Inheritances

This is the order of inheritance: When a person dies, his children inherit his estate. They receive priority over everyone else, and the sons receive priority over the daughters.

In every situation, a female does not inherit together with a male. If a person does not have children, his father inherits his estate. A mother does not inherit her son's estate. This has been conveyed by the Oral Tradition.

With regard to every concept of precedence for an inheritance, a person's blood descendants receive precedence. Therefore, when a person - either a man or a woman - dies and he leaves a son, he inherits everything. If the son is no longer alive, we look to see if the son left descendants. If there are descendants of the son, whether male or female - even the daughter of the daughter of the son's daughter, and this chain can be continued endlessly -that descendant inherits everything. If the son does not have descendants, we return to the deceased's daughter. If there are descendants of the daughter, whether male or female - and this chain can be continued endlessly - that descendant inherits everything. If the son does not have descendants, the estate returns to the deceased's father. If the father is no longer alive, -we look to see if the father left descendants - i.e., the brothers of the deceased. If there is a brother of the deceased or the descendant of a brother, he inherits everything. If there are no brothers, we return and look to see if the deceased had a sister. If there is a sister or the descendant of a sister, that person inherits everything. If there are no descendants of the deceased's brothers or sisters, since there are no descendants of the deceased's father, the estate returns to the deceased's paternal grandfather. If the paternal grandfather is no longer alive, we look to see if the paternal grandfather left descendants - i.e., the uncles or aunts of the deceased. The males receive precedence over the females, and even the descendants of the males receive precedence over the females, as is the law with regard to the descendants of the deceased himself. If there are no uncles or none of their descendants, the estate returns to the deceased's paternal great-grandfather. Following this pattern, the chain of inheritance continues to extend until Reuven the son of Jacob. Thus the order of inheritance is as follows: A son takes precedence over a daughter. Similarly, all of the son's descendants take precedence over the daughter. The daughter takes precedence over her paternal grandfather, and similarly, all her descendants take precedence over her paternal grandfather. The deceased's father takes precedence over the deceased's brothers, because they are the father's descendants. The deceased's brothers take precedence over his sisters. Similarly, all their descendants take precedence over the sister. The deceased's sister takes precedence over her paternal grandfather, and similarly, all her descendants take precedence over her paternal grandfather. The deceased's paternal grandfather takes precedence over the deceased's uncles. The uncles take precedence over the aunts. Indeed, all the uncles' descendants take precedence over the aunts. The aunts take precedence over the deceased's paternal great-grandfather. Indeed, all the aunts' descendants take precedence over the deceased's paternal great-grandfather. This pattern should be continued until the beginning of all generations. Thus, there is no Jew who does not have heirs.

When a person dies and leaves a daughter and the daughter of a son - or even the daughter of the son's daughter and this chain can continue for several generations - the son's daughter takes precedence. She inherits everything; the deceased's daughter does not receive anything. Similar laws applies when a person is survived by his brother's daughter and his sister, by his uncle's daughter and his aunt, or in all other analogous situations.

A woman is, however, given full rights in the following situation. A person had two sons who died in his lifetime. One of the sons left three sons and the other left a daughter. Afterwards, the elder man died. The three grandsons inherit half of the inheritance and the granddaughter inherits the other half. For each inherits their father's portion. Similar laws apply with regard to the division of an estate among the children of the deceased's brothers, the children of his uncles, or the children of other relatives extending back until the beginning of all generations.

With regard to the concept of inheritance, the family of a person's mother is not considered family. Inheritance is relevant only with regard to one's father's family. Therefore, maternal brothers do not inherit each other's estates, while paternal brothers do. This applies to brothers who share only a father or who share both a father and a mother.

All relatives who were conceived through forbidden relations have equal inheritance rights to those who are conceived through permitted relations. What is implied? When a person has a son or a brother who is a mamzer, he is treated like any of the other sons or any of the other brothers when it comes to the concept of inheritance. A person's son who is born by a maid-servant or a gentile woman is not considered his son at all, and has no right of inheritance whatsoever.

A woman does not inherit her husband's estate at all. A husband inherits all his wife's property, according to the words of our Sages. He takes precedence over all others with regard to inheriting her estate. This applies even if she is forbidden to him - e.g., a widow who was married to a High Priest, or a divorcee or a woman who had performed chalitzah who was married to an ordinary priest. Similarly, this applies even if the woman was below majority. Even though a husband is a deaf-mute, he inherits his wife's estate.

We have already explained in Hilchot Ishut that a husband does not inherit his wife's estate until she enters his domain, and that a man who is mentally aware does not inherit the estate of a woman whom he married as a deaf mute. This applies even if she later becomes fully mentally aware. There we also explained that a husband inherits the property that enters his wife's domain and which she took possession of during her lifetime. This applies to the property she brought to his household as a dowry, and property that she did not bring to his household. When a husband attempted to divorce his wife, although there is a question about the validity of the divorce, her husband does not inherit her estate after her death.

When a man marries a young girl who does not need the right of to nullify a marriage, he does not inherit her estate, because there is no marriage. Similarly, when a man who was mentally or emotionally unstable married a mentally aware woman, or a mentally aware man married a woman who was mentally or emotionally unstable, the husband does not inherit his wife's estate, for our Sages did not ordain marriage for such individuals.

A husband whose wife dies, and afterwards her father dies, or her brothers, or one of her heirs, the husband does not inherit them. Instead, the inheritance goes to her living heirs, and if there are none the inheritance returns to her father's family. For the husband does not inherit assets that come to him after her death, only those who already came before she died.

Similarly, a husband does not inherit his wife's estate while he is in the grave as is the ordinary pattern of inheritance for members of his father's family. What is implied? A man died, and afterwards his wife died. We do not say: Since the husband receives precedence over all others with regard to the inheritance, the husband's heirs should receive precedence over the woman's other heirs. Instead, the woman's heirs from her father's family inherit her estate if she dies after her husband.

Similarly, a son does not inherit his mother's estate while he is in the grave, so that the estate will be inherited by his paternal brothers. What is implied? A person died, and afterwards his mother died. We do not say that if the son were alive, he would take precedence in the inheritance of her estate, and hence, the heirs of the son take precedence over the heirs of this woman. According to the latter conception, the son's paternal brothers would inherit the estate of his mother after her death. This view is not accepted. Instead, if the son has children, they should inherit his mother's estate. If he does not have children, the estate should return to her father's family. If, however, the mother died first and then the son died, even if he was a newborn baby who was born prematurely, since he survived his mother and then died, he inherits his mother's estate and then transfers the rights to that estate to the family of his father.

A firstborn receives a double portion of his father's estate, as Deuteronomy 21:17 states: "To give him twice the portion." What is implied? If a father left five sons, one the firstborn, the firstborn receives a third of the estate and each of the other four receives a sixth. If he left nine sons, the firstborn receives a fifth and each of the other eight receive a tenth. We follow this pattern in dividing the estate in all instances.

When a firstborn is born after his father's death, he does not receive a double portion. This is derived from ibid.: 16-17: "On the day when he transfers his inheritance to his sons... he shall recognize the firstborn, the son of the hated one." If his forehead emerged during the lifetime of his father, even though his entire head did not emerge until after his father's death, he receives a double portion.

When a firstborn was born with his genitals covered by flesh and afterwards, an operation was performed and it was discovered that he was male, he does not receive a double portion. Conversely, when an ordinary son was born with a similar condition and after the operation was performed, it was discovered that he was male, he does not reduce the firstborn's share. These concepts are derived from ibid.:15 "And she will bear him sons." Implied is that the sons must be sons from the moment of birth.

What is meant by saying that such a son does not reduce the firstborn's share? A person had a firstborn, two ordinary sons, and this son whose genitals were covered by flesh and afterwards were revealed through an operation. The firstborn receives one fourth of the estate as his extra share as the firstborn, as if there were only two other sons. The remaining three fourths of the estate are divided equally among the two ordinary sons, the son who underwent the operation, and the firstborn.

A day-old child reduces from the firstborn share, though this is not the case by a fetus. [Likewise,] a son born after the death of his father does not cause a reduction of the firstborn share.

When there is a question if a son is a firstborn or an ordinary son - e.g., the firstborn became mixed together with another - he does not receive a double portion. What is done? If at first, the babies were distinct and then they became mixed together," they may compose a document granting power of attorney to each other, and on that basis take the portion of the firstborn with their brothers. If the identity of the firstborn was never known - e.g., the two wives gave birth in one hiding place, - they should not compose a document granting power of attorney to each other, for there is no extra portion for the firstborn.

The following laws apply when a person had two sons - a firstborn and an ordinary son - and they both died in his lifetime, after fathering children. The firstborn left a daughter and the ordinary son left a son. The son of the ordinary son inherits one third of the estate of his grandfather - i.e., his father's portion. And the daughter of the firstborn inherits two thirds of that estate, her father's portion. The same laws apply with regard to the sons of the deceased's brothers, or the sons of his uncles, or any other set of heirs. If the father of any of the heirs was a firstborn, the person who inherits his share of the estate also receives the firstborn's share.

A firstborn does not receive a double portion of his mother's estate. What is implied? When a firstborn and an ordinary son inherit their mother's estate, they divide it equally. This applies with regard to a son who was the firstborn with regard to the laws of inheritance, and to one who "open his mother's womb."

The firstborn with regard to the laws of inheritance is the first child born to the father, as ibid.:17 states: "Because he is the first manifestation of his strength." We do not pay attention to the child's status vis-a-vis his mother. o Even if she gave birth to several sons previously, since this was the first son born to the father, he receives a double portion of the inheritance.

A son who is born after stillborn babies, even if the stillborn baby was alive when its head emerged from the womb, is considered the firstborn with regard to the laws of inheritance. Similarly, when a fetus was born after a full-term pregnancy, but was not alive when its head emerged, the son who follows is considered the firstborn with regard to the laws of inheritance. The term "the first of his strength," Deuteronomy 21:17, used with regard to the firstborn implies that no child before him emerged alive into the world. Hence, when a fetus was alive after its head emerged after a full-term pregnancy, a son born afterwards in not a firstborn even the first baby died immediately thereafter.

Neither a son born by Cesarean section, nor the son born after him, is considered "the firstborn." The first son was never "born," and ibid.: 15 states "and she bore sons to him." And the second son is not given this privilege, for he was preceded by another.

When a person had sons as a gentile and then converted, he does not have a firstborn with regard to the rights of inheritance. If, however, a Jewish man fathered sons from a maid-servant or from a gentile woman, since they are not considered his sons, a son he fathers afterwards from a Jewish woman is considered his firstborn with regard to the laws of inheritance, and he receives a double portion of his father's estate.

Even if the firstborn is a mamzer, he receives a double portion. This is reflected by Deuteronomy 21:16: "But rather he will recognize the firstborn, the son of the hated one." This refers to a woman whose marriage is "hated." Needless to say, this applies if the firstborn is the son of a divorcee or a woman who performed chalitzah.

There are three individuals whose word is accepted with regard to the designation of a firstborn: the midwife, the mother and the father. The midwife's word is accepted only at the moment of birth. For example, a woman gave birth to twins; if the midwife said: "This one emerged first," her word is accepted. His mother's word is accepted for the first seven days after birth, when she says: "This one is the firstborn." His father's word is always accepted. Even if the father said that a person who was not known to be his son was his firstborn son, his word is accepted. Similarly, his word is accepted if he says that the person whom we consider to be his firstborn is not his firstborn.

When a father loses his ability to speak, we check the soundness of his intellect in the same way as is done with regard to a bill of divorce. If through his motions he indicates - or he writes - that this is his firstborn son, that son receives a double portion.

If witnesses testify that they heard a father make certain statements that clearly indicate that a child is his firstborn son, the son receives a double portion even though the father did not explicitly say: "This is my firstborn son."

If the father was heard saying: "This son of mine is a firstborn," the son does not necessarily receive a double portion of the estate because of this testimony. Perhaps the son was the mother's firstborn, and this was his father's intent. For the son to receive a double portion, the father must call him: "My son, my firstborn."

The firstborn does not take a double share from property destined to come after the death of his father; rather, just property that is [already] held by his father that [already] came into his domain, as it says (in Deuteronomy 21 17) "in all that is found to him". For example, if one of those from whom his father would inherit dies after his father's death, the firstborn and regular son inherit that one's estate as one [i.e. on equal footing]. Likewise, if his father was due repayment of a loan [he had made to a borrower] or if he owned a ship at sea [at the time of his death], they inherit [these not yet present assets on equal footing, i.e. with no special double portion for the firstborn].

If the father left his sons a cow that was rented out, hired out, or that was pasturing in open territory and it gave birth, the firstborn receives a double share of it and its offspring.

If one of the colleagues of a person's father slaughtered an animal and then the father died, the son is entitled to a double portion of the presents from that animal.

A firstborn does not receive a double portion of an increase to the value of the estate that accrued after his father's death. Instead, he should have the value of that increase assessed, and he should give the financial equivalent of the difference to the ordinary sons. The above applies provided the property undergoes a change, e.g., budding grain became ears, or budding dates became dates. If, however, the value of the land improved as a matter of course, without undergoing a change - e.g., a small tree grew taller and thicker, or sediment was washed up onto land, the firstborn receives a double portion of the increase in value. If the property increased in value because of investment, he does not receive a double portion.

A firstborn does not receive a double share of a debt owed to his father. This applies even though the debt was supported by a promissory note and land was expropriated to pay the debt. If the father was owed a debt by the firstborn, there is an unresolved doubt concerning the matter. It might be said that he should receive a double portion, because the money was in his possession. It could, however, be argued that he should not receive the extra amount, since he is inheriting it because of his father, and it did not enter his father's possession before his death. Therefore, he should take half of the firstborn's portion from it.

When a firstborn sells his extra share of the inheritance before the estate is divided, the sale is binding. For the firstborn's extra share is distinct, even before the estate is divided. Therefore, if initially, the firstborn divides a portion of the estate, either landed property or movable property, and accepts the same portion as an ordinary son, he is considered to have waived his right to an extra portion with regard to the entire estate. He receives only an ordinary son's share of the remainder. When does the above apply? When he did not protest. If, however, he protested against his brothers and said in the presence of two witnesses: "Although I am dividing these grapes equally with my brothers, I have not waived my right to the firstborn's share," his protest is significant and he is not considered to have waived his right to the other property. Even if he protested with regard to the division of grapes while they were still attached to the earth, and yet agreed to divide them equally after the harvest, he is not considered to have waived his right to the other property. If, however, the grapes were pressed, and he divided the wine equally with them and did not issue a protest when the wine was made, he is considered to have waived his right to the other property. To what can the matter be compared? To a person who issued a protest when grapes were divided but then divided olives equally, in which instance he is considered to have waived his rights to an extra portion of the entire estate.

The brother who performs the rite of yibbum, marrying his brother's childless widow, inherits all of the property in his estate at the time of his brother's death. With regard to any property that is fit to enter the deceased's estate afterwards, he receives the same share as the others. This concept is derived from the fact that the verse refers to him as a "firstborn," as Deuteronomy 25:6 states: "And the firstborn that she will bear will take the place of the brother who died, and thus his name will not be wiped out among Israel." Just as the brother who performs the rite of yibbum does not acquire property that is fit to be acquired by the estate, in contrast to property that is within the estate; so, too, he does not acquire the increase in the estate's value. To what does the latter phrase refer? To the increase in his deceased brother's share in his father's estate, which increased in value in the time between his father's death and the division of that estate among his brothers. Even if the property increased in value after he married his brother's widow, but before it was divided, he receives the same share of the increase as the other brothers. This applies despite the fact that he receives two shares of this property, his own share and the share of his brother whose widow he married. For the father died while they were all alive.

We already explained in Hilchot Shechenim that the firstborn is given his two portions of a field together. This does not apply with regard to a person who marries his brother's childless widow. He receives his portion and his brother's portion by lot. If it happens that he is allotted portions in two different places, these are the portions he receives.

The following laws apply when a childless widow who was waiting to be married by her deceased husband's brother dies. They apply even when one of the brothers designated her for marriage. Her family from her father's household inherit her nichsei m'log and half of her nichsei tzon barzel, and her husband's heirs inherit the money due her by virtue of her ketubah and the other half of her nichsei tzon barzel. Since they inherit the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, her husband's heirs are obligated to bury her, as we have explained in the appropriate place.

When a person says: "This is my son," "This is my brother," "This is my uncle," or identifies a person as any of his other heirs, his word is accepted and that person inherits his estate. This applies even when he makes this acknowledgment concerning people who are not recognized to be his relatives. And it applies whether he made such a statement when he was healthy or when he is on his deathbed. Even if he lost his power of speech and identified a person as his heir in writing, his word is accepted, provided we test his powers of understanding as we test a man with regard to divorce.

When one person is recognized to be another person's brother or cousin, and the latter says: "He is not my brother," or "He is not my cousin," his word is not accepted. His word is accepted, however, with regard to a person who is recognized to be his son. If he says he is not his son, he does not inherit his estate. It appears to me that even if the son already fathered children - although at that point, the father's word is no longer acceptable with regard to the determination of his lineage, and we do not consider him a mamzer because of his father's statement - his father's word is, nevertheless, accepted with regard to the concept of inheritance. He should not inherit his father's estate.

When a person states: "This is my son," and afterwards, says: "He is my servant," his latter statement is not accepted. If he states: "He is my servant," and afterwards, says: "He is my son," his latter statement is accepted. This applies even though the "son" serves him like a servant. We interpret his statement that he is his servant to mean that he relies on him like a servant. Nevertheless, if people would call this individual "A slave worth 100 zuz" or the like - i.e., expressions that are appropriate only for servants - the deceased's retraction is not accepted.

If a person had to pass through customs and identified an individual as his son, but afterwards identified him as a servant, his later statement is accepted. We assume that he identified him as his son only to avoid paying customs duty. If, however, in customs, he identified a person as his servant, and afterwards identified him as his son, his word is not accepted.

A person should not call a servant Papa Joe or a maidservant Mama Sarah lest this lead to an undesirable outcome and a blemish be placed on his lineage. Therefore, if there were servants or maidservants who were very distinguished personages, their reputations are well known, and everyone in the community recognizes them and the children and servants of their master - e.g., the servants of the nasi - it is permitted for the children of that household to refer to the servants in the above manner.

The following rules apply when a person had a maidservant and fathered a son with her, and he would treat the son as one treats a son or said: "He is my son and his mother was freed." If the person involved is a Torah scholar or an honorable person whose conduct has been scrutinized and he is found to be precise in the observance of the details of the mitzvot, the "son" may share in the inheritance of his estate. Nevertheless, this "son" may not marry a Jewish woman until he brings proof that his mother was freed before she gave birth. The rationale for this stringency is that it has been established for us that the woman is a maidservant. If the person is one of the ordinary people - and needless to say, if he is one of those who act loosely in this manner - the "son" is presumed to be a servant with regard to all matters. His paternal brothers may sell him. If his father does not have any children other than him, the father's wife must undergo the rite of yibbum. This is the law as it appears to me, for it follows the fundamental principles of the received tradition. There are, however, authorities who do not make a distinction between honorable people and people at large, except with regard to the ruling that his brothers may not sell him. ' And there are others who rule that this "son" may even inherit his father's estate, so that a distinction is not made with regard to Jews. It is not appropriate to rely on this ruling.

All the heirs may inherit on the basis of the prevailing presumption that they are the deceased relatives. What is implied? When witnesses testify that the prevailing presumption is that a person is an individual's son or his brother, the former may inherit the latter's estate on the basis of this testimony, even though the witnesses do not testify concerning the person's lineage, nor do they possess indubitable knowledge concerning his lineage.

A person's statements regarding his relatives affect his share of an inheritance, but not that of his brothers. To illustrate by example: Jacob died and left two sons: Reuven and Shimon. The prevailing presumption was that he did not have any sons other than these two. Reuven took Levi from among people at large and said: "He is also our brother." Shimon replied: "I don't know." Shimon is granted half the estate. Reuven is given a third, for he acknowledged that they are three brothers, and Levi is given a sixth. If Levi dies, that sixth is returned to Reuven. If other property had been acquired by Levi, it should be divided between Reuven and Shimon, for Reuven acknowledges Shimon's claim to a portion of the estate, because Levi is their brother. Different rules apply if the sixth that Levi was given increased in value on its own accord and then Levi died. If the increase were crops that were almost ready to be reaped - e.g., grapes that are ready to be harvested - they are considered to be property acquired from others and should be divided among the two brothers. If they are not ready to be reaped, they belong to Reuven alone. If Shimon said explicitly: "Levi is not my brother," and Levi received part of Reuven's share, as explained above, and then died, Shimon should not inherit any part of his estate. Instead, Reuven should inherit both the sixth from his share and any other property that Levi left. These principles apply with regard to any other heirs when a portion of them acknowledge the existence of other heirs that the remaining portion do not acknowledge.

The following principles apply with regard to questions concerning the right of inheritance: Whenever there are two prospective heirs, one who is definitely an heir and one whose right to inherit is a matter of question, the person whose right is in doubt does not receive anything. If there are two claimants whose rights are a matter of question, perhaps this one is an heir or perhaps the other is an heir, they divide the estate equally. Accordingly, if a person died and left a son and a tumtuni or an androgynous? the son inherits the entire estate. For the status of the tumtum or the androgynous is a matter of question. If he left daughters and a tumtum or an androgynous, they share equally in the inheritance. The tumtum or androgynous is considered as one of the daughters.

In Hilchot Ishut, we explained the laws pertaining to the portions of an estate given to daughters from the sons' share to provide for the daughters' sustenance? and for their livelihood. There' we explained that the sustenance of the daughters is one of the provisions of the ketubah. When the estate is ample," the daughters receive only their sustenance. The sons inherit everything, and they should give dowries to the daughters of a tenth of the estate each so that men will desire to marry them as husbands. When the estate is limited, the sons do not receive anything. Instead, everything is set aside for the daughters' sustenance. Accordingly, the following rules apply when a person died and left sons, daughters and a tumtum or an androgynous. If the estate is ample, the sons inherit the estate and compel the tumtum to be treated as one of the daughters. He is given only his sustenance as they are. If the estate is limited, the daughters compel the tumtum to be treated as one of the sons. They tell him: "You are a male and hence you are not entitled to receive your sustenance as we are."

The following rules apply when a woman did not wait three months after parting from her husband, but instead, married within that time and gave birth to a son. We do not know if the son was born after nine months and is her first husband's child or was born after seven months and was her second husband's son. This son does not inherit the estate of either father, because his claim is doubtful. If this son dies, both of them inherit his estate, sharing it equally, because both of their claims are doubtful. Maybe this one is his father? Or maybe the other one?

The following laws apply when a childless widow did not wait three months after her first husband's death, married her husband's brother and bore a son. We do not know if the son was born after nine months and is her first husband's child, or was born after seven months and was her second husband's son. With regard to the inheritance of the estate of the woman's first husband, the son whose parentage is doubtful says: "Perhaps I am the son of the deceased, in which instance I would inherit my father's entire estate. You would not be fit to marry my mother, for she would not be required to perform the rite of yibbumP The brother who married her says: "Perhaps you are my son and thus your mother was required to perform the rite of yibbwn. You have no right to my brother's estate." Since not only the status of the "son," but also that of the brother who married the widow is doubtful, they share the estate equally. The same laws apply when this "son" whose status is doubtful and the other sons of the brother who married the widow come to divide the estate of the brother whose widow was married. They divide the estate equally. The "son" whose status is doubtful receives half, and the other sons of the brother who married the widow receive half. If the brother who married the widow died after dividing the estate of his deceased brother with the son whose status is doubtful, the sons of that brother who are fit to inherit his estate are granted it. The son whose status is doubtful may feel entitled to claim: "If I am your brother, give me a share in this estate. And if I am not your brother, return to me the half of my father's estate that your father took." This claim is not accepted. Instead, the son whose status is doubtful is not given any share in the estate of the brother who married the widow; he does not expropriate property from them.

The following rules apply when the son whose status is doubtful and the brother who married the widow come to divide the estate of the father of the family. The brother who married the widow is definitely an heir. In this instance as well, there is a question concerning the rights of the son whose status is doubtful. If he is the son of the deceased brother, he receives half; if he is the son of the brother who married the widow, he does not receive anything. Therefore, the estate should be given to the brother and the son whose status is doubtful should be overlooked. The following principles apply with regard to the inheritance of the grandfather's estate if the brother who married the widow left two sons whose lineage is definite and died. The son whose status is doubtful claims: "I am the son of the deceased brother. Hence, I should receive half and you two should receive half." The two sons say: "You are our brother and the son of the brother who married the widow. Hence, you deserve only one third of the estate of our grandfather." ? The two sons receive the half that the son whose status is doubtful acknowledges as belonging to them. The third that they acknowledge as belonging to him is given to him, and the remaining sixth is divided equally: he receives half of it and they receive half of it. ? If the son whose status is doubtful dies, the brother who married the widow may claim: "Perhaps he is my son and I have the right to inherit his estate." His father may say: "Perhaps he is the son of my deceased son and I have the right to inherit his estate." In such a situation, they should divide the estate equally. (If the son who married the widow died, the son whose status is doubtful may claim: "He is my father and I have the right to inherit his estate." His father may say: "Perhaps you are the son of my other son and this is your father's brother. Thus, I have the right to inherit his estate." In such a situation, they should divide the estate equally.)

The following rules apply when a house fell on a person and his wife and they both died. It is not known if the woman died first, in which instance the heirs of her husband inherit her entire estate, or the husband died first, and the woman's heirs inherit her estate. How is the issue resolved? We consider the nichsei m'log to be in the possession of the woman's heirs. The money due her by virtue of her ketubah - both the essential obligation and the additional amount - are considered to be in the possession of her husband's heirs. Her nichsei tzon barzel are divided, half are given to the woman's heirs and half to the husband's heirs. If a house fell on a person and his mother, the estate of the mother may be retained by her heirs from her father's household, for they are definitely heirs. The status of the heirs of the son, by contrast, is doubtful. For if the son died first, his paternal brothers do not have a share in the inheritance of his mother, as we have explained.

The following rules apply if a house fell on a person and his daughter's son. If the father died first, his daughter's son would inherit his estate, and thus the estate would be given to the son's heirs. If his daughter's son died first, the son does not inherit his mother's estate after his death as we have explained. Thus, the estate would be given to the father's heirs. Since we do not know who died first, the father's heirs should divide his estate with the heirs of his daughter's son. Similar rules apply if the father was taken captive and died while in captivity, and his daughter's son died in his city, or conversely, the son was taken captive and died while in captivity and his mother's father died in his city. Since we do not know who died first, the father's heirs should divide his estate with the heirs of his daughter's son.

The following rules apply if a house fell on a person and his father or on other person whose estates he would acquire, and the son was responsible for the money due his wife by virtue of her ketubah and other debts. The father's heirs claim that the son died first without leaving an estate. Hence, the debts will remain unpaid. The creditors maintain that the father died first, and thus the son acquired the inheritance. Hence, they have a source from which they can collect the debts owed them. The estate is considered to be in the possession of the heirs. The son's wife or the creditors must prove that the father died first, or they must depart without receiving anything.

The same laws apply to people who die in a landslide, were drowned at sea, fell into a fire, or died on the same day in different countries. For in all these and other analogous situations, we do not know who died first.

Although all that is involved is money, a person may not give property as an inheritance to a person who is not fit to inherit, nor may he exclude a rightful heir from inheriting. This is derived from the verse in the passage concerning inheritance, Numbers 27:11: "And it shall be for the children of Israel as a statute of judgment." This verse implies that this statute will never change, and no stipulation can be made with regard to it. Whether a person made statements while he was healthy or on his deathbed, whether orally or in writing, they are of no consequence.

Therefore, if a person states: "So-and-so is my firstborn son, he should not receive a double portion," or "My son so-and-so should not inherit my estate together with his brothers," his statements are of no consequence. Similarly, if he says: "Let so-and-so inherit my estate" when the dying man has a daughter, or "Let my daughter inherit my estate" when he has a son, his statements are of no consequence. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. If, however, he had many heirs - e.g., many sons, brothers, or many daughters - and he says while on his deathbed: "Of all my brothers, only my brother so-and-so should inherit my estate," or "Of all my daughters, only my daughter so-and-so should inherit my estate," his words are binding. This applies whether he made these statements orally or in writing. If, however, he states: "My son so-and-so should be my sole heir," different rules apply]. If he made this statement orally, his words are binding. If, however, he had a document composed stating that his entire estate should be given to one son, he is considered merely to have appointed him as a guardian, as explained.

If a person states: "So-and-so my son should inherit half my estate and my other sons should inherit the other half," his words are binding. If, however, he states: "My firstborn should inherit as an ordinary son," or "My firstborn should not receive a double portion among his brothers," his words are of no consequence. This is derived from Deuteronomy 21:16-17: "He cannot give the firstborn rights to the son of the beloved instead of the firstborn, the son of the hated. Instead, he shall recognize the firstborn, the son of the hated."i4

If the person desiring to bequeath his estate was healthy, he may not increase or decrease either the portion of the firstborn or that of any other heirs.

When does the above apply? When the person making the bequest uses the expression "inherit." If, however, he gives a present, his statements are binding. Accordingly, when a person apportions his estate verbally to his sons on his deathbed, his statements are binding even though he gave a greater portion to one, reduced the portion of another and equated the portion of the firstborn with that of his other sons. If, however, he used wording that speaks of "inheritance," his statements are of no consequence.

If, when apportioning his estate, a person wrote that he is giving his estate as a present, whether at the beginning, the middle, or the end, his statement is binding even though he also spoke of an inheritance. What is implied? The person said: "Have this-and-this field given to so-and-so, my son, and let him inherit it," "Let him inherit this-and-this field, have it given to him and let him inherit it," or "Let him inherit it and have it given to him." Since he mentioned a present, even though he spoke of an inheritance at the beginning and/or at the end of his statements, his words are binding. Similarly, if he was apportioning three fields to three different heirs, and he said: "May so-and-so inherit this-and-this field. This-and-this field should be given to so-and-so, and so-and-so should inherit this-and-this field," the intended recipients acquire the gifts even though wording indicating an inheritance was used with regard to one individual, and wording indicating a present was used with regard to another. This applies provided that the person making the bequest did not make a significant pause between his statements. If, however, he paused, he must mention giving a present with regard to all three individuals.

What is implied? If the wording mentioning a present was in the middle, he should say: "So-and-so, so-and-so, and so-and-so, should inherit this-and-this field, this-and-this field, and this-and-this field that I gave them as a present, and they should inherit it." If the wording mentioning a present was in the beginning, he should say: "May this-and-this field, this-and-this field, and this-and-this field be given to so-and-so, so-and-so, and so-and-so, and they should inherit it." If the wording mentioning a present was at the end, he should say: "May so-and-so, so-and-so, and so-and-so, inherit this-and-this field, this-and-this field, and this-and-this field that I gave to them as a present."

Although a husband's right to inherit his wife's estate is a Rabbinic decree, our Sages reinforced their words and gave them the strength of Scriptural Law. Hence, a stipulation in which the husband waives his right to her inheritance is not effective unless he made this stipulation while the woman was consecrated, as we have explained in Hilchot Ishut.

According to Scriptural Law, a gentile inherits his father's estate. With regard to other inheritances, we allow them to follow their own customs.

A convert does not inherit the estate of his father, a gentile. Nevertheless, our Sages ordained that he be able to inherit the estate as he was entitled previously, lest he return to rebellion against G-d. It appears to me that a stipulation can be made with regard to this inheritance, for a gentile is not obligated to accept our Sages' ordinances. A gentile does not inherit the estate of his father, a convert, nor does one convert inherit another convert's estate, neither according to Scriptural Law nor according to Rabbinic Law.

Our Sages did not derive satisfaction from a person who gives his property to others, taking it away from his heirs. This applies even when the heirs do not conduct themselves properly toward him. Nevertheless, the recipients acquire everything that was given to them. It is an attribute of piety for a pious person not to act as a witness with regard to a will in which property is being taken from an heir. This applies even when the property is being taken from a son who does not conduct himself properly, and being given to a brother who is wise and who conducts himself properly.

Although a Jew converts out of the faith, he retains the right to inherit the estates of his Jewish relatives as before. If, however, the court sees fit to make him forfeit his money and penalize him by preventing him from receiving the inheritance so as not to strengthen his hand, they have that power. If he has children " among the Jewish people, the inheritance due their father, the apostate, should be given to them. This is the custom that is always followed in the West.

Our Sages commanded that a person should not differentiate between his children in his lifetime, even with regard to a small matter, lest this spawn competition and envy as happened with Joseph and his brothers.

Heirs are not given their inheritance until they bring clear proof that the person whose estate they are inheriting did in fact die. Even if they heard that he died, or gentiles mentioned that he died in the course of conversation, despite the fact that this is sufficient for license to be given for the person's wife to remarry and to receive the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, the heirs do not receive their inheritance on this basis.

When a woman comes and states: "My husband died," although her testimony is accepted and she is given license to remarry and to receive the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, the heirs do not receive their inheritance on this basis. If she testifies: "My husband died," and is married by his brother, the brother receives the deceased's estate on the basis of her testimony. This is derived from Deuteronomy 25:6: "He will assume the name of his deceased brother," and he has assumed his position.

When a person drowned in a body of water that has no end, and witnesses testify that he drowned in their presence and all traces of him were lost, his heirs may inherit his estate on the basis of their testimony, despite the fact that, at the outset, his wife is not permitted to remarry in this situation. Similarly, if witnesses come and testify that they saw a person fall into a lions' or tigers' den, they saw him crucified with birds eating from his body, he was pierced in battle and died, or he was killed, but his face was not recognizable, but there were definitive signs on his body and they were identified - with regard to these and similar situations, if all traces of the person were lost afterwards, the heirs may assume possession of the inheritance because of such testimony, although the person's wife is not given license to marry. I maintain that our Sages were stringent concerning these matters only because of the severity of the prohibition involving karet involved. With regard to financial matters, by contrast, if witnesses testify with regard to matters that we can presume will lead to death, saying that they saw these matters, all traces of the person are lost, and afterwards it is heard that he died, we allow the heirs to assume possession of the estate on this basis. This is the standard practice followed on an everyday basis in all courts of law. We have not heard about anyone who rules differently regarding this matter.

When a report was heard that a person who had been captive died, and the heirs assumed possession of his estate and divided it among themselves, we do not expropriate it from their possession. A similar law applies when a report is heard about the death of a person who fled because of danger to his life." If, however, a report was heard that a person who voluntarily left his city died, and the heirs assumed possession of his estate and divided it among themselves, we do expropriate it from their possession unless they bring proof that this person died.

The court is obligated to take responsibility for the property belonging to a person who was taken captive or one who fled because of mortal danger. What do they do? They entrust all the movable property to a person deemed trustworthy by the court for safekeeping. They give possession of the landed property to relatives who are fit to inherit it, so that they would work the land and care for the property until they know whether the person died or he comes. When the person who was taken captive or who fled comes, we evaluate the increase in value brought about by the relatives who were granted trusteeship and the benefit they received according to the norms applying to sharecroppers in that region. Why does the court not appoint a guardian at all times, both for movable property and for landed property, until the owners come or until it is definitely known that they died? Because the court is not obligated to appoint guardians for adults who are intellectually mature.

When a person was taken captive or fled because of danger and left standing grain to reap, or grapes, dates or olives to harvest, the court takes possession of their property and appoints a guardian who will reap or harvest this produce and sell it. The money is then entrusted to the court for safekeeping together with the remainder of the movable property. Afterwards, the relative is given possession of the property as stated in the previous halachah. This procedure is followed because if the relative were given the land at the outset, he might harvest this produce - for it is already as if it had been reaped - and consume it. This concept also applies with regard to courtyards, inns and stores that are fit to be rented out, do not need work, for here is no difficulty in tending to them, and they are usually not given out in a sharecropping agreement. We do not place them in the possession of an heir, for he would collect the rent and consume it. What is done instead? The court appoints a collector and has the rent placed in the court until the heir brings proof that the owner died or until the owner comes and takes his property.

A relative is never given possession of property other than fields, gardens, vineyards and the like. In these properties, he is considered as a sharecropper. This measure is instituted so that the properties will not be ruined and be left fallow and desolate.

If someone voluntarily departed [from his place of residence] and left his property and it is unknown where he went or what happened to him, [the court] does not give his estate over to a relative [of his who stands to inherit it]. If, however, [the relative] takes possession [of the estate on his own, the court] does not remove [the relative from the estate]. The court is not required to tend to [such an abandoned estate] nor to appoint [for it] a guardian, neither for real estate nor for movables, for he voluntarily departed and left his property. How should this [abandoned] property be treated legally? The movables remain with the one in whose possession they are till [the owner] comes and claims them or until he dies and the heirs claim [them].

With regard to landed property in which he left someone dwelling, we do not collect rent from him. If there is a field or a vineyard left to a sharecropper, it should remain as he left it until he comes. If he left a field or a vineyard fallow, it should be left fallow. The rationale is that he willingly caused the loss of his property, and when a person willingly forfeits his property, we are not required to return it.

If we hear a report that the person who had left voluntarily died, the court collects all the movable property belonging to him and entrusts it to a person whom they consider faithful. They give the fields and vineyards to a relative to care for as a sharecropper, until the heirs bring clear proof that the owner died or until the owner comes.

When the [court designates] a relative [to attend] to the properties of the captive or fleer [about whom it is suspected that they are deceased], or to the properties of the one who departed voluntarily, about whom it was heard that he is deceased, [the court] does not [appoint] a minor [to attend the properties] lest he cause a loss to the properties. [The courts also] do not [appoint] a relative [to attend in a sharecropping arragnement] to the property of a minor, lest [the relative] will [take advantage of the minor's inexperience and falsely] claim, "This [property] is my share that belongs to me through my own inheritance." Even a relative of a relative is not [given the property to attend, because of this concern]. What is an example [of this law]? [If] there were two brothers, one an adult and one a minor, and the minor was taken captive or fled, [the court] does not [appoint] the adult [brother as a sharecropper] of [the minor's] field, since the minor [brother] cannot protest [effectively if] the [adult] brother takes possession [of the field] and after [some] years claims, "This is my portion that I received in my own inheritance and it is in my possession because of [my own] inheritance." Even a nephew of this minor who was taken captive is not given the property [in a share-cropping arrangement], lest he say that, "I inherited this portion because of my [own] father."

No relative is ever given possession of the property of a minor, not even a person whose family connection stems from one's maternal brother, who is not fit to inherit. This is an extra safeguard. Even if there is a document recording the division of the estate, whether homes or courtyards, the property should not be given to the relative. Even if the relative states: "Write a document stating that I received the field as part of a sharecropping agreement," he should not be given the field. Perhaps the documents will be lost, and after a long period the person will claim that he received it as an inheritance, or that he received it as an inheritance from a relative who received it as an inheritance. An incident once occurred concerning an old woman who had three daughters. The old woman and one daughter were taken captive. A second daughter died and left a son below the age of majority. The Sages said: We do not give the property to the remaining daughter in a sharecropping agreement, for perhaps the elderly woman died and thus one third of the estate would belong to the minor, and we do not give a relative property belonging to a minor. Similarly, we do not give the property to the minor. For perhaps the old woman is still alive, and the property of a person taken captive should not be given to a minor. "What should be done instead? Since a guardian must be appointed for the half designated for the minor, we appoint a guardian for the old woman's entire estate." Afterwards, it was reported that the older woman died. Our Sages said: "The remaining daughter should receive the third that is her portion of the inheritance. The minor should receive the third that is his portion of the older woman's estate. And a guardian should be appointed for the third that belongs to the daughter in captivity, because of the portion of it that the minor might receive. For if the daughter in captivity also dies, the minor would receive one half of her third." Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.

The brothers that did not yet divide their inheritance from their father, but rather they are all using what their father left them together, they are considered like partners for every matter [related to the inherited estate]. Likewise other heirs [to an estate] are considered partners with regard to the estate of the one they inherit. And whenever any of them engaged in [profitable] transactions using the money [of the estate], the profit goes to the middle [i.e. is shared].

When there were heirs above majority and others below majority, and those above majority improved the estate, the increment is split equally. If they said: "See the estate that our father left us. We will work it and benefit from the increase," the persons who brought about the increase are entitled to it. This applies provided the increase comes about because of the expenses undertaken by those persons. If the value of the estate increased on its own accord, that increase is shared equally.

Similar laws apply if the wife of the deceased was also his relative and had a right to inherit the estate together with her sisters or her cousins. If she increased the value of the estate, the increase is shared equally. If she said: "See the estate that my husband left me. I will work it and benefit from the increase," should she increase the value of the estate through investments she made, the increase belongs to her.

The following rules apply when a person inherits his father's estate, improves its value by planting trees and building structures, and afterwards he discovers that he has brothers in another country. If they are minors, the increase in value is divided equally. If they are above majority, since he did not know that he had brothers, he is given a portion as if he was a sharecropper." Similarly, if a brother took possession of property belonging to a minor and improved it, he is not given a portion as if he were a sharecropper. Instead, the increase of the entire estate is divided equally, because he did not have permission to make use of the property.

The following rule applies when one of the brothers took money from the inheritance and engaged in commerce with it. If he is a great Torah scholar who ordinarily does not abandon his Torah study for one moment, the profits are given to him. For he would not abandon his Torah studies to engage in commerce for the sake of his brothers.

The following laws apply when a king appoints one of the brothers who share in the father's estate as a tax collector, an accountant who supervises the influx and efflux of the king's monies, or to another one of the positions in the king's service. If the son was appointed for his father's sake - i.e., his father was renowned for this skill, and the king said: "Let us appoint his son in his stead in order to act graciously to the orphans," the portion that the son who receives the appointment receives and any wages he earns in this task should be shared among all the brothers. This ruling applies even if that son is very wise and fit to be appointed on his own merit. If the king appointed him on his own merit, his wages are his alone.

The following laws apply when one of the brothers was carrying out transactions on behalf of the household and purchased servants as his own individual property, or lent money to others and had the promissory note written to him alone. If he says: "The money that I lent or with which I purchased the servants is my own. It came to me as an inheritance from my maternal grandfather, I found an ownerless object, or a present was given to me," he is required to verify the authenticity of his statements. Similar laws apply when a married woman was carrying out transactions on behalf of the household and deeds of purchase of servants and promissory notes were composed in her own name. If she says: "The money belonged to me. I received it as an inheritance from my father's family," she is required to verify the authenticity of her statements. Similar laws apply when a widow was carrying out transactions with funds belonging to orphans, and deeds of purchase and promissory notes were circulated in her personal name. If she claimed them as her own, saying: "It came to me as an inheritance, I found an ownerless object, or a present was given to me," she is required to verify the authenticity of her statements. If she said: "I took them from the resources of my dowry," her word is accepted. If, however, she does not have a dowry, or in the situation described in the previous clauses, she did not bring proof of her statement, everything is assumed to be owned by the heirs.

When does the above apply? When the brothers or the widow do not eat separately. When, however, they eat separately, we suspect that they saved from their food allowance. Hence, the other brothers must prove that the money was taken from the estate. Similarly, if the brother who was managing the funds died, the other brothers are required to bring proof that the money was taken from the estate, even though they did not eat separately.

The following laws apply when one of the brothers is in possession of a promissory note owed to his father. He is obligated to bring proof that his father gave him the note, signing and transferring a document attesting to the fact that the note was given as a gift, or that, at the time of his death, the father commanded that it be given to that brother. If the brother in possession does not bring proof of this nature, the note must be shared equally as part of the estate.

When does the above apply? With regard to brothers, because the prevailing assumption is that they take from each other. When, however, a promissory note is in the possession of another person who claims that the creditor gave it to him or that he purchased it from him, he may collect the debt. He is not required to bring proof of his claim.

If one of the brothers took 200 zuz from his share of the estate to study Torah or to study a profession, the other brothers may tell him: "If you do not live together with us, we will not give you a food allocation beyond what it would cost were you living with us." For the food expenses incurred by an individual living alone are much higher than they would be were he to live with others.

When a person died, leaving sons past majority and under majority, the older sons cannot be required to receive only what is allocated for the younger sons' living expenses. Nor may younger sons be required to receive only what is allocated for the older sons' food expenses. Instead, the estate should be divided equally. If the older brothers married after their father's death using the funds of the estate, the younger brothers may marry using the funds of the estate, and then divide it. If the older brothers married during their father's lifetime, we do not heed the requests of the younger brothers who say: "Let us marry using the funds of the estate, as you married." Instead, whatever the father gave the older brothers is considered as a present.

The following laws apply when a father married off one of his sons and made a feast for him, paying for the expenses himself. If a wedding gift was sent to this son during the father's lifetime, should the wedding gift have to be repaid after the father's death, it should be repaid by the estate as a whole. If, however, the brother paid for the expenses of the wedding feast from his own resources, the brother who received the gift must repay it from his portion alone.

When the father sent a wedding gift to a friend in the name of one of his sons, when that wedding gift is repaid to that son, it is his alone. If, however, the father sent the wedding gift in the name of his sons without making any specification, when it is repaid, it should be repaid to the estate as a whole. The person to whom the wedding gift was sent is not required to return it unless all the brothers rejoice together with him, for they are all members of the wedding party and the gift was sent in all of their names. Therefore, if he rejoiced with only several of them, he need return only the portion appropriate for those with whom he rejoiced. The money he repays is shared by the estate as a whole.

When the oldest of the brothers dresses and garbs himself in fine raiment, he may purchase these garments from the funds of the estate if this brings his brothers benefit, i.e., because of his fine clothing, his words are heeded by other people.

When two brothers divided an estate and then a third brother came from overseas, or when three brothers divided an estate and then a creditor came and expropriated the portion of one of them, the division is nullified. They should return and divide the remainder equally. This applies even if originally one brother took land and the other cash.

When, before his death, a person commanded that so-and-so be given a palm tree or a field from his property, but the brothers divided the estate without giving that person anything, their division is negated. What should they do? The entity concerning which the deceased commanded should be given to that person, and then they should divide the estate anew.

When brothers divide an estate, we evaluate the clothes they are wearing. We do not evaluate the clothes that their sons and daughters are wearing that they purchased with the funds of the estate. Similarly, the clothes that their wives are wearing are considered as if they have already been acquired by them. When does the above apply? With regard to weekday garments. With regard to Sabbath and festival garments, we evaluate what the women and children are wearing.

The following law applies when a person died leaving some orphans who are past majority, and others who are below majority. If they desired to divide their father's estate so that the older brothers could receive their portion, the court appoints a guardian for the minors and chooses a good portion for them. Once they come of age, they may not protest the division, because it was made by the court. If, however, the court erred in its evaluation of the estate's worth and reduced their portion by a sixth, they may issue a protest. In that instance, a new division is made after they come of age.

When a person dies, leaving some orphans who are past majority and others who are below majority, he must appoint a guardian before his death, who will care for the portion of the minors until they come of age." If the father does not appoint such a guardian, the court is obligated to appoint a guardian for them until they come of age. For the court acts as the parents of the orphans.

If the dying person ordered: "Give the minor's portion of my estate to him. Let him do whatever he wants with it," he has the license to deal with his own estate in this manner." Similarly, if the dying person appointed a minor, a woman or a servant as the guardian for the minors, he has the license to deal with his own estate in this manner. A court, by contrast, should not appoint a woman, a servant, a minor or an unlearned person who is suspect to violate the Torah's prohibitions' as a guardian. Instead, they should seek out a faithful and courageous person who knows how to advance the claims of the orphans and bring arguments on their behalf, one who is capable with regard to worldly matters to protect their property and secure a profit for them. Such a person is appointed a guardian over the minors whether or not he is related to them. If he is a relative, however, he should not take control of the landed property.

When the court appointed a guardian and afterwards heard that he was eating, drinking and making other expenses beyond what he could be expected to, they should suspect that he is using the resources of the orphans. They should remove him from his position and appoint someone else. If, however, the guardian was appointed by the orphan's father, he should not be removed in such a situation; it is possible that he found an ownerless article. If, however, witnesses come and testify that he is ruining the orphans' estate, he is removed from his position.The Geonim agreed that he should be required to take an oath in such a situation, for he is causing the orphans a loss. Similarly, when a guardian was appointed by the orphans' father who had a praiseworthy reputation, was known to be upright and to pursue the mitzvot, and he became a glutton and a drunkard and began following paths that arouse suspicion, or became reckless with regard to vows and the shade of theft, the court is required to remove him from his position and require him to take an oath. Afterwards, they appoint an appropriate guardian. These matters are dependent on the perception of the local judge. For each and every court must act as the parents of the orphans.

When a minor attains majority, even if he eats and drinks excessively, ruins his estate and follows an undesirable path, the court does not withhold his property from him, nor does it appoint a guardian, unless his father or the person whose property he inherited ordered that the property not be given to him unless he conducts himself uprightly and successfully, or that it not be given to him until later. A person who is mentally or emotionally unstable or a deaf-mute are considered as minors, and a guardian should be appointed for them.

Money belonging to orphans that was left to them by their father does not require a guardian. What, instead, is done with it? We search for a person who owns property that can be expropriated by a creditor and that is of high quality. This person should be trustworthy, one who heeds the laws of the Torah, and who was never placed under a ban of ostracism. He is given the money in the presence of the court to invest in a manner that will most likely lead to a profit and will not likely lead to loss. Thus, the orphans will derive benefit from the investment of the money. Similarly, if such a person does not have landed property, he should give bars of gold that do not have any identifying marks as security. The court takes the security and gives him the money to invest in a manner that will most likely lead to a profit and will not likely lead to loss. Why does he not give golden utensils or golden jewelry as security? For perhaps these articles belong to another person. We fear that in the event of the investor's death, that other person will claim these articles by identifying them with signs. They will then be given to him if the judge knows that the investor was unlikely to possess such articles. How much should be given to the orphans as profit? As the judges determine, a third of the profits, half of them, or even a fourth of them; if the judges ascertain that this is in the best interests of the orphans, such an arrangement is followed. If the court cannot find a person to give the money to invest in a manner that will not likely lead to loss and will most likely lead to a profit, they should use a small amount of the money to provide the orphans with their livelihood until they use the money to purchase land that they entrust to a guardian whom they appoint.

Movable property inherited by orphans should be evaluated and sold in the presence of a court. If the marketplace is close to their city of residence, we have the articles brought to the marketplace. They are sold and the proceeds added to the financial resources of the orphans."

If someone has in his possession [investment] beer that belongs to orphans [and there is a risk that] if he leaves it [in place] until it is sold, it may sour, but if he brings it to the market [there's a risk that] an accident may occur to it en route - he should treat it as he would treat his own [investment beer]. Likewise for all similar cases.

When the court appoints a guardian, he is given all the property of the minor: the landed property and the movable property that was not sold. He sells and purchases whatever he determines is necessary; he builds and he destroys; he rents, plants, sows and does whatever he thinks is in the best interests of the orphans. He should provide them with food and drink and provide them with their expenses according to their financial capacity and their social standing. He should not be overly generous with them, nor should he be overly parsimonious.

When the orphans come of age, the guardian should give them the property of the person whose estate they inherited. He does not have to give them an account of what he purchased and what he sold. Instead, he tells them: "This is what remains," and takes an oath holding a sacred article that he did not steal anything from them. When does this apply? When the guardian was appointed by the court. When, however, the guardian was appointed by the orphans' father or other relatives, he is not required to take an oath because of an indefinite claim. A guardian may dress and garb himself in a distinguished manner using the fund belonging to the orphans, so that he will be esteemed and his words will be heeded, provided that the orphans will benefit from the fact that he is esteemed and his words are heeded.

A guardian may sell animals, servants, maidservants, fields and vineyards belonging to the estate to provide sustenance for the orphans. He may not sell these assets and hoard the money. Nor may he sell fields to purchase servants, nor sell servants to purchase fields, for perhaps he will not be successful. He may, however, sell fields to purchase oxen to work other fields, for oxen are the fundamental element of the fields one possesses.

The guardian is not permitted to sell a field located far from the city and purchase a field close to the city, nor may he sell a poor field and purchase a good field, for perhaps his purchases will not be successful. Similarly, a guardian may not enter into a lawsuit to argue on behalf of the orphans with regard to a claim registered against them, with the intent of benefiting them. The rationale is that he may not be successful, and the claim against them will be substantiated.

The guardians are not permitted to grant Canaanite servants their freedom. They may not even take money from the servant so that he will be released. Instead, they sell the servants to others and take the money from them with the intent that they grant them their freedom. It is those purchasers who release the servants.

The guardians should separate terumah and the tithes from the crops of the orphans so that they can provide them with food. . For we may not feed the orphans forbidden substances. They may not, however, tithe or separate terumah so that the produce will be ready for use. Instead, they should sell it as tevel. Those who desire to make it ready for use will do so.

The guardians must make a lulav, a sukkah, tzitzit, a shofar, a Torah scroll, tefillin, mezuzot and a megillah on behalf of the orphans. The general principle is: All mitzvot that have a fixed measure - whether of Scriptural or Rabbinic origin - should be made available for them, although they are obligated in these mitzvot only as part of their education. We do not, however, levy charitable assessments against their property, even for the sake of the redemption of captives. The rationale is that such mitzvot have no limit to them.

When a person loses his intellectual faculties or becomes a deaf-mute, the court levies charitable assessments against his property if he has the means.

Although a guardian does not have to make an accounting, as mentioned above, he must keep a personal account, being extremely precise, so as not to incur the wrath of the Father of these orphans, He who rides upon the heavens, as Psalms 68:5-6 states: "Make a path for He who rides upon the heavens... the Father of orphans."