal or anal intercourse, the marriage bond is established.

The statements that the man makes when he consecrates [his wife] must imply that he acquires her as a wife, and not that he gives himself to her. What is implied? Should he tell her, or write in the document he gives her: "I am your husband," "I am your betrothed," "I am your man," or the like, the marriage bond is not established at all. If he tells her or writes to her: "Behold, you are my wife," "Behold, you are my betrothed," "Behold, you are acquired by me," "Behold, you are mine," "Behold, you are my possession," "Behold, you are my designated one," "Behold, you are within my property," "Behold, you are bound to me," or the like, the marriage bond is established.

Should he tell her, or write to her: "You are set aside for me," "You are earmarked for me," "You are my helper," "You are my counterpart," "You are my rib," "You are closed off for me," "You are below me," "You are my captive," "You have been taken by me," [the matter is unresolved, and] the status of the kiddushin is in doubt. The above applies only when the man was [previously] speaking to the woman about establishing a marriage bond. If he was not speaking to the woman about such a matter, these words are of no consequence.

A man may consecrate a woman by making statements in any language that she understands, provided that, in that language, his statements mean that he is acquiring her, as explained. If a man was speaking to a woman about consecrating her and she consented, and he immediately gave her [something] in her hand to consecrate her or engaged in sexual relations [with that intent], without [making a statement] clarifying [his purpose], it is sufficient. Since they were speaking about this matter, it is not necessary for him to be explicit. Similarly, a man need not tell witnesses who observe kiddushin or divorce, "You are my witnesses." As long as he has divorced or consecrated a woman in their presence, she is consecrated or divorced.

When a man tells a woman, "Become consecrated to my half," she is consecrated. To what can this be compared? To his saying, "May you become my wife, and also another woman." And so, she has only half a man. If, however, he said: "Half of you is consecrated to me," she is not consecrated. For a woman cannot be consecrated to two men. Similarly, if he says, "Behold, you are consecrated to me and to him," the woman is not consecrated.

If he told her: "Behold, half of you is consecrated to me with a p'rutah, and half of you [is consecrated to me with another] p'rutah," or if he told her: "Behold, half of you is consecrated to me with half a p'rutah, and your other half [is consecrated to me with another] half a p'rutah," she is consecrated. If he told her: "Behold, half of you is consecrated to me with a p'rutah today, and half of you [is consecrated to me with another] p'rutah tomorrow," or if he told her: "Your two halves are consecrated to me with a p'rutah," "Your two daughters are consecrated to my two sons with this p'rutah," "Your daughter is consecrated to me, and your cow is sold to me with this p'rutah," or "Your daughter... and your land... with a p'rutah" - in all of these circumstances, [the matter is unresolved, and] the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.

A father may consecrate his daughter without her knowledge while she is a minor. Even when she is a na'arah, he still possesses this right, as [implied by Deuteronomy 22:16]: "I gave my daughter to this man." [The money received as] kiddushin belongs to her father. Similarly, he has the right to [any ownerless property] she finds, [the wages she receives for] her labor, and [the money she receives as stipulated in] her ketubah if she is divorced or widowed before the marriage bond is consummated. He is entitled to all these until she becomes a bogeret. Therefore, a father is entitled to receive kiddushin on behalf of his daughter from the day she was born until she becomes a bogeret. Even if she is a deaf mute or intellectually incompetent, if her father consecrates her [to another man], she is his wife. If a girl is older than three years and one day, she can be consecrated through sexual relations with her father's consent. Should she be below this age, if her father has her consecrated through sexual relations, the marriage bond is not established.

After a daughter becomes a bogeret, her father has no rights over her; she is like all other women, and she can be consecrated only with her own consent. Similarly, if her father had her married, the marriage bond was consummated [nisu'in], and then she was widowed or divorced, [even] in her father's lifetime, she is considered to be independent, despite the fact that she is still a minor. Once a woman enters nisu'in, her father no longer has any authority over her.

When a girl receives kiddushin without her father's knowledge before she reaches the age of majority, the marriage bond is not established. [This applies] even when the father consents subsequently. Moreover, if she is widowed or divorced after these kiddushin, she is not forbidden [to marry] a priest. Both she and her father can prevent [the marriage bonds from taking effect]. Regardless of whether she was consecrated in the presence of her father or not, she is not consecrated.

[The following rules apply when] there is doubt whether or not the girl is a bogeret: Whether her father consecrated her without her consent, or she consecrated herself without her father's consent, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt. Therefore, [to marry another man,] she must receive a get given because of the doubt. A man may appoint an agent to consecrate a wife for him. [This applies] if he specifies a particular woman, or gives the agent the authority to consecrate any woman. Similarly, a woman past the age of majority may appoint an agent to receive kiddushin for her. [This applies] if she specifies [that they be given by] a particular man, or gives the agent the authority to receive them from any man. Similarly, a father may appoint an agent to accept the kiddushin of his daughter as long as she is under his authority. A man may tell his daughter who is below the age of majority, "Go out and receive your kiddushin."

When an agent is appointed to receive kiddushin, he must be appointed in the presence of two witnesses. When, by contrast, a man appoints an agent to consecrate a woman, there is no need for the appointment to be made in the presence of witnesses. For the only purpose witnesses would serve with regard to the agency of the man is to make known the truth of the matter. Therefore, if the agent and the principal acknowledge the appointment, there is no need for witnesses, [as in parallel cases, such as] an agent appointed to bring a get or an agent appointed to separate terumah. In all matters, a principal's agent is regarded as the principal himself, and there is no need to appoint witnesses.

An agent may serve as a witness. Therefore, if a person appointed two men as agents to consecrate a woman, and they did so, they serve both as agents and as witnesses. Hence, there is no need for them to consecrate her in the presence of two other witnesses.

All are fit to serve as agents [in this capacity] except a deaf mute, a mentally incompetent individual and a minor - for they are not responsible - and a gentile, because he is not a member of the covenant. [The latter exclusion is based on Numbers 18:28, which] states: "And so shall you set aside, and you...." [This is interpreted as] including an agent. [Our Sages commented:] Just as you are members of the covenant, your agents must be members of the covenant, thus excluding a gentile. A [Canaanite] servant, although he is acceptable as an agent with regard to financial matters, is not acceptable as an agent with regard to kiddushin and gittin, because the laws of marriage and divorce do not apply to him.

An agent appointed by a man to consecrate a woman should tell her: "Behold, you are consecrated to so and so by virtue of this money" or "...by virtue of this legal document." If an agent of the woman receives the kiddushin, the [man consecrating her] should tell [the agent]: "So and so who appointed you is consecrated to me," and the agent should reply, "I have consecrated her to you," "I have betrothed her to you," "I have given her to you as a wife," or the like. Similarly, when a man consecrates a girl by [giving kiddushin to] her father, he should tell him, "Behold, your daughter so and so is consecrated to me," and the father should reply: "I have consecrated her to you." If the father or the agent says "yes," or even if he remains silent, it is sufficient. If they were discussing the matter, and the man gave the kiddushin to the father or to the agent without making any statement, it is sufficient, and the kiddushin are effective. If the kiddushin are established by virtue of [the transfer of] a legal document, he must have the document written with the consent of the father or of the agent. In all matters pertaining to kiddushin, the same laws that apply to the man and the woman, apply when [the kiddushin are established by] the [man's] agent and [the woman's] agent or [her] father.

It is a mitzvah for a man to consecrate his wife by himself, rather than to charge an agent [with this matter]. Similarly, it is a mitzvah for a woman to [receive] kiddushin herself rather than to charge an agent with receiving them for her. Although a father has the option of consecrating his daughter to anyone he desires while she is a minor or while she is a maiden, it is not proper for him to act in this manner. Instead, our Sages enjoined that a person should not consecrate his daughter while she is a minor until she matures and says, "I would like [to marry] so and so." Similarly, it is not proper for a man to consecrate a girl below the age of majority. Nor should one consecrate a woman until one sees her and deems her fitting, lest she not find favor in his eyes, and he divorce her, or sleep with her while hating her.

Kiddushin established by virtue of sexual relations are effective according to Scriptural law. Similarly, kiddushin established by virtue [of the transfer] of a legal document are effective according to Scriptural law. Just as [the transfer of a legal document] concludes a divorce, as [Deuteronomy 24;1] states: "And he shall write her a scroll of divorce," so too, [the transfer of a legal document] concludes [the establishment of the marriage bond]. [The effectiveness of the transfer of] money stems from Scriptural law, but its interpretation is based on Rabbinic law. [Deuteronomy, ibid.,] states "When a man takes a wife," and our Sages explained: This [process of] acquisition involves [the transfer of] money, as implied by [Genesis 23:13]: "I have given the money for the field; take it from me."

Although this is the essence of the principle, it has already become universal Jewish custom to consecrate [a marriage bond] through [the transfer of] money or objects that are worth money. If one desires to consecrate [a woman] by [giving her] a legal document, one may, but at the outset one should not consecrate [a woman] through sexual relations. If a man consecrates [a woman] through sexual relations, he is given stripes for rebelliousness, so that the Jewish people will not extend beyond the limits of modesty in this manner. Nevertheless, the kiddushin are binding.

Similarly, a man who consecrates a woman without establishing an engagement previously, or a man who consecrates a woman in the marketplace, is given stripes for rebelliousness, although his kiddushin are binding. [This was instituted] lest such a practice accustom people to licentious conduct and invite a comparison to a harlot, as existed before the giving of the Torah.

Whenever a man consecrates a woman, whether by himself or via an agent, either he or his agent should recite a blessing before the consecration, as one recites a blessing before performing any of the mitzvot. [After reciting the blessing,] he should consecrate [the woman]. If he consecrates a woman without reciting a blessing, he should not recite the blessing afterwards. It would be a blessing in vain, for the activity has already been performed.

Which blessing is recited? Blessed are You, G-d, our Lord, King of the universe, who has sanctified us with His mitzvot and separated us from illicit relationships, who has forbidden the arusot to us, and permitted to us those who are married by [the rites of] chuppah and kiddushin. Blessed are You, G-d, who sanctifies Israel. This is the blessing of erusin. The people have established the custom of reciting this blessing over wine or beer. If there is wine available, one should recite the blessing over the wine, recite the blessing of consecration afterwards, and then consecrate the woman. If there is no wine or beer available, one should recite [the blessing of consecration] by itself.

A woman may be consecrated only voluntarily. If one forces a woman to be consecrated, she is not consecrated. When a man, by contrast, is forced to consecrate [a woman], she is consecrated. A man may consecrate many women at one time, provided that he does so by [transferring] money, and there is enough money to give each one a p'rutah. One of these [women] or another person may accept the money on behalf of them all, [provided] they consent.

When a person [desires to] consecrate a woman, and with her consent gives the kiddushin to another woman, and tells the latter "And you as well," or uses another similar expression, they are both consecrated. When, however, the man places [the kiddushin] in the hand [of the second woman] and says, "And you," there is doubt whether or not the kiddushin are valid. Perhaps his intent was only to clarify her feelings. It was as if he asked her, "What would you say about this?" Therefore, she accepted the kiddushin, for she thought he was still asking her about her intent. For this reason, [the question is unresolved,] and the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.

If he told her, "Become consecrated to me with this dinar," and she took it and threw it in front of him or to the sea, into a fire or into anything that will cause it to be destroyed, she is not consecrated. If she told him, "Give it to my father," "...to your father" or "...to so and so," she is not consecrated. If she told him, "Give it to him, so that he will accept it on my behalf," she is consecrated.

[In the above instance, if] the woman told the man, "Place [the kiddushin] on [this] rock," she is not consecrated. If the rock belonged to her, she is consecrated. If the rock belonged to both of them, [the question is unresolved, and] the status of the kiddushin is in doubt. If he told her, "Be consecrated to me with this loaf of bread," and she told him, "Give it to a poor person," she is not consecrated. [This applies] even if she supports the poor person in question. [If she told him,] "Give it to a dog," she is not consecrated. If the dog belonged to her, she is consecrated. If [the dog] was chasing after her and she told him, "Give it to this dog," [the question is unresolved, and] the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.

[The following laws apply when a man] was selling produce, utensils or the like, and a woman came and asked him: "Give me some of these." If he asked her, "If I give them to you, will you be consecrated to me?" and she said, "Yes," she is consecrated when he gives [the items] to her. If, however, she replied to him: "[Just] give them to me," "Heave them over," or another reply that means "Don't fool around with me regarding such matters, just give me [what I asked for]," she is not consecrated although he gave her [what she asked for]. A similar [decision is rendered] if [a man] was drinking wine and [a woman] asked him, "Give me a cup," and he asks her, "If I do, will you be consecrated to me with it?" If she replies, "[Just] let me drink," "Give me," "Serve me drink," or "Dish it out," she is not consecrated. Her words imply: "Just give me a drink, and don't fool around with me regarding such matters."

When [a man] consecrates [a woman] in the presence of a single witness, his kiddushin] are of no consequence. [This applies] even when both [the man and the woman] acknowledge [that the kiddushin were given]. Surely this applies when [a man] consecrates [a woman] without any witnesses at all [observing the act]. When [a man] consecrates [a woman] in the presence of individuals who are disqualified from serving as witnesses by Scriptural law, she is not consecrated. [When he consecrates her in the presence of] individuals who are disqualified from serving as witnesses by Rabbinic law, or in the presence of witnesses regarding whom there is doubt whether or not they are acceptable according to Scriptural law, [the following rules apply:] If he desires to consummate the marriage, he should consecrate the woman again in the presence of acceptable witnesses. If he does not desire to consummate the marriage, the woman must receive a get from him [to enable her to marry others], because of the doubt. [This ruling applies] even when the woman denies [the matter], contradicting the witnesses and saying that she was never consecrated. This ruling applies with regard to all situations in which the status of the kiddushin is in doubt. If [the man] desires to consummate the marriage, he should consecrate the woman again in a manner that is unequivocally acceptable. If he does not desire to consummate the marriage, the woman must receive a get from him, because of the doubt.

When a minor consecrates [a woman], his kiddushin are of no consequence. When, by contrast, a male past the age of majority consecrates a girl below the age of majority who is an orphan, or who has left her father's authority, [different rules apply]: If she is below the age of six, even if she is one who shows deep understanding of secret matters, and can differentiate and discern, she is not married, and there is no need for mi'un. If she is more than ten years old, even when she is very foolish, since she willingly accepted the kiddushin, she is consecrated [according to Rabbinic law] and [must perform] mi'un [should she desire to nullify the marriage]. If she is between the ages of six and ten, [the rabbis] must evaluate her ability to discern. If she is able to differentiate and discern with regard to matters of marriage and kiddushin, [the marriage is binding according to Rabbinic law] and mi'un is necessary. If she lacks [this degree of discernment], she is not consecrated [at all], and need not perform mi'un [to nullify the marriage].

What is meant by the statement that she is consecrated [according to Rabbinic law], and [must perform] mi'un [should she desire to nullify the marriage]? If she was consecrated but no longer desires to remain with her husband, she must perform mi'un in the presence of two witnesses. She should say: "I no longer desire him." Afterwards, she leaves [the relationship] without a divorce, as will be explained in Hilchot Gerushin. Why does she leave [the relationship] without a divorce? Because the consecration is not absolutely binding according to Scriptural law; it is merely a Rabbinic institution. [According to Scriptural law, the outcome] is tentative. If she continues living with her husband until she reaches the age of majority, the kiddushin are finalized, and she becomes a married woman in the complete sense of the term. There is no need for [her husband] to consecrate her again after she attains majority. If she does not want [to continue] living with him, she must perform mi'un; she then leaves [the relationship] without a divorce.

When a male deaf mute marries a mentally competent woman, or a female deaf mute marries a mentally competent man, the marriage bond is not absolutely binding according to Scriptural law; it is merely a Rabbinic institution. Therefore, if a mentally competent man consecrates the wife of a deaf mute man who is herself mentally competent, she is considered to be consecrated to the mentally competent man. He must give her a get, and she is permitted to remain married to her deaf mute husband. When, by contrast, a mentally incompetent man consecrates a mentally competent woman, or a mentally competent man consecrates a mentally incompetent woman, the marriage bond is not at all binding - neither according to Scriptural law nor according to Rabbinic law.

When a sexually impotent male - whether a s'ris chamah or a s'ris adam - consecrates [a woman], and similarly, when [a man] consecrates an aylonit, the kiddushin are absolutely binding.

When a tumtum or an androgynous consecrates a woman, or when either of these individuals has been consecrated by a man, there is doubt whether these kiddushin are binding, and because of the doubt, a get is required.

When a person consecrates one of the women forbidden as arayot, his act is of no consequence. For kiddushin are not binding with regard to these forbidden relationships, with the exception of [kiddushin given] a niddah. When a man consecrates a niddah, the kiddushin are binding absolutely. It is, nevertheless, improper to do so.

When a married woman accepts kiddushin from another man in the presence of her husband, she is considered to be consecrated to the second man. For a woman's word is accepted when she tells her husband to his face that he had divorced her. We assume it axiomatically that a woman would not act so brazenly in her husband's presence [unless it were true]. If, however, the other person consecrates her outside her husband's presence, these kiddushin are not considered to be binding unless she brings proof that she was divorced before she was consecrated. As long as she is outside her husband's presence, it is possible that she will act brazenly.

When a man consecrates one of the shniyot or a woman forbidden because of a negative commandment [not associated with karet] or because of a positive commandment, the kiddushin are binding absolutely. [The same ruling applies when] a yavam consecrates a woman who was married to the same man as his yevamah. There is one exception to the above principle: when a person other than [the yavam] consecrates a yevamah, [the question is unresolved, and] the status of the kiddushin is in doubt. For our Sages were unsure whether the kiddushin of a yevamah are valid, like those of others in which the relationship is forbidden by merely a negative commandment, or whether the kiddushin are of no consequence, as in the case of an incestuous relationship. In all the situations mentioned above, although the man who gave the kiddushin is forbidden to consummate the marriage, he must terminate it by giving a get.

[When] a man consecrates a gentile woman or a [Canaanite] maidservant, the kiddushin are of no consequence; the woman's status is the same after receiving the kiddushin as beforehand. Similarly, when a gentile or a [Canaanite] servant consecrates a Jewish woman, the kiddushin are of no consequence. When an apostate Jew consecrates [a woman], his kiddushin are absolutely valid, despite the fact that he willingly worships a false deity. The woman must receive a get from him.

When a man consecrates a woman who is half a maidservant and half a free woman, she is not completely consecrated until she becomes [totally] free. Once she becomes free, the kiddushin are [automatically] completed, like the kiddushin of a minor who comes of age. There is no need for her to be consecrated again. If another man consecrates such a woman after she was granted her freedom [before the person who consecrated her originally consummates their marriage], there is doubt regarding the matter, and the status of both their kiddushin is in doubt.

What then is a shifchah charufah [a betrothed maidservant] as described by the Torah [Leviticus 19:20]? A woman who is half a maidservant and half a free woman, who was consecrated by a Hebrew servant. When a male who is half a servant and half a free man consecrates a woman, [the matter is unresolved, and] the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.

When a drunk gives [a woman] kiddushin, they are valid, even if he is very drunk. If he reaches a state of drunkenness comparable to that of Lot, the kiddushin are of no consequence. This matter requires ample deliberation.

When a man gives money worth less than a p'rutah as kiddushin, the kiddushin are not valid. When a man consecrates a woman with food or with a utensil worth less than a p'rutah, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt; perhaps the kiddushin are worth a p'rutah in another place. From this one can deduce that whenever a person consecrates a woman with an article worth money, if it is worth a p'rutah in that country the kiddushin are definitely binding. If it is not worth a p'rutah [there], the status of the kiddushin is in doubt [as above]. It appears to me that if [a man] consecrated [a woman] with cooked food, a vegetable that will not be preserved or the like, and the item is not worth a p'rutah in that place, the kiddushin are not binding at all. For by the time this item reaches another place, it will spoil and be worthless. This is a reasonable inference; one may rely on it.

When [a man] consecrates a woman with less than a p'rutah's worth, or he consecrates two women with a p'rutah, the women are not consecrated. [This applies] even when he sends wedding presents [worth more than a p'rutah] afterwards. Similarly, when a minor consecrates a woman, the kiddushin are not valid, despite the fact that he sent marriage presents after he had attained majority. [This ruling was delivered because the presents] were sent because of the original kiddushin, which were invalid [and therefore are not considered to be significant in their own right].

When [a man] consecrates a woman by [giving her] money or a legal document, he does not have to place the kiddushin in her hand. Instead, if she consents that he throw them to her and he does so, she is consecrated, whether he throws them into her hand, her bosom, her courtyard or her field. If she is standing in a domain belonging to her [prospective] husband, he must place them in her hand or in her bosom. If she is standing in a domain that belongs to both of them, and he threw kiddushin to her with her consent, but they did not reach her hand or her bosom, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt. Even when she tells him, "Put the kiddushin down in this place," if the place belongs to both of them the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.

[The following rules apply when the two] are standing in the public domain or in a domain that does not belong to either of them, and he throws kiddushin to her: If they are closer to him, she is not consecrated. If they are closer to her, she is consecrated. If they are halfway between the two of them, or if there is doubt whether they were closer to him or to her, and they were lost before they reached her hand, there is doubt regarding the status of the kiddushin. What is meant by "closer to him," or "closer to her"? A situation in which he can guard [the kiddushin] and she cannot is considered as "closer to him." One in which she can guard them and he cannot is considered to be "closer to her." One in which they can both guard them or neither can guard them is considered to be "halfway between the two of them."

When a man consecrates a woman with an object from which it is forbidden to derive benefit - e.g., a mixture of milk and meat, chametz on Pesach, or other similar objects from which it is prohibited to derive benefit - she is not consecrated. [This ruling applies] even if the prohibition against deriving benefit from the object is merely Rabbinic in origin - e.g., chametz during the sixth hour on the fourteenth of Nisan.

If a man transgresses and sells an article from which it is forbidden to derive benefit, and consecrates [a woman] with the money [he receives] for it, the kiddushin are valid. [There is one] exception. If a person consecrates a woman with the money [received] for a false deity, the kiddushin are not valid. For it is forbidden to derive benefit from the money received for a false deity, just as [it is forbidden to derive benefit from] the false deity itself. When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the dung of cows [consecrated to] a false deity, the kiddushin are not valid. For it is forbidden to derive benefit from anything produced by entities [consecrated to] a false deity, as [Deuteronomy 13:18] states: "Let nothing that is condemned cling to your hand." If, by contrast, [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the dung of an ox condemned to be stoned, the kiddushin are binding. Although it is forbidden to derive benefit from an ox condemned to be stoned, this prohibition does not apply to its dung. For the dung is considered of negligible importance when compared to the ox.

When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the produce of the Sabbatical year, with the ashes of the Red Heifer, or with water that was drawn for the purpose of sprinkling [the ashes of the Red Heifer], the kiddushin are valid. [The following rules apply when a man] consecrates [a woman] with property dedicated to the Temple. If he was unaware [that the property had been dedicated], the kiddushin are valid. He must give the value [of the dedicated property] and an [additional fifth] to the Temple treasury and bring a guilt offering, as is required of all those who unwittingly make mundane use of property dedicated to the Temple. If he consecrated the woman knowing [that the property was dedicated], she is not consecrated.

When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the produce of the second tithe - whether unknowingly or knowingly - the kiddushin are not valid. For unless a person redeems [this produce], it does not belong to him to use for his other purposes, since with regard to [this] tithe, [Leviticus 27:30] states: "It is G-d's."

When a priest consecrates [a woman] with his share of offerings of the most sacred nature or [his share of] offerings of lesser sanctity, she is not consecrated. For one was permitted merely to eat these sacrifices. When, by contrast, a priest consecrates [a woman] with the great terumah, the terumah taken from the tithe or with the first fruits, the kiddushin are binding. [This same ruling applies] when a Levite consecrates [a woman] with [produce from] the first tithe, or an Israelite consecrates [a woman] with [produce from] the tithe of the poor.

The gifts [required to be separated from produce] that have not been separated are considered as if they have already been separated. Therefore, when an Israelite inherited produce from his maternal grandfather who was a priest, and none of the required gifts had been separated from that produce, he may separate the terumah and the tithes [and keep the portions to be given to the priests as his own]. It is as if he inherited the terumah and the tithes from his maternal grandfather. Therefore, if he consecrates a woman with them, she is consecrated. Although they are not fit for [the Israelite] to eat, he has the right to sell them to someone for whom they are fit. When, by contrast, an Israelite consecrates [a woman] with terumah that he separates from his grain heap, the kiddushin are not effective. For he does not have the right to sell this terumah; he possesses merely the privilege of giving it to the priest of his choice. This privilege is not considered to be money.

[The following rules apply when] a person consecrates a woman [with property that] he robbed, stole or took against its owner's will. If the owner has despaired of the return of the article, and it is known that [the man] acquired it through the owner's despair, the consecration is effective. If not, it is not valid.

When a person enters a colleague's home and takes an object, food or the like, and consecrates a woman, she is not consecrated. [This ruling applies] even when the owner comes and says, "Why did you not give her a more valuable article than the one you gave her?" He is making this statement only to prevent the person from being shamed [and it does not reflect his true intent]. Since the man consecrated [a woman] with property belonging to a colleague without the colleague's knowledge, this is robbery, and the woman is not consecrated. If [the man] consecrated [the woman] with an article that the owner would not object [to its being taken] - e.g., a date or a nut - the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.

When a person owns merchandise in partnership with a colleague and divides the merchandise without his colleague's knowledge, using it to consecrate [a woman], the kiddushin are not valid. [The rationale is that for the division of a partnership's assets to be effective,] an evaluation by the court is necessary. One [partner] may not take what he wants as his own and leave [the remainder for his colleague].

[The following rules apply when] a person robbed or stole an article from a woman or took it without her consent, and afterwards consecrated her with the article that he took from her, saying: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this." If the two were already engaged, and she took the article in silence, she is consecrated. If, however, there was never an engagement between them, she is not consecrated, even if she remained silent when he gave her [the stolen articles] as kiddushin. If, however, she explicitly agreed [to the kiddushin], she is consecrated.

Similar [concepts apply when a man] entrusts an article to [a woman] for safekeeping and tells her: "Take care of this article," and afterwards tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated with it." If he told her this before she took [possession of] the article, and she took it in silence, she is consecrated. If, however, he made his second statement after she had accepted the article for the purpose of safekeeping, and she remained silent, [the kiddushin] are not valid. For whenever [a woman] remains silent after money has been given, [the kiddushin] are not valid. If, however, she explicitly agreed, she is consecrated, even though she made the statement after accepting the article.

[The following rules apply when a man] pays a debt that he owed [a woman] and [upon paying it,] says: "You are consecrated with it." If the two were engaged, [the man made the statement] before she accepted the money, and she accepted it in silence, she is consecrated. If they were not engaged, she is not consecrated unless she explicitly agrees. If he states [his desire to consecrate her] after she accepted payment of the debt, she is not consecrated, even if she explicitly agrees. For nothing has been given her; she merely took what was rightfully hers. The debt he owed was repaid when she took the money, and she cannot demand repayment again.

When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with a debt, even with [a debt that is recorded] in a promissory note, she is not consecrated. What is implied? [The woman] owed [the man] a dinar; if he tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me with the dinar that you owe me," she is not consecrated. [The rationale is that] a loan is given to be spent, and there is nothing that presently exists for her to derive benefit from [and to accept as kiddushin]. For she has [- or it is as if she has - ] already spent that dinar and has derived benefit from it already.

[A different rule applies when] he has given her a loan [and received] collateral for it. If he consecrates her with the loan and returns the collateral, she is consecrated. For she derives benefit from the collateral from that time onward, and thus, [as a result of the kiddushin,] she has derived benefit.

When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the benefit [derived from] a loan, the consecration is valid. What is implied? The consecration is binding if he lends her 200 zuz [at the time of the kiddushin] and tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me through the benefit [you receive] by my extending the length of this loan for you. It may be in your possession for so many days, and I will not demand payment until this date." For she is receiving benefit now [from the opportunity] to use the loan until the end of the time period fixed. It is forbidden to make [such a condition], because it is like taking interest. My teachers interpreted the expression "the benefit [derived from] a loan," in a way that is not worthy of mention.

If [the man] tells [the woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this p'rutah and with the debt that you owe me," she is consecrated. Similarly, if he tells her, "[Behold, you are consecrated...] with the debt that you owe me and with this p'rutah, the consecration is binding.

When [a man] is owed a debt by a third party, and he tells [a woman] in the presence of the third party: "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the debt that I am owed by this person," the consecration is binding.

[The following rule applies when a man] consecrates [a woman] with an object that he has entrusted to her for safekeeping or with an article that he has lent her: If the entrusted object or borrowed article is worth a p'rutah and it exists within her property, she is consecrated.

[The following rule applies when a man] tells [a woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me in consideration of my speaking to the ruling authorities on your behalf." Although [the man] indeed spoke to the ruling authorities on her behalf - [and his words had an effect,] causing them to refrain from prosecuting her, she is not consecrated unless he gives her a p'rutah of his own. [The rationale is that] the benefit that she received from his speaking [on her behalf] is regarded as a loan, and when one consecrates [a woman] with a loan, the kiddushin are not binding.

[The following rule applies when a man] tells [a woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me [in return] for the work that I will perform on your behalf." Although [the man] indeed performs [the work he promised], she is not consecrated unless he gives her a p'rutah of his own. [The rationale is that] a worker earns his wages [continuously] from [the time he] begins [working] until the end. As he performs a portion of the work, he earns an [equivalent] portion of his wages. Thus, [in the above situation, the man's] wages are considered to be a debt that she [owes him]. And when one consecrates [a woman] with a loan, the kiddushin are not binding.

[The following rule applies when a woman] tells [a man]: "Give so and so a present, and I will be consecrated to you." If he tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me for the sake of the present I gave upon your request," the kiddushin are binding. Although she [personally] did not receive anything, she derived benefit from the fact that her will was carried out, and the other derived benefit because of her. Similarly, if she told him, "Give a dinar to so and so as a present, and I will be consecrated to him," the kiddushin are binding provided the person who receives the present tells [the woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the pleasure [you derived] from the present that I received at your request."

[To cite a similar instance: A man] tells [a woman]: "Take this dinar as a present and become consecrated to so and so"; the kiddushin are binding provided that the other person tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the benefit you received on my behalf," despite the fact that he himself did not give her anything. [The following rule applies when a woman] tells [a man]: "Take this dinar as a present and I will become consecrated to you"; he receives the present and tells her "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the pleasure [you received] in my accepting a present from you." If he is an important person, she is consecrated. For she derives satisfaction from the fact that he has benefited from her, and for the sake of this satisfaction, she consecrates herself to him.

When [a man] tells a woman: "Become consecrated to me with a dinar. [Take this article] as security until I give you the dinar," she is not consecrated to him. For she did not receive the dinar, and the security was not given to her for it to be her own. If the man has in his possession security that he was given for a debt that a third party owes him, and he gives a woman the security as kiddushin, the consecration is binding although [the security] does not belong to him. For a creditor has certain rights with regard to the ownership of security.

When [a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this dinar on condition that you return it to me," she is not consecrated, regardless of whether or not she returns it. For if she does not return it, his condition will not be met. And if she returns it, she will not have derived any benefit, for she will not have received anything.

[These rulings were issued with regard to the following instances:] [A man] gave [a woman] a wreath of myrtle or the like and told her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this." She accepted it, but [protested,] saying: "But it is not worth a p'rutah." He responded, "Become consecrated with the four zuz that are hidden in the wreath." If she said yes, she is consecrated. If she remained silent, she is not consecrated with this money, for remaining silent after money has been given is of no consequence. There is nonetheless a doubt: perhaps the kiddushin are valid, lest the wreath be worth a p'rutah in another place.

[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Become consecrated to me with this date. Become consecrated to me with this one. Become consecrated to me with this one." If one of them is worth a p'rutah, she is consecrated. If not, the kiddushin are merely of doubtful status, [their viability stemming only from] the possibility that one of the dates would be considered to be worth a p'rutah in another place.

[Different rules apply if] he told her: "Become consecrated to me with this one, with this one and with this one." If together, they are all worth a p'rutah, she is consecrated. If not, the status of the kiddushin is doubtful. [Different rules apply if] she eats [the dates] one after another as he gives them to her: If the last date is worth a p'rutah, she is consecrated. If not, the status of the kiddushin is doubtful. For the dates that she ate are considered to be a loan, and when [a man] consecrates [a woman] with a loan, the kiddushin are not valid. Thus, the status of the kiddushin [depends] solely on [the worth of] the final date.

If he tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated with these," the kiddushin are binding if all the dates together are worth a p'rutah. [This applies] even when she eats [the dates] one after another as he gives them to her. She is consecrated, for she is eating her own property.

[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this cup." If it is filled with water, the consecration [depends on the combined value of] the cup itself and its contents. If it is filled with wine, the consecration [depends on the value of] the cup itself, but not its contents. If it is filled with oil, the consecration [depends on the value of] the contents, but not of the cup itself. Therefore, if the oil was not worth a p'rutah, the status of the kiddushin is doubtful. If the oil is worth a p'rutah, she is definitely consecrated; no attention is paid to [the value of] the cup.

[The following rules apply when a man] consecrates [a woman] based on a conditional agreement: If the condition is met, the kiddushin are binding. If not, they are of no consequence. This applies regardless of whether the condition was stipulated by the man or by the woman. Every [valid] conditional agreement whatsoever - whether with regard to kiddushin, divorce, commercial transactions or other questions of business law - must conform to the following four rules.

These are the four rules governing all conditional agreements: a) the stipulation must be twofold [with both a positive and negative statement]; b) the positive aspect must be stated before the negative aspect; c) the stipulation should be mentioned before the completion of the deed that one desires to make conditional; d) the stipulation must be something that is possible to comply with. If one of these rules was not kept when a conditional agreement was made, the stipulation is nullified; it is as if there is no condition at all. Thus, [the woman] is either consecrated or divorced immediately, and the commercial agreement is completed as if no condition had ever been made, for one of the four rules of conditional agreements was not met.

What is implied? [When a man] tells a woman: "If you give me 200 zuz, you are consecrated to me with this dinar. And if you do not give me [that sum], you are not consecrated," and after making this stipulation gives her the dinar, the condition is valid, and the kiddushin are subject to its terms. If she gives him 200 zuz, she is consecrated. If she does not give him, she is not consecrated.

If, however, [the man] told [the woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this dinar," gave her the dinar in her hand and then made a stipulation, saying: "If you give me 200 zuz you are consecrated," and if you do not give me [that sum] you are not consecrated," the stipulation is of no consequence, because he performed the deed first by giving it to her, and then making the stipulation. [The above applies] even if everything occurred within a brief span of time; she is consecrated immediately and does not have to give [her husband] anything at all.

Similarly, when [a man] tells [a woman]: "If you give me 200 zuz you are consecrated to me with this dinar," and then places the dinar in her hand, the stipulation is of no consequence, because the condition was not stated in a twofold manner. He did not tell her: "If you do not give me, you will not be consecrated." [Therefore] she is consecrated immediately without having to give him anything.

Similarly, when [a man] tells [a woman]: "If you do not give me 200 zuz, you will not be consecrated to me. But if you give me 200 zuz, you are consecrated to me with this dinar," and then places the dinar in her hand, the stipulation is of no consequence, because the negative dimension of the stipulation was stated before the positive one. [Therefore,] she is consecrated immediately without having to give him anything.

Similarly, when [a man] tells [a woman]: "If you ascend to the heavens or descend to the depths, you are consecrated to me with this dinar. But if you do not ascend to the heavens or descend to the depths, you are not consecrated." If he places the dinar in her hand afterwards, the stipulation is of no consequence, and the kiddushin are effective immediately. For it is well known that she cannot keep this stipulation; he is merely speaking facetiously in a jesting and teasing manner.

[The following rules apply when a man] makes a condition with regard to a deed that is possible to be performed, but that is forbidden by the Torah - e.g., he told a woman: "If you eat fat or blood, you are consecrated to me with this dinar. But if you do not eat fat or blood, you are not consecrated," or [a man tells his wife]: "If you eat the meat of pigs, this is your get. But if you do not eat it, the get is not effective." If, after making this stipulation, he placed the dinar or the get in her hand, the stipulation is valid. If the woman transgresses and eats [the forbidden article as stipulated], she will be either consecrated or divorced [accordingly]. It is not with regard to such a situation that it is said, "the person made a stipulation that contradicts what is written in the Torah." For the woman has the option not to eat and not to be consecrated or divorced.

With regard [to which situations] did in fact our Sages say: "Whenever a person makes a stipulation that contradicts what is written in the Torah, his stipulation is nullified, except with regard to financial matters, in which instances his stipulation is binding"? When a person consecrates, divorces, gives or sells, dependent on a stipulation through which he wants to acquire a right that the Torah did not grant him, but rather prevented him from obtaining, or to use this stipulation to free himself from an obligation for which the Torah made him liable. In such an instance, he is told, "Your stipulation is of no consequence. The deed you have performed is binding. You are not freed from any responsibility for which the Torah obligates you, nor can you acquire any privilege that the Torah does not grant you."

What is implied? For example, when a man consecrates a woman on condition that he is not obligated to provide her with her provisions or garments, nor grant her conjugal rights, he is told: "With regard to provisions and garments, your stipulation is binding, for these are financial obligations. With regard to conjugal rights, however, your condition is not binding, for the Torah has obligated you to grant these [to a woman]. Therefore, she is consecrated and you are obligated to grant her conjugal rights. You do not have the potential to free yourself of this responsibility with this stipulation." The same applies in all similar situations. Similarly, if a man consecrates a woman whom he took as a captive for sexual relations on condition that he may have her perform servile tasks, she is consecrated and he is forbidden to have her perform these tasks, for after he had relations with her this was prohibited by the Torah. His stipulation does not empower him to a privilege that the Torah held back from him. The same applies in all similar situations.

If a man established a condition with a woman at the time of kiddushin or divorce requiring her to engage in sexual relations with her father, her brother, her son or the like, it is as if he made a stipulation that she ascend to the heavens or descend to the depths, and his condition is of no consequence. For it is not within the woman's capacity to cause others to transgress and to engage in a forbidden sexual relationship. Thus, he has made a stipulation that she is incapable of fulfilling. The same applies with regard to all similar instances.

If, however, the man made a stipulation that she [influence] so and so to "give me his courtyard or to have his daughter marry my son," the stipulation is binding. For it is in her capacity to fulfill it, she can give so and so a large amount of money so that he will [consent to] give the man [making the condition] his courtyard or have his daughter marry that man's son. For in this instance, there is no sin involved. The same applies with regard to all similar instances.

Have in mind at all times all these guidelines that have been mentioned with regard to conditional agreements. Whenever you hear the expression "A man consecrated [a woman] on the basis of these and these conditions," "gave a divorce on the basis of these and these conditions," or made a sale or gave a present conditionally, you will know that the condition must fit the four rules mentioned. Thus, it will not be necessary to repeat them on every occasion. If one of these rules is not kept, the stipulation is of no consequence.

Some of the later geonim maintain that a person is required to make a conditional statement twofold only with regard to kiddushin and divorce. With regard to financial matters, by contrast, a twofold statement need not be made. It is not proper to rely on this ruling, for our Sages derived the need to make a twofold statement of the condition, and the other four rules, from the condition made [with] the members [of the tribes] of Gad and Reuven, as [Numbers 38:29-30] states: "If the members [of the tribes] of Gad... cross over. But if they do not cross over...." And this condition involved neither kiddushin nor divorce. [My ruling echoes] the decisions of the great geonim of the previous eras, and it is fitting to follow it.

When a man consecrates a woman conditionally, the kiddushin become effective at the time the stipulation is fulfilled, and not at the time of the [original] kiddushin. What is implied? [For example, a man] tells a woman: "If I give you 200 zuz this year, you are consecrated to me with this dinar. But if I do not give you, you are not consecrated." If he [made these statements and] gave her the dinar in Nisan, but gave her the 200 zuz that he stipulated only in Elul, it is in Elul that the consecration takes effect. Therefore, if another person consecrates her before the first completes carrying out his stipulation, she is consecrated to the second. Similar laws apply with regard to divorce and monetary law. When the stipulation is fulfilled, the divorce is effective or the sale or gift is completed.

When does the above apply? When a stipulation was made, and [the person making it did not state that the agreement took effect] from this time onward. If, however, [a man] told [a woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me from this time onward with this dinar if I give you 200 zuz," when at a later date he gives her the 200 zuz she is consecrated. Retroactively, the kiddushin are considered to have taken effect at the time they were given, despite the fact that the stipulation was not fulfilled until after much time had passed. Therefore, if a second person consecrates her before the stipulation has been fulfilled, she is not consecrated to that [second] person. Similar laws apply with regard to divorce and monetary law.

Whenever a person makes a stipulation and states [that it is effective] "from this time onward," it is not necessary for him to make a twofold statement of the stipulation, nor is it necessary to state the stipulation before performing the deed involved. Even when he performs the deed first, his stipulation is effective. He must, however, make a stipulation that is possible to fulfill. A person who makes a stipulation that is impossible to fulfill is merely speaking facetiously; there is no [intent to make] a [binding] stipulation. When a person appends a stipulation to an agreement using the wording al menat ("on condition that"), the rules that apply when the person states "from this time onward" also apply. It is not necessary for him to make a twofold statement of the stipulation, nor is it necessary to state the stipulation before performing the deed involved.

What is implied? When [a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me on condition that you give me 200 zuz," "here is your get on condition that you give me 200 zuz," or "this courtyard is given to you as a present on condition that you give me 200 zuz," the stipulation is binding. She is consecrated or divorced, or she acquires the field, but she must give the 200 zuz. If she does not give [the money], she will not be consecrated or divorced, nor will she acquire the field. [The above applies] even when the man did not make a twofold condition, and even though he performed the deed before stating the condition - i.e., he placed the kiddushin or the get in her hand or let her take possession of the courtyard, and then completed [the statement of] his stipulation. [The rationale for these leniencies is that] when the stipulation is fulfilled, she retroactively either acquires the field or is consecrated or divorced from the time the deed was performed, as if a stipulation had never been made at all.

[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me on condition that my father will consent." If his father consents, she is consecrated. If he does not consent, if he remained silent, or if he died before he heard of the matter, she is not consecrated. [If the man tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me] on condition that my father does not object." If he hears and objects, she is not consecrated. If he does not object or he dies, she is consecrated. If the son dies, and the father hears afterwards, we instruct the father to say: "I do not consent," so the kiddushin will not be effective, and the woman will not be obligated to undergo the rites of yibbum.

[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that I possess 200 zuz or land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain." If there are witnesses who say that he possesses these entities, the kiddushin are binding. If there are no witnesses, [the kiddushin are not nullified entirely; instead,] their status is doubtful. Perhaps he possesses these entities and says he does not own them in order to cause the woman difficulties.

[The following rules apply when he tells her:] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that I possess 200 zuz or land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain in a particular place." If he possesses these entities in that place, the kiddushin are binding. If he does not possess these entities in the place he specified, [the kiddushin are not nullified entirely; instead,] their status is doubtful. Perhaps he possesses these entities in that place [and says he does not own them] in order to cause the woman difficulties.

[The following rules apply when he tells her:] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that I show you 200 zuz or land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain." When he shows her these entities, she is consecrated. If he shows her money that is possessed by someone else or land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain in a field belonging to someone else, she is not consecrated; he [must] show her what belongs to him. If he borrowed the money, rented a field or took it on a sharecropping arrangement and showed it to her, she is not consecrated; he [must] show her what belongs to him. For when he says "I will show you," that implies that "I will show you the entity I mentioned that belongs to me and is in my possession."

[The following rules apply when] the man owns land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain, but it contains clefts ten handbreadths deep or rocks ten handbreadths high. If the clefts are filled with water, they are considered to be rocks and are not included in the total measure, because they are not fit to be sown. If they are not filled with water, they are included in the total measure, because they are fit to be sown.

[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that you are not bound by vows." The kiddushin are not binding if she is bound by any of the following three vows: that she may not eat meat, that she may not drink wine, or that she may not wear colored ornaments. If she is bound by any vow other than these, she is consecrated, even when [the husband] states: "I object even with regard to these." If he told her, "[Behold, you are consecrated...] on condition that you are not bound by any vow," even if she has made a vow [as insignificant as] not to eat carobs, she is not consecrated.

[The following rules apply when a man tells a woman:] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that you do not have any physical blemishes." If she has one of the physical blemishes that cause a woman to be deemed unfit [as a wife], she is not consecrated. If she has a physical blemish other than these, she is consecrated, even though he states, "I object even with regard to these." What are the physical blemishes that cause a woman to be deemed unfit [as a wife]: All the physical blemishes that cause a priest to be deemed unfit [for service in the Temple] cause a woman to be deemed unfit. In Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash, all the blemishes affecting the priests are explained. In addition, [there are other blemishes that cause] women [to be deemed unfit]. They include: foul body odor, [excessive] sweating, foul breath, deep voice, breasts of abnormal size, being more than a handbreadth larger than those of other women, a distance of more than a handbreadth between one breast and the other, a scar in the place where she was bit by a dog, and a birthmark on her forehead. This includes even a birthmark that is very small, even if it is close to her hairline, and even if there are no hairs growing from it. This is the birthmark that is mentioned as a disqualifying factor for a woman and not for a priest. If, however, a birthmark has facial hair growing from it, or if it is as large as an isar even when no hair grows from it, it is a disqualifying blemish, both for priests and for women.

When a man consecrates a woman without making any specific stipulations, and it is discovered that she has one of the physical blemishes that cause a woman to be deemed unfit, or [it is discovered that] she is bound by one of the three vows mentioned above, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt. If [a man] consecrates [a woman] on condition that she is not bound by vows, and she was bound by vows, but [afterwards,] she went to a wise man who nullified them for her, she is consecrated.

If [a man] consecrates [a woman] on condition that she does not have physical blemishes, and she does have blemishes, she is not consecrated, even if [afterwards,] she goes to a physician who heals these blemishes. When, by contrast, a man enters into a marriage contract on condition that he is not bound by any vows, and that he does not have any physical blemishes, although he is indeed bound by vows and has physical blemishes, if he goes to a wise man who nullifies the vows, and if he goes to a physician who heals the blemishes, the marriage is valid. [The rationale is that] there is no shame for a man to have had physical blemishes once they have been healed. A woman will not object because of such a thing.

[The following rules apply when a man tells a woman:] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that I give you 200 zuz within 30 days." If he gives her [the money] within 30 days, she is consecrated. If 30 days pass without him giving it to her, she is not consecrated. [If a man tells a woman,] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with these zuz after 30 days," she is consecrated after 30 days, even though she used the money within the 30 days. If either he or she change their minds [and decide to nullify the marriage] within these 30 days, she is not consecrated.

If another man comes and consecrates her within these 30 days, she is consecrated to the second man forever. [The rationale is] that at the time the second man consecrated her, she was not consecrated. Therefore, the second man's kiddushin are binding and make her a married woman. Thus, after the 30 days pass and the first man's kiddushin are fit to take effect, she is already a married woman. It is thus as if the first man consecrated a married woman, in which case the kiddushin are not binding.

[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this dinar from this time onward, and after 30 days," and another person consecrates her within the 30 days. [There is doubt regarding the matter, and] both [men] are considered as having established kiddushin that may possibly be binding. Therefore, both are required to divorce her. The divorce may be given within the [original] 30 days or afterwards. [Should one man tell a woman,] "Behold, you are consecrated to me from this time onward, and after 30 days"; and another man comes and tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me from this time onward, and after 20 days," and another man comes and tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me from this time onward, and after 10 days," [there is doubt regarding the matter, and] all [the men] are considered as having established kiddushin [that may possibly] be binding, and every one must divorce her. [Indeed, these rules apply] even when a hundred men consecrate her in this manner.

When [a man] tells a woman, "Behold, you are consecrated to me [and these kiddushin apply to everyone] with the exception of so and so" - i.e., that she should not be forbidden to have relations with him - with regard to everyone else she should be considered a married woman, but with regard to him she should be considered to be single - there is doubt regarding the status of the kiddushin. If, however, he tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me on condition that you are permitted to so and so," she is consecrated, and she is forbidden to that person as she is forbidden to all others. [The rationale is that] he has made a condition that is impossible to fulfill.

When [a man] gives two p'rutot to a woman and tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with one today, and with the other after I divorce you," she is consecrated. When he divorces her, she becomes consecrated to him again until he divorces her a second time, because of the kiddushin established by the second p'rutah. If, however, [a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] after I convert," "...after you convert," "...after I become freed [from servitude]," "...after you become freed [from servitude]," "...after your husband dies," or "...after your sister dies," she is not consecrated. [The rationale is] that he cannot consecrate her now.

When [a man] tells a yevamah: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] after your yavam performs chalitzah for you," she is consecrated. [The rationale is] that even if he consecrated her at present, the kiddushin would be [at least] of a doubtful status.

When a man tells a friend, "If your wife gives birth to a girl, [the girl] is consecrated to me with this [item]," his statements are of no consequence. If the friend's wife is pregnant, and the existence of a fetus has been recognized, [the girl] is consecrated. [Nevertheless,] it appears to me that [the man] must consecrate [his bride] again via her father after she is born, so that she will enter a marriage bond about which there are no questions.

When [a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with 100 dinarim," and gives her at least one dinar, she is consecrated, provided he gives her the entire sum. It is as if he told her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this dinar on condition that I give you 100 dinarim." [In such an instance,] the kiddushin take effect from [the time he gave her the first dinar]. When does the above apply? When he told her "with 100 dinarim" without specifying [any particular dinarim]. If, however, he is more explicit and tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me with these 100 dinarim," and begins counting them out into her hand, she is not consecrated until he gives her [all 100]. Either of them may retract their consent until the very last dinar is given. Similarly, if one of the dinarim was found lacking the standard weight, or one was a dinar of brass, she is not consecrated. [The following rules apply when] one of the dinarim was inferior: If it would be accepted with difficulty, [the kiddushin are valid, provided] he exchanges it. If it would not [be accepted], the kiddushin are of no consequence.

[The following rules apply when a man] tells [a woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with these clothes that are worth 50 dinarim." When they are silk or of similar fabrics that a woman would desire, and they are worth 50 [dinarim], the woman is consecrated from the time she took them onward. There is no need that they be evaluated in the market, and only afterwards, when the woman is assured [of their value], will she be consecrated. Instead, since they are worth the amount he states, she is consecrated from the time of the initial [exchange]. If they are not worth [that amount], she is not consecrated.

A man and a woman were discussing the subject of their consecration, he saying: "I will consecrate you with 100 dinarim," and she saying: "I will not be consecrated for less than 200 [dinarim]." [Since they did not agree,] they both went home. [The following rules apply when] afterwards, [either the man or the woman requested the other [to reconsider], and the man consecrated her without specifying a sum. If the man made the request of the woman, the sum [originally] quoted by the woman is accepted. If the woman made the request of the man, the sum [originally] quoted by the man is accepted.

When a man appoints an agent to consecrate a woman, and the agent consecrates her on the basis of a conditional agreement, the kiddushin are not valid. Similarly, if [the principal] instructed the agent to consecrate the woman on the basis of a conditional agreement, and he consecrated her without making any stipulation whatsoever, or made another stipulation or changed the stipulation stated by the principal, the kiddushin are not valid.

When [the principal] tells the agent: "Consecrate her in this and this place," and the agent consecrated her in another place, the kiddushin are not valid. [If the principal tells the agent:] "Consecrate her for me. She is in this and this place," and the agent goes and consecrates her in another place, she is consecrated; he is merely suggesting to him the place [where she might be found]. Similarly, if [the woman] tells her agent, "Receive kiddushin for me in this and this place," and the agent received them for her in another place, the kiddushin are not valid. [If she told her agent: "Receive kiddushin for me. My prospective] husband is in this and this place," and [the agent] receives the kiddushin in another place, she is consecrated; she is merely suggesting to him the place [where he might be found].

When [a man] consecrates a woman, but he or she desires to retract immediately - even if the retraction is made within a very short amount of time - the retraction is of no consequence and the woman is consecrated.

When [a man] consecrates [a woman] and attaches a condition [to the kiddushin], and after several days changes his mind and nullifies the condition, the condition is of no consequence and it is as if the woman had been consecrated without any condition ever having been made. [This law applies] even when he nullifies the condition in the presence of his intended bride alone, without this being observed by witnesses. Similarly, if the woman was the one who attached a condition to the kiddushin, and afterwards nullified it in the presence of her prospective husband alone, the condition is of no consequence. Therefore, if [a man] consecrated [a woman] and attached a condition [to the kiddushin], and afterwards, brought her [to the chuppah] without mentioning the condition, or engaged in sexual relations with her without mentioning the condition, she must receive a divorce [before she marries another man] even though the condition was never fulfilled. [The rationale is that] perhaps [the man] nullified the condition when he brought her [to the chuppah] or when he engaged in sexual relations with her. Similarly, when [a man] consecrates a woman with [an article] worth less than a p'rutah or with a loan, and then engages in sexual relations [with this woman] in the presence of witnesses, without making a statement of intent, the woman must receive a divorce [before she marries another man]. [The rationale is that] perhaps [the man intended to consecrate her through these relations] and relied on them, rather than on the kiddushin that are inadequate. [The principle on which these rulings depend is:] It is an accepted presumption that no virtuous Jewish man will enter into sexual relations that are wanton when he has the potential to engage in these relations in a way that is a mitzvah.

When [a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this cup of wine," and the cup is discovered to contain honey [she is not consecrated]. [Similarly, if he tells her: "...Behold, you are consecrated to me with this cup] of honey," and the cup is discovered to contain wine; "...with this dinar of silver," and it is discovered to be gold; "...[with this dinar] of gold," and it is discovered to be silver; "...on condition that I am a priest," and he was discovered to be a Levite; "[on condition that I am] a Levite," and he was discovered to be a priest; "...[on condition that I am] a Givonite," and he was discovered to be a bastard; "...[on condition that I am] a bastard," and he was discovered to be a Givonite; "...[on condition that I am] an inhabitant of a town," and he was discovered to be an inhabitant of a metropolis; "...[on condition that I am] an inhabitant of a metropolis," and he was discovered to be an inhabitant of a town; "...on condition that I am poor," and he was discovered to be rich; "...[on condition that I am] rich," and he was discovered to be poor; "...on condition that my house is close to the bathhouse," and it is discovered to be distant from it; "...[on condition that my house is] distant from the bathhouse," and it is discovered to be close to it; "...on condition that I have a maid," "...a daughter who knows how to braid hair," or "...who bakes," and [it is discovered that] he does not have one; "...on condition that he does not have [one of the above,] and [it is discovered that] he does; "...on condition that he has a wife and children," and [it is discovered that] he does not; "...on condition that he does not have [the above,] and [it is discovered that] he does - in all these and in any similar instance, the woman is not consecrated. The same rule applies if she [makes a condition based on] false information.

In all the above instances, she is not consecrated even though she says: "In my heart, I was willing to be consecrated to him even though he deceived me and gave me wrong information." Similarly, [if she gave him false information,] she is not consecrated even though he says: "In my heart, I was willing to consecrate her even though she deceived me." [The rationale is that] feelings in one's heart are not [the same as explicit] statements.

[When a man tells a woman:] "Behold, you are consecrated to me on condition that I am a perfumer," and it is discovered that he is both a perfumer and a leather craftsman; "...on condition that I am an inhabitant of a town," and he was discovered to be an inhabitant of both a town and a metropolis; or "...on condition that my name is Yosef," and it was discovered that his name was Yosef and Shimon; she is consecrated. If, however, he told her: "[Behold, you are consecrated to me] on condition that my name is only Yosef," and it was discovered that his name was Yosef and Shimon; "...on condition that I am solely a perfumer," and it is discovered that he is both a perfumer and a leather craftsman; or "...on condition that I am solely an inhabitant of a town," and he was discovered to be an inhabitant of both a town and a metropolis; she is not consecrated.

When [a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me on condition that I know how to read," [for the stipulation to be fulfilled] it is necessary that he know how to read from the Torah and translate what he reads according to the translation of Onkelos the convert. If he tells her: "...on condition that I am a reader," he must know how to read the Torah, the works of the Prophets and the Holy Writings with proper grammatical precision. [If he tells her:] "...on condition that I know how to study the Mishnah," he must know how to read the Mishnah. "...On condition that I am a sage of the Mishnah," he must know how to read the Mishnah, the Sifra, the Sifre, and the Tosefta of Rabbi Chiyya.

[When a man tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me] on condition that I am a student [of the Torah]," we do not say that [he must be a student] of the caliber of ben Azzai and ben Zoma. Instead, it is sufficient that when one asks him a question regarding his studies, he is able to answer. [This includes] even the laws of the festivals that are studied in public; these are easy matters that are studied close to the festival, so that people at large will be familiar with them. [When a man tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me] on condition that I am a wise man," we do not say that [he must be] like Rabbi Akiva and his colleagues. Instead, it is sufficient that when one asks him a point of logic with regard to any subject, he is able to answer. "...On condition that I am mighty," we do not say that [he must be] like Avner ben Ner or Yoav. Rather, it is sufficient that his colleagues fear him because of his might. "...On condition that I am rich," we do not say that [he must be as wealthy] as Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah. Rather, it is sufficient that the inhabitants of his city honor him because of his wealth. [When a man tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me] on condition that I am righteous," even if the person is known to be thoroughly wicked, there is doubt [regarding the status of the kiddushin, and] the woman is considered as consecrated. For it is possible that he had thoughts of repentance in his heart at that time. "...On condition that I am wicked," even if the person is known to be thoroughly righteous, there is doubt [regarding the status of the kiddushin, and] the woman is considered as consecrated, since it is possible that he had thoughts of idol worship in his heart at that time. For the sin of idol worship is so great that even when a person thinks of serving [idols] in his heart, he is considered wicked, as [implied by Deuteronomy 11:16, which] states: "lest your hearts be tempted [and you go astray and serve other gods]," and [Ezekiel 14:5, which] states: "that I may detect the House of Israel in their hearts [for they are all estranged from Me because of their idols]."

[When a man] consecrates a woman and says, "I thought she was from a priestly family, and instead she is from a family of Levites," "...from a family of Levites, and instead she is from a priestly family," "...poor, and instead she is rich," or "...rich, and instead she is poor," she is consecrated, for she did not cause him to err. Similarly, if she says, "I thought he was a priest, and instead he is a Levite," "...a Levite, and instead he is a priest," "...poor, and instead he is rich," or "...rich, and instead he is poor," she is consecrated, for he did not cause her to err.

[When a man] consecrates two women whom he is forbidden to marry at the same time, because it creates a prohibited relationship, neither is consecrated. What is implied? When a man consecrates a woman and her daughter or two sisters at the same time, neither of them is consecrated.

[The following rule applies when a man] consecrates many women at the same time and says: "Behold, all of you are consecrated to me." If among [these women] were two sisters, a woman and her daughter or the like, none of the women is consecrated. If [the man] told [the women]: "Those of you who are fit to engage in marital relations with me are consecrated to me," they are all consecrated to him, except the sisters, the mother and her daughter or the like. Similarly, if [a man] told [a group of women], "Behold, all of you are consecrated to me," and among [these women] was a Canaanite maidservant, a non-Jewish woman or a woman who is forbidden to this man as an ervah - e.g., a married woman, his daughter, his sister or the like - none of them is consecrated to him. If he says: "Those of you who are fit to engage in marital relations with me are consecrated to me," they are all consecrated to him, except the women with whom he cannot establish kiddushin.

[The following rule applies when] a man tells two sisters: "Behold, one of you is consecrated to me with this [article]," and gives them both a p'rutah, or one accepts it on behalf [of herself and] her sister. They both require a divorce from him, and it is forbidden for him to engage in marital relations with either of them, for the kiddushin are viable even though he is forbidden to engage in relations with either of them. The same [rule applies] when [a man] tells a father: "One of your daughters is consecrated to me," and the father accepts the kiddushin.

[The following rule applies when a man] appoints an agent to consecrate a particular woman, the agent went and consecrated her, the principal himself consecrated the woman's mother, daughter or sister, and it is not known which of them was consecrated first: They both require a divorce, and they both are forbidden [to have relations] with him. A similar [rule applies] if a woman appointed an agent to consecrate her, he [fulfilled her charge], she herself consecrated herself to another man, and it is not known which consecration took place first. Both men are required to divorce her. If they so desire, one may divorce her and one may marry her.

When does the above apply? When [the two men who consecrated her] were not related. If, however, they were related, the agent consecrated the woman to a father, and she consecrated herself to his son, to his brother or the like: they both must divorce her, and they both are forbidden [to have relations] with her.

[The following rules apply when a man] tells an agent: "Go out and consecrate a woman for me," the agent dies, and it is not known whether or not he consecrated a woman on behalf of the principal. We accept the presumption that he consecrated [on his behalf], for it is an accepted presumption that the agent will carry out the mission with which he was charged. [Accordingly,] since it is not known which woman he consecrated, the principal is forbidden to marry any woman who has a relative who might be forbidden because of the laws of ervah - i.e., a woman who has an [unmarried] daughter, mother, sister or the like. [The rationale is] that if you say: "Let him marry this one," perhaps the agent had consecrated the woman's mother, sister or daughter. He is permitted [to marry] a woman who does not have relatives like these. If [the woman the man desires to marry] has a relative like this - e.g., a sister - and that relative was married at the time the agent was appointed, [the man] is permitted to marry her. [This applies] even if this relative was divorced before the agent died. We do not say that perhaps the agent consecrated her relative after she was divorced. For she was not fit to [marry him] at the time the agent was appointed, and a person does not appoint an agent to consecrate a wife for him if [the intended] is not fit to be consecrated at the time the agent is appointed.

[The following rules apply when] a person has five sons, they each appoint their father as an agent to consecrate a wife for them, and the father tells a colleague who has five daughters: "[Each] one of your daughters is consecrated to one of my sons." Should the father [of the girls] accept the kiddushin, each of the girls must be divorced by each of the five brothers. For they all gave their father the prerogative of consecrating a wife for them [and he did not specify which woman would be the wife for which of his sons]. If one of [the sons] dies, each of the women must be divorced by the four [remaining brothers] and must perform the rite of chalitzah with one of them.

[There is, by contrast, no doubt in the following situation:] A father had [two daughters]: one a minor or a na'arah whom he has the privilege [of consecrating], and one a bogeret. Even if the bogeret gives her father the privilege of consecrating her, when he consecrates one of his daughters without specifying which one, it is assumed that the bogeret is not the one intended unless he specifically states [that the kiddushin are for] "my older daughter, who is a bogeret, who appointed me as [her] agent." Therefore, [in such a situation,] the bogeret is not consecrated, and her sister is consecrated.

[The following rules apply with regard to a father] who has two pairs of daughters from two different wives, and he has the prerogative [of consecrating all of them]. If he consecrated one daughter, and at the time of the kiddushin told the husband: "I consecrated my oldest daughter" [there is no confusion with regard to his intent]. Although it is possible to say that perhaps he consecrated the older daughter in the older pair to him, or the older daughter in the younger pair or the younger daughter in the older pair - for she is older than the older daughter in the younger pair [- we do not entertain such doubts.] All [the daughters] are permitted [to marry other men] except the older daughter in the older pair; she alone is considered to be consecrated. Similarly, if [the father says that] he consecrated his youngest daughter: Although it is possible to say that perhaps [he consecrated] the younger daughter in the younger pair to him, or the younger daughter in the older pair or the older daughter in the younger pair - for she is younger than the younger daughter in the older pair [- we do not entertain such doubts]. All [the daughters] are permitted [to marry other men] except the younger daughter in the younger pair; she alone is considered to be consecrated. For the phrase "my oldest daughter" implies the daughter whom none is elder than, and the phrase "my youngest daughter" implies the daughter whom none is younger than.

A father's word is accepted with regard to [the status of] his daughter below the age of bagrut. [If] he states that she has been consecrated, she is forbidden to marry at all.

When a father says, "I consecrated my daughter, but I do not know to whom I consecrated her," she is forbidden [to marry] any man forever unless the father says, "I became aware of the fact that I consecrated her to so and so." He alone must divorce her [before she can marry another person]. [Her father's word is accepted with regard to the identity of the person who consecrated her] even if he becomes aware after she reaches the age of bagrut.

If a father says, "I don't know to whom I consecrated [my daughter]," and a person comes and says, "I am the one who consecrated her," his word is accepted. [Moreover, he is granted the prerogative of] consummating the marriage. He need not consecrate her a second time.

[In the above situation,] if two people come and both claim that they were the ones who consecrated her, they are both required to divorce her. If they desire, one may divorce her, and one may consummate the marriage. [If the latter option was taken, and] one consummated the marriage, and afterwards a third person came and claimed that he was the one who had consecrated her [originally], his word is not accepted and he does not cause her to be forbidden to her husband.

[The following rules apply when] a woman states: "I was consecrated, but I do not know to whom I was consecrated," and a man comes and claims: "I was the one who consecrated her." His word is accepted and he may divorce her [so that] she is permitted to marry others, but not him. He is forbidden to consummate the marriage. [This restriction was instituted out of suspicion that] perhaps the man's natural inclination overcame him [and he made his statement out of desire for her]. [And we fear that the woman] will encourage [his false statements] so that she will be permitted [to marry].

[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "I consecrated you," and the woman denies the matter. He is forbidden [to marry] her close relatives, but she is permitted [to marry] his close relatives. If she says, "You consecrated me," and he denies the matter, he is permitted [to marry] her close relatives, but she is forbidden [to marry] his close relatives. If he says: "I consecrated you," and the woman says: "It was my daughter, not me, whom you consecrated," he is forbidden [to marry] the close relatives of the mother; the mother is permitted [to marry] his close relatives; he is permitted [to marry] the close relatives of the daughter; and the daughter is permitted [to marry] the man's close relatives. [The following rules apply when the man says:] "I consecrated your daughter," and the woman says: "It was myself [not my daughter] whom you consecrated." He is forbidden [to marry] the daughter's close relatives; the daughter is permitted [to marry] his close relatives; he is permitted [to marry] the mother's close relatives; and the mother is forbidden [to marry] the man's close relatives.

All the claims of kiddushin [mentioned in the previous halachah] refer to a situation in which the person making the claim states that the kiddushin were given in the presence of witnesses, and the witnesses either journeyed overseas or died. If, however, they acknowledge that the kiddushin were given without witnesses observing, the kiddushin are of no consequence, as we have explained. Whenever a woman tells a man, "You consecrated me," and he denies the matter, we ask him to compose a bill of divorce so that she will be permitted to marry others, for [doing this] does not involve any loss to him. If he gives her a divorce on his own volition, we compel him to give her [the monetary settlement, as stated in] the ketubah.

When a man appoints an agent to consecrate a woman for him, and the agent goes and consecrates her for himself, the woman is consecrated to the agent. It is, however, forbidden to do such a thing. Whoever does this or performs a similar act with regard to business matters is considered to be wicked.

[The following rules apply when a man] appoints an agent to consecrate a woman for him, the agent consecrates her [but a doubt arises whether the agent consecrated her for himself or for the principal]. When the agent says, "I consecrated [the woman] for myself," and the woman says, "I was consecrated to the principal," [the ruling depends on whether or not the appointment of the agent was made in the presence of witnesses]. If the agent was not appointed in the presence of witnesses, the agent is forbidden to marry the woman's close relatives, and she is permitted to marry [the agent's] close relatives. The woman is forbidden to marry the principal's close relatives, but the principal is permitted to marry her close relatives. If the agent was appointed in the presence of witnesses, she is consecrated to the principal.

[The following rules apply when] the woman says, "I do not know to whom I was consecrated, whether to the agent or to the principal." If the agent was not appointed in the presence of witnesses, she is consecrated to the agent. If he was appointed as his agent [in the presence of witnesses], they both are required to divorce her. If they desire, one may divorce her and one may consummate the marriage.

[The following rule applies when] a woman appoints an agent to consecrate her, he went and fulfilled his mission, but while he was in the process of doing so, she nullified his agency and rescinded his appointment, and it is not known whether she nullified his agency before he received the kiddushin or afterwards. The status of the kiddushin is doubtful. [She cannot marry another man without receiving a divorce, nor may the marriage be consummated unless she receives kiddushin again.] Similar rules apply when a man appoints an agent and retracts his appointment.

[The following rules apply when a man] consecrates one of five women but does not know which of them he has consecrated, and each of them says, "He consecrated me." He is forbidden to marry the [close] relatives of all these women and must divorce each of them. [With regard to the payment of the money due because of the marriage contract,] he should leave [the sum due because of] one marriage contract among all the women and depart. If, however, [the man] had consecrated [his intended] through sexual relations, our Sages penalized him [and required him] to give [the sum due because of] the marriage contract to each of the women. [When could such a situation apply?] When it is known that he wrote a marriage contract for one of the women, and the marriage contract was lost, and each of the women claims: "I was the one who was consecrated. He wrote the marriage contract for me and it was lost."

When a report is circulated that a woman has been consecrated to a particular man, we operate under the presumption that [the woman] is consecrated although there is no binding evidence to that effect. Whenever a report is not substantiated by a court, no attention is paid to it. What type of report when substantiated will cause a woman to be considered to be consecrated? Two [men] came [to court] and testified that they saw candles lit, couches spread, people coming in and out of the house, and women celebrating with her, saying "So and so was consecrated today." If the women are heard saying: "So and so will be consecrated today," no attention is paid [to the report]; perhaps they assembled for the purpose of kiddushin, but the kiddushin were not given. It is only when [the report says that the woman] was [actually] consecrated [that the court considers her as such]. Similarly, if two [men] come and say, "We saw what looked like an erusin celebration and we heard sounds [of joy], and we heard from so and so who heard from so and so that this woman was consecrated in the presence of [two witnesses] and the witnesses went to another country or died" - this is a report that could cause a woman to be considered consecrated.

When does the above apply? When there is no rationale that offsets the report. If, however, there is a rationale that offsets the report, and that rationale is heard when [the report that] she was consecrated is heard, [the woman] is not considered to be consecrated. What is [an example] of a rationale that offsets a report? "So and so was consecrated with a stipulation attached," or "[So and so was given] kiddushin whose status is in doubt." [In such instances,] the woman is not considered [consecrated]. Instead, we ask her [for an account of the circumstances] and rely on her word, since there is no clear evidence nor firm report.

[The following rules apply when at first] a report spreads that [a woman] was consecrated to a particular man, and after a few days a rationale that offsets the report is stated. If it appears to the court that the rationale is true, they rely on it, and [the woman] is not considered to be consecrated. If not, since the rationale was not heard at the time the report of the kiddushin was heard, we do not take it into consideration.

An incident once occurred involving a report that a particular woman was consecrated to the son of so and so. After time passed, they asked [the husband's] father, who said, "There was a stipulation attached when she was consecrated to him, and the stipulation was not fulfilled." The Sages did not rely on his words. Instead, they ruled that the status of the kiddushin was in doubt, as if there were no rationale that offsets [the original report].

[The following rules apply when] a report is spread that [a woman] was consecrated to a particular man, and a second man came and consecrated her in our presence. We attempt to verify the report of the kiddushin of the first man. If witnesses come and give clear testimony that [the woman] was consecrated to the first man, the kiddushin given by the second are of no consequence. If not, the first man, for whom there is merely a report of his kiddushin, must divorce the woman, and the second man, who definitely consecrated her, is allowed to consummate the marriage. If the second man divorces her, the first should not consummate the marriage, lest people at large say, "He remarried the woman he divorced after consecrating her, after she had been consecrated by another man."

When a report is spread that a woman was consecrated to one man, and a second report is later spread that she was consecrated to another, one of the men should write her a bill of divorce, and the other - either the first or the last - may consummate the marriage.

In a place where it is customary for [a prospective groom] to send gifts to his [prospective] bride after consecrating her, and witnesses who had seen presents being brought to [a woman] come [and testify to that effect], we suspect that she has been consecrated. [Because of this] suspicion, she must be divorced. [This ruling applies] even when the majority of the men in the city send presents before consecrating [their prospective brides]. In a place where it is customary for all the men [of the locale] to send presents first and then consecrate, [the fact that witnesses] saw presents [being sent] is not a cause for suspicion.

[The following rules apply when] it was established that a marriage contract had been composed [for a specific woman]: If it is common for some of the people in that place to consecrate and then have [a marriage contract] composed, we suspect [that the woman was consecrated]. [This law applies] even when there is no scribe in the locale. We do not say that because a scribe happened to be found [in the locale], [the man had the marriage contract] written before [he consecrated the woman]. If all the men in a locale have marriage contracts composed before consecrating [their wives], [the existence of a marriage contract] is not a cause for suspicion [that a woman has been consecrated].

[The following rule applies when there is a dispute between two pairs of witnesses:] two [witnesses] say: "We saw [a woman] consecrated on this particular day," and two [witnesses] say: "We did not see [this happen]." Although they are all neighbors, living in the same courtyard, [the woman] is considered to be consecrated; the claim "We did not see [this happen]" is of no consequence, for it is common for [a man] to consecrate [a woman] in private.

When one witness says, "This [woman] has been consecrated," and [the woman] herself says, "I have not been consecrated," she is permitted [to marry without restriction]. When one [witness] says, "[This woman] has been consecrated," and another [witness] says, "she has not been consecrated," she should not marry [anyone other than the person to whom the witness says she has been consecrated]. If she, nevertheless, marries another person, [there is no necessity to] terminate [the marriage], for she says, "I was not consecrated." [The following rules apply when a woman herself] says, "I have been consecrated," and afterwards she accepts kiddushin [a second time]. If she can offer a rationale that explains her previous statements, explaining why she said she was consecrated, and the reason appears substantial [to the court], she is permitted to [marry] the second man. If she cannot offer an explanation, or she offers one but it does not appear substantial, she is forbidden [to marry]. [Nevertheless, we also give certain consideration to] the kiddushin given by the second man, and [require] him to divorce her. She is forbidden to [marry] him or anyone else until the person who first consecrated her comes. Similar [rules apply with regard to] a woman who comes [to a new community] and says that she is a married woman, and afterwards says that she is unmarried. If she gives a rationale that explains her statements, and it [appears] substantial, her word is accepted.

An engaged woman (arusa) is forbidden to her husband by rabbinic law so long as she is in her father's house. He [the husband] who sleeps with his fiancee in his father-in-law's house is lashed for rebellion (against rabbinic decrees). Even if he engaged her (kiddushin) through sexual intercourse, he is nevertheless forbidden from sleeping with her in her father's house until he brings her into his house and is alone with her and separates her for himself. This seclusion is the stage of "chuppa" and it is "nisuin" for all intents and purposes. One who sleeps with his finacee for the sake of nisuin after kiddushin is married to her in all regards after the initial stage of intercourse (penetration).

Once an arusah has entered the chuppah, her husband is allowed to have relations with her at any time he desires, and she is considered to be his wife with regard to all matters. Once she enters the chuppah, she is called a nesu'ah, although [the couple] has not engaged in sexual relations. [The above applies when] it is fitting to engage in relations with the woman. If, however, the woman is in the niddah state [when relations are forbidden], the marriage bond is not completed and she is still considered to be an arusah although she entered the chuppah and remained in privacy [with her husband].

The marriage blessings must be recited in the groom's home before the marriage takes place. There are six blessings; they are: Blessed are You, G-d, our Lord, King of the universe, who has created all things for His glory. Blessed are You, G-d, our Lord, King of the universe, Creator of man. Blessed are You, G-d, our Lord, King of the universe, who created man in His image, in an image reflecting His likeness; [He brought forth] his form and prepared for him from His own Self a structure that will last for all time. Blessed are You, G-d, Creator of man. May the barren one rejoice and exult as her children are gathered to her with joy. Blessed are You, G-d, who makes Zion rejoice in her children. Grant joy to these loving companions, as You granted joy to Your creation in the Garden of Eden long ago. Blessed are You, G-d, who grants joy to the groom and the bride. Blessed are You, G-d, our Lord, King of the universe, who created joy and happiness, bride and groom, gladness, song, cheer and delight, love and harmony, peace and friendship. Soon, G-d, our Lord, may there be heard in the cities of Judah and the outskirts of Jerusalem, a voice of joy and a voice of happiness, a voice of a groom and a voice of a bride, a voice of grooms rejoicing from their wedding canopies and youths from their songfests. Blessed are You, G-d, who grants joy to the groom together with the bride.

If wine is available, a cup of wine should be brought, and the blessing over wine recited first. Afterwards, all the above blessings should be recited over the cup of wine; thus, one recites seven blessings. In certain places, it is customary to bring a myrtle [branch] together with the wine. The blessing over the myrtle is recited after [the blessing over] the wine, and then the six blessings [mentioned above] are recited.

The wedding blessings are recited only in the presence of a quorum of ten adult free men. The groom is counted as part of the quorum.

When a man consecrates a woman, recites the wedding blessings, but does not enter into privacy with her in his home, she is still considered to be [merely] an arusah. For nisu'in are not established by the recitation of the wedding blessings, but rather by [the couple's] entry into the chuppah. When [a man] consecrates [a woman] and [the two] enter a chuppah, but do not have the wedding blessings recited, the woman is considered to be married with regard to all matters. The wedding blessings may be recited even after several days have passed. A woman in the niddah state should not marry until she is purified. The marriage blessings are not recited for her until she is purified. If a person transgresses, marries [a woman in this state] and has the blessings recited, they should not be recited again afterwards.

[A man] must write a marriage contract (a ketubah) [for his wife] before their entry into the chuppah; only afterwards is he permitted to live with his wife. The groom pays the scribe's fee. How much does [the marriage contract require him to promise to have paid to her in the event of his death or his divorcing her]? If the bride is a virgin, no less than 200 dinarim. If she is not a virgin, no less than 100 dinarim. This amount is called the fundamental requirement of the ketubah. If the groom desires to add to this amount he may, [promising any sum,] even a talent of gold. The laws pertaining to this addition and to the fundamental requirement of the ketubah are the same with regard to most matters. Therefore, every time the term ketubah is used without any additional explanation, it should be understood to include the fundamental requirement of the ketubah together with the additional amount [promised by the groom]. It was our Sages who ordained the requirement of [writing] a ketubah for a woman. [They instituted this obligation] so that it would not be a casual matter for [her husband] to divorce her.

[Our Sages] did not require that these dinarim be of pure silver. Instead, [their intent was] the coin [commonly used] in the [Talmudic] period, which was seven parts copper and one part silver. Thus, a sela (a coin worth four dinarim) contained half a zuz of [pure] silver. And the 200 dinarim to be paid a virgin were equivalent to 25 zuz of pure silver, while the 100 zuz to be paid to a woman who had previously engaged in sexual relations was 12 and a half zuz [of pure silver]. The weight of each zuz is 96 barley corns, as explained at the beginning of [Hilchot] Eruvin. A dinar is universally referred to as a zuz, regardless of whether it was of pure silver or of the coins used in the [Talmudic] period.

[A marriage contract] for a virgin may not be less than 200 [zuz], nor less than 100 [zuz] for a woman who is not a virgin. Whenever anyone [composes a marriage contract for] a lesser sum, the sexual relations [he conducts with his wife] are considered promiscuous. [Marital relations] are permitted whether the husband composes a legal document [recording] the ketubah, or whether he has witnesses observe him making a commitment for either 100 or 200 [zuz] and [reaffirms that] commitment with a contractual act. Similarly, if [a man] gives his wife possessions equivalent to the value of her ketubah [as security], he is permitted to engage in relations with her until he has the opportunity to [have the document] composed.

When a man brings a woman [into a chuppah] without writing a ketubah for her, or he has written her a ketubah but it was lost, or the woman waived the ketubah in favor of her husband, or she sold her ketubah to him, he must compose a document [obligating himself] for [at least] the fundamental requirement of the ketubah if he desires to continue living with his wife. For it is forbidden for a man to continue living with his wife for even a single moment without [her having] a ketubah. When, however, a woman sells her ketubah to others for the possible benefit, [her husband] does not have to write another ketubah for her. For the ketubah was instituted solely so that it would not be a casual matter for [a man] to divorce [his wife]. In this instance, if [the woman's husband] divorces her, he must pay her ketubah to the purchaser in the same way that he would pay her if she had not sold it.

When [a man] consecrates a woman and writes her a ketubah, but does not enter into a chuppah with her, her status is that of an arusah and not that of a nesu'ah. For a ketubah does not bring about nisu'in. If [the husband] dies or divorces her, she may collect the fundamental requirement of the ketubah from property possessed by the man or his estate. She does not collect the additional sum [that he attached to the ketubah] at all, for they did not enter [a chuppah]. If, by contrast, a man consecrates a woman and does not write a ketubah for her, and he dies or divorces her while she is still an arusah, she has no claim against him, not even for the fundamental [requirement of the ketubah]. For our Sages did not grant [a woman] the fundamental requirement of the ketubah until the marriage is consummated or until the husband writes a document for her. When a man consecrates his daughter, and [her intended husband] writes her a ketubah and dies or divorces her while she is a na'arah, her father receives [payment for] her ketubah, as explained in Chapter Three above.

Similarly, our Sages ordained that whoever weds a virgin should celebrate with her for seven days. He should not pursue his occupation, nor should he involve himself in commercial dealings; he should eat, drink and celebrate. [This ruling applies] regardless of whether the groom had been married before or not. If the bride is not a virgin, [he should celebrate with her] for no less than three days. For it is an ordinance of our Sages that a husband - regardless of whether he was married before or not - should celebrate with a non-virgin bride for three days.

A man may wed several women at one time on one day and recite the marriage blessings for all of them at the same time. With regard to the celebrations, however, he must rejoice with each bride the time allotted to her: seven days for a virgin, three days for a non-virgin. One celebration should not be allowed to overlap with another.

It is permitted to consecrate a woman on any weekday, even on Tish'ah B'Av, whether during the day or during the night. With regard to weddings, by contrast, a wedding is not conducted on a Friday or a Sunday. [This is] a decree, [ordained] lest conducting the wedding feast lead to the desecration of the Sabbath, for a groom is preoccupied with the wedding feast. Needless to say, a wedding is not conducted on the Sabbath. Even on Chol HaMo'ed weddings are not held, as we have explained, for one celebration should not be mixed with another, as [implied by Genesis 29:27]: "Complete the week [of celebration] of this one and then I will give you this other one." On other days, it is permitted to wed a woman on any day one desires, provided one spends three days preparing for the wedding feast.

In a locale where the court holds session only on Monday and Thursday, a virgin bride should be wed on Wednesday. Thus, if her husband has a claim with regard to her virginity, he can take it to the court early the next morning. It is the custom of the Sages that a man who weds a non-virgin bride should wed her on Thursday, so that he will celebrate with her on Thursday, Friday and the Sabbath. On Sunday, he will go back to work.

When a man consecrates his daughter while she is below the age of majority, both she and her father may object and delay the wedding until she comes of age and becomes a na'arah. If [the husband] desires to wed her, he may. It is not proper, however, to do so.

If a man consecrated [a girl], delayed several years, and seeks to wed her while she is a na'arah, the girl is given twelve months from the day he makes his request, to outfit herself and prepare what she needs for him. Only afterwards, must she wed. If he makes his request after she becomes a bogeret, she is given twelve months from the day she becomes a bogeret. Similarly, if he consecrates her on the day on which she becomes a bogeret, she is given twelve months from the day of the kiddushin - i.e., the day on which she became a bogeret. When he consecrates her after she has become a bogeret, if more than twelve months have passed from the time she became a bogeret until he consecrates her, she is given only 30 days from the day he requests to wed her [to prepare]. Similarly, when a man consecrates a non-virgin bride, she is given 30 days [to prepare] from the day he requests to wed her.

Just as a woman is given time to outfit herself after her groom requests to wed her and then the wedding is held, so too, time is granted to the man to prepare himself if the woman requests the wedding to be held. How much time is granted him? The same as is granted her. If [she would be granted] twelve months, [he is granted] twelve months. If [she would be granted] thirty days, [he is granted] thirty days.

When the time allotted to the man passes and he still has not wed his arusah, he is obligated to provide her livelihood, although they have not wed. [Nevertheless,] if [the final day in] the time allotted him falls on Sunday or Friday, he is not liable for her livelihood on that day, for the wedding cannot be held then. Similarly, if he or she falls ill or she enters the niddah state at the conclusion of the time allotted him, he is not obligated to provide her with her livelihood. For she is not fit to wed until she purifies herself, or until she becomes healthy. Similarly, he is not able to wed a woman until he regains his health.

[The following laws apply when a man] weds a virgin who was widowed or divorced or who underwent the rite of chalitzah. If she was widowed or divorced or underwent the rite of chalitzah after erusin alone, the ketubah [to which she is entitled from her second husband] is 200 zuz. If, however, she had been wed, the ketubah [to which she is entitled from her second husband] is 100 zuz. Once she is wed, she is considered to be a non-virgin. Similar [rules apply when a man] weds a virgin [bride] who is [a Canaanite maidservant] who has been freed, who is a convert, or who was held captive [by gentiles and freed]. If the maidservant had been freed, the convert had converted, or the women held captive had been redeemed before they reached the age of three years and one day, they are entitled to a ketubah of 200 zuz. If [this took place after they reached that age, their ketubah is [only] 100 [zuz].

Why did our Sages ordain that these women receive a ketubah of [only] 100 [zuz] even though they are virgins? Because it is a presumption that can be accepted as fact that a woman who is wed will engage in marital relations, and similarly, that a maidservant, a gentile woman and a woman held captive by gentiles will have engaged in relations. Hence, they ordained that such women would be entitled to [only] 100 [zuz],whether they engaged in relations or not. With regard to all matters, they are considered to be non-virgins.

A mukat etz [is granted] a ketubah of 100 [zuz]. Even if [her husband] wed her under the presumption that she was a virgin and then he discovered that she was a mukat etz, she is entitled to a ketubah of 100 [zuz]. When a girl of less than three years of age engages in sexual relations, even when her partner is an adult male, she [is entitled to] a ketubah of 200 [zuz]. Ultimately, she will heal and be a virgin like all others. Similarly, when a boy below the age of nine engages in sexual relations with an adult woman, she [is entitled to] a ketubah of 200 [zuz], as if she had never engaged in relations. For it is only after a boy reaches the age of nine years and one day that relations with him are of consequence. Before that age, they are of no consequence.

Whether a virgin is a bogeret,, blind, or an aylonit, she [is entitled to] a ketubah of 200 [zuz]. By contrast, no provision was made for a ketubah for a woman who is a deaf mute or mentally incompetent. [The rationale is] that no provision has been made for the marriage of a mentally incompetent woman at all. With regard to a woman who is a deaf mute, although our Sages made provision for her marriage, they did not entitle her to a ketubah, so that a man would not refrain from marrying her. Just as she is not entitled to a ketubah, so too, [her husband] is not [obligated to provide] her with her livelihood or grant her any other [of the ordinary] conditions of the marriage contract. If one wed a woman who was a deaf mute and her difficulty was remedied, she is entitled to a ketubah and to the other conditions of the marriage contract. [The amount of] her ketubah is 100 zuz.

When a man marries a woman who is a deaf mute or mentally incompetent and writes her a ketubah for 10,000 [zuz], the obligation is binding; it was he who desired to diminish his assets.

[The following rules apply when] a deaf mute or a mentally incompetent man married a woman who was mentally competent. Even if afterwards the deaf mute's disability disappears and the mentally incompetent person gains stability, they are under no obligation to their wives. If, however, [the men] desire to remain [married] to [the women] after their own wellbeing has been restored, [the wives] are entitled to a ketubah, and its value should be 100 zuz. If the deaf mute's marriage was made by the court, and they write [his wife] a ketubah against his assets, she is entitled to everything that the court has prescribed for her. A court will not arrange a marriage for a mentally incompetent person at all. Since the sages' injunction will not be maintained in his instance, they did not ordain marriage for him at all. Similarly, our Sages did not ordain marriage for a male below the age of majority; [the rationale is that] ultimately he will gain the potential to enter into a comprehensive marriage bond. Why then did they ordain marriage for a girl below the age of majority although she too will ultimately gain the potential for a comprehensive marriage bond? So that she will not be treated in a wanton manner. A youth should not be [allowed to] marry until he has been examined, and it has been determined that he has manifested signs of physical maturity.

When a male below the age of majority marries a woman, she is not entitled to a ketubah, even if he is already nine years and one day old. If he attains majority and remains [married] to her, she is entitled to the fundamental requirement of the ketubah. Similarly, when a man converts together with his wife, she is entitled to a ketubah [of 100 zuz]. It was with this intent that he maintained their marriage.

Whenever a virgin bride is entitled to a ketubah of 200 [zuz], there is [the possibility of issuing] a claim against her, [denying] her virginity. Whenever, by contrast, a bride is entitled to a ketubah of [only] 100 [zuz], or the Sages did not entitle her to a ketubah at all, there is no [possibility of issuing] a claim against her [denying] her virginity. [Similarly,] if [a groom] enters into privacy with his arusah before their wedding, there is no [possibility of issuing] a claim against her [denying] her virginity.

What is meant by a claim [denying a woman's] virginity? [A man] married a woman on the assumption that she was a virgin, and [after the wedding] claims that he did not find signs of virginity. For there are two signs of virginity: a) [hymenal] bleeding at the conclusion of her first sexual experience; b) tightness that is felt during sexual relations at that time.

When [a man] weds a virgin who is granted a ketubah of 200 [zuz], and claims that he did not discover signs of her virginity, the woman is questioned [regarding the matter]. If she says, "It is true that he did not find me a virgin, but this is because I fell, and I was struck by a piece of wood or the ground, and my hymen was damaged," her word is accepted and she is entitled to a ketubah of [100 zuz]. Although [her husband] claims: "Perhaps you engaged in intercourse, and I am under no obligation to you," his claim is not accepted, for his claim is not absolute. He may, however, have a ban of ostracism issued, conditional on her having engaged in relations with another man.

If [the woman] says, "It is true that he did not find me a virgin, for another man raped me after I had been consecrated by him," her word is accepted, and she is entitled to a ketubah of 200 [zuz] as before. If [her husband] claims: "Perhaps you were raped before you were consecrated, and the agreement I entered was based on false premises. Or perhaps you willingly engaged in relations after you were consecrated" [his claim is not accepted]. He may, however, have a ban of ostracism issued conditionally against anyone who makes a false claim to have him incur a financial obligation for which he is not liable.

If he claims, "I did not find her a virgin," and she claims, "He has not had intercourse with me and I am still a virgin," she should be examined. Alternatively, he should have relations with her under the surveillance of witnesses [and the truth will be clarified]. If she claims, "He had relations with me and he found me a virgin like all others, and his claim is false," he is questioned [and asked to clarify his statements]. We ask him: "Why do you say that she was not a virgin?" If he answers: "Because she did not have hymenal bleeding," we check her family [history]. Perhaps [the women of] this [family] are known not to have [vaginal] bleeding at all: neither menstrual bleeding nor hymenal bleeding. If this was found to be true, we presume [that she was a virgin, and she is entitled to a ketubah of 200 zuz]. If the women in her family are not known to have such a condition, we check her [physical state]; perhaps she is afflicted by a serious infirmity that has parched her body's natural fluids, or [perhaps] she was afflicted by hunger. Therefore, we have her bathe, eat and drink until she becomes healthy. At which point, [the couple] engage in relations again to see if she manifests hymenal bleeding or not. If she is not hampered by sickness, hunger or the like, the [husband's] claim that she was not a virgin [is accepted]. [This applies] even if he felt tightness during relations. Since there was no hymenal bleeding, her hymen was not intact. For every virgin will manifest hymenal bleeding, whether she is a minor or above the age of majority, whether a na'arah or a bogeret, unless [this is prevented by an external factor,] illness or the like, as explained. If [the husband] said: "[I claim that she was not a virgin,] because I did not feel tightness [during intercourse]. Instead, I found an open passageway," we inquire with regard to [the woman's] age. Perhaps she is a bogeret, and most bogrot do not have tightness that can be felt substantially [during intercourse], for as she grew older [the adhesion of] her limbs lessened, and the virginal [tightness] disappeared. If she had not become a bogeret yet, we ask him: "Perhaps you leaned on the side or [entered] gently during intercourse, and therefore you did not feel any tightness?" If he replies: "No. I found an open passageway," [his] claim that she was not a virgin [is accepted] with regard to any woman who has not reached the age of bagrut, regardless of whether she was a minor or a na'arah, or whether she was healthy or sick. For the vaginal channel of every virgin is closed. Even if she manifests hymenal bleeding, she is not considered to be a virgin, because the vaginal channel was open.

There are Geonim who teach that for the bogeret, she cannot claim [that she did not have hymenal] bleeding but she can claim that [her vaginal] channel was opened. This ruling does not appear to go along with the Gemara. There were mistakes in their version of the text. I have already examined many texts, including early [texts], and I found that the matter is [correctly read] as we have explained, that the only claim a bogeret [can make is that she did not have hymenal] bleeding.

Our Sages were those who instituted the fundamental requirement of a marriage contract for a woman and they also instituted [the following consideration]: Whenever [a man] makes a claim that his wife was not a virgin, and the woman disputes his claim, [the husband's claim] is accepted. It is the woman's responsibility to bring support for her claim, not the man's. [The rationale is] that we assume that a man will not labor to prepare a [wedding] feast and then mar it, turning his celebration into mourning.

Until when may a husband issue a claim denying his wife's virginity? If [the couple] went into privacy, only immediately [thereafter]. If they did not enter into privacy, he has this option even after 30 days.

All the geonim have ruled that our Sages' statement that the husband's statements are accepted even though his wife disputes his claim applies only with regard to nullifying the obligation for the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract. Nevertheless, the woman is entitled to the additional amount [to which her husband committed himself] unless there is clear proof that she was not a virgin, or she admitted that she was not a virgin before she was consecrated and that she deceived him. Therefore, [the husband] may require her to take an oath while holding a sacred article, as must be done by all others who must take oaths before they collect [the money due them]. Afterwards, she may collect the additional sum. She, by contrast, does not have the option of requiring him to take an oath that he did not discover her to be a virgin, before she must forfeit the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract, for it is a presumption accepted as fact that a person will not labor to prepare a [wedding] feast and then mar it. She may, however, have a ban of ostracism issued conditionally, applying to anyone who lodges false claims against her.

If [the husband] desires to remain married to [his wife] after causing her to forfeit the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract, he must write her [a new ketubah for] 100 [zuz]. For it is forbidden for a man to live with his wife for even one moment without a ketubah, as we have explained.

When a man marries a woman, whether she is a virgin or a non-virgin, whether she is above the age of majority or a minor, and whether she was born Jewish, is a convert or a freed slave, he incurs ten responsibilities toward her and receives four privileges.

With regard to his ten responsibilities: three stem from the Torah. They include sha'arah, kesutah v'onatah. Sha'arah means providing her with subsistence. Kesutah means supplying her with garments, and onatah refers to conjugal rights. The seven responsibilities ordained by the Rabbis are all conditions [of the marriage contract] established by the court. The first is the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract. The others are referred to as t'na'ei ketubah, the conditions of the marriage contract. They are: a) to provide medical treatment if she becomes sick; b) to redeem her if she is held captive: c) to bury her if she dies; d) to provide for her from his possessions; e) the right for her to continue living in his home after his death as long as she remains a widow; f) the right for her daughters to receive their subsistence from his estate after his death until they become consecrated; g) the right for her sons to inherit her ketubah in addition to their share in her husband's estate together with their brothers [borne by other wives, if she dies before her husband does].

The four privileges that the husband is granted are all Rabbinic in origin. They are: a) the right to the fruits of her labor; b) the right to any ownerless object she discovers; c) the right to benefit from the profits of her property during her lifetime; d) the right to inherit her [property] if she dies during his lifetime. His rights to her property supersede [the rights of] all others.

Our Sages also ordained that the fruits of a wife's labor should parallel her subsistence, [the obligation to] redeem her should parallel [the right to] the benefit from her property, and [the obligation to] bury her should parallel [the right to] inherit [the property mentioned in] her ketubah. Therefore, if a woman says: "I will not [hold you obligated for] my subsistence, but I will not work," she is given this option, and she cannot be compelled to work. If, however, her husband says: "I will not provide for your subsistence, and I will not receive the right to the fruits of your labor," he is not given this option, lest the woman be unable to earn her subsistence. Because of this institution, [the obligation to provide for a woman's] subsistence is considered to be one of the t'na'ei ketubah.

Whether or not these matters were written in the marriage contract - indeed, even if a marriage contract was not written and the couple merely married - once they marry, the husband is granted the four privileges mentioned, and the woman is granted the ten rights mentioned. There is no need to state them explicitly.

If the husband made a stipulation that he would not be responsible for one of these obligations - or the wife made a stipulation that [her husband] would not be granted one of these privileges - [and the other party agreed,] the stipulation is binding, with the exception of three matters with regard to which it is impossible for a stipulation to be made. Indeed, if a stipulation is made with regard to these three matters, it is of no consequence. These [three] are: [the woman's] conjugal rights, the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract and [the husband's right] to inherit [his wife's property].

What is implied? If [the groom] made a stipulation with his bride that he is not obligated to give her conjugal rights, his stipulation is of no substance. For he has made a stipulation against what is written in the Torah, and the stipulation does not concern financial matters.

When a man makes a stipulation to reduce the amount of the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract - or he writes a ketubah for either 200 or 100 [zuz], but she writes that she has already received a portion of the sum, when in fact she did not - his stipulation is of no substance. For whenever a person establishes a marriage contract with a virgin for less than 200 [zuz] or with a non-virgin for less than 100 [zuz], the sexual relations [he conducts with his wife] are considered promiscuous.

If he makes a stipulation after he weds her that he will not inherit her property, his stipulation is of no consequence. Although the husband's [right to] inherit [his wife's property] is a rabbinic institution, [our Sages] reinforced their edict, [giving it the power of a statute of] the Torah. With regard to [the Torah's statutes of] inheritance, all stipulations that are made are of no consequence, despite the fact that financial matters are concerned, as [derived from Numbers 27:11]: "the statutes of judgment." With regard to other [aspects of the marriage contract], a stipulation [made by the husband and accepted by his wife] is binding. For example, if he made a stipulation that he is not obligated to supply her with her subsistence or with clothing, or that he would not receive the benefits from her property, his stipulation is binding.

What is the amount that is designated for a woman's subsistence? We allot her bread for two meals every day, according to the norm of the people of her town, for a person who is neither sick nor a glutton. The allotment is also made according to the type of bread eaten as a staple in that locale, be it wheat or barley, or rice, millet, or other grains, as is customary [in that locale]. Similarly, she is allotted other foods that are eaten together with bread - i.e., legumes, vegetables and the like. [She is also allotted] oil for food and to light a lamp and also fruit. She is also [allotted] a small amount of wine, if it is the local custom for women to drink wine. On the Sabbath, she is allotted three meals, and meat or fish according to the local custom. And she is given a me'ah of silver for her private needs - e.g., a p'rutah for laundry, or for the bath and the like.

To whom does the above apply? To a poor Jewish man. But if the husband is wealthy, [the support he is required to provide his wife is apportioned] according to his wealth. If he is wealthy enough to provide her with several dishes of meat each day, he is compelled to do so, and she is allotted [subsistence] commensurate with his wealth. If he is extremely poor and is unable to provide his wife with even the bread that she requires, he is compelled to divorce her. He remains indebted for her ketubah until he finds the means to provide payment for it.

When a husband desires to provide his wife with subsistence as befits her, on condition that she should eat and drink alone, and that he should eat and drink alone, he is given this prerogative, provided he eats together with her on Friday night.

When a woman has been allotted subsistence, and [the entire allotment was not used], the remainder belongs to her husband. If her husband is a priest, he is not entitled to provide her with all her provisions from terumah. [He is not given this option] because it is very difficult for her to protect [the terumah] from contacting ritual impurity, and to eat it while ritually pure [herself]. Instead, he should give her half her provisions from ordinary [food] and half from terumah.

Just as a man is required to provide his wife with her subsistence, he is required to provide for the maintenance of his children, both male and female, until they reach the age of six. Afterwards, he should continue to provide for their maintenance until they reach majority, as ordained by our Sages. If, however, he does not, he should be rebuked and embarrassed publicly, and appeals should be made to him. If he [persists in his] refusal, a public announcement is made with regard to him: "So and so is cruel and does not desire to provide for the maintenance of his children. He is worse than an impure bird, which does provide for its chicks." Nevertheless, he should not be compelled to provide for the maintenance [of children] six and older.

To what does the above apply? To a person who is not known to have resources, and it is not known whether or not he is capable of giving charity. If, however, he has resources and he possesses the means to give an amount to charity that would provide for [his children's] needs, his property is expropriated against his will for the purposes of charity, and [his children's] needs are provided for until they reach majority.

When a person travels to another country [and leaves his wife behind], [the following rules apply] should his wife come to court to place a claim [against her husband] for her subsistence. For the first three months from the day her husband departed, she is not given an allotment for her subsistence. [The rationale is that] it is an accepted assumption that a person does not depart without leaving provisions for his household. Afterwards, an allotment is made for her subsistence. If her husband owns property, the court expropriates his property and sells it to provide for his wife's subsistence. [When doing so,] no account is made for his wife's earnings until her husband comes. If it is discovered that she earned [money during the time that he was away], he is granted that sum. Moreover, even if the matter is not taken to court, and instead the woman sells [her husband's property] on her own in order to pay for her subsistence, the sale is binding. There is no need for a public announcement [regarding the sale of the property]. Similarly, the woman is not required to take an oath [that her husband did not leave her money] until her husband comes and lodges a claim [against her], or until she comes to claim [the money due her, as stated in her] ketubah in the event of her husband's death. [In the latter instance, together with the oaths she is required to take to collect her ketubah,] on the basis of the principle of gilgul shevu'ah, [she is also required to take an oath] that she did not sell [any more of her husband's property than] was necessary for her subsistence.

Just as the court [expropriates and] sells [the property of] a husband who travelled [to another country to provide for] the subsistence of [his] wife, so too, it [expropriates and] sells property to provide for the subsistence of his sons and daughters who are six years old or less. If, however, they are more than six [years old], [the court] does not provide for their subsistence from his property when he is not present, even when he is reputed to have means. Similarly, when a person loses his mental faculties, the court expropriates his property and sells it to provide subsistence and other necessities for his wife and his children below the age of six.

There are Geonim who teach that we should not apportion maintenance to a woman whose husband went overseas or died until she produces a ketubah document. If she does not produce a ketubah document, she does not receive maintenance, lest she [already] received her ketubah from her husband or waived her ketubah to him, so that she should not received maintenance, as will be explained. There are others who teach that we determine her maintenance on the presumption that she did not receive [payment from her husband] or waive [payment]. [Therefore,] she needn't bring [forth] her ketubah. I incline toward [the latter] with regard [to a woman] whose husband left, since her [claim to] maintenance [comes from] the Torah [itself]. But if her husband died, she is not [entitled to] maintance until she brings her ketubah, because she receives maintenance due to an enactment of the rabbis. Additionally, [her maintenance] is pained from the property of [the husband's] heirs, and [a court] always [privileges] claims of heirs.

If [a woman's] husband departed on a journey, and she borrowed money for her subsistence, [her husband] is required to pay [the debt] when he returns. If a person voluntarily took the initiative of providing for her subsistence, when [her husband] returns the husband is not required to pay [that person]. The other person forfeited his money, [the rationale being] that [the husband] did not instruct him to provide for her, nor did she [request the assistance] as a loan.

When a husband [who plans to] depart on a journey tells his wife: "Use your earnings to purchase your subsistence," she has no [right to demand] her subsistence [from him afterwards]. For if she had not accepted this agreement, and she had not felt confident, she could have issued a claim against him, or told him, "My earnings are not sufficient for me."

[The following rule applies if] the woman took the matter to court and was awarded an assessment for her subsistence, the court sold [her husband's landed property] and gave her [the proceeds] - or she sold [the property] herself - and afterwards, the husband came and claimed that he left provisions for her. She is required to take an oath, while holding a sacred article, that he did not make provisions for her [and then she is not held liable]. [The following rule applies when a husband departed on a journey, and the woman] did not take the matter to court, nor sell his property, but instead waited until he returned. [If upon his return there is a dispute,] he claims: "I made [provisions for you]," while she claims, "You did not make provisions. Instead, I borrowed money from this person to provide for myself," he is required to take a rabbinic oath that he left provisions for her, and then he is not held liable. She remains responsible for the debt.

[In the above instance,] if she sold movable property, claiming that she sold it to provide for her subsistence, and her husband claimed that he had left provisions for her, she is required to take a rabbinic oath that he did not leave her any provisions. If she did not issue a claim against him, did not borrow money, and she did not sell his property, but instead strained herself during the day and during the night and earned her livelihood, she is not entitled to any recompense.

[The following rules apply when] a man takes a vow that his wife should not derive any benefit from him [or his property]. Whether he specified the span of the vow or did not specify the span of the vow, we grant him an interval of thirty days. If the span of his vow is concluded, or even though it is not concluded, but he has his vow annulled, this is acceptable. If not, he must divorce his wife, and pay her [the money due her because of] her ketubah. During those thirty days, she should work and [attempt to] sustain herself [through her labor]. One of [her husband's] friends should provide her with those things she needs that she cannot purchase through the fruits of her labor, if the fruits of her labor are not sufficient for her.

When a person makes a vow [preventing] his wife from tasting one of the species of produce, he should be given an interval of thirty days. [If he prolongs the situation] beyond this time, he is required to divorce [his wife] and pay [her the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah. [This ruling applies] even when his vow prevents her from eating undesirable food, or a species that she has never tasted in her life. [The following rules apply when a woman] took a vow not to partake of a particular species of produce, and [her husband] allowed the vow to stand, or she took a Nazarite vow and he did not annul it. If he desires to remain married to her and for her not to partake of this species or to be a Nazarite, he may. If, however, he says: "I do not desire a woman with vows," he may divorce her, but he is required to pay her the money due her because of her ketubah. [The rationale is that] he had the option to nullify [her vow], and instead, he willingly allowed the vow to stand.

To what extent is he required to provide her with garments? Annually, he must purchase for her clothes that were worth 50 zuz in the coinage prevalent [in the Talmudic period], these being worth six and one fourth dinarim of pure silver. He should provide her with new [garments] during the rainy season. After these garments become worn, she should wear them in the summer. Frayed garments - that which remains from her garments from the previous year - belong to her; she should wear them while she is in the niddah state. She is granted a belt for her loins, a cap for her head and new shoes on each festival.

When does the above apply? In [the Talmudic period,] and in Eretz Yisrael, but in other ages or in other countries, there is no fixed amount of money [determined for this purpose]. For there are some places where garments are very expensive, and others where they are inexpensive. The fundamental principle is that he is obligated to provide her with appropriate clothes for the winter and the summer, the minimal that are worn by a married woman in that country.

Included in the [obligation to provide her with] garments is the requirement to provide her with household goods and a dwelling place. With which household goods is he obligated to provide her? With a bed and its spreads, a reed or woven rug to sit on, and utensils with which to eat and drink - e.g., a pot, a plate, a cup, a bottle and the like. With regard to her dwelling? He must rent a dwelling at least four cubits by four cubits. It must have a yard outside for her use and a latrine [nearby].

Similarly, he is obligated to provide her with ornaments - e.g., colored cloths to wrap her head and forehead, eye-makeup, rouge and the like - so that she will not appear unattractive to him.

When does the above apply? With regard to a poor Jewish man. Concerning a rich man, by contrast, all [of his obligations are judged] according to the extent of his wealth. If it would be appropriate for him to buy her silk and embroidered clothing and golden articles, he is compelled to provide her with these. Similarly, the dwelling [he is required to give her] is judged according to his wealth, as are the ornaments and the household goods. If he does not have the means to provide her with the minimum required of a poor Jewish man, he is compelled to divorce her. The money due her by virtue of her ketubah is considered to be a debt that he is required to pay when he gains the means.

[A man] is obligated to provide the necessary clothing, dwelling and household goods, not only for his wife, but also for his sons and daughters who are six years old or less. He is not, however, required to provide for them according to his wealth; all that is necessary is that he provide for their needs. This is the governing principle: whenever a husband [or his estate] is required to provide for a person's subsistence - whether the husband is alive or deceased - the husband [or his estate] is also obligated to provide for the person's clothing, household goods and dwelling. Whenever a court must sell [a person's property] to provide for [a dependent's] subsistence, they also sell [his property] to provide [the dependent] with clothing, household goods and a dwelling.

When a woman's husband has departed on a journey, and the court allots [money from his property] for her subsistence, her clothes, her household goods and the renting of a dwelling, they do not allot her money for ornaments. For she does not have a husband [present] for whom to make herself attractive. If, by contrast, a woman's husband loses his mental faculties or becomes a deaf mute, she is granted an allotment for ornaments. The laws that apply to the claims and counterclaims between a woman and her husband with regard to garments, clothing and the rental of a dwelling [in the event of the husband's departure on an extended journey] are the same as those that apply with regard to her subsistence. If he claims to have provided for her and she denies [his claim], the same rulings apply to all claims.

[The following rules apply if a husband] takes a vow that prevents his wife from wearing any type of ornament. If the couple are poor, they may remain married for a year while the vow is in effect. If [it remains in effect] for a longer period, he must either absolve himself of the vow, or divorce [his wife] and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah. If the couple are wealthy, they may remain married for a month while the vow is in effect. If [it remains in effect] for a longer period, he must either absolve himself of the vow or divorce [his wife] and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.

[The following rules apply if a husband] takes a vow that prevents his wife from going to the bathhouse. [The couple may remain married for only] one week in a large city and two weeks in a village [if the vow remains in effect]. If he takes a vow that prevents his wife from wearing shoes [the couple may remain married for only] three days in a village and one day in a large city. If [the vow remains in effect] for a longer period, he must either absolve himself of the vow or divorce [his wife] and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.

If [a husband] takes a vow that prevents his wife from borrowing or lending household goods that are frequently lent and borrowed between neighbors - e.g., a sifter, a sieve, a mill, an oven or the like - he must either absolve himself of the vow, or divorce [his wife] and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah. [The rationale is that his vow] causes her to have a bad reputation among her neighbors. Similarly, if she takes an oath not to borrow or lend [neighbors] a sifter, a sieve, a mill, an oven or the like, or not to weave attractive garments for her sons in places where it is customary to do so, he may divorce her without paying her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah. [The rationale is that her vow] causes him to have a reputation as a miser among his neighbors.

In a place where it is customary for a woman not to go out to the market place wearing merely a cap on her head, but also a veil that covers her entire body like a cloak, her husband must provide at least the least expensive type of veil for her. If he is wealthy, [he must provide her with a veil whose quality] is commensurate with his wealth. [He must give her this veil] so that she can visit her father's home, a house of mourning or a wedding celebration. For every woman should be given the opportunity to visit her father and to go to a house of mourning or a wedding celebration as an expression of kindness to her friends and relatives, for [this will have a reciprocal effect], and they will return the visits. For a woman [at home] is not confined in a jail, from which she cannot come and go. Nevertheless, it is uncouth for a woman always to leave home - this time to go out and another time to go on the street. Indeed, a husband should prevent a wife from doing this and not allow her to go out more than once or twice a month, as is necessary. For there is nothing more attractive for a woman than to sit in the corner of her home, as [implied by Psalms 45:14]: "All the glory of the king's daughter is within."

[The following rules apply when a husband] takes a vow that prevents his wife from going to her father's home. If he lives in the same city, [the husband] is granted a respite of one month. [If he desires to maintain his vow at the beginning of] the second month, he must divorce [his wife] and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah. If [the wife's father lives] in another city, [the husband] is granted respite until the first festival. [If he desires to maintain his vow until] the second [festival], he must divorce [his wife] and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.

[The following rules apply when a husband] takes a vow that prevents his wife from going to a house of mourning or to wedding celebrations. He must either absolve himself of the vow or divorce [his wife] and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah. For this is like placing her in jail and locking her in. If [the husband] claims: "[I forbade her from going] because of indecent people who were present at that house of mourning or wedding," and it was discovered that indeed, indecent people were present, he is given the prerogative [of making that vow].

When a person tells his wife, "I do not desire that your father, your mother, your brothers and your sisters come into my domain," he is given that prerogative. Instead, she should visit them when an [unusual] event occurs to them. And she should visit her father's house once a month and on each festival. They, by contrast, should visit her only when an unusual event of great import occurs - e.g., sickness or birth. For a person should not be forced to have others enter his domain. Similarly, if [the wife] says: "I do not want your mother and your sisters to visit, nor will I live together with them in one courtyard, because they cause me difficulties and distress," she is given that prerogative. For a person should not be forced to have others dwell with him in his domain.

When a husband says: "I will not dwell in this home, because there are wicked or indecent people or gentiles in this neighborhood, and I fear them," he is given that prerogative. This applies even if it has not been established that there are indecent people living there. For our Sages ordained: "Keep away from a bad neighbor." Even if the dwelling belongs to the woman, she is forced to leave it, and they should establish their dwelling among worthy people. The same law applies if the woman makes such a demand. Although [the husband] says, "I do not object to them," her will is followed. [The rationale is that] she can say, "I do not want to get a bad reputation in these neighborhoods."

All of the earth is divided into different lands - e.g., the Land of Canaan, the Land of Egypt, the Land of Yemen, the Land of Ethiopia, the Land of Babylonia and the like. Every land is subdivided into large cities and villages. With regard to the subject of marriage, the cities of Eretz Yisrael are considered to be divided into three different lands: Judea, Transjordan and the Galilee.

When a man from one of these lands marries a woman in another land, she is compelled to follow him to his land, or to accept a divorce without receiving [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah. [The rationale is that,] although it was not specifically stated, [it can be assumed] that he married her on this condition. When, however, a person marries a woman in a particular land and he is from that land, he does not have the right to [compel] her to move to another land. He may, nevertheless, [compel] her to move from city to city and from village to village within that land. He may not, however, [compel] her to move from a city to a village, or from a village to a city. For there are certain advantages to living in a city, and other advantages to living in a village.

When he [compels] her to move from one city to another, or from one village to another within a particular land, he may not compel her to move from pleasant surroundings to unpleasant surroundings, nor from unpleasant [surroundings] to pleasant ones. [Although the latter move would seemingly be to her benefit, she still must consent,] because she must care for and check herself in the pleasant surroundings, so that she will not be considered inferior and unattractive. Similarly, [her husband] may not [compel] her to move from an area inhabited primarily by Jews to an area inhabited primarily by gentiles. Wherever [the couple lives], they should move from an area inhabited primarily by gentiles to an area inhabited primarily by Jews.

When does the above apply? When moving from one place in the diaspora to another, or from one place in Eretz Yisrael to another. But if [the husband desires to move] from the diaspora to Eretz Yisrael, the woman should be compelled to move. [This applies even when moving involves leaving] pleasant surroundings for unpleasant ones. Even [when it is necessary to leave] an area inhabited primarily by Jews for an area inhabited primarily by gentiles, one should [move to Eretz Yisrael]. One should not leave Eretz Yisrael for the diaspora, even if the move enables one to relocate from unpleasant [surroundings] to pleasant ones, and even when it enables one to move from an area inhabited primarily by gentiles to an area inhabited primarily by Jews.

When a husband desires to move to Eretz Yisrael and [his wife] does not desire to do so, he may divorce her without paying her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah. If she desires to move [to Eretz Yisrael] and he does not desire to do so, he must divorce her and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah. The same laws apply with regard to moving from other places in Eretz Yisrael to Jerusalem. [Just as] everyone should move to Eretz Yisrael, and no one should leave there, [so too,] everyone should move to Jerusalem, and no one should leave there.

The [obligation of] conjugal rights as prescribed by the Torah [is individual in nature], depending on the strength of each particular man and the [type of] work that he performs. What is implied? Healthy men who are pampered and indulged, and who are not employed in labor that weakens their strength - but rather eat, drink and spend [the majority of their day] at home - should fulfill their conjugal duties every night. [The following rules apply to] workers - e.g., tailors, weavers, construction workers and the like. If they work in the city [in which they live], they should fulfill their conjugal duties twice a week. If they work in another city, they should fulfill their conjugal duties once a week. Donkey-drivers should fulfill their conjugal duties once a week. Camel-drivers should fulfill their conjugal duties once every thirty days. Seamen should fulfill their conjugal duties once every six months. Students of the Torah should fulfill their conjugal duties once a week. [Their obligation is limited,] because the Torah weakens their strength. It is the practice of Torah scholars to engage in marital relations on Friday night.

A wife has the right to prevent her husband from making business trips except to close places, so that he will not be prevented from fulfilling his conjugal duties. He may make such journeys only with her permission. Similarly, she has the prerogative of preventing him from changing from a profession that grants her more frequent conjugal rights to one that grants her less frequent rights - e.g., a donkey-driver who wishes to become a camel-driver, or a camel-driver who wishes to become a seaman. Students of the Torah may, however, depart for Torah study for two or three years without their wives' permission. Similarly, a wife cannot prevent a husband who is pampered and indulged from becoming a student of the Torah.

A man [has the prerogative of] marrying several wives - even 100, whether at one time or one after the other. His wife may not object to this, provided he has the means to provide each [wife] with her subsistence, clothing and conjugal rights as befits her. He may not, however, compel his wives to live in the same courtyard. Instead, each one is entitled to her own household.

What are [his obligations with regard to his wives'] conjugal rights? [They are determined according to] the number [of wives he has.] What is implied? If a worker has two wives, he is obligated to fulfill his duties towards each one once a week. If he has four wives, he is obligated to fulfill his duties towards each one once every two weeks. Similarly, a seaman who has four wives is obligated to fulfill his duties towards each one once every two years. Therefore, our Sages commanded that a person should not marry more than four wives, although he has ample financial resources, so that he will be able to fulfill his conjugal obligations towards each one once a month.

When a man makes a vow requiring his wife to tell other people what he told her - or what she told him - of the jests and frivolities that a man and his wife will [occasionally] speak [in preparation for] marital relations, he must divorce [his wife] and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah. For a woman may not [be compelled] to speak brazenly and tell others lascivious things. Similarly, if a man makes a vow requiring his wife to take actions during marital relations to prevent conception, or if he makes a vow requiring her to act foolishly, [performing] acts that have no meaning and are merely foolishness, he must divorce [his wife] and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.

When a man makes a vow causing marital relations with his wife to be forbidden, he is given a respite of one week. After that time, he must divorce [his wife] and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah, or absolve his vow. [This ruling applies even if the man] is a seaman whose obligation towards conjugal duties is once every six months. [The rationale is that] since he took a vow, he has caused his wife distress, and she despairs [of ever resuming intimacy]. How can such a vow be effective? If he tells her: "Marital relations with me are forbidden for you," or he takes an oath not to engage in marital relations, his vow is of no consequence, and by taking an oath he violates the prohibition against taking a false oath, for he is obligated [by the Torah to engage in relations with her]. If, however, he tells her, "The satisfaction of engaging in relations with you is forbidden to me," it is a [binding] vow, and he is forbidden to engage in relations with her. For a person should not be fed food that is forbidden to him.

It is forbidden for a man to deprive his wife of her conjugal rights. If he transgresses and deprives her of these rights in order to cause her distress, he violates one of the Torah's negative commandments, as [Exodus 21:10] states: "Do not deprive [her] of her sustenance, garments or conjugal rights." If he becomes sick or his virility is weakened, and he is unable to engage in sexual relations, he is given a period of six months- for [a woman is never required to wait] longer for her conjugal rights than this - in the hope that he recovers. Afterwards, the prerogative is hers [whether to remain married] or whether he must divorce her and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.

A woman who withholds marital intimacy from her husband is called a moredet ("a rebel"). She is asked why she has rebelled. If she answers: "Because I am repulsed by him and I cannot voluntarily engage in relations with him," her husband should be compelled to divorce her immediately. For she is not like a captive, [to be forced] to engage in relations with one she loathes. [In such an instance, as part of] the divorce [settlement], she does not receive any of the money promised her in her ketubah. She is entitled to whatever remains of the possessions she brought into the marriage arrangement, both those for which her husband assumed responsibility and those for which he did not assume responsibility - i.e., nichsei m'log. She is not entitled to anything that belongs to her husband. She should remove even the shoe on her foot and her head-covering that he gave her and return them to him. [Similarly,] she should return to him any presents that he gave her. For he did not give them to her with the intent that she take them and [leave his home].

[Different rules apply, however,] if she rebelled against her husband with the intent of causing him distress, saying: "I intend to cause him distress this way, because he did this or this to me," "...because he cursed me," "...because he has caused me strife," or the like, she is sent a messenger from the court, [who] tells her: "Take note. If you continue your rebellious conduct, you will forfeit your ketubah, even if it is worth one hundred maneh." Afterwards, announcements are made concerning her in the synagogues and the houses of study each day for four consecutive weeks, saying: "So and so has rebelled against her husband."

After the announcement has been made, the court sends her a messenger a second time. He tells her: "If you continue your rebellious conduct, you have forfeited your ketubah." If, nevertheless, she continues this conduct and does not retract, she is consulted by the court. [If she does not change her mind,] she then forfeits her ketubah and has no rights to a ketubah at all. She is not given a divorce until twelve months pass. During these twelve months, [her husband is] not [required] to provide for her subsistence. If she dies before being divorced, her husband inherits her [property].

This is the sequence followed with regard to a woman who rebels [against her husband] in order to cause him distress. These laws apply even when the woman is in the niddah state or when she is ill and is not fit to engage in sexual relations. Similarly, they apply even when her husband is a seaman whose conjugal duties are only once in six months, and even when [her husband] has another wife.

Similarly, when the time comes for an arusah to enter nisu'in, and she refuses to do so, rebelling in order to cause [her husband] distress, she is considered to be one who rebels [and refuses to engage] in marital relations. Similarly, the above sequence is followed when a yevamah refuses to undergo yibbum in order to cause [her yavam] distress.

When this woman who rebels is divorced after twelve months without receiving [any of the money due her because of] her ketubah, she must also return everything that belongs to her husband. With regard to the property that she brought to [the marriage arrangement] and what remains [of her trousseau, different rules apply]. If she takes physical possession of these articles, they are not taken from her, but if her husband takes physical possession of them, they are not taken from him. Similarly, her husband is not held liable for anything that has been lost from her possessions for which he accepted responsibility. This is the law prescribed by the Talmud with regard to a woman who rebels [against her husband].

[There are] Geonim who say that they have in Babylonia different customs regarding the moredet. These customs have not spread through the majority of [the people] Israel and rabbis and great [thinkers] differ in many places. Thus, it is appropriate to follow and rule according to the law [as stated in] the Gemara.

[The following ruling applies when] a man rebels against his wife and says, "I will support her and provide her with her subsistence, but I will not be intimate with her, because she has become loathsome to me." He must increase her ketubah by the equivalent of 36 barleycorns worth of [pure] silver each week. They may remain married without engaging in relations for as long as she desires. Although her ketubah continues to increase, [her husband] also transgresses a negative commandment, for [Exodus 21:10] states: "Do not deprive [her of her... conjugal rights]." If the husband hates her, let him divorce her; causing her anguish, however, is forbidden. Why is he not punished by lashes for [violating] this negative commandment? Because its [violation] does not involve a deed.

[The following rules apply when] a man and his wife come to court and he claims that his wife refuses to engage in marital relations, and she replies: "I follow the way of the world with him," or if she claims that he deprives her of her conjugal rights, and he replies that he "follows the way of the world with her." At first, a ban of ostracism is issued against anyone who denies his or her spouse marital intimacy and refuses to acknowledge the matter before the court. Afterwards, if acknowledgement is [still] not made, the couple are asked to enter into privacy in the presence of witnesses. If they do this, and yet the claims continue as before, a request is made of the defendant, and a compromise is made [as just] as the judge can make. It is, however, forbidden to engage in relations in the presence of others. For it is forbidden to engage in relations in the presence of any living being.

When a woman becomes ill, [her husband] is obligated [to provide] medical treatment for her until she recovers. If the husband sees that her illness is prolonged, and he will be forced to spend much money treating her, he may tell her: "Here is the money due you by virtue of your ketubah. Either pay for your treatment from this money, or I will divorce you and pay you what is due you and abandon you." [Although] he is given this prerogative, it is not ethical to act in this manner.

[When a man's wife] is taken captive, he is obligated to redeem her. If he is a priest, [although] she has become forbidden to him, he must redeem her and have her returned to her father's home. If he was in another city, he must still provide for her until she is returned to her native locale. [Then] he must divorce her and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah. If her husband was an Israelite - who is permitted to remain married to a woman who was held captive - he must return her to her station as his wife, as she was previously. Afterwards, if he desires, he may divorce her, [provided] he pays her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.

A husband is not obligated to redeem his wife for more than her worth. Instead, [the laws applying] to her [redemption] are the same as with regard to others held captive. When her ransom exceeds [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, her husband is not given the prerogative of saying: "I will divorce her. Here is [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. Let her redeem herself." Instead, [if necessary,] he should be compelled to redeem her, even if her ransom is ten times [the value of] her ketubah - even if it is equivalent to all of his assets. When does the above apply? On the first occasion [that she is held captive]. If, however, he redeems her and she is taken captive again, if he desires to divorce her he may divorce her, pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, and [then] she must redeem herself.

When a man's wife is taken captive and he is abroad, the court expropriates his assets and sells them after announcements have been made, and redeems his wife as he would be required to.

When a person causes his wife to be bound by a vow that requires him to divorce her and pay her [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, and she is taken captive after he causes her to be bound by this vow, he is not required to redeem her. For from the time he caused her to be bound by the vow, he was obligated to divorce her and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.

When a woman who is forbidden to [engage in relations] with her husband because of one of the Torah's prohibitions is taken captive, he is not obligated to redeem her. Instead, he must provide her with [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, and she must redeem herself. [One might ask: Why is this instance different from the wife of a priest who is taken captive?] A woman who has been taken captive is forbidden to a priest, and yet he is obligated to redeem [his wife in such an instance]. [There is, however, a difference between the two instances. The priest's wife] was not forbidden to him beforehand. It is the prohibition stemming from her being taken captive that causes [their relationship to be forbidden].

When a man's wife dies, he is obligated to bury her and to have eulogies and lamentations performed as is the local custom. Even a poor Jewish man should provide at least two flutes and one woman to lament. If [her husband] is rich, [the funeral should be carried out] in a manner appropriate to his wealth. If the social standing of [a man's wife] exceeded his own, he must have her buried in a manner appropriate to her social standing. For [when she marries,] a woman ascends to her husband's social standing [if his is higher than hers], but does not descend [to his, if her social standing surpasses his]. [This principle applies] even after death.

If a husband does not desire [to pay for] the burial of his wife, and another person voluntarily takes the initiative and has her buried, [the costs of the burial] should be expropriated from her husband against his will and given to the person [who arranged the burial]. [The rationale is to prevent the body of a Jew] from being thrown to the dogs. If a man is in another city when his wife dies, the court should expropriate his property and sell it without an announcement. The woman should be buried as appropriate to her husband's financial resources and his social standing or her social standing.

It is permissible for a woman to authorize her husband to ignore her conjugal rights. When does this apply? When he has children already and has fulfilled the mitzvah to be fruitful and multiply. If, however, he has not fulfilled the mitzvah of being fruitful and multiplying, he is obligated to engage in sexual relations whenever his conjugal duties require, until he fathers children. For this is a positive commandment of the Torah, as [Genesis 1:28] states: "Be fruitful and multiply."

Men are obligated in procreation (periyya u-reviyya), but not women. When is a man obligated in this mitzva? From the age of seventeen. Once he reaches [the age of] twenty years and has not married, he has transgressed and neglected a positive commandment. However, if he is involved in Torah and engrossed in it, and he fears that if he marries, he will have to busy himself with supporting a wife and thereby come to neglect Torah study, then it is permissible for him to delay [marriage]; for one who is involved in a mitzva is exempt from another mitzva – all the more so regarding Torah study.

One who is in love with Torah and studies it and cleaves into it always, as Ben Azzai did, commits no sin thereby. That is, providing his sexual desire does not get the better of him. If it does, he is required to marry even if he already has children, in order that he not come to thoughts of sin.

How many children is it necessary for a man to have fathered to be considered to have fulfilled this mitzvah? One boy and one girl, as [implied by Genesis 5:2]: "He created them, a male and a female." If the son was a saris or the daughter an aylonit, he is not considered to have fulfilled this mitzvah.

A man is considered to have fulfilled the mitzvah of being fruitful and multiplying [even when] he fathers [children] and they die, so long as [his children] have left behind children [of their own]. For grandchildren are considered to be children. When does the above apply? When the person's grandchildren are both male and female, and they are descended from a male and a female, even though the male grandchild is the son of the man's daughter, and the female grandchild is the daughter of the man's son. Since they come from two of his children, he is considered to have fulfilled the mitzvah of being fruitful and multiplying. If, however, he had a son and a daughter who both died, and [one did not leave any children, while] one left a son and a daughter, the grandfather is not considered to have fulfilled this mitzvah.

When [a convert] had fathered children as a gentile, and both he and they convert, he is considered to have fulfilled this mitzvah. By contrast, a freed slave who had fathered children as a slave is not considered to have fulfilled this mitzvah, although his children were also freed. Instead, he must father children after he has been freed. [The rationale is that] a slave is not considered to have any paternal lineage.

A man should not marry a barren women, an elderly woman, an aylonit or a minor who is not fit to bear a child unless he has already fulfilled the mitzvah of being fruitful and multiplying, or he has another wife with whom he can father children. When a man has married a woman and remained married to her for ten years without her bearing children, he must divorce her and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah, or marry a woman who is fit to bear children. If he does not desire to divorce her, he should be compelled to do so; he should be beaten with a rod until he divorces her. Even when he says, "I will not engage in marital relations with her. Instead, we will dwell together with witnesses so that we will not ever be in private," regardless of whether it is he or she who offers this proposition, it is not accepted. Rather, he is required to divorce [his wife] or marry another woman who is fit to bear children.

When a man has lived [together with his wife] for ten years without her bearing children, and he releases semen as one shoots an arrow, it can be assumed that the affliction comes from her. Therefore, he should divorce her without paying her [the essential requirement of] the ketubah. She is, however, entitled to the additional sum [by which the ketubah was increased]. [The rationale is that] such a woman should not be judged more severely than an aylonit whose husband did not recognize her condition, who is granted the additional amount, as will be explained. If [the husband] does not [release semen] as one shoots an arrow, it can be assumed that the affliction comes from him alone. When he divorces her, he must pay her [the entire sum due her by virtue of her] ketubah: the essential requirement and the additional sum.

[The following rules apply when there is a dispute with regard to which of the couple it is whose affliction prevents the couple from having children. The husband] claims: "It is she who cannot bear children," and she claims "He cannot conceive children, for he does not [release semen] as one shoots an arrow." Her word is accepted. He may, however, have a ban of ostracism issued conditionally against anyone who makes a claim that she does not definitely know to be true. Afterwards, he must pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah. If she says, "I do not know if the difficulty stems from me or from him," she is not entitled to the essential requirement of the ketubah, as explained. [The rationale is that] the money should stay in the possession of its owner until she makes a definite claim that he does not [release semen] as one shoots an arrow. Why is the woman's word accepted when she makes such a claim? Because she can feel whether or not he [releases semen] as one shoots an arrow, and he cannot make such a distinction.

When a woman demands of her husband to divorce her after ten years [of marriage], because she has not given birth, and she claims that he does not [release semen] as one shoots an arrow, her request is accepted. Although she is not commanded to fulfill the mitzvah of being fruitful and multiplying, she needs sons [to assist] her in her old age. [Therefore,] he should be compelled to divorce her. He is required to give her only the essential requirement of the ketubah. [He is not required to give her the additional amount,] because he did not promise her this additional amount with the intent that she leave him at her will and take this money.

If [a husband] travels on an [extended] business trip during these ten years, or either the husband or the wife were ill or confined in prison, [the time that the couple did not share together] is not included in the calculation [of the ten years].

If a woman miscarries, [the ten years are] recalculated from the day of the miscarriage. If a woman has three successive miscarriages, we can presume that she will continue to miscarry, and there is the possibility that [her husband] will not merit to have children from her. Therefore, he should divorce her, and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.

[The following rules apply when there is a difference between the information stemming from the claims of a husband and his wife.] He claims that she has miscarried within the ten years so that they can continue [their marriage], and she denies the miscarriage. [Her claim] is believed; [if it were not true,] she would not cause herself to be considered barren. If he claims that she has miscarried twice, and she claims to have miscarried three times, [her claim] is believed. [If it were not true,] she would not cause herself to be considered a woman who [continually] miscarries. [Therefore, in both instances,] he should divorce her and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah. With regard to the above situations, he may require her to take a Rabbinic oath that she did not miscarry or that she miscarried three times. For this claim obligates him to pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.

[When a woman] marries one man, remains married to him for ten years without bearing a child and is divorced [for that reason], she is permitted to marry a second husband. If she remained married to the second husband for ten years without bearing a child, she should not marry a third husband. If she marries a third husband, she should be divorced; [he is] not [required to pay her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. [This applies] unless he has another wife, or he has already fulfilled the mitzvah of being fruitful and multiplying.

[The following laws apply when] a woman comes to court and claims that her husband cannot perform sexually in an ordinary way that will lead to the conception of children, or that he does not [release semen] as one shoots an arrow. The judges should try to arrange a compromise, telling the woman: "It is proper for you to conduct yourself with your husband [as follows]: Remain [married] for ten years. [If] you do not give birth, come to him with a claim at that time." We protract the negotiations of this matter with her; we do not require her to continue living with him, nor do we judge her as a woman who rebels against her husband. Instead, the dealings are prolonged until the two parties reach a compromise.

Although a man has fulfilled the mitzvah of being fruitful and multiplying, he is bound by a Rabbinic commandment not to refrain from being fruitful and multiplying as long as he is physically potent. For anyone who adds a soul to the Jewish people is considered as if he built an entire world. Similarly, it is a mitzvah of our Sages that a man should not live without a wife, so that he will not be prompted to [sexual] thoughts. Similarly, a woman should not live without a man, so that she will not be suspected [of immoral conduct].

It is an obligation for a man to admonish his wife. Our Sages declared: "A man will not admonish his wife unless a spirit of purity enters his being." [Nevertheless,] he should not admonish her more than necessary. [A man] should never compel [his wife] to engage in sexual relations against her will. Instead, [relations] should be with her agreement, [preceded by] conversation and a spirit of joy.

Similarly, our Sages commanded a woman to conduct herself modestly at home, not to proliferate levity or frivolity before her husband, not to request intimacy verbally, nor to speak about this matter. She should not deny her husband [intimacy] to cause him anguish, so that he should increase his love for her. Instead, she should oblige him whenever he desires. She should keep her distance from his relatives and the members of his household so that he will not be provoked by jealousy and should avoid scandalous situations - indeed, any trace of scandal.

Thus the Sages commanded: A man should honor his wife more than himself and love her as himself. If his money abounds, according to what he can afford. He should not inspire excess fear in her, and he should speak gently with her, and be neither depressed nor hot-tempered.

Thus the Sages commanded: A woman should honor her husband too much, and have awe of him, do all of her actions according to his word. He should seem to her like a minister or king, walking in the desires of his heart, and distancing herself from what he hates. This is how holy and pure Jews behave in their marriages. These paths should be their pleasant and praiseworthy lifestyle.

The property that a woman brings to her husband's [resources] - be it landed property, movable property or servants - is not referred to with the term ketubah, but rather with the term nedunyah. [More particularly, there are two subdivisions within this category.] When the husband accepts responsibility for the nedunyah and it is considered to be his property - i.e., if it decreases in value he suffers the loss, and if it increases in value the gain is his - the property is referred to as nichsei tzon barzel. If the husband did not accept responsibility for the nedunyah, and it instead remained the property of the woman - if it decreases in value she suffers the loss, and if it increases in value the gain is hers - the property is referred to as nichsei m'log.

Similarly, all the property that a woman owns that she did not bring to her husband's household, nor had written in her ketubah, but rather left as her own, or property that came to her as an inheritance, or that was given to her as a present - all of this is referred to as nichsei m'log, for it is all in her possession. The term ketubah, by contrast, refers only to the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract - i.e., 100 [zuz for a non-virgin] or 200 [zuz for a virgin] and the additional amount that [the husband promised].

We have already explained that our Sages established the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract, and that the laws governing the additional amount [promised by the husband] are the same as those governing the fundamental requirement. [Our Sages] did not grant a woman the option of collecting [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah whenever she desired. Instead, it is like a debt, which is not payable until a given date. For a ketubah, the time when payment is due is not until after the woman's husband dies or divorces her. Similarly, our Sages ordained that if a husband has fields [of varying quality] - good, bad and intermediate - when the woman comes to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from this property, she is entitled to collect only from the inferior fields. They are referred to as ziboorit.

Similarly, our Sages ordained that when a woman comes to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah after her husband's death, she may not collect [this sum] until she takes an oath while holding a sacred article, that her husband did not leave any property in her possession, that she had not sold her ketubah to him, nor waived payment of it. [Her wardrobe, even] the garments she is wearing should be evaluated and the sum deducted from [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. If, however, he voluntarily divorces her, she may collect [the money due her] without taking an oath, nor should [her wardrobe] be evaluated. [The rationale is that] he bought them for her, she acquired them, and it is he who desires to divorce her, and not the reverse.

Similarly, [our Sages] ordained that a widow should collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from landed property only. [Moreover,] she may not collect [her due] from the increment in the value of that property after the husband died. Similarly, after their father's death, [the woman's] daughters do not receive their subsistence from the increment in the value of that property after his death. Similarly, a woman may not collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from the increment in the value of [landed] property accomplished through the efforts of a purchaser, although other creditors are entitled to collect their due from that increment. These rulings are among the leniencies [granted with regard to the the payment of the money due a woman by virtue] of her ketubah.

Similarly, among the leniencies [granted with regard to the payment of the money due a woman by virtue] of her ketubah is that a woman will collect the money due her from the coinage that is of least value. What is implied? A man married a woman in one country and divorced her in another. If the coinage of the country in which the couple married is more valuable than the coinage of the country in which they divorced, he may pay her with the coinage of the country in which they divorced. If, by contrast, the coinage of the country in which the couple divorced is more valuable than the coinage of the country in which they married, he may pay her with the coinage of the country in which they married. When does the above apply? When her ketubah states a sum of coins without specification. If, however, a specific type of coin is explicitly mentioned, whether with regard to the fundamental requirement of the ketubah, or with regard to the extra amount added by the husband, the law is the same as when a person lends a colleague a specific type of coin - he must return the loan in the coinage that he took, as will be explained in Hilchot Halva'ah.

The geonim of all the yeshivot ordained that after the death of a man, a woman should be able to collect her [money due her by virtue of her] ketubah from movable property, just as they ordained that a creditor can collect the debt owed him from movable property. This mandate spread throughout the majority of the Jewish people. Similarly, the other conditions of a woman's ketubah are governed by the same rules as [the fundamental requirement of] the ketubah, and they are binding on the movable property of the deceased's estate, as well as on the landed property. There is, however, one exception - the right of the sons to inherit their mother's ketubah. Since the custom of granting them this inheritance was not universally accepted by all the yeshivot, I maintain that the law of the Talmud should be applied in this instance, and they should inherit the money due their mother by virtue of her ketubah only from the landed property [within the estate].

In all the [Jewish] communities of which I know and have heard reports from, it has already become the custom to write the ketubah so that [its obligations are binding] on both the landed property and the movable property [in the estate]. [Making] this addition is a great asset; it was ordained by learned men of great stature. For it is a monetary stipulation, and thus a widow is entitled to collect [the money due her] from the movable property [in her husband's] estate by virtue of this stipulation, and not by virtue of the mandate of the later sages.

[The following rules apply when] this stipulation was not included in the text of the ketubah, but instead [the couple] married without making an explicit statement [in this regard]. If the husband knew of this ordinance established by the geonim, the woman may collect [the money due her from the movable property in his estate]. If, however, he was not [aware of this ordinance], or we are unsure whether he knew of it, we deliberate at length concerning this matter. For an ordinance of the geonim does not have the power to be applied and to have money expropriated from the heirs because of it, when it was not explicitly stated, as is the law regarding the conditions of the ketubah. [The distinction between the two is that the conditions of the ketubah] are ordinances instituted by the Great Sanhedrin.

Our Sages also ordained that all of a husband's property should be on lien for the woman's ketubah. Even if the woman's ketubah is [only 100 zuz] and [her husband] owns property worth several thousand gold pieces, it is all under lien to her ketubah. [Her husband] is entitled to sell all his property if he desires, and his sale is binding. Nevertheless, all the property that he sells after his marriage can be expropriated [from the purchaser] by his widow [in lieu of payment for] her ketubah when he divorces her or when he dies, if he does not possess property that has not been sold. When a woman expropriates property [from a purchaser], she must take an oath holding a sacred article, as is taken by any of [a person's] creditors [who seek to expropriate property from its purchasers]. This provision was instituted so that he should not view [the obligation of] the ketubah lightly.

When the court or the heirs require a widow to take an oath when she comes to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, the oath should be taken only outside the court. For the court would refrain from administering the oath, lest she not be precise with herself when making it. If the heirs desired that she make a vow [instead of an oath], she may make a vow linked to any object they desire. This vow may be administered in a court. Afterwards, she should collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.

If a widow dies before taking this oath, her heirs should not inherit her ketubah at all, for she does not have any rights to her ketubah until she takes an oath. If the woman marries [a second time] before taking an oath [with regard to [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from her previous husband's estate], she may take an oath after her remarriage and collect her due whenever she desires. She does not, however, have the option of making a vow, lest her [second] husband annul it.

If [a woman's husband] designated a plot of land for her in her ketubah, whether he specified [only] one of its borders or all four of its borders, she may collect her ketubah from this plot of land without taking an oath. Similarly, if he specified movable property [in the ketubah] and this movable property exists, she may take it without taking an oath. [Moreover,] if the [movable property that was specified] was sold and other movable property purchased with the proceeds, it being known that these goods were purchased with the proceeds of [the movable property specified in the ketubah], she may take them without taking an oath.

A woman who diminishes [the amount of money due her by virtue of] her ketubah may collect her due only after taking an oath. What is implied? A woman produces a ketubah that states [that she is due] 1000 zuz. Her husband claims that she received the entire amount, while she claims to have received only a portion of the amount. Even if there are witnesses who testify that she received the amount that she admits to having received, and even if she is extremely precise in accounting what she took, mentioning even [the last] half-p'rutah, she may collect the remainder only after taking an oath.

[An oath is also required in the following instance.] The husband claims that [his wife] received all [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah], while the woman claims not to have received the money, and one witness testifies that she received either the entire sum or a portion of it. [The woman] may collect the entire [sum mentioned in] the ketubah, but only after taking an oath.

[When a divorcee collects [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah] outside the presence of her husband, she must take an oath before doing so. What is implied? A man divorced his wife and departed. After his wife takes an oath, the court should expropriate his property and give [the woman the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. The above applies when the husband is in a distant place, where there is difficulty in notifying him. If, however, he is in a nearby place [where it is possible] to notify him, a message should be sent to notify him [of the court's impending action]. If he does not come, the woman should take the oath and collect [her due].

A woman who reduces the value of her ketubah is not required to take an oath before collecting [her due]. What is implied? A woman produces a ketubah that states [that she is due] 1000 zuz. Her husband claims that she received the entire amount, while she claims not to have received anything at all, but she admits: "I am owed only 500 zuz. Although he wrote 1000 for me [in the ketubah], there was an understanding between me and him [concerning this]." In this instance, she is not required to take an oath before collecting [her due]. If, however, [in the above situation,] the woman says: "My ketubah states only 500 zuz," she may not collect with this document that says [she is due] 1000 zuz, for she has negated it. It is as if she has admitted that it is false. Therefore, [the husband] may take a rabbinic oath [to support his claim]; he is then freed [of all obligations].

Whenever we have stated that a woman may not collect [her due] unless she takes an oath, the court tells her: "Take the oath and collect [your due]." Whenever we said that she may collect her due without an oath, [the court] tells the husband: "Give her [what is due her]. Your claim is not acceptable until you bring proof to support it."

If [in the latter instances], on his own initiative, the husband asks that [the woman] take an oath [denying] his claim, [the court] tells her: "Take the oath and collect [your due]." She must take this oath holding a sacred article. If, [originally,] she made a stipulation with [her husband] enabling her to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah without taking an oath, or that her word would be accepted regardless of what she claims, she may collect [her due] from him [in the event of a divorce] without taking any oath at all. [In the event of his death,] however, she must take an oath before collecting [her due] from his heirs.

If, [originally,] she made a stipulation with [her husband] enabling her to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from his heirs without taking an oath, or that her word would be accepted by his heirs regardless of what she claims, she may collect [her due] from the heirs without taking any oath at all. If, however, she comes to collect [her due] from property that has been sold, she must take an oath before collecting. Although her husband was willing to accept her word, the stipulation he made is binding only on himself and [the estate he left to] his heirs. It does not have the power to cause others to incur a financial loss.

A widow who is in possession of her [the document recording her] ketubah may collect her due, after taking an oath, even though 100 years have passed since her husband's death. This applies regardless of whether she resides in her [deceased] husband's home or in her father's home. If, however, she does not have possession of her ketubah, she is not entitled to anything, even if she makes her claim on the day her husband dies. Similarly, a divorcee is not entitled even to the fundamental requirement of the ketubah until she produces her ketubah.

When does the above apply? In a place where it is customary to compose a document [recording] the ketubah. [Different rules apply,] however, in a place where it is not customary to compose a document [recording] the ketubah, and instead, [the couple] rely on the conditions established by the Jewish court. [In such a situation, the woman is entitled to] collect the essential requirement of the ketubah even when she is not in possession of a document recording the ketubah, regardless of whether she was widowed or divorced, or whether she [continues to] reside in her husband's home or [has returned to] her father's home. She is not, however, given [anything she claims her husband promised her] in addition unless she has definite proof [of such an obligation].

Until when is a widow entitled to collect the essential requirement of the ketubah in a place where it is not customary to compose a ketubah? If she [continues to reside] in her husband's home, there is no limit on the time she is granted. If she [resides] in her father's home, [she has this prerogative] for twenty-five years. If, [however,] she comes to collect [the money due her because of her ketubah] after twenty-five years, she is not entitled to anything. [The rationale is that] had she not foregone [the money due her], she would not have remained silent for this long. Nor is she living together with the heirs, so that she could [excuse her silence,] explaining that she was embarrassed to sue them while she was living together with them in [one] home.

For this reason, if [one of] the heirs was in the habit of bringing her subsistence while she was residing in her father's home and caring for her needs, she has the prerogative of demanding [her due] even after twenty-five years have passed. The reason why she remained silent and did not present her claim is that she was ashamed [to sue] the heir.

[The following rules apply when there is a difference between the claims of a husband - or his heirs - and his wife regarding the size of the essential requirement of her ketubah.] She says, "I was a virgin when I married, and the essential requirement of my ketubah is 200 [zuz]." Her husband or his heirs claim, "She was not a virgin, and she is due only 100." If there are witnesses who saw that the customs that people in that locale carry out when virgins are wed were carried out on her behalf - e.g., there were different types of celebrations, [she wore a] crown or a particular garment [designated for this purpose], or other rites that are performed only for the sake of virgins were performed [for her] - she is entitled to 200 [zuz]. If there are no witnesses to this, she is entitled to only 100 [zuz]. [In the latter instance,] if her husband is alive, she can require him to take an oath required by the Torah, for he has acknowledged a portion of a claim. [In cases of this nature,] testimony is accepted [from a person] once he became an adult, who says: "I remember that when I was a child, the rites performed for virgin brides were performed on behalf of such and such." As mentioned, all the above applies [only] in places where it is customary not to compose a document recording the ketubah.

When a woman tells her husband, "You divorced me," her word is accepted. [The rationale is that if this were not the truth,] she would not speak so boldly to her husband. Accordingly, when a woman produces her ketubah, [even] without having a bill of divorce, and tells her husband: "You divorced me. I lost my bill of divorce. Give me [the money due me by virtue of] my ketubah," [her claim is accepted, and her husband] is obligated to pay her the essential requirement of the marriage contract, even though he claims that he never divorced her. He is not, however, [obligated to] give her the additional amount he promised, unless she brings proof that she has been divorced, or she manifests possession of both the bill of divorce and her ketubah.

[In the above situation,] if [the woman's] husband said: "This is what happened. I divorced her and paid her all [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, both the essential requirement and the additional amount. She wrote me a receipt, but I lost it" [the following rules apply]. He requires her to take an oath while holding a sacred article [that he is liable to pay her] the essential requirement [of the ketubah], and then he must give her [that sum]. With regard to the additional amount, his word is accepted. [The rationale is that] he could have claimed that he never divorced her, and in such an instance he would not be held liable for the additional amount. [We assume that had he desired to lie, he would have used that alternative.] He is, however, required to take a rabbinic oath with regard to the additional amount.

[The following rules apply when] a woman produces a bill of divorce, but does not have her ketubah in her possession. If the local custom is not to compose a ketubah, she is entitled to collect the essential requirement of her ketubah by [virtue of] the bill of divorce she is holding. If, however, it is the local custom to compose a ketubah, she is not entitled even to the fundamental requirement of the ketubah until she produces her ketubah, as was explained. Her husband must take a rabbinic oath denying her claim, and he is freed of liability.

[When] a woman produces two bills of divorce and two ketubot, she is entitled to collect the amount due her by virtue of both ketubot. If she produces two ketubot and one bill of divorce, she is entitled to collect only [the money due her for] one ketubah. Which ketubah should she collect? If they are both for the same amount, the later ketubah negates the earlier one, and she is entitled to collect [property that was sold to others] from the date of the later [ketubah]. If one of them is for a greater sum than the other, she may collect whichever she desires, and the other one is voided.

[When] a woman produces two bills of divorce and one ketubah, she has [the right to collect] only [the amount due her by virtue of] one ketubah. For when a man divorces his wife and remarries her without specifying any conditions, [it can be assumed] that he remarried her with the intent that her original ketubah [become binding again]. [The following rules apply when] a woman produces a bill of divorce and a ketubah after the death of her husband: If the bill of divorce is dated prior to the ketubah, [in a place where] it is not customary to compose a ketubah, she is entitled to collect the essential requirement of her ketubah by [virtue of this] bill of divorce, and she is entitled to collect the entire sum [mentioned] in the second ketubah, for she acquires this sum by virtue of [her husband's] death. If her ketubah is dated prior to the bill of divorce, she is entitled to collect [the money due her by virtue of] the ketubah only once. [We assume] that when he remarried her, his intent was that her original ketubah [become binding again].

A woman's word is accepted if she says: "My husband died," so that she [be granted permission to] remarry, as will be explained in Hilchot Gerushin. One of the conditions of the ketubah is that if a woman remarries after the death of her husband, she is entitled to collect the entire sum written in her ketubah. Therefore, if she came to the court and said: "My husband died. Grant me permission to remarry," without mentioning [the collection of the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah at all, she is granted permission to remarry. [Afterwards,] she is required to take an oath, and then she is given [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. If she says, "My husband died. Give me the money due me by virtue of my ketubah," [not only is she not granted this money,] she is not even permitted to remarry. [We assume that] she came [only] because of the matter of the ketubah. Our presumption is that her husband has not died. Her intent is not to remarry, but merely to collect [the money due her by virtue of] the ketubah during [her husband's] lifetime. If she came and said: "My husband died. Grant me permission to remarry and give me [the money due me by virtue of] my ketubah," she is permitted to remarry and is granted [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. The rationale is that her primary intent is remarriage. If, however, she comes and says: "My husband died. Give me [the money due me by virtue of] my ketubah, and grant me permission to remarry," she is permitted to remarry, but she is not granted [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. If, however, she seizes possession [of this sum], the court should not expropriate it from her possession.

[The following laws apply when] a person dies after having been married to several wives. Whichever of his wives was married first has the right to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah [before the others]. None may collect [her due] without taking an oath. The [wives who married] last are entitled to [collect their due] only from what remains after [those who married previously collect theirs]. Even the last wife [to collect] must take an oath [before] she collects what remains. Similarly, when there is [also] a promissory note [owed by the husband's estate], if the promissory note was dated before [the ketubot], the promissory note should be collected first. If the ketubot were each dated before [the promissory note], the woman should collect [her due] first, and the person owed the promissory note [should collect from] the remainder.

When does the above apply? When the land from which [the wives and the creditor] desire to collect was owned by [the deceased] at the time he married the women and took the loan. For [in such a situation], the law is that whoever's document is dated first takes precedence. If, however, a man married several women in succession, and borrowed money - whether before marrying the women or afterwards - and [then - i.e.,] after marrying and borrowing he purchased land - it should be divided among all of them equally, for all their liens took effect at the same time. At the time he purchased the land, each one established a lien on it. None has precedence over the others.

Similarly, if all the ketubot and promissory notes were dated on one day - or at a specific time, in a place where it is customary to [include] the time [of a legal document] - it should be divided among all of them equally; none has precedence over the others. Under all circumstances, [if one of the creditors or one of the wives] took possession of movable property [belonging to the estate as payment for] the loan or ketubah, the property that they took should not be expropriated from him or her. For no creditor has precedence over another with regard to movable property.

[The following rules apply when] a person divorces his wife at the time he has an outstanding promissory note, and his creditor and his divorcee come to collect [their due]. If the husband owns [enough] money and land to settle the debt and the obligations stemming from the ketubah, the creditor should be awarded the money, and his divorcee should collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from the landed property. If all [the husband] possesses is land that is not of sufficient value to settle both debts, and neither [his divorcee nor his creditor] has a prior claim to this land, it should be given [toward the payment of the debt owed to] the creditor. If any [land] remains [after the settlement of the debt], it should be given to the divorcee. If nothing remains, the divorcee must yield to the creditor. [The rationale is that] the creditor suffered a loss; he [lent] money [to the husband]. The woman, by contrast,did not lose anything. For more than a man desires to marry, a woman desires to be married.

Similarly, if a man dies leaving a widow and a creditor, and land to which neither of them has a prior claim, the widow must yield to the creditor, and he collects the debt owed him first.

Since the geonim ordained that a woman and a creditor may collect their due from movable property, and as is well known, no creditors are given precedence with regard to movable property [the following rules apply]. If the husband did not leave enough movable property to settle both accounts, the creditor is allowed to collect the entire debt [owed him] first. If anything remains [after the settlement of the debt] for the wife to receive [by virtue of] her ketubah, it should be given to her. If nothing remains, the wife must yield.

[The following rule applies when] nichsei tzon barzel were recorded in a woman's ketubah and she claims that they were lost or taken by her husband. With regard to nichsei tzon barzel, a woman is regarded like any other creditor. Therefore, she is required to take an oath that she did not take possession of them, give them away or forego the obligation [to her husband]. Afterwards, she receives a share in the estate together with the other creditors.

When a person who has many wives and who dies or divorces them when none of them has a claim of higher priority to his property than the others, and his holdings are not of sufficient value to pay them each the money due them by virtue of their ketubot, how are his holdings divided? If his holdings are sufficiently valuable to provide only the wife with the ketubah of the least value, or if they are less valuable than that, all of his wives divide [his holdings] equally. If his holdings are more valuable than that, they should be divided equally to provide the wife with [the money due her by virtue of] the ketubah of the least value. Afterwards, the remainder is divided among the remaining wives according to the same pattern. What is implied? [To explain by example:] A man was married to four wives. The ketubah of the first was for 400 [zuz], that of the second for 300, that of the third for 200, and that of the forth for 100. The total sum is thus 1000 [zuz]. [The following rules apply] if he divorces all of them or dies. If his holdings are worth 400 [zuz] or less, they divide his holdings equally, and each receives 100 or less. If his holdings are worth 800 [it would be improper to divide them equally]. For if they were divided equally, the fourth wife would receive 200 [zuz], and [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah is only 100. What is done instead? 400 [zuz] are set aside and divided equally, each receiving 100. Thus, the fourth wife has received [the full amount due her by virtue of] her ketubah and she withdraws [from the suit]. Thus, 400 [zuz] are left for three wives, each of whom has already received 100 zuz]. If the 400 were divided equally among the three of them [it would be unfair]. For the third wife would receive 233 and [the amount due her by virtue of] her ketubah was only 200. Therefore, 300 [zuz] are separated from the 400, and these are divided equally among the three. Thus, the third wife receives her 200 and withdraws [from the suit]. There remain two wives and 100 [zuz]. This sum is divided equally between the first and second wife. Thus, the first and second wife each received 250 zuz; the third wife received 200; and the fourth wife, 100. This pattern of allocation is followed even when there are 100 [wives].

A person who guarantees the value of a woman's ketubah is not obligated to pay [her the money due her in the event that her husband's holdings are not sufficient if he dies or divorces her]. [This applies] even when he affirmed his commitment with a contractual act. [The rationale is that] his [intent is to] perform a mitzvah, and he did not cause the woman to lose anything. If, however, a person guarantees the ketubah of his son and affirms his commitment with a contractual act, he is obligated to pay. For a father will make a binding commitment on behalf of his son and decide to obligate himself. A person who underwrites a ketubah, by contrast, is obligated to pay, even though he did not affirm his commitment with a contractual act. What is meant by a person who underwrites a ketubah? One who tells a woman: "Marry this man. I will give [the money for] this ketubah." If, however, he says: "I will guarantee this ketubah," "I will pay this ketubah," "I am obligated for it" or the like, he is not liable unless he is the father [of the groom]. When a person divorces a wife [whose ketubah has been underwritten in the above fashion], he must first take a vow that she is forbidden to derive benefit from him. Only then may she collect her ketubah from the underwriter or the [husband's] father, if he guaranteed it. [This precaution was instituted,] lest the husband remarry her, and thus the two will [have acquired] the property of [the underwriter] through subterfuge.

Similarly, a person who consecrates his property and then divorces his wife must take a vow that she is forbidden to derive benefit from him. Only then may she collect [the money due her by virtue of her ketubah] from the person who redeems the property from the Temple treasury. [This precaution was instituted,] lest the two attempt to deceive the Temple treasury. When, however, a person divorces his wife, and she comes to collect [the money due her by virtue of her ketubah] from the [property that was sold to] purchasers, he is not required to take a vow that she is forbidden to derive benefit from him. Instead, she must take the oath required of her, and then she [is entitled to] collect [her due]. If afterwards she desires, she may return to her husband. For the purchasers know that the property was under lien to the ketubah of a woman, and they caused themselves the loss by taking property that was under such a lien.

When a husband sold his property, and afterwards the woman agreed to [her husband's] act and wrote the purchaser: "I have no claim against you," she may, nevertheless, collect [the money due her by virtue of her ketubah by expropriating this property]. [This applies] even when she affirmed [her commitment] with a contractual act. [The rationale is] that she wrote this [statement to the purchaser] only so that there will not be strife between her and her husband. She can [therefore excuse herself,] saying: "I was [merely intending] to please my husband." [A different rule applies, however, when the purchaser] enters into an agreement with the woman that she foregoes her lien on this property [before purchasing it from her husband]. If this agreement is affirmed with a contractual act, and afterwards the husband sells the property [to him], [the woman is not entitled to] expropriate this property. Similarly, [a woman is not entitled to expropriate property sold by her husband in the following circumstance]. Her husband sold a property [on a previous occasion, and at that time] asked his wife to write the purchaser, "I have no claim to this property," and the woman refused, causing the sale to be nullified. [If,] afterwards, the husband sells [property] - whether the same field he had sold previously or another field - to another person, and after the husband's sale the woman agreed, [made a commitment] that she has no claim to this field and affirmed it with a contractual act, she may not expropriate it. For she cannot say, "I did this [merely] to please my husband," since on the previous occasion, when she did not want [to waive her rights], she did not follow her husband's desires.

[The above ruling is also relevant in the following situation.] A man had two wives. He sold a field, and the purchaser had entered into a contractual act with one of [the husband's] wives, waiving her lien to this field in a manner in which the agreement was effective and the woman no longer had the privilege of claiming, "I did this [merely] to please my husband." Afterwards, the husband died or divorced both his wives. The second wife may expropriate the property from the purchaser, for she did not enter into any agreement with him. The first wife may then expropriate [the property] from the second wife, for she had a prior claim to it, and she waived her lien only with regard to the purchaser [and not with regard to anyone else]. When the property comes into the possession of the first [wife], the purchaser may expropriate it from her, since she made an agreement with him. [The second wife can then expropriate it from the purchaser,] and the cycle continues until they reach a compromise among themselves.

[In the event of her husband's death,] a widow - regardless of whether she was widowed from erusin or nisu'in - may take the oath [required of her], sell land belonging to her husband and collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. [The sale may be carried out] in a court of expert judges, or in a court whose judges are not expert, provided it consists of three trustworthy men who are knowledgeable with regard to the evaluation of land. The responsibility for the sale falls on the estate belonging to the heirs. A divorcee, by contrast, may sell [her ex-husband's property] only in a court of expert judges. Whenever a woman has property sold in court, she must have it sold after a public announcement has been made. In the laws of loans, the guidelines for the sale [of property] will be explained. When, by contrast, a woman sells property without the participation of the court, a public announcement [of the sale] need not be made. It is, nevertheless, necessary [to consult] with three trustworthy men who are knowledgeable with regard to the evaluation [of property].

[The following rules apply when] a widow sells [her husband's] landed property privately in order to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah: If she sold the property at its proper value, the sale is binding. [All that is necessary is for] her to take the oath required of widows after the sale. The above applies when she sells the property to another individual. If she takes it as her own after evaluating it, her act is of no significance. [This applies even when] she had announced the sale of the property [and received no better offer].

[In the above situation,] if the woman's ketubah was for 200 [zuz], and she sold [property] that was worth 100 [zuz] for 200, or property that was worth 200 for 100, she has received the value of her ketubah and is no longer owed anything. She must, however, take the oath required of a widow. If her ketubah was for 100 [zuz] and she sold [property] worth 101 [zuz] for 100, the sale is nullified. [This applies] even if she says, "I will [accept the loss and] return the [outstanding] dinar to the heirs."

If her ketubah was for 400 zuz and she sold [four pieces of property], three that were each worth 100 [zuz] for 100 [zuz] each, and one that was worth 101 zuz for 100 [zuz - the final sale is nullified, but the [first three] are all binding.

A woman has the privilege of selling [the rights to] her ketubah or giving [them] as a present. If her husband dies or divorces her, [the purchaser or the recipient] is entitled to come and collect [the money due her by virtue of her ketubah]. If she dies in the lifetime of her husband or [after his death, but] before she takes the oath [required of widows], he is not entitled to anything.

Although a woman sold [the rights to] a portion of her ketubah, used them as security [for a loan] or gave them as a present, she may sell landed property belonging to her husband and collect the remainder of [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. [This sale may be carried out] in a court of three expert judges or through three trustworthy men. [A woman] may sell [portions of her husband's property] many times. [These sales may be carried out] in a court of three expert judges or through three trustworthy men who are knowledgeable with regard to the evaluation of property.

When a woman sells [the rights to] her ketubah - whether to another person or to her husband - she does not forfeit the other privileges of her ketubah. [As such,] if she has a son, [and she dies before her husband does,] he inherits the worth of her ketubah - [although it] was sold from his father's estate - in addition to his share [in the estate, as will be explained]. If, by contrast, a woman waives her ketubah in favor of her husband, she forfeits all the privileges associated with her ketubah. [Her husband] is not required to provide her even with her subsistence. The waiver of a ketubah [in favor of the woman's husband] need not [be affirmed by] a contractual act nor [be observed by] witnesses, just as the forfeiture [of any obligations] does not require affirmation by] a contractual act nor [the observation of] witnesses. Through one's words alone [the forfeiture is binding], provided the statement is made seriously, [in a manner that] can be relied upon, rather than facetiously, as a joke, or rhetorically.

A widow is entitled to receive support from the estate [inherited by her husband's] heirs as long as she remains a widow, unless she collects [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. From the time she demands payment for her ketubah in court, however, she is no longer entitled to receive her subsistence. Similarly, if she sold [the rights to] her entire ketubah, gave them as security [for a loan] or made her ketubah an ipotiki for another person - i.e., she told him "Collect your debt from here" - she is not entitled to receive her subsistence from the heirs. [The above applies] whether these exchanges were made in a court of expert judges or outside a court, or whether they were made in her husband's lifetime or after his death. If, however, she sold [the rights to] only a portion of her ketubah, she is entitled to receive her subsistence. When a widow becomes consecrated [to a new husband], she forfeits [her rights to receive] subsistence [from her deceased husband's estate].

Just as the woman receives her subsistence from her husband's estate after his death, so, too, is she granted a wardrobe, household utensils and [the right to continue] living in the dwelling she lived in during her husband's lifetime. She may continue to make use of the pillows, spreads, servants and maidservants that she made use of during her husband's lifetime. If the dwelling falls, the heirs are not required to rebuild it. [Even] if the widow asked, "Allow me to rebuild it at my own expense," she is not granted this option. Similarly, she may not repair it, nor have the walls sealed [and painted]. She must [continue to] dwell in it in the condition it [was in her husband's passing], or she must leave [and find other accommodations]. Should the heirs sell the dwelling in which a widow is living, their deed is of no consequence.

If the dwelling [in which she was living fell] or her husband had been renting a dwelling, [the estate must] provide her with a dwelling appropriate to her social standing. Similarly, her subsistence and the wardrobe given her are granted according to her social standing. If her husband's social standing exceeded her own, she is granted the above according to his social standing. For a woman's [social standing] ascends according to [her husband's] social standing, but does not descend [according to his]. [This applies] even after his death.

[The widow is given her subsistence as a member of] the household at large. What is the intent of [the latter term]? When five people who would each require a kav of food when they eat alone [live] in the same house and eat together [their needs are reduced]. Four kabbim will be sufficient for them. The same applies with regard to other necessary household [supplies]. Therefore, if a widow says: "I will not leave my father's house. Ascertain the amount of support I deserve for my subsistence and give it to me there," the heirs have the right to tell her: "If you desire to dwell with us, you will receive [a full measure of] support. If not, we will give you only your share as a member of the household at large." If she explains [that she desires not to live with them] because she is young, and they are young [and the situation would be immodest, her claim is accepted]. [The heirs are required] to provide her with support sufficient for her as she lives alone, while she lives in her father's home. [Any money] remaining from [the funds granted for] the support of a widow or from her wardrobe belongs to the heirs.

[The following laws apply when] a widow becomes sick. If she requires medical treatment that is of an undefined nature, it is considered as support for her subsistence, and the heirs must provide her with it. If, however, she requires medical treatment of a limited nature, the treatment [should be paid for by deducting it] from [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. If she is taken captive, the heirs are not required to redeem her. [This applies] even if she is a yevamah [and it is a mitzvah for her late husband's brother to marry her]. [Indeed,] even when she was taken captive during her husband's lifetime [and he was thus obligated to redeem her], if he dies while she is in captivity, there is no obligation to redeem her from his estate. Instead, she must be redeemed from her private funds, or she must collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah and redeem herself.

When a widow dies, her late husband's heirs are responsible for her burial. If, however, she had already taken the oath required of a widow [before collecting the money due her by virtue of her ketubah], her heirs inherit her ketubah, and they are required to bury her, and not her late husband's heirs. [Her late husband's] heirs are entitled to the income [from the work] of the widow. If the heirs tell the widow, "Take the income you generate in exchange for [receiving] your subsistence," their words are of no substance. If, however, she desires such an arrangement, she is given this prerogative.

All the household tasks that a wife performs on behalf of her husband, a widow must perform on behalf of his heirs, with the exception of pouring them drinks, making their beds and washing their face, hands and feet.

An ownerless article discovered by a widow and the benefit that accrues from the property that the woman brought to her husband's household belong to the woman herself; the heirs [to her husband's estate] have no right to them at all.

The property that [a woman brought to the household as] her nedunyah may be taken by the woman without her having to take an oath. The heirs to her husband's estate have no claim with regard to it, except if the nichsei tzon barzel have increased in value during her husband's lifetime. [In this instance,] the increase belongs to the husband [and is given to his heirs]. [Even] if a widow dies without taking the oath [required of her], her heirs inherit her nedunyah, even if it is nichsei tzon barzel. If, however, it has increased in value, the increase must go to her husband's heirs.

When a woman seizes movable property [belonging to her husband's estate, so that she can sell it and use the money] for her subsistence, the property should not be removed from her possession. [This applies regardless of] whether she took possession of the movable property during her husband's lifetime or afterwards. Even if she takes possession of a talent of gold [it is not removed from her possession]. Instead, the court documents what she has taken into her possession and defines the amount she should be given for her subsistence. Calculations are made, and she is allowed to derive her subsistence from [the property] in her possession until she dies or until she is no longer entitled to support for her subsistence. [At that time,] the heirs are granted the remainder.

Similarly, if she took possession of movable property during her husband's lifetime [to provide] for [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, she may collect [the money due her] from this [property after he dies]. If, however, she took possession of it after her husband's death [to provide] for [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, she may not collect [her due] from it.

The geonim ordained that a woman may collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah and every obligation due her as a stipulation of her ketubah from the movable property [in her husband's estate]. Based on this [provision], a woman may receive her subsistence from [the sale of] movable property [from her husband's estate]. Nevertheless, if her husband left movable property and she did not take possession of it, the heirs take possession of it, and they must provide her with her subsistence. She has no right to prevent them from taking possession, by saying: "Have the movable property held in the court [so that] I can derive my subsistence from it, lest it become depleted, and I will have no means of support." Even if an explicit stipulation was made [by her husband at the time her ketubah was composed] that she could derive her subsistence from this movable property, she cannot prevent [the heirs] from taking possession of it. This is the ruling that is universally followed in all courts.

If, however, her husband left landed property, she has the right to prevent the heirs from selling it. If they do sell it, however, she does not have the right to expropriate [the property] from the purchasers. A widow and a man's daughters may derive their subsistence only from the property that remains in his estate. [In this regard, they have no claim to property that was sold.]

If the deceased left many wives, they all have equal rights to receive their subsistence. [This applies] even when he married them one after the other. For the concept of a prior claim does not exist with regard to a claim for support.

[The following rules apply with regard to] a widow who has an obligation to marry a yavam. During the first three months, she derives her subsistence from her deceased husband's estate. If it can be determined that she is pregnant, or if it was known that she was pregnant when her husband died, she continues to derive her support [from his estate] until she gives birth. If she bears a viable child, she may continue to derive her subsistence throughout her widowhood as other women do. If after three months have passed, it is [either] not evident that she is pregnant or she miscarries, she is not entitled to support from either her husband's estate or from her yavam. Instead, she must file a suit against her yavam either to marry her or [to free her of her obligation through] chalitzah.

If she filed a suit against her yavam either to marry her or [to free her of her obligation through] chalitzah, he appeared in court and then fled or became ill, or if the yavam lives overseas, the woman is entitled to derive her support from the property of the yavam without taking any oath at all.

If the yavam she was obligated to marry is a minor, she is not entitled to receive her support from him until he comes of age and resembles other yevamim.

Should a person designate a portion of land to be used for support of his wife after his death, by saying: "This particular place will be for [my wife's] support," he has granted her additional rights with regard to her support. If the income [from this land] is less than the support due her, she is entitled [to collect] the remainder from the other portions of his estate. If the income [from those portions of land] is more than the support due her, she is entitled to the entire amount. If, however, he told her, "Your support will come from this particular place," and she remained silent, her sole source of support is the income from that particular place. [Her husband] has specificied [the source for] her support.

There are those who have ruled that when a widow comes to the court to ask for support she should be allotted support without requiring her to take an oath. This ruling should not be followed; they have misunderstood [the situation, erroneously associating it with that of] a woman whose husband left on an overseas journey. My teachers ruled that she should not be allotted support until she takes an oath in court. For she is coming to collect from property in the possession of heirs, and anyone who collects property in the possession of heirs may do so only after an oath has been taken. My own conception [also] follows [this approach], and it is proper to rule accordingly.

When a woman comes to the court to collect support for her subsistence, an oath is administered to her at the outset. The property is then sold without being publicized, and an allotment is made for her subsistence. Similarly, she is entitled to sell property for her subsistence without involving a court of expert judges; three trustworthy individuals are sufficient, and the sale need not be publicized. Similarly, if she sells property by herself for its appropriate value to provide for her subsistence, the sale is binding. When the heirs come and require her to take an oath, she must take the oath.

How much property is sold to provide for her subsistence? Enough to provide for her support for six months, but not for longer than that. The sale is made on the condition that the purchaser give the widow an allotment for food every thirty days. Afterwards, another parcel of property is sold for another six months. The property should continue to be sold in this manner until all that remains from the estate is [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. She should collect this sum and complete her dealings with the court.

When the court allots a widow support for her subsistence, they do not reckon the money she earns until the heirs come and demand it. [If such a demand is made,] and the woman has earned money, they are entitled to it. If not, they have no further claim against her. I maintain [however] that if the heirs are below majority, the court should make a reckoning with the widow with regard to [her income]. Just as she is allotted a subsistence, the court declares that her income [should be given to the orphans].

When a widow does not manifest possession of her ketubah, she is not granted money for her subsistence. [The rationale is that] perhaps she waived her ketubah [in favor of her husband] or sold it or gave it as security [for a loan]. Even when the heir[s] do not issue such a claim against her, the court makes this claim on their behalf and tells her: "Bring your ketubah, take the required oath and collect [the money for] your subsistence." [This law applies] unless it is not customary [in a particular locale] to compose a document recording the ketubah.

[The following laws apply when] a woman and her husband traveled overseas, and she returned, claiming [her husband] died. If she desires, she is entitled to receive her subsistence from her husband's estate, as are other widows. If she desires, she may collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. If she claims, "My husband divorced me," her word is not accepted. She is, however, entitled to derive her subsistence from his estate until she receives a sum equal to [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. [The rationale is] that if she is still his wife, she is entitled to receive her subsistence [from his holdings]. If he divorced her, she is entitled to receive [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, [provided] she manifests possession of her ketubah. Therefore, she may collect the support for her subsistence until she receives [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. [From this point on,] she has completed her dealings with the court.

[The following laws apply when] there is doubt whether a woman was divorced, and her husband died [afterwards]. She is not entitled to receive her subsistence from his estate, for property cannot be expropriated from an heir on the basis of a doubtful claim. During her husband's lifetime, by contrast, she is entitled to her subsistence until she is divorced in a complete and binding manner.

If a poor widow waits two years before she sues for support - or if a rich widow waits three years - it can be assumed that she has waived her claim to support for the previous years. Therefore, she is not granted support for that period. From the time she issues a claim onward, however, she is entitled to support. If, however, she waited even one day less [before presenting her claim], she is not considered to have waived her claim, and she may collect her support for the previous years.

[The following rules apply when] a widow demands support for her subsistence from the heirs, and they claim to have paid her, while she claims that she did not receive payment. Until she remarries, the burden of proof is on the orphans. [If they do not support their claim], the widow is entitled to take a rabbinical oath and collect the money due her. If she has already remarried, the burden of proof is upon her. [If she does not support her claim,] the heirs are entitled to take a rabbinic oath that they paid her [and are freed of obligation].

The laws governing the extra sum added by the husband to the ketubah are the same as those governing the fundamental requirement of the ketubah. Therefore, if a widow demands payment of this additional amount - or sells it, waives payment of it [in favor of her husband] or gives it as security - together with the fundamental requirement of the ketubah, she is not entitled to support for her subsistence. If she demanded payment for a portion and left a portion uncollected, it is as if she demanded payment for a portion of the fundamental requirement of the ketubah and left a portion uncollected. Whenever a woman sells or waives payment of her ketubah without making any further specification, she is considered to have sold or waived this additional amount together with the fundamental requirement of the ketubah. For the term ketubah is universally used to refer to both these items.

One of the provisions of [a woman's] ketubah is that her male offspring will inherit the money due their mother by virtue of her ketubah and the nedunyah she brought to the household as nichsei tzon barzel. Afterwards, these children divide the remainder of the estate with their brothers equally.

What is implied? A man married a woman whose ketubah and nedunyah were together valued at 1000 [zuz]. She bore a son, and then she died within [her husband's] lifetime. Afterwards, the man married another woman whose ketubah and nedunyah were together valued at 200 [zuz]. She bore a son, and then she died within [her husband's] lifetime. Afterwards, the man died, leaving an estate worth 2000 [zuz]. His first wife's son should inherit 1000 [zuz] by virtue of his mother's ketubah, and his second wife's son should inherit 200 [zuz] by virtue of his mother's ketubah, and the remainder they should [both] inherit and [divide] equally. Thus, the first wife's son will receive 1400 [zuz], and the second wife's son will receive 600 [zuz].

When does the above apply? When [the estate] is worth at least one dinar more than the amount [due the children by virtue of their mothers'] ketubot. If, however, there is not a dinar or more remaining [in the estate], the entire estate should be divided equally [without applying the provision mentioned above]. [The rationale is that] if [the children of one of the mothers] will inherit [what is due them by virtue of] their mother's ketubah, [the other mother's children] will inherit [what is due them by virtue of] their mother's ketubah, and at least one dinar will not remain to be divided among the heirs, then this provision [which is of Rabbinic origin] will supersede [entirely] the equal division of the estate among the children that is required by Scriptural law.

The same law applies to a man who married many wives, whether one after the other or several at one time. If they have all died in his lifetime, and they have all borne male children from this man, if his estate contains at least a dinar more than the ketubot of all his wives, each of the [sets of] sons inherits the money due their mother by virtue of her ketubah. The remainder [of the estate] is divided equally.

[Should the estate not be large enough to satisfy the obligations of both ketubot and the additional dinar,] and the heirs say: "We will increase the value of our father's estate so that there will be more than a dinar [in addition to the value of the ketubot]," so that they can collect [the money due their mother by virtue of] her ketubah, their request is not accepted. Instead, the estate should be evaluated in court according to its value at the time of their father's death [and the decision rendered on the basis of this figure]. Even if the value of the estate increases or decreases [in the time between] the death of their father and the actual division of the property, [the decision whether to grant the heirs their mothers' ketubot] depends only on the value of the estate at the time of their father's death.

If the value of the estate was a dinar or more than the sum of the two ketubot, each of the sons inherits the money due his mother by virtue of her ketubah. Even if there is a promissory note due against the estate for the amount that exceeds the value of the ketubot, it is not considered to have reduced [the value of the estate].

[The following rules apply when a man] was married to two wives. One died within his lifetime and one died afterwards, and he has sons from both wives. Although the value of the estate he left does not exceed the value of the two ketubot, the sons of the [wife who died after her husband's death] have the right to inherit the money due their mother by virtue of her ketubah first, [provided] she took the oath required of a widow before she died. [The rationale is] that they do not inherit their mother's ketubah by virtue of this provision, but rather through the Torah's laws of inheritance. Afterwards, the sons of the wife [who died during her husband's lifetime] inherit [the money due their mother by virtue of her] ketubah on the basis of this provision. If anything remains in the estate afterwards, it should be divided equally. If [the woman who died after her husband] died before she was able to take the oath [required of her], only the sons of [the woman who died in her husband's lifetime] are entitled to inherit [the money due their mother by virtue of] her ketubah. The remainder is divided equally.

[The following rules apply when a man] was married to two wives, fathered sons with both of them and then died. If the wives died after the father did, but after taking the oath [required of widows], each of their sons is entitled to inherit [the money due his mother by virtue of] her ketubah according to the Torah's laws of inheritance, and not by virtue of this provision. Therefore, in this instance it is not significant whether the estate is more valuable than the sum of the two ketubot or not. [The claim of] the heirs of the wife married first takes precedence over the claim of the wife married afterwards. If neither of the wives took [the required] oath, the sons [of both women] divide the entire estate equally. Neither has the right to inherit [his mother's] ketubah, for a widow is not entitled to her ketubah until she takes the [required] oath.

[In the above instance,] if one of the widows took the [required] oath and one did not, the sons of the one who took the oath inherit [the money due their mother by virtue of] her ketubah first, and then the remainder of the estate is divided equally [among all the heirs]. Whenever [a son] inherits [the money due his mother by virtue of] her ketubah after she died in his father's lifetime, he does not have the right to expropriate property that was sold to others; [he inherits] only property in the possession of the estate.

Among the provisions of the ketubah is that after the death of their father, [his wife's] daughters have the right to receive support for their sustenance from their father's estate until they become consecrated or until they reach the age of bagrut. If a daughter reaches the age of bagrut but has not been consecrated, or if she is consecrated before she reaches the age of bagrut, she is not entitled to receive her sustenance. When a daughter receives her sustenance from her father's estate after his death, her earnings and the ownerless objects she discovers belong to her, not to her brothers.

An allotment of support, garments and living quarters should be made for a man's daughters from his estate, just as it is made for his widow. His [landed property] may be sold to provide his daughters with their sustenance and garments without a public announcement, just as it is sold to provide for his widow's sustenance and garments. [There is, however, one difference between the two.] The allotment to the widow is made according to her social standing and that of her husband, while his daughters are given only their necessities. The daughters are not, however, required to take an oath.

A man's sons are not entitled to inherit [the money due their mother by virtue of] her ketubah, nor are his daughters entitled to receive their sustenance according to the provisions mentioned above unless they manifest possession of the document [recording their mother's] ketubah. If, however, they do not manifest possession of the document, they are not entitled to anything, for it is possible that their mother waived her ketubah [in favor of her husband]. In a locale where it is not customary to record the ketubah in a document, however, the children are entitled to [the benefits stemming from] these provisions.

When, shortly before his passing, a man orders that one of the provisions of [his wife's] ketubah be ignored - e.g., he said: "My daughters should not derive their sustenance from my estate," "My widow should not derive her sustenance from my estate," or "My sons should not inherit the money due their mother by virtue of her ketubah" - his words are of no consequence. [Although] a person gives his entire estate to others through an oral will [all the provisions of his wife's ketubah must be met]. [The rationale is] that the transfer of property through an oral will does not take effect until after death, as will be explained. Thus, the mandate of the will and the obligations of the estate due to the provisions [of the ketubah] take effect simultaneously. Therefore, the widow and [the deceased's] daughters receive support for their sustenance from the estate, and [the deceased's] sons inherit the money due their mother by virtue of her ketubah if she dies during her husband's lifetime.

A daughter of a girl who nullifies her marriage through mi'un is considered like any other daughter, and she is entitled to support for her sustenance [after her father's death]. Nevertheless, the daughter of a yevamah, the daughter of a sh'niyah, the daughter of one's arusah, and the daughter of a woman who has been raped are not entitled to support for their sustenance after their father's death by virtue of this provision. During their father's lifetime, however, he is obligated to support them like any of his other sons and daughters.

A man who consecrates a girl who is receiving her sustenance from her brothers is obligated to provide her with support from the time of consecration onward. [Although a husband is ordinarily required to support his wife only after nisu'in, an exception is made in this instance, because] the girl is not entitled to support from her brothers after she becomes consecrated. Nor is she past the age of majority, when she is capable of providing for her own sustenance, but rather she is a minor, or a na'arah. [Hence, her husband is obligated to support her, because] a man would not desire that the woman he consecrated be put to shame [by having to] wander and beg [for her support].

Should a daughter marry and then leave her husband through the rite of mi'un, or be divorced, or be widowed - even if she is obligated to marry a yavam - since she returns to her father's home and has not reached the age of bagrut, she is entitled to support from her father's estate until she reaches the age of bagrut or until she becomes consecrated.

When a man dies leaving both sons and daughters, the sons inherit his estate, and it is their responsibility to provide their sisters with support until they reach the age of bagrut, or until they become consecrated. When does this apply? When the estate is large enough to provide both the sons and the daughters with their sustenance until the daughters reach the age of bagrut. This is called an ample estate. If, however, the estate contains only a lesser amount, the funds necessary to support the daughters until they reach the age of bagrut are set aside, and the remainder is given to the sons. If the estate contains only enough to provide for the support of the daughters, the daughters are entitled to their sustenance until they reach bagrut or until they become consecrated, and the sons should beg for their support.

When does the above apply? When the estate contains landed property. If, however, the estate contains movable property, since it is only by virtue of the ordinance of the geonim that the daughters are entitled to derive their support from the movable property, the sons and the daughters should receive their support equally from this meager estate. For with regard to movable property, [the daughters] were given the right to be considered like the sons, but not superior to them. The geonim have ruled in this manner.

If [a man] left an ample estate of landed property, and afterwards [the value of the estate decreased until] it became meager, the heirs have already acquired [the property]. If [the estate was deemed] meager [in value] at the time of the man's death, and [the value increased afterwards] to the point that it is considered ample, the heirs are given the right to inherit it. Even if the value did not increase, if the sons sold an estate that was considered meager, the sale is binding.

If the estate was ample but a debt was owed, or [the man] had made a provision with his wife, [promising] to support her daughter [from a previous marriage], the debt or [the obligation to] support the widow's daughter does not prevent the estate from being considered ample. Instead, the sons inherit the entire estate. [It is their responsibility] to pay the creditor his debt, to support the widow's daughter for the time stipulated and to support their sisters until they reach majority, or until they become consecrated and leave their domain.

[The following rules apply when a man] left a widow and a daughter, either from her or from another wife, and his estate is not large enough to provide support for both of them. The widow should derive her support from the estate, and the daughter should beg [for alms]. Similarly, I maintain that support for [a man's] daughter takes precedence over [his] sons' inheritance of their mother's ketubah if she died in her husband's lifetime, although both [rights] are provisions of the ketubah. [This can be derived by making] an inference from a more serious responsibility to a less serious one: If the inheritance [of a man's estate to which the sons are entitled] by virtue of Scriptural law is superseded by [the obligation to provide] the daughter with her support, how much more so should [the sons'] inheritance of [their mother's] ketubah, which is only a Rabbinic ordinance, be superseded by [the obligation to provide] the daughter with her support.

When a man dies and leaves older daughters and younger daughters, without leaving a son, we do not say that the younger daughters should be granted their sustenance until they reach the age of bagrut, and then the entire estate should be divided equally. Instead, the entire estate should be divided equally [immediately].

Our Sages decreed that a man give a certain portion of his holdings to his daughter as a dowry. This is referred to as parnasah. When [a man] marries off his daughter, he should provide her with at least the wardrobe that is given to the wife of a poor Jewish man, as we have explained. When does the above apply? When [the bride's] father is poor. If he is wealthy, he should provide for his daughter according to his standards.

If a father explicitly tells the prospective husband that his daughter does not possess anything, and that [his intent is that] he marry her although she does not possess a wardrobe, [the bride] is not entitled to anything of her father's. [In such a situation, the prospective] husband should not say: "When she comes to my home, I will provide her with a wardrobe." Instead, he should provide her with a wardrobe while she is living in her father's home.

When a father dies and leaves [at least one son and] a daughter [she is provided with a dowry from his estate]. We estimate what the father would have desired to give the daughter as a dowry, and she is given [that sum]. How is it possible to arrive at such an estimate? [We survey the habits of] his friends and acquaintances, his business affairs and his standard of living. If he married off a daughter during his lifetime, we base our estimate [on what she was given]. If the court is unable to determine what he would have desired [to give his daughter], she is given a tenth of his estate as a dowry.

When a man leaves [a son and] many daughters, the first [daughter] who desires to marry is given a tenth of the estate. The second [daughter to marry] receives a tenth of what was left after providing the first [daughter with her dowry]. And the third daughter receives a tenth of what was left after providing the second [daughter]. If all [a man's] daughters come to marry at the same time, [money is set aside for them according to the above pattern,] even if there are ten daughters [or more]. Afterwards, [all the allotments are pooled], and then divided equally among the daughters. The remainder of the estate is given to the sons.

The allotment of a tenth [of the estate] as a dowry is not one of the provisions of the ketubah. Therefore, even according to the enactment of the later Sages, it is only to be collected from landed property. It may, however, be collected from rent due for landed property. If, however, [a girl's] brothers desire to give her money in lieu of a tenth of the landed property, they have that right.

With regard to this allotment of a tenth [of the estate], the daughter is considered to be a creditor of her brothers. Therefore, she is entitled to collect it from property of intermediate quality. An oath is not required of her. If her brothers die, she is entitled to collect it from their sons, [expropriating] property of inferior quality, and an oath is required of her. For she is collecting property from heirs, and [it is an accepted principle that] a person who comes to collect property from heirs may collect only from that of inferior quality and is required to take an oath [before doing so], as will be explained in the laws of loans.

Should her brothers have sold the landed property of their father's estate, or given it as collateral, the daughter may collect her dowry from the purchasers, just as other creditors are entitled to collect from the purchasers, as will be explained in the laws of loans.

When a man has [several daughters, but] no sons, [his estate] is divided equally [among his daughters at the time of his death]. Although he married off the older daughters during his lifetime [and provided them with dowries], we do not grant dowries to the younger daughters and then divide the estate.

[The following rules apply when a man] has died, leaving two daughters and a son. The older daughter received a tenth of the estate as a dowry, but before the younger daughter had collected her dowry, the son died [without leaving any heirs], and [the two sisters] inherited the entire estate. [In this situation,] the younger sister is not entitled to her tenth of the estate. Instead, the entire estate is divided equally, but the older sister is granted the tenth [she had received previously].

When a man gives an order at the time of his death: "Do not give my daughters a dowry from my estate," his words are heeded. [The rationale is that a dowry] is not one of the provisions of a ketubah.

[The following rules apply when] a man dies, leaving a widow and a daughter. It has already been explained that the support of a man's widow takes precedence over the support of his daughter. Similarly, if the daughter marries, she is not entitled to collect her tenth [of the estate], because of [the obligation to] support the widow. Even if the daughter dies after she marries, her husband is not entitled to inherit the dowry that should have been given her. For the entire estate is considered to be in the possession of the widow so that she can derive her sustenance.

When an orphan girl is married off by her brothers or her mother as a child with her consent, and she is given 50 or 100 zuz as a dowry, she is entitled to collect the dowry that is due her - according to the estimation of her father's desires or one tenth of the landed property [of his estate] - from them after she attains the age of majority. [This applies] even if her brothers did not provide her with sustenance, and even if she did not object at the time of the wedding. For a minor is not capable of making an objection [in court].

When a daughter marries after she reaches majority - whether as a na'arah or as a bogeret - and does not demand her dowry, she forfeits her dowry. If, however, she protested at the time of her marriage, she may collect her due whenever she desires. [A further point must be considered when] she reaches the age of bagrut and remains in her father's house - regardless of whether she reaches bagrut after his death, or [he died] when she had already reached the age of bagrut. If her brothers have already ceased providing her with her sustenance, which is their prerogative, as we have explained, and [the girl] remained silent and did not demand her dowry, she forfeits her dowry. If she protests, she does not forfeit her dowry. If, however, her brothers had not ceased providing her with her sustenance [although] she reached bagrut, she is not considered to have forfeited her dowry as long as they continue to provide her with her sustenance, even though she did not protest. For she can claim that she did not demand her dowry because [her brothers] are supporting her although they are not obligated to do so, and she has not yet married.

[The following rules apply when a man] stated - whether while making an oral will before death or while healthy - that his daughter should be given a specific sum of money as a dowry, and that this sum should be used to purchase landed property, and [then] died [afterwards]. When the money is in the possession of a third party and the daughter states: "Give the money to my husband and let him do with it as he desires," [the third party should do as follows]. If [the daughter] has reached the age of majority and has married, she is granted this prerogative. If she is [past majority, but merely] consecrated, the third party should follow the instructions he was given. And if she is a minor, even if she is already married, her request is not heeded. Instead, the third party should carry out her father's instructions.

A husband is entitled to [any ownerless objects] discovered by [his] wife, and the proceeds of her labor. What [type of work] must she perform on his behalf? Everything follows the custom of the country. In a place where it is customary for women to weave, she should weave. [In a place where they] embroider, she should embroider. [In a place where they] spin wool or flax, she should spin. If it is not customary for women in that place to perform these labors, he may compel her only to spin wool; [wool, but not flax,] because flax damages [a woman's] mouth and lips. [This occupation is chosen because] spinning is a task designated for women, as [implied by Exodus 35:25]: "And all the skilled women put their hands to spinning...."

If a woman exerts herself and produces more than would be expected of her, her husband is entitled to the extra amount. Even when her husband is very wealthy and even when the woman has several maids, she may not sit idle, without work. For idleness leads to lewdness. [Her husband] may not, however, compel her to work for the entire day. Instead, according to the extent of his wealth, her obligation to work is minimized.

When a man takes a vow that prevents his wife from doing any work at all, he is obligated to divorce her and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah. [The rationale is that] idleness leads to lewdness. Every wife is obligated [to perform the following household tasks] on behalf of her husband: to wash his face, feet and hands, to pour him beverages, to make his bed, and to do his bidding - e.g., to bring him water or a utensil, to remove an article from his presence, or to perform similar tasks. She is not, however, required to do the bidding of his father or his son.

These tasks should be performed only by a man's wife alone. Even if she possesses several maids, these tasks are performed for a man only by his wife.

There are other tasks that a woman performs for her husband when they are poor; they are: to bake bread in an oven - Ezra ordained that a woman get up early and bake bread so that there will be bread available to give the poor. She should cook food, wash clothes, nurse her child, place straw before her husband's beast - but not before his cattle - and grind [flour]. What does grinding [flour] involve? [Not that the woman actually operates the mill herself,] but that she stays at the mill, sifts the flour and prods the animal [who turns the mill], so that [the operation of] the mill will not be hampered. If it is the [local] custom, for women to grind [flour] using a hand mill, [a woman] should grind [flour in this manner].

When does the above apply? With regard to a poor [couple]. If, however, a woman brings a maid to [the household] or property with which a maid could be purchased, or if the man possesses a maid or funds with which a maid could be purchased, the wife is not required to grind [flour], to bake, to do laundry or to place straw before her husband's beast. If the wife brings two maids to [the household] or property with which two maids could be purchased, or if the man possesses two maids or is [wealthy] enough to purchase two maids, the wife is not required to cook or to nurse her child. Instead, she gives him to a maid to nurse.

Thus, there are five tasks that every woman must perform on behalf of her husband: to spin [thread], to wash his face, hands and feet, to pour beverages for him, to make his bed and to do his bidding. And there are six tasks that some women perform and some women do not perform. They are: to grind [flour], to cook, to bake, to do laundry, to nurse, and to place straw before her husband's beast.

All the tasks that a woman must perform on behalf of her husband must also be performed by a woman while she is in the niddah state, with the exception of pouring beverages, making his bed and washing his face, hands and feet. [The rationale for the exceptions is that] this is a decree, [enacted] lest [sexual] thoughts arise, and the husband be prompted to engage in relations. Therefore, when she is in the niddah state, she should make his bed when he is not present. When pouring a beverage for him, she should not place it in his hand as is her usual practice, but rather leave it on the ground, on a utensil or on a table, and he will take it.

When a woman breaks utensils while performing household tasks, she is not held liable. This ruling does not reflect the dictates of the law, but is instead an enactment [of our Sages]. For if this were not the case, there would never be peace in a household. For a woman would be overly cautious and would refrain from performing many tasks, and there would thus be strife between [the couple].

Whenever a woman refrains from performing any of the tasks that she is obligated to perform, she may be compelled to do so, even with a rod. When a husband complains that [his wife] does not perform [her required tasks], and [the wife] claims that she does, [the dispute should be clarified by having] a [neutral] woman dwell with them or [by asking] the neighbors. The judges should clarify the matter in the best way they see fit.

During the time a woman nurses her child, she is not compelled to perform as many tasks [as usual], and wine and foods that are beneficial to nursing are added to her support. If, despite the fact that she was allotted the foods appropriate for her, she desires to eat more or desires to eat other foods, because of the craving in her stomach, she is entitled to eat everything she desires [provided she pays for the additional food] from her own funds. The husband cannot prevent her, saying: "Perhaps she will overeat or eat harmful foods and the child will die." [The rationale is] that the physical pain the woman feels takes priority.

When a woman bears twins, she cannot be compelled to nurse both of them. Instead, she is required to nurse one, while the husband is required to hire a nursemaid for the second child. If a woman desires to nurse another woman's child together with her own, her husband may object and restrict her to nursing only her own child.

Although a woman takes a vow not to nurse her child, she may be compelled to do so until the child - whether a boy or a girl - is 24 months old. If a woman desires to nurse her child, but her husband objects, claiming that this will mar her beauty, she is given this prerogative, for it is painful for her to part from her child. [This law applies] even if she owns several maids.

If she is poor and would thus be obligated to nurse her child, but her husband is rich, and it is appropriate that his wife not be obligated to nurse his child - if his wife does not desire to nurse, he must hire a nursemaid or buy a maid, even if he did not possess any maidservants beforehand. [The rationale is] that the woman's social standing rises together with that of her husband and does not descend with his.

If a woman claims that [her husband] is of [a social standing that] requires him to hire or purchase a maid, and he claims that he is not, the burden of proof is on the woman. [The husband] is not [required] to take an oath.

When a woman is divorced, she cannot be compelled to nurse [her child]. If she desires to nurse the child, [her ex-husband] must pay her a wage. If she does not desire [to nurse], she should give the son to his father, and he should care for him. When does the above apply? When she did not nurse the child long enough for him to recognize her. If, however, [the child is able] to recognize his mother, even if [the child] is blind, he should not be separated from his mother because of the [possible] danger [the separation will cause] the child. Instead, the woman is compelled to nurse the child for a wage until he reaches the age of 24 months.

[A husband] is not [obligated to] support his divorcee, even when she is nursing his child. In addition to the wage she receives [as a nursemaid], he must, however, provide her with those things that the child needs for clothing, food, drink, salves and the like. A woman who is pregnant is not entitled to any [payment] at all [from her ex-husband]. [The following rules apply after the 24] months have been completed, and the child has been weaned. If the divorcee desires that her son remain in her custody, he is not separated from her until he completes his sixth year [of life]. Instead, his father is compelled to provide him with his sustenance while he lives with his mother. After the child completes his sixth year, the father has the right to say: "If [my son] is in my custody, I will support him. If, however, he continues to live with his mother, I will not give him anything." A mother, by contrast, is given custody of her daughter forever, even after [she passes] the age of six.

What is implied? If the father is [wealthy enough] to be obligated to give charity, the money necessary for his daughter's support should be expropriated from him and used to support the daughter, while she is in her mother's custody. Even if the mother marries another [man], her daughter remains in her custody, and the father is obligated to provide for her sustenance until his death, as an act of charity. [Moreover, even if the girl's] father dies, she is entitled to receive her sustenance from his estate, as a provision of [her mother's] ketubah, although she remains in her mother's custody. If a mother does not want her children - either males or females - to remain in her custody after she weans them, she has this prerogative, and she can give their father their custody, or make them wards of the community if there is no father, and [the community] must care for them.

The husband takes precedence over any other person with regard to the inheritance of his wife's estate. When does the husband acquire this right? When his wife leaves her father's domain, even though she has not entered the chuppah. Since the woman has entered her husband's domain, he [has the right] to inherit [her estate].

What is implied? When a woman has been consecrated and her father hands her over to her husband or to his agents, or the agents of the woman's father hand her over to her husband or to his agents, and the woman dies on the way, before she enters the chuppah, her husband inherits her estate, even though her dowry is still in her father's home. Similarly, if the father or his agents went together with the husband, and the husband entered into privacy in a courtyard together with [his bride] with the intent of marriage, and afterwards she dies, her husband inherits [her estate]. If, however, [the woman and] her husband or his agents are still accompanied by her father or his agents on their journey to the husband's house, her father inherits [her estate] if she dies, even if her dowry is already in her husband's home. [This law applies even if the woman] and her husband entered a courtyard together to spend the night, as travelers lodge together in one inn. [The rationale is that] she is accompanied by her father or his agents, and [her husband] has not entered into privacy with her for the sake of marriage.

Similarly, when a bogeret, an orphan, or a widow goes from her father's house to her husband's home on her own initiative without being accompanied by her husband or his agents, and dies on the way, her husband does not inherit [her estate].

Although a man marries a woman with whom he is forbidden [to have relations], if she dies [during his lifetime], he inherits her estate when his consecration of her is binding. Similarly, a man who marries a k'tanah [after her father's death] inherits her estate if she dies in his lifetime, even though his consecration of her is not binding entirely. When, by contrast, a mentally capable man marries a deaf mute, he is not entitled to inherit her estate when she dies. When, however, a deaf mute marries a mentally capable woman and dies, he should inherit her estate. For she is capable of understanding and married him voluntarily. [In doing so,] she gave him a right to her property.

When a k'tanah was consecrated with her father's consent, but married without his consent - whether in his presence or outside his presence - her father has a right to object, as we have explained. [In such a situation,] if the girl dies, her husband should not inherit her estate, even if the father remains silent, unless he expressed his consent to her marriage.

The Geonim taught that the woman who becomes ill and requests that her husband divorce her and that she will go without her ketubah, in order that he shouldn't inherit from her, we do not listen to her. Even if she says, "I hate him, and I no longer want to be with him," we do not listen to her, and she is not judged according to the law of the moredet. This is an appropriate ruling.

During a woman's lifetime, her husband enjoys the benefits of all the property she owns, regardless of whether it is classified as nichsei tzon barzel or nichsei m'log. If she dies in her husband's lifetime, her husband inherits everything. Therefore, if the woman sold property classified as nichsei m'log after she married, even if she became the owner of that property before she became consecrated, her husband may expropriate the income from that property from the purchasers throughout his wife's lifetime. He may not, however, expropriate the land itself, for he has no right to the land itself, if it is classified as nichsei m'log, until his wife dies. If she dies in his lifetime, he may expropriate the land from the purchasers without paying them for it. If the actual money that [the woman] took from the purchasers still exists, however, it must be returned to the purchasers. The husband cannot say: "Perhaps this money was found [by my wife]" [and on that basis take it as his own].

When does the above apply? With regard to property about which the husband knew. When, however, a woman inherits property in another country without her husband's knowledge and sells it, the sale is binding. Similarly, if a woman sells [property] between her consecration and the consummation of the marriage bond, the sale is binding. For the husband has no right to his wife's property until their marriage is consummated.

When a woman signs over all of her property to another person - regardless of whether or not that person is a relative - before she marries, even when there is a provision that if she is divorced or if she becomes a widow, this present is nullified - as will be explained in Hilchot Matanah - her husband is not entitled to benefit from the income of this property. And if she dies in his lifetime, he does not inherit it. [The rationale is] that she gave this property away before she married. When she dies during her husband's lifetime, the recipient of the present acquires full title to it. Moreover, [the same laws apply] even if she gave away a portion of her property - or all her holdings - before she married and wrote [in the deed of transfer] to the recipient: "Acquire the property from this time onward, [dependent] on my consent." [Although] the recipient does not acquire complete ownership until the woman expresses her consent, her husband is not entitled to benefit from the income of this property. And if she dies in his lifetime, he does not inherit it.

While a woman is waiting for her yavam [to marry her according to the rite of yibbum], she may sell or give as a present property that she acquires during the time she is in this status. Until he marries the yevamah, the yavam has no right to benefit from the property, even the nichsei tzon barzel, that she brought to his [deceased] brother's household. If the yevamah dies in this status, her heirs from her father's household inherit her nichsei m'log and half of her nichsei tzon barzel. Her husband's heirs inherit [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah and the remaining half of her nichsei tzon barzel, and they are responsible for her burial.

The money due a yevamah by virtue of her ketubah is considered to be a lien on her [late] husband's estate. Therefore, a yavam is not entitled to sell any of his brother's property - neither before yibbum nor after yibbum. If he sells the deceased's property, gives it away as a present, divides it with his brothers - whether before yibbum or after yibbum - his actions are of no consequence. For it is already obligatory to make this property available to the widow so that she can collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from it.

When a man marries his yevamah at a time when there is produce growing on the land left by her husband, this produce should be sold, and the proceeds used to purchase land from which the yavam will derive the benefit that accrues.

When, [by contrast, the deceased] left produce that was already harvested, money or movable property, it becomes the property of the yavam. He may use it as he sees fit, and [the yevamah's] objections are of no consequence. [The rationale is that the woman's right] to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from movable property stems only from an enactment of the geonim, and this enactment does not have the power to prevent [the yavam from taking possession] of his brother's property, and cause him to be restrained from dealing with them because of this lien.

[The following rules apply when] a yevamah's [first husband was not obligated to] grant her a ketubah or [when] she waived her ketubah in his favor. The yavam acquires his brother's estate and may sell [portions of it] or give them away as he desires. When he marries his yevamah, he is obligated to compose a ketubah for 100 [zuz]. All of his property will be considered as being on lien for the ketubah, [i.e., the same laws apply to her] as apply to other women who have a ketubah.

When a woman sells nichsei tzon barzel - whether to her husband or to others - after she marries, her act is of no consequence. Similarly, if her husband sells landed property belonging to his wife - whether it be nichsei tzon barzel or nichsei m'log - his act is of no consequence.

[Should the husband] sell movable property that is classified as nichsei tzon barzel - although he is not allowed to make such a sale - the sale is binding. If both [the husband and the wife] sell nichsei m'log, the sale is binding, regardless of whether the purchaser purchased the property from the husband first and then from the wife, or if he first purchased it from the wife and then from the husband.

Similarly, when a woman sells her nichsei m'log to her husband or gives them to him as a present, the sale or the gift is binding. She cannot rationalize her actions by saying, "[This was not my true intent.] I did it [only] to appease my husband." With regard to other property, however, she may offer such a rationalization.

What is implied? When a woman sells her nichsei tzon barzel to her husband or gives them to him as a present, her husband does not acquire this property. [This applies to] landed property and movable property [in this category], to a field that was designated for her from which [she could collect the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, a field belonging to her that was specifically mentioned in her ketubah or a field that [her husband mentioned in her ketubah] as his present to her [to be included in her dowry]. [In all the above instances,] even though [the husband] formalized the transaction with his wife through an act of contract that she voluntarily agreed to, she has the prerogative of recanting whenever she desires. [We assume that] she gave the present or made the sale only for the sake of maintaining peace in her home. Accordingly, a husband has no way of substantiating his claim to his wife's property except with regard to nichsei m'log, as explained [in the previous halachah].

It appears to me that a woman is not entitled [to nullify her statements, based on the rationale]: "I did it [only] to appease my husband," when her nichsei tzon barzel were lost or stolen, and she waived the debt in favor of her husband. [This applies even when the commitment] is formalized in the presence of witnesses. To what can this be compared? To a man and a woman who formalized an agreement in which she forgoes the responsibility [he had taken for property that had been classified as nichsei tzon barzel] and considers it instead nichsei m'log. For the husband is not bringing a proof for the sake of taking possession or maintaining possession of property, merely to free himself of the obligation to pay a claim [his wife will issue]. If, by contrast, she gives him movable property that exists and was considered to be nichsei tzon barzel, the husband does not acquire it. For the wife may rationalize her conduct saying: "I did this to appease my husband."

When a husband sells [the right to] the benefits from landed property [that belongs to his wife, to another person, while the legal owner of the property remains his wife, the sale] is of no consequence. [The rationale is that] the reason our Sages granted a man [the right to] the benefit that accrues from his wife's property is [to afford him additional income] so that he will spend more generously on the household expenses. [Based on that rationale,] if he sells the benefit to be derived [from the landed property to another person] and takes the money and invests it in a business [which offers profit], he is given that prerogative.

[The following laws apply if] the woman possesses financial resources [that she brings to the household]. If they are nichsei tzon barzel, her husband may use them for commercial enterprises. If they are nichsei m'log - regardless of whether she brought them to the household at the time of marriage or she inherited them or received them as a present [- landed property should be purchased with them, from which her husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues]. [Similarly,] if she inherited or was given movable property, it should be sold, and the proceeds of the sale should be used to purchase landed property, from which her husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues.

Similarly, if a woman was injured by others, all the money that is ordained to be given to her should be used to purchase land, from which her husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues, as stated in Hilchot Chovel.

[The following law applies when] a woman inherits servants [while she is married]. Even if they are old, they should not be sold, because they bring honor to her family's household. [The following law applies when] she inherits olive trees or vines, but did not [inherit] the land on which these trees were planted. If they produce enough to pay for their upkeep, they should not be sold, because they bring honor to her family's household. If they do not, they should be sold as firewood, land should be purchased with the proceeds, from which the husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues.

When [a married woman] inherits produce that is still attached to the land [on which it is growing], it becomes her husband's [property]. When the produce has been uprooted from the land, it should be sold and used to purchase landed property, from which her husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues. When, however, a husband divorces his wife, and there was produce that was still attached to the ground, it belongs to the woman. If it has already been reaped, it belongs to the man.

A husband is obligated to provide for the sustenance and all the needs of the servants and livestock that belong to his wife and are classified as nichsei m'log. They must work for him, and he is entitled to the benefit that accrues. Therefore, a baby born to a maid classified as nichsei m'log belongs to the husband. And a calf born to a cow that is classified as nichsei m'log belongs to the husband. If, however, the husband divorces his wife and she desires to pay the worth of a child born from a maidservant who is classified as nichsei m'log and take the child as her property because this brings honor to her family's household, she is given that prerogative.

[The following laws apply when] a woman brings two utensils or two maidservants to the household and has them classified as nichsei tzon barzel. They were [originally] evaluated at 1000 zuz; afterwards, their value increased and they were evaluated at 2000 zuz. If the woman's husband divorces her, she is entitled to one [utensil or maidservant] for the 1000 zuz that she is owed. With regard to the other - if she desires to pay its value and take it because of the honor it brings to her father's household, she has that prerogative.

When a man gives a present to his wife - regardless of whether he gave her landed property, or he gave her money and she bought landed property - her husband is not entitled to the benefits that accrue from the present [that was given]. Similarly, when a man gives a woman a present on the condition that her husband not be entitled to derive the benefits from it, but rather the benefits that accrue will belong to the wife to be used for whatever she desires, [the provision is binding, and] the husband is not entitled to the benefits that accrue from this present. Similarly, if a woman sells the rights to her ketubah [in the event of her divorce or her husband's death], the money she receives belongs to her, and her husband is not entitled to derive the benefit that accrues from it.

When a calf born from cattle that was classified as nichsei m'log is stolen, and the thief is apprehended and forced to pay twice the amount, the woman receives the extra payment. [The rationale is that] this is not the benefit that our Sages granted [the husband]. When a man injures his wife, the entire [amount he must pay] - the damages and the restitution for the pain and the embarrassment - belongs to the woman, and the husband is not entitled to the benefits that accrue from [property purchased with this money], as explained in Hilchot Chovel.

[The following rules apply when] a husband sells landed property [that he owns] to his wife. If the husband knew about the funds with which she purchased the land previously, the sale is binding, and the husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues from that land. If, however, [the existence of] these funds was concealed, she does not acquire the land. For the husband may [explain that he did not really intend to complete the sale]. [His intent was] to reveal the existence of funds that his wife had hidden. The funds that were revealed should be used to purchase landed property, from which the husband is entitled to the benefits that accrue.

When funds or movable property are discovered in a woman's possession, and she claims that they were given her as a present, while her husband claims that they stem from the fruits of her labor and hence belong to him, it is the woman's claim that is accepted. [The husband] may, however, have a ban of ostracism [conditionally] issued against anyone who makes false statements. [The funds should be used] to purchase landed property, from which [the husband] is entitled to the benefit that accrues. If the woman claims that the funds were given to her with the provision that her husband have no control over them, but rather that they be used for whatever purpose she desires, she must bring proof [that such a provision was made]. [The rationale is that] the prevailing assumption is that a husband has the right to the benefits from all the funds found in a woman's possession, unless she brings proof otherwise.

If [a wife] tells [her husband]: "You gave me [these funds] as a present," she is required to take a Rabbinic oath that her husband gave her [the funds]. [After she takes that oath,] her husband is not entitled to the benefit [from the property purchased with these funds].

One should not accept an article for safekeeping that was given by a wife, a servant or a minor. If one transgressed and accepted [an article given by] a woman, one should return it to the woman. If she dies, one should return it to her husband. If one accepted [an article given by] a servant, one should return it to the servant. If he dies, one should return it to his master. If one accepted [an article given by] a minor, one should purchase a Torah scroll with the proceeds or an article that will provide [the minor] with benefit. [The following rules apply] with regard to all [the abovementioned individuals], if at the time of their death, they say: "The article I gave for safekeeping belongs to so and so." If the person caring for the article operates under the presumption that the person who entrusted it to him is true to his word, he should carry out the command he was given. If not, he should give [the article] to the person's heirs.

[The following rules apply when] a woman has financial resources sufficient [to purchase property] from which the husband would derive the benefits [but they disagree with regard to the property fit to purchase]; he suggests that this type of property be purchased, and she desires that another type be purchased. A property should be purchased that brings a large revenue and requires little upkeep, regardless of whether this is the article desired by [the husband] or by [the wife]. We do not purchase any article that does not renew itself, lest the entire property be used and the principal lost.

[The following rule applies when] a woman brings to her husband's household a goat [that she is entitled] to milk, a sheep [that she is entitled] to shear or a date palm whose fruit [she is entitled to take], although she is entitled only to these benefits [and not to the principal]. [Her husband] is entitled to [these benefits] although the principal is dwindling. Similarly, if she brought utensils or articles of clothing to his household that were classified as nichsei m'log, he may use them, wearing them or using them as spreads or as covers until the articles themselves are destroyed. If he divorces [his wife], he is not required to pay for any nichsei m'log that became worn out.

The geonim [issued the following] ruling. A husband takes responsibility for the diminished value of nichsei tzon barzel. Nevertheless, if [such property] exists [at the time a woman's ketubah is due for payment,] and still serves its initial purpose, the woman must take it regardless of its condition at that time. If they are no longer fit to serve their initial purpose, it is as if they were stolen or lost, and the husband is obligated to pay the value appraised originally at the time of the marriage. This is the common custom. Whenever a man marries, he accepts responsibility for [the woman's] dowry as contingent on this custom. On the basis of this custom, just as the husband does not pay for the depreciation of the article, so too, he does not take the appreciation of the property if it increases in value. A husband has the right to compel some of the servants and maidservants who belong to his wife to serve him in the home of another woman he has married. [This applies] regardless of whether the servants are classified as nichsei m'log or nichsei tzon barzel. The husband may not, however, take these servants to another city without his wife's consent.

[The following rules apply when] a woman makes a provision with her husband in which he agrees to forgo one of the privileges that a husband is granted. If he wrote down [this provision] for her after she was consecrated, but before nisu'in, there is no need to formalize the matter with an act of contract; everything he wrote to her is binding. If he wrote down [this provision] for her after nisu'in, he must formalize the matter with an act of contract.

If, [after nisu'in,] the husband stipulates that he will have no say with regard to [his wife's] property, and she sells it or gives it away as a present, the sale or the present is binding. Nevertheless, [the husband] is entitled to the benefits [that accrue from the property] during the time it is in her possession. If he affirmed these statements with an act of contract between consecration [and nisu'in], he is considered to have waived his rights to the land itself, and he no longer has any rights to the benefits that accrue from her property. His words are not heeded if he protests this action, saying: "I did not realize that this act of contract formalized my waiver of all rights to benefit from the property. [I thought that it only entitled my wife] to make a binding sale. [This interpretation is justified,] for no one will marry a woman without property." Instead, he is considered to have waived [all] rights to the land itself.

If [the husband] made a provision with [his wife] not to receive the benefit that accrues from her property, he is not entitled to this benefit. Nevertheless, the benefit that accrues should be converted to financial resources, landed property should be purchased, and [the husband] is entitled to the benefits from that property. For he waived only the rights to the property [she owned originally].

If [the husband] made a provision with [his wife] not to receive the benefit that accrues from her property, nor to receive the benefit that results from property purchased with the income from her original property, the proceeds from that property should be used to purchase other property, from which [the husband] is entitled to the benefits that accrue. These are called "the fruit of the fruit's fruit." This pattern continues until the husband makes a provision that he has no right to any by-product of the proceeds from [his wife's property]. [If he makes such a provision,] he has no right to any benefit during her lifetime, but if she dies, he inherits her entire estate.

If he makes a provision that he will not inherit [his wife's] property, the provision is binding. He is, however, entitled to receive the benefits that accrue [from this property] during her lifetime. Similarly, [his word] is binding if he stipulates that he will inherit [only] a portion of her estate, or if he stipulates that if she dies without bearing children, her estate will return to her father's household.

When does the above apply? When he made this provision before nisu'in. For a man has the prerogative to forgo an inheritance that comes to him from a source outside his family before he acquires the rights to it. If, however, he made the provision after nisu'in, his provision is not binding, and he inherits her estate as we explained.

When, after nisu'in, [a husband] stipulates that he has no say with regard to his wife's property - not with regard to the benefits from that property nor any eventual byproducts from them during her lifetime - then after her death he is not entitled to any benefit from this property at all. If she dies, however, he inherits her estate, as explained [above].

[The following rules apply] when a husband spends money [to improve property belonging to his wife that is classified as] nichsei m'log. Whether he spent a small amount and derived much benefit, or spent a large amount and derived little benefit [he is not required to pay anything, nor may he collect anything]; what he spent, he spent, and the benefit that he enjoyed, he enjoyed. [The above applies] even if he ate only one dried fig in a respectful manner, if he ate a dinar's worth of produce in a haphazard manner, or if he did not even take produce [from the field on which he spent money] and took merely a bundle of twigs.

Similar [laws apply] if a woman inherited funds in a distant place, and the husband undertook expenses in order to bring them [to their home], or [expenses were required] to take them from the person who was holding them. If [the husband] purchased land [with these funds] and ate the measure of fruit [mentioned above, he is not required to pay anything, nor may he collect anything]; what he spent, he spent, and the benefit that he enjoyed, he enjoyed. [The following procedure is adhered to if] a husband incurred expenses [on behalf of his wife's property] and did not derive any benefit or derived less benefit than the above measure. We evaluate the increment to the property, and we ask him the extent of his expenses. If the increment is greater than the expenses, the husband must take an oath holding a sacred object, stating how much he spent. He is then reimbursed for those expenses. If the increment is less than the expenses, he receives only the amount of the expenses that is justified by the increment, and he must take an oath [with regard to the extent of those expenses].

When does the above apply? When a husband divorces his wife [under ordinary circumstances]. [Different rules apply regarding] a woman who rebels against her husband [and denies him intimacy]. Even if he derived much benefit, the benefit that he derives should be evaluated and subtracted from the amount fit to be given him for the expenses he undertook. After he takes an oath [affirming his claim], he is entitled to collect it. For he did not [incur these expenses on behalf of his wife] so that she would take them and leave him on her own accord. Similarly, [different rules apply when] a man undertakes expenses [to develop] property belonging to his wife who is below the age of majority, and she dissolves the marriage through the right of mi'un. We evaluate the amount of benefit he received, the amount of his expenses, the extent of the property's increment - and then he is given the share usually allocated to a sharecropper.[This consideration is taken] because he had permission to work [his wife's property].

There are various customs regarding [a woman's] dowry. In certain places it is customary to [state a higher figure] in the ketubah [with regard to the value of the dowry], increasing by a third, a fifth or a half. For example, if the dowry was 100 [zuz], it is written [in the ketubah] that the woman brought 150 [to the household], in order to appear more generous in the eyes of the people. [Therefore,] when the woman comes to collect her dowry, she collects only 100. Conversely, there are places where it is customary to write a lesser amount. If it is agreed that she will bring utensils worth 100 [zuz to the household], she must bring a value of 120 or 150, and yet, [in the ketubah,] it is written that she brought only [a value of] 100. And there are other places where it is customary to write a value of 100 [zuz] as 100. There are places where it is customary for a man to give a set amount of money proportionate to the dowry, for the bride to adorn herself and purchase perfume and the like. There are places where [it is customary for] the man to add an additional sum of his own for his wife and add it to her dowry, for her to appear attractive.

When a man marries a woman without specifying any conditions, he should write her a ketubah, giving her a sum that is customarily given in that locale. Similarly, if she makes a commitment to bring [utensils to the household], she must bring what is customarily brought in that locale. And when she comes to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, she collects as is customary in that locale. In this and in all similar matters, local custom is a fundamental principle, and it is used as a basis for judgment, provided that the custom is commonly accepted in the locale.

[The following rules apply when a man and a woman were engaged to each other. When he asks her, "What is the value [of the utensils] you are bringing [to the household]?", and she answers him with an amount, and she asks him, "How much will you give me [for my ketubah]?", and he answers with an amount, and afterwards he arises and consecrates her, the commitments are binding even though they were not formalized with an act of contract. Similarly, a commitment made by a father on behalf of his son or daughter [is binding]. For example, if he is asked, "How much will you give on behalf of your son?", and he specifies an amount, or he is asked "How much will you give on behalf of your daughter?", and he specifies an amount, [his commitment is binding]. These are commitments that are established through speech alone.

When does the above apply? When a father made a commitment on behalf of his daughter, whether she is a minor or past majority, or on behalf of his son, for their first marriage. For a man feels an inner connection to his son, and because of his happiness at his first marriage, he makes a definite commitment, and designates [the sum] for him with a verbal statement [alone]. [Different rules apply when], by contrast, a brother makes a commitment on behalf of his sister, a woman makes a commitment on behalf of her daughter, [when a commitment is made by] other relatives, and similarly, when a father makes a commitment on behalf of his son or daughter for a second marriage. The commitment is not binding until the person making it formalizes it with an act of contract and states the amount he will give.

When a father makes a commitment for his daughter, the daughter does not acquire that present until her husband consummates the marriage with her. Similarly, a son does not acquire [the present that he was promised] until he consummates his marriage. For whenever one makes [such] a commitment, his intent is that [it be fulfilled when] the marriage is consummated. Therefore, when a man makes a commitment to his [prospective] son-in-law, but the son-in-law dies [after erusin, but] before the marriage is consummated, and the woman is bound to his brother, [if he desires to perform the rite of] yibbum, [the woman's] father may [retract his commitment], saying: "I desired to give your brother; I do not desire to give you." [This applies] even if the first husband was an unlearned man and the second is a Torah scholar, and even if the woman desires [to marry] the second man.

When a man makes a financial commitment to his son-in-law and then moves to another country [without fulfilling his commitment], the woman has the prerogative of telling her [prospective] husband: "I did not make this commitment myself. What can I do? Either consummate the marriage without a dowry or divorce me." If, however, she made such a commitment herself, and she was not able to muster the funds, she must remain [in this intermediate state] until she accumulates the sum to which she committed herself or until she dies. Why does she not release herself from her obligation by becoming a moredet against her husband? [Because there is a difference between these two instances.] With regard to a moredet who has [merely] been consecrated, the husband desires to consummate the marriage; it is she who does not desire. In this instance, by contrast, the husband does not want [to consummate his marriage with] her until she gives the dowry to which she committed herself. She, however, desires him, [as reflected by] her request: "Either consummate [the marriage] or divorce me." When does the above apply? To a woman past majority. If, however, a woman makes a financial commitment while she is still a minor, we compel [her prospective husband] either to divorce her or to consummate the marriage without a dowry.

When a man marries a woman and makes a commitment to support her daughter for [an explicit number of] years, he is obligated to support her for [all] the years to which he committed himself, provided he made this commitment at the time of the woman's consecration. If, however, he made the commitment [after] the kiddushin [were given], the commitment is not binding until he affirms it with an act of contract or composes a document to that effect, as will be explained in the laws of business transactions. [The following rules apply when] a woman is divorced within the time that her husband committed himself to support her daughter, and she married another man who also committed himself to support her daughter for a particular number of years. The first husband does not have the prerogative to say: "If she comes to my house, I will support her." Instead, he must bring her support to the place where she is staying together with her mother. Similarly, both husbands do not have the prerogative of saying: "We will together provide for her support." Instead, one of the husbands must provide for her support, and the other must give her the financial value of her support.

[The following rules apply when the woman's] daughter marries during the time [in which her mother's husbands] obligated themselves to supply her with her sustenance. Her own husband is obligated to provide her with her sustenance, and both of her mother's husbands are obligated to give her the financial value of her support. [Even when the men] who obligated themselves to support her die, if they affirmed their commitment to her mother with an act of contract or they composed a formal document recording their obligation, [the daughter] is considered to be a creditor whose claim is supported by a deed, and she has the prerogative of collecting her due from property that has been sold until the conclusion of the time period for which he committed himself. If the commitment was made at the time of the kiddushin, and was not affirmed by an act of contract, it is a commitment that was not to be recorded in a contract, and [the daughter] does not have the prerogative of expropriating property [from purchasers] for her support.

When a man who marries an aylonit is childless and does not have another wife with whom he will father children, he is compelled to divorce her. Nevertheless, [during and after the marriage], the financial arrangements that [govern] other women [govern] her. She is entitled to the fundamental requirement of the ketubah and [all] the provisions of the ketubah. Similarly, her husband acquires the same financial privileges with regard to her as he would with regard to another woman.

If, however, a man married a woman without recognizing her condition, and later it was discovered that she was an aylonit, or forbidden to him by virtue of a negative commandment [for which he is not liable to death - neither by the hand of G-d nor by an earthly court] she is not entitled to the fundamental requirement of the ketubah, nor to any of the provisions of the ketubah. She is, however, entitled to the extra amount that the husband added to the fundamental requirement of the ketubah. She is not entitled to receive her sustenance, [neither during her husband's lifetime,] nor even after his death. The couple [should be] forced to separate. When that is done, the value of the produce of which the husband partook is not expropriated from him. The same laws apply when a man marries a sh'niyah, regardless of whether or not [the husband] was aware of the prohibition.

Why are these women not granted the essential requirement of the ketubah, when they are granted the extra sum added [by the husband]? The fundamental requirement of the ketubah was instituted by our Sages so that [a man] should not think that the divorce [of his wife] is a light matter. Since he was not aware [of the prohibition or of his wife's condition], she is not granted the essential requirement of the ketubah. With regard to the extra amount for which he obligated himself: as long as she desired to maintain their relationship, she kept her part of the agreement. She granted him [marital] satisfaction, and is willing to continue their relationship; it is the Torah that deems her to be forbidden. What then can she do? Therefore, she is granted this extra amount, for it is not her deeds that cause her to be forbidden after marriage; she was forbidden beforehand.

Why did [our Sages] not distinguish between a sh'niyah [whom her husband] recognized, and one that he did not recognize, but rather said that in all instances she is not entitled to the fundamental requirement of the ketubah? Because [the prohibition involving these relations] is Rabbinic [in origin], they reinforced it. If, by contrast, a man married a woman [whom he was forbidden to marry because of] a negative prohibition of the Torah [that was not punishable by death, neither by the hand of G-d nor by an earthly court] and he was aware of the prohibition, [his wife] is entitled to [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.[Similarly, if he marries] a woman whom he was forbidden to marry because of a positive commandment, whether he was aware of the prohibition or not, [his wife is entitled to a ketubah]. [The rationale is] that if he recognized that a woman was forbidden by a negative prohibition, he willingly undertook to damage his resources. And with regard to [relations which are forbidden] because of a positive commandment, the prohibition is light. In both these instances, the women are entitled to support [from their husband's estate] after his death. Similarly, if [during his absence,] they borrowed money for their sustenance, [the husband] is liable to pay. And when the husband is forced to divorce [a woman in either of these situations], he is forced to reimburse her for all the benefit that he received from her property.

A woman who dissolves a marriage through the rite of mi'un is not entitled to a ketubah. She is, however, entitled to the extra amount [added by the husband to the ketubah]. The husband is not required to reimburse her for the benefit that he received from her property. If she borrowed money for her sustenance while she was still his wife, and afterwards terminated the marriage through the rite of mi'un, that money is not expropriated from the husband.

When a woman commits adultery [her husband is obligated to divorce her]. She is not entitled to a ketubah - neither the fundamental requirement nor the additional amount. Nor is she entitled to any of the conditions of the ketubah. [The rationale is that] it is her own deeds that cause her to become forbidden to her husband.

What is the law with regard to the rights these women have to their dowries? Whenever a woman's dowry endures, she is entitled to take her property when she leaves [her husband's household after divorce]. This applies even when she commits adultery. [If the property is not intact, the following laws apply.] If the woman was a sh'niyah or forbidden as a result of a positive commandment - whether or not her husband was aware of the prohibition - the same laws that apply to other women with regard to their dowries apply to her. Similarly, if the woman was an aylonit or was forbidden because of a negative prohibition of the Torah [that was not punishable by death - neither by the hand of G-d nor by an earthly court], the same laws that apply to other women with regard to their dowries apply to her. [What are those laws?] The husband is liable for nichsei tzon barzel. With regard to nichsei m'log, if anything was lost or stolen, she suffers the loss. [The husband] is not liable to pay.

[Different rules apply when] a woman is either an aylonit or prohibited because of a negative commandment, and [the husband] did not recognize her status. Whatever was lost, stolen, destroyed or damaged from nichsei tzon barzel, her husband is not liable to pay. For she gave him permission to use them. With regard to nichsei m'log, by contrast, whatever was lost or stolen, he is liable to pay. This is the opposite of all other women. Since the marriage bond is not of a binding nature, he did not acquire [rights to use] the nichsei m'log.

A woman who dissolves a marriage through the rite of mi'un is not entitled to any compensation at all for property that was destroyed. Nothing is expropriated from her husband in payment for what was lost or stolen, with regard to both nichsei m'log and nichsei tzon barzel. Instead, she takes whatever property is intact and departs.

A woman who committed adultery is not entitled to a ketubah - neither the fundamental requirement nor the extra amount. Nor is the husband held responsible for any of her nichsei tzon barzel that were lost or stolen. Needless to say, this ruling also applies with regard to her nichsei m'log. [The above does not apply] only to an adulteress, but also to a woman who violates the faith of Moses, one who violates the Jewish faith, or one who is divorced because of a scandalous report. These women are not entitled to a ketubah - neither the fundamental requirement nor the extra amount - nor are they granted any of the conditions of the ketubah. When these [women are divorced], each one should take what remains from her dowry and depart. Her husband is not liable to pay anything, neither what was reduced in value nor what was lost.

The following are the actions for which a woman is considered to have "violated the faith of Moses": a) going out to the marketplace with her hair uncovered; b) taking vows or oaths that she does not keep; c) engaging in sexual relations [with her husband] while in the niddah state; d) failing to separate challah or feeding her husband food that is forbidden to eat - needless to say, this applies to forbidden crawling animals and animals that were not ritually slaughtered; it applies even to produce that was not tithed. How can the latter [two] matters be known? For example, she said: "So and so, the priest, [separated tithes] from this produce for me," "So and so separated challah [from this dough]," "So and so, the Sage, said this stain does not render me a niddah" - and after eating the food or engaging in sexual relations with her, the husband asked the person whose name was mentioned and he denied the occurrence of the incident. Another example: a woman's [conduct caused] it to be established in her neighborhood that she was in the niddah state, but she told her husband that she was ritually pure. He engaged in relations with her [and afterwards discovered the truth].

What is meant by "the Jewish faith"? The customs of modesty that Jewish women practice. When a woman performs any of the following acts, she is considered to have violated the Jewish faith: a) she goes to the marketplace or a lane with openings at both ends without having her head [fully] covered - i.e., her hair is covered by a handkerchief, but not with a veil like all other women, b) she spins [flax or wool] with a rose on her face - on her forehead or on her cheek - like immodest gentile women, c) she spins in the marketplace and shows her forearms to men; d) she plays frivolously with young lads, e) she demands sexual intimacy from her husband in a loud voice until her neighbors hear her talking about their intimate affairs, or f) she curses her husband's father in her husband's presence.

Ezra ordained that a woman should wear a belt in her home at all times, as an expression of modesty. If a woman does not wear [such a belt], however, she is not considered to have violated the faith of Moses, nor does she forfeit her ketubah. Similarly, if she goes from courtyard to courtyard without having her hair [fully] covered - as long as it is covered with a handkerchief, she is not considered to have violated the [Jewish] faith.

A woman who violates the faith must have had a warning issued to her [prior to her having performed the act] and [the warning and her improper conduct must be observed by] witnesses before she forfeits her ketubah. [The following rule applies when a woman] transgresses privately, her husband knows that she violated the faith and [therefore] gives her a warning, [but the warning] was not observed by witnesses, and then she transgresses again. Should the husband claim that she violated [the faith] after receiving a warning, and the woman claims not to have transgressed, or not to have received a warning, the husband must pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah if he desires to divorce her, after she takes an oath that she has not transgressed. [This oath is required because] she would not be entitled to any payment if she admitted to having transgressed after having received this warning.

What is meant by "a woman who is divorced because of a scandalous report"? For example, there were witnesses that she performed a very indecent act that indicates that a sin was committed, but there is no definitive testimony [that she committed adultery]. What is implied? She was alone in her courtyard, and they saw a perfume salesman leaving. They entered immediately afterwards and saw her getting up from bed and putting on her underwear or tying her belt, or they found wet spittle on the canopy above the bed. Alternatively, they saw them coming out of a dark place [together], or one helping the other up from a trench or the like, or they saw him kissing the opening of her cloak, or saw them kissing each other, or embracing each other, or they entered a room one after the other and locked the doors, or any similar act [that would arouse suspicion]. [In all these instances,] if her husband desires to divorce her, she is not entitled to receive [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. There is no necessity for a warning [in this instance].

[When a woman] violates the faith of Moses or the Jewish faith, and similarly, one about whom is issued a scandalous report, her husband is not compelled to divorce her. If he desires [to remain married], he need not divorce her. Nevertheless, even when her husband does not divorce her, she is not entitled to a ketubah. [The rationale is that] a ketubah was ordained by our Sages so that a husband should not consider the divorce [of his wife as] a light matter. Our Sages were concerned only with modest Jewish women. This institution was not enacted for women [who act] wantonly. On the contrary, let their husbands think that divorcing them is a light matter.

When a man sees his wife commit adultery, or he was informed of this by one of his relatives or her relatives - whether male or female - whom he trusts and whose statements he believes, he is obligated to divorce her and is forbidden to engage in relations with her, for he relies on their word as true. He must [however] pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah, [unless] she admits that she has committed adultery, in which case she should be divorced without receiving her ketubah. Therefore, if [her husband saw her commit adultery himself], he can require her to take an oath, while she holds a sacred object, that she did not commit adultery while married to him. [Only afterwards] can she collect the money [due her by virtue of] her ketubah. With regard to other matters, he cannot require her to take an oath, except through the convention of gilgul [sh'vuah].

When a woman tells her husband that she willingly committed adultery, no attention is paid to her words. [We suspect] that she is attracted to another man [and wants to be released from marriage to her husband so that she can marry him]. She does, however, lose the rights to her ketubah - both the fundamental requirement and any extra amount - and [her right to any of her property] that was destroyed, for she admitted that she has committed adultery. If he believes her and considers her word to be true, he is obligated to divorce her. A court, however, does not obligate a man to divorce his wife through any means, unless two witnesses come forth and testify that the person's wife willingly committed adultery in their presence. [In such a situation,] he is compelled to divorce her.

A woman who committed adultery unknowingly or who was raped is permitted to [continue marital relations with] her husband, as [implied the Numbers 5:13, which describes adultery:] "and she was not raped," indicating that if she was raped, she is permitted. [This applies whether] she was raped by a gentile or by a Jew. Whenever [a woman] was forced into relations at the outset, she is permitted [to her husband], even if she ultimately consented - even if she says: "Let him continue, if he had not raped me, I would have hired him." For [her] natural inclination has overcome her; originally, she was forced against her will.

When women have been abducted by robbers, they are considered as though they have been taken captive and were raped; they are permitted to their husbands. If, however, they were left alone and they went to the robbers on their own initiative, they are considered to have acted willingly and they are forbidden to their husbands. The laws applying to a woman who acted unwittingly and to one who was raped are the same. For acting unwittingly is comparable to a deed committed under coercion.

When does the above apply? When the woman's husband was an Israelite. If, however, a priest's wife [committed adultery] unwittingly or under duress, she is forbidden to her husband. For these relations cause her to be deemed a zonah at all times, and he is forbidden to have relations with a zonah, as will be explained in Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah.

With regard to both an Israelite's wife and a priest's wife who have been raped, they are entitled to their ketubah - both the fundamental requirement and the additional amount. She does not lose anything in this regard. We compel the priest to pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah and then to divorce her.

When a priest's wife tells her husband: "I was raped," or "I unwittingly had relations with another man," he should not pay any attention to her words. [We suspect that perhaps] she was attracted to another man. If he believes her, or he was told about it by a person upon whose word he relies, he should divorce her and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.

[The following rules apply when] a man tells his wife in the presence of witnesses: "Do not enter into privacy with so and so." If two witnesses observed her entering into privacy with the said person, and she and he remained there sufficient time for relations to have taken place, she is forbidden to engage in relations with her husband until he causes her to drink "the bitter waters", as will be explained in Hilchot Sotah. If he dies before he has caused her to drink [these waters], she is not entitled to her ketubah. Although witnesses did not see any [blatant] wanton act, there is no more wanton behavior than [disobeying her husband's words in] this [manner]. In the present age, when the waters [to test a] sotah are not available to us, the woman becomes forbidden to her husband forever. She must be divorced without receiving [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, neither the fundamental requirement nor the additional amount, for it is her evil deeds that caused her to become forbidden.

[The following laws apply when a husband] tells [his wife] in private: "Do not enter into seclusion with so and so." If he observed her enter into seclusion with the said person, and she and he remained there sufficient time for relations to have taken place - in the present age, when the waters [to test a] sotah are not available to us - the woman becomes forbidden to her husband. He is obligated to divorce her and pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. If she admits entering into seclusion with the said person after having received the warning, she must be divorced without receiving [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. Therefore, she is required to take an oath in this regard. Only afterwards must he pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.

When a man marries a woman without having made any specifications about that matter, and it is discovered that she is bound by vows, he [may] divorce her without having to pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah - neither the fundamental requirement nor the additional amount. With regard to which vows does this rule apply? [I.e., a vow] not to eat meat, not to drink wine, or not to adorn herself with colored garments or with other objects with which women of her locale customarily adorn themselves. If, however, she is bound by other vows, she does not forfeit anything.

Similar [rules apply when] a man marries a woman without having made any specifications about the matter, and it is discovered that she has one of the blemishes [that mar] a woman's [appeal to her husband], as outlined above. If the husband neither knew nor heard about this blemish, and did not willingly accept it, he [may] divorce [his wife] without having to pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah - neither the fundamental requirement nor the additional amount. What is implied? If there is a bathhouse in the city, and he has relatives [in the town], he does not have the prerogative of saying: "I did not know about these blemishes." [This applies even if] the blemishes were located in hidden places. For we assume that he checks with his relatives [and asks them about his wife's condition]. [If he marries her nonetheless,] we can assume that he heard [about the blemishes] and accepted them. If the town does not possess a bathhouse, or if he does not have relatives, he may issue a claim with regard to blemishes that are usually unseen. Regular fits of epilepsy are considered to be a blemish that is unseen. By contrast, with regard to physical blemishes that are openly seen, the husband cannot claim [not to have known about the blemish]. For they can be seen by everyone, and it may be assumed that he heard about them and accepted [the matter]. This law applies only in those places where it is customary for women to walk in the marketplace with their faces uncovered, and everyone recognizes each other and will say: "This is so and so's daughter," and "This is so and so's sister," as in the European cities of the present era. In places where, by contrast, women do not go out to the marketplace at all, and if a girl goes out to the bathhouse in the evening she goes out veiled, and no one will see her except her relatives, a claim may be issued with regard to blemishes that can be openly seen as well. [Such a claim may be issued] when there is no bathhouse in the city, or [the husband] does not have a relative with whom he can check. If, however, there is a bathhouse in the city, [even] when it is not customary for women to go out with their faces uncovered, if [the husband] has a relative in the city he may not issue such a claim, for everyone sees her naked in the bathhouse. If the woman's habit is to cover herself and to hide even in the bathhouse, or she washes at night, or in a small private room in the bathhouse, so she will not be seen, and no one will know of her, [her husband] may issue a claim, even with regard to blemishes that can be seen openly. These matters are concepts that reason dictates; they are not decrees of the Torah [to be accepted on faith].

Some of the Geonim taught that what the Sages said indicating that [a husband] may check [concerning his wife] with his relatives does not [mean] only his relatives alone but even to [other] people he knows. Even if he was living in a city without a relative, if there is [in that city] a bathhouse, he cannot bring a legal claim, because it is impossible that he has no friends [there] and he ask one of his friends to have his wife or sister check [the appearance] of such-and-such [woman that he wants to marry]. Therefore, the presumption is that he has heard [of any blemish] and accepted [it]. It does not appear to me that such a ruling [is correct], as no man will reveal all that is in his heart in these matters to [people who are] not his relatives. And furthermore, he will rely only on the words of his relatives.

What is meant by a claim issued because of physical blemishes? If the blemishes that were found were such that it is certain that they existed before she was consecrated - e.g., an extra finger or the like - the burden of proof is on the father. He must prove that the husband knew about them and accepted them, or that they were such that we may assume that he knew. If he cannot bring proof, the woman may be divorced without receiving any [of the money due her by virtue] of her ketubah at all. [The following rules apply when] the blemishes were such that they could have come about after she was consecrated. If the blemishes were discovered after the woman entered her husband's home, the burden of proof is on the husband. He must show that she possessed these blemishes before she was consecrated, and that he entered into the relationship under false premises. If the blemishes were discovered while she still was in her father's home, the burden of proof is on [the father]. He must show that the blemishes came about after the consecration, and the husband suffered the loss.

If the husband brought proof that [the woman] had [the blemishes] before she was consecrated, or she admitted that fact, and the father brought proof that the husband had seen the blemishes and accepted them in silence, or that one could assume that he knew about them and accepted them, [the husband] is obligated with regard to the ketubah.

If [a husband] had relations with his wife and waited several days, and [afterwards,] claimed that he discovered a blemish only then, his words are disregarded. [This applies] even if [the blemish] is in the folds [of the woman's skin] or on the sole of her foot. [The rationale is that] we presume that a man will not drink from a cup unless he checks it well first. [Therefore,] we assume that he knew [of the blemish] and accepted it.

[The following rules apply when a man] marries a woman and it is discovered that she does not have a fixed time for the onset of her menstrual period, but rather she does not feel anything until she begins to menstruate. She may engage in sexual relations only if she uses two cloths with which she checks herself, one before relations and one afterwards. In addition, her husband must also check himself with a cloth, as will be explained in Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah.

Even though this is a great blemish, it does not cause the woman to forfeit anything [with regard to her ketubah], for she can inspect herself and engage in relations. [The following rules apply if] she inspected herself and then engaged in relations, and when she and her husband cleaned themselves afterwards, blood was found on either his cloth or her cloth. If this phenomenon recurred on three consecutive occasions, she is forbidden to remain married to her husband. Instead, she must be divorced, and she is not entitled to the money due [her by virtue of] her ketubah - neither the fundamental requirement nor the additional amount. Nor do any of the provisions of the ketubah apply to her. [She suffers these losses] because she is not fit to engage in sexual relations. When he divorces her, he may never remarry her. [This restriction was instituted,] lest her condition heal, in which instance his decision to divorce her would not have been final. She is permitted to marry another man,, as will be explained with regard to [the laws of] niddah.

When does the above apply? When the woman had this condition from the beginning of her marriage, and on the first occasion that she engaged in relations she menstruated. If, however, this ailment occurred after she married, it is the husband who suffers the loss. Therefore, if [the couple] engaged in relations once and the woman did not menstruate, and afterwards she began to menstruate whenever they engaged in relations, he must divorce her and pay her all [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. He may never remarry her, as explained above.

Similarly, if a woman suffers blemishes after marriage, even if she becomes a leper [the loss is her husband's]. If he desires to remain married to her, he may. If he desires to divorce her, he must pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.

[The following rules apply when] a husband suffers blemishes after he marries. Even if his hand or foot is cut off, or he becomes blinded in one eye, and his wife no longer desires to live with him, he is not forced to divorce her and pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. Instead, if she desires to remain married, she may. If she does not desire this, she may obtain a divorce without receiving [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, as is the law concerning any woman who rebels against her husband. If, however, he becomes afflicted by [constant] bad breath or a smell from his nose, or becomes a collector of dog feces, a miner of copper, or a tanner, he is forced to divorce his wife and pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah [if she desires to terminate the marriage]. If she desires, she may remained married to her husband.

If a man becomes a leper, he is compelled to divorce his wife and pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. Even if she desires to remain married to him, her request is not heeded. Instead, they are compelled to separate, because [having relations with] her will cause his flesh to be consumed. If she says: "I will remain married to him, [and we will live in the presence of] witnesses, so that we will not engage in relations," her request is heeded.

[The following rules apply when] a woman's husband had [constant] bad breath or a smell from his nose, or he was a collector of dog feces, or the like, and he died [childless, causing his wife to be obligated to fulfill the mitzvah of either yibbum or chalitzah]. If [the yavam] possesses the same difficulty that his brother, [the late husband,] had, she has the right to say: "I was willing to accept this difficulty with regard to your brother. I am not willing to accept it with regard to you." He should perform the rite of chalitzah and pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. "May you see your children [father] children, and may there be peace over Israel."