The Sanhedrin and the Penalties within Their Jurisdiction

It is a positive Scriptural commandment to appoint judges and enforcement officers in every city and in every region, as Deuteronomy 16:18 states: "Appoint judges and enforcement officers in all your gates." "Judges" refers to magistrates whose attendance is fixed in court, before whom the litigants appear. "Enforcement officers" refers to those equipped with a billet and a lash who stand before the judges and patrol the market places and the streets to inspect the stores and to regulate the prices and the measures. They inflict corporal punishment on all offenders. Their deeds are controlled entirely by the judges. Whenever a person is seen perpetrating injustice, they should bring his to the court, where he will be judged according to his wickedness.

We are obligated to appoint courts in every region and in every city only in Eretz Yisrael. In the diaspora, by contrast, we are not obligated to appoint courts in every region. This is derived from the continuation of the above verse: "Appoint...in all your gates which G-d your Lord is giving you for your tribes."

How many established courts should there be among the Jewish people and how many judges should there be in each court? First, a supreme court is established in the Temple. This is called the Great Sanhedrin. It was composed of 71 judges. This is derived from Numbers 11:16 which states: "Gather for Me seventy men from the elders of Israel." And Moses presided over them, as the verse continues: "And they shall stand there with you." Thus there are 71. The one who is of greatest knowledge is placed as the head over them. He acts as the Rosh Yeshivah. And he is called the nasi by the Sages in all sources. He assumes the position of Moses our teacher. The greatest among the remaining 70 is appointed as an assistant to the head. He sits at his right and is called av beit din. The remaining judges from the 70 sit before them and are seated according to their age and according to their stature. Whoever possesses greater wisdom than his colleague is seated closer than his colleagues to the nasi on his left. The members of the Sanhedrin sit in a semi-circle so that the nasi and the av beit din can see all of them. In addition, two courts of 23 judges each are appointed. One holds sessions at the entrance to the Temple courtyard. and the other at the entrance to the Temple Mount. In addition, in every city in Israel in which their are 120 or more adult males, we appoint a minor Sanhedrin. They hold court at the entrance to the city, as implied by Amos 5:15: "And you shall present judgment in your gates." How many judges should be in such a court? 23. The one who possesses the greatest wisdom is the chief justice and the remainder sit in a semi-circle so that the chief justice can see all of them.

When there are less than 120 adult males in a city, we appoint a court of three judges. For a court should never be less than three. In that way, there will be a majority and a minority if there is a difference of opinion in any particular judgment.

When a city does not possess two sages of great knowledge - 0ne fit to teach and issue rulings with regard to the entire Torah and one who knows how to listen diligently and knows how to raise questions and arrive at solutions - a court should not be appointed for it even though thousands of Jews live there.

A court that has two of the following: one who is capable of listening and one who is capable of expounding is a (valid) court. If there are three, it is a court of average esteem. If there are four who can expound, it is a wise court.

We sit three rows of Torah scholars before every minor Sanhedrin. In each row, there are 23 men. The first row is seated next to the Sanhedrin, the second row below it, and the third row below it. In each row, the scholars are seated in the order of their level of wisdom.

If there is a difference of opinion among the judges and it is necessary to grant semichah to one student to add to the number, the scholar of the greatest stature from the first row is granted semichah. The first scholar in the second row advances and sits in the first row to make up for the lack, and the first scholar in the third row advances and sits in the second row to make up for the lack. One of the remaining people is chosen and is seated in the third row. Similarly, if they must grant semichah to a second or third judge, they follow this pattern.

Whenever a Sanhedrin functions, two legal scribes should stand before them: one at the right and one at the left. One writes the arguments of those who seek to hold the defendant liable, and one writes the arguments of those who seek to exonerate him.

Why is a Sanhedrin appointed only in a city with a population of 120? So that there will be a Sanhedrin of 23 judges, three rows of 23 students each, ten sitters in the synagogue, two scribes, two court officers, two litigants, two witnesses, two witnesses who seek to invalidate the testimony of the witnesses, two witnesses who seek to invalidate the testimony of the second pair of witnesses and restore the validity of the first, two charity collectors, and a third to distribute these collections, a doctor who is a bloodletter, a scribe, and a teacher for young children. This reaches a total of 120.

We appoint to a Sanhedrin - both to the Supreme Sanhedrin and to a minor Sanhedrin - only men of wisdom and understanding, of unique distinction in their knowledge of the Torah and who possess a broad intellectual potential. They should also have some knowledge concerning other intellectual disciplines, e.g., medicine, mathematics, the fixation of the calendar, astronomy, astrology, and also the practices of fortune-telling, magic, sorcery, and the hollow teachings of idolatry, so that they will know how to judge them. We appoint to the Sanhedrin only priests, Levites, and Israelites of lineage of fine repute who can marry into the priesthood. This is derived from Number 11:16: "And they shall stand there with you." Implied is that they should resemble you, Moses in wisdom, the fear of heaven, and in lineage.

It is a mitzvah to have priests and Levites included in the Great Sanhedrin, as it is said: "You shall come before the priests and Levites." (Deut 17:9). And if none can be found, it is permissible to have a court of exclusively Israelite judges.

We should not appoint to a Sanhedrin a man of very old age or one who does not possess male physical attributes, for they possess the trait of cruelty, nor a man who is childless, so that the judges should be merciful.

A king of Israel may not be included in the Sanhedrin, for we are forbidden to disagree with him and repudiate his words. The High Priest, by contrast, may be included in the Sanhedrin if his knowledge makes him fitting.

Although the kings of the House of David may not be included in the Sanhedrin, they may sit in judgment over the people. Conversely, they may be called to judgment if a person has a complaint against them. The Kings of Israel, by contrast, may not serve as judges, nor may they be called to judgment. The rationale is that they do not humble themselves before the words of the Torah, and letting them serve as a judge or issuing a judgment against them may lead to a disaster.

Just as the judges of a court must be on the highest level of righteousness; so, too, must they be unsullied by any physical blemishes. An effort should be made that they all be white-haired, of impressive height, of dignified appearance, men who understand whispered matters, who understand many different languages so that the Sanhedrin will not need to hear testimony from an interpreter.

We are not careful to demand that a judge for a court of three possess all these qualities. He must, however, possess seven attributes: wisdom, humility, the fear of G-d, a loathing for money, a love for truth; he must be a person who is beloved by people at large, and must have a good reputation. All of these qualities are mentioned explicitly in the Torah. When relating Moses' statements concerning the appointment of judges, Deuteronomy 1:13 mentions: "Men of wisdom and understanding." This refers to wisdom. The verse continues: "Beloved by your tribes." This refers to those who are appreciated by people at large. What will make them beloved by people? Conducting themselves with a favorable eye and a humble spirit, being good company, and speaking and conducting their business with people gently. When relating Jethro's advice to Moses to appoint judges, Exodus 18:21 speaks of "men of power." This refers to people who are mighty in their observance of the mitzvot, who are very demanding of themselves, and who overcome their evil inclination until they possess no unfavorable qualities, no trace of an unpleasant reputation, even during their early manhood, they were spoken of highly. The phrase "men of power" also implies that they should have a courageous heart to save an oppressed person from the one oppressing him, as Exodus 18:21 continues: "G-d-fearing" - the intent is obvious. It mentions: "men who hate profit," i.e., people who do not become overly concerned even about their own money. They do not pursue the accumulation of money, for anyone who is overly concerned about wealth will ultimately be overcome by want. The verse continues: "men of truth," i.e., people who pursue justice because of their own inclination; they love truth, hate crime, and flee from all forms of crookedness.

Our Sages relate: From the Supreme Sanhedrin, they would send emissaries throughout the entire land of Israel to seek out judges. Whenever they found a person who was wise, sin-fearing, humble, modest, with a good reputation, and beloved by people at large, they have him appointed as a judge in his own city. From there, they promote him to the court which holds sessions at the entrance to the Temple Mount. From there, he is promoted to the court which holds sessions at the entrance to the Temple Courtyard, and from there, to the Supreme Sanhedrin.

When one of the judges of a court of three is a convert, the court is disqualified. His mother must be a native-born Jewess. If, by contrast, one of the judges is a mamzer, even if all three of them are mamzerim, they are acceptable to pass judgment. Similarly, if all of the members of a court of three were blind in one eye, it is acceptable. This does not apply with regard to a Sanhedrin. If, however, a judge is blind in both eyes, he is unacceptable to serve on all courts.

Although a court requires no less than three judges, it is permissible for one judge to adjudicate a case according to Scriptural Law, as Leviticus 19:15 states: "Judge your fellow countryman with righteousness." According to Rabbinic Law, however, there should be three judges. When two judges adjudicate a case, their ruling is not binding.

When a judge is an expert and he is known by many to possess such knowledge or if he was granted permission by the court, he may adjudicate a case alone. Nevertheless, he is not considered as a court. Even though it is permitted for such a person to issue judgments alone, it is a mitzvah from the Sages for him to have others sit in judgment with him, for our Sages said: "Do not act as a judge alone, for there is only One who judges alone."

A person may execute judgment himself if he has the power to do so. If he acts according to the dictates of our faith and according to law, he is not obligated to take the trouble to come to the court. This applies even if he would not suffer any financial loss if he would delay and bring the matter to the court. Consequently, should the other litigant lodge a complaint against him and bring him to court, if the court investigates and discovers that he acted according to law, i.e., the decision which he arrived at was true, we do not abrogate his decision.

Although a court of three is considered as a complete entity, whenever there are more judges, it is praiseworthy. It is preferable to make a decision with 11 judges than with ten. All the judges who sit in court must be Torah scholars and of appropriate character.

It is forbidden for a wise man to sit in judgment until he knows with whom he will be sitting. This restraint is observed lest he be coupled with men who are unsuitable. Thus he will be part of "a band of traitors," and not part of a court.

Until when should the judges hold session? A minor Sanhedrin and a court of three should hold sessions from after the morning service until the end of the sixth hour of the day. The supreme Sanhedrin, by contrast, would hold sessions from the time of the slaughter of the morning sacrifice until the offering of the afternoon sacrifice. On Sabbaths and on festivals they would hold sessions in the House of Study on the Temple Mount.

The High Court of 71 judges was not required to sit all together in their place in the Temple. Instead, when it was necessary for them to gather together, they would all gather together. At other times, whoever had private affairs would tend to his concerns and then return. The above applies provided there would be no less than 23 judges in attendance whenever they were sitting. If a judge needs to leave, he should look at his colleagues who remain. If there are 23 remaining, he may leave. If not, he should not leave until another comes.

A court should not begin adjudicating a case at night. According to the Oral Tradition, this concept was derived as follows: Based on Deuteronomy 21:5 which mentions: "Every dispute and every blemish," an equation is established between the adjudication of disputes and blemishes. Just as blemishes are viewed only during the day; so, too, disputes should be adjudicated only during the day.

Similarly, we do not listen to the testimony of witnesses or validate the authenticity of legal documents at night. With regard to cases involving monetary law, if the judges began hearing the matter during the day, it is permitted for them to conclude the judgment at night.

The division of an inheritance resembles a judgment, for with regard to them, Numbers 35:29 states: "For the statutes of judgment." Therefore inheritances are not divided at night.

When two people enter to visit a person who is deathly ill, if he makes statements dividing his estate in their presence, they may record his statements, but they may not adjudicate the division of the estate. They were three, if they desire, they may record his statements, or they may adjudicate the division of the estate. When does the above apply? During the day. During the night, they may record his statements, but they may not adjudicate the division of the estate.

Whenever a suitable court among the Jewish people sits in judgment, the Divine Presence rests among them. Accordingly, the judges must sit in awe and fear, wrapped in tallitot, and conduct themselves with reverence. It is forbidden to act frivolously, to joke, or to speak idle matters in court. Instead, one may speak only words of Torah and wisdom.

Whenever a Sanhedrin, a king, or an exilarch appoints a judge who is not fitting and/or is not learned in the wisdom of the Torah and is not suitable to be a judge - even if he is entirely a delight and possesses other positive qualities - the person who appoints him violates a negative commandment, as Deuteronomy 1:17 states: "Do not show favoritism in judgment." According to the Oral Tradition, we learned that this command is addressed to those who appoint judges. Our Sages declare: "Perhaps a person will say: 'So and so is attractive, I will appoint him as a judge,' 'So and so is strong, I will appoint him as a judge,' 'So and so is my relative, I will appoint him as a judge,' or "So and so knows all the languages, I will appoint him as a judge.' This will lead to those who are liable being vindicated and those who should be vindicated held liable, not because the judge is wicked, but because he does not know Torah law. Therefore the Torah states: "Do not show favoritism in judgment." Our Sages also declare: "Whoever appoints a judge who is not appropriate for the Jewish people is considered as if he erected a monument, as implied by Deuteronomy 16:22: "Do not erect a monument which is hated by G-d, your Lord." If he is appointed instead of a Torah scholar, it is as if one planted an asherah, as Ibid.:21 states: "Do not plant an asherah or any other tree next to G-d's altar." And our Sages interpreted Exodus 20:20: "Do not make gods of silver and gods of gold together with Me" to mean "Do not appoint a judge because of silver and gold." This refers to a judge who was appointed because of his wealth alone.

Whenever a judge pays money in order to be appointed, it is forbidden to stand in his presence. Our Sages commanded that he be denigrated and derided. And our Sages declare: "Consider the tallit with which he wraps himself as the saddle blanket of a donkey."

This was the manner of conduct of the sages of the previous generations. They would flee from being appointed to a court and would undergo extreme pressure not to sit in judgment until they knew that there was no other person as appropriate as they were and that if they would refrain from participating in the judgment the quality of the legal system would be impaired. Even so, they would not sit in judgment until the people at large and the elders would compel them and implore them to do so.

At least one of the members of the Supreme Sanhedrin, a minor Sanhedrin, or a court of three must have received semichah (ordination) from a teacher who himself had been given semichah. Our teacher, Moses ordained Joshua by placing his hands upon him, as Numbers 27:23 states: "And he placed his hands upon him and commanded him." Similarly, Moses ordained the 70 judges and the Divine presence rested upon them. Those elders ordained others, and the others still others in later generations. This tradition continued until the Talmudic era, when the Sages had received ordination one from the other in a chain extending back to the court of Joshua, and to the court of Moses. A person who is ordained by the nasi and one ordained by another ordained judge have the same status, even if that ordained judge never served in a Sanhedrin.

How is the practice of semichah practiced for all time? The person conveying ordination does not rest his hands on the elder's head. Instead, he is addressed by the title of Rabbi and is told: "You are ordained and you have the authority to render judgment, even in cases involving financial penalties.

The semichah which ordains elders as judges may be conveyed only by three individuals. One of the three must have received semichah from others as explained.

The term Elohim can be applied only to a court which received semichah in Eretz Yisrael alone . They are wise men who are fit to render judgment who were scrutinized by a court within Eretz Yisrael which appointed them and conveyed semichah upon them.

At first, whoever, had received semichah would convey semichah on his students. Afterwards, as an expression of honor to Hillel, the elder, the Sages ordained that semichah would not be conveyed upon anyone unless license had been granted by the nasi. They also ordained that the nasi should not convey semichah unless he is accompanied by the av beit din, and that the av beit din should not convey semichah unless he was accompanied by the nasi. The other elders could convey semichah themselves after receiving license from the nasi, provided they were accompanied by two others. For semichah cannot be conveyed by less than three judges.

Semichah may not be conveyed upon elders in the diaspora even if the judges conveying semichah received semichah in Eretz Yisrael. Even if the judges conveying semichah were in Eretz Yisrael and the elders to receive semichah were in the diaspora, they should not convey semichah. Needless to say, this applies if the judges conveying semichah were in the diaspora and the elders to receive semichah were in Eretz Yisrael. If both of them were in Eretz Yisrael, semichah may be conveyed even though the recipients are not in the same place as those conveying semichah. Instead, the judges conveying semichah send to the elder or write to him that he has been given semichah and that he has permission to adjudicate cases involving financial penalties. This is acceptable, because both of them are located in Eretz Yisrael. The entire area of Eretz Yisrael which the Jews who left Egypt took possession of is fit to have semichah conveyed within it.

Judges who themselves were granted semichah may convey semichah on many individuals - even 100 - at one time. King David once conveyed semichah on 30,000 individuals on one day.

Such judges may appoint whoever they desire for particular matters, provided he is fit to adjudicate all matters. What is implied? A court has the authority to give semichah to a remarkable judge who is fit to issue rulings with regard to the entire Torah and limit his authority to the adjudication of financial matters, but not to what is forbidden and permitted. Conversely, they may grant him authority with regard to what is forbidden and permitted, but not to adjudicate cases involving financial matters. Or they may give him license with regard to adjudicate both such manners, but not laws involving financial penalties, or to rule with regard to financial penalties, but not to rule that a blemish disqualifies a firstborn animal. Or they may give him license merely to absolve vows, to judge stains, or to rule only within other similarly limited parameters.

Similarly, the judges conveying semichah have permission to give the person receiving semichah license to judge only for a specific time, telling him: "You have permission to judge or issue rulings until the nasi arrives here," or "...as long as you are together with us in this city," or to issue other similar restrictions.

When a sage of remarkable knowledge is blind in one eye, he is not given semichah with regard to matters of financial law although he may adjudicate such cases. The rationale is that he is not fit to judge all matters. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.

If there was only one judge in Eretz Yisrael who possessed semichah, he should call two other judges to sit with him and they should convey semichah on 70 judges at one time or one after the other. Afterwards, he and these 70 should join together to make up the Supreme Sanhedrin and grant semichah to others to make up other courts. It appears to me that if all the wise men in Eretz Yisrael agree to appoint judges and convey semichah upon them, the semichah is binding and these judges may adjudicate cases involving financial penalties and convey semichah upon others. If so, why did the Sages suffer anguish over the institution of semichah, so that the judgment of cases involving financial penalties would not be nullified among the Jewish people? Because the Jewish people were dispersed, and it is impossible that all could agree. If, by contrast, there was a person who had received semichah from a person who had received semichah, he does not require the consent of all others. Instead, he may adjudicate cases involving financial penalties for everyone, for he received semichah from a court. The question whether semichah can be renewed requires resolution.

When a court received semichah in Eretz Yisrael and then departed to the diaspora, they may judge cases involving financial penalties in the diaspora in the same manner as they judge such cases in Eretz Yisrael. For the Sanhedrin exercises judicial authority in Eretz Yisrael and in the diaspora, provided the judges have received semichah in Eretz Yisrael.

The exilarchs in Babylon function instead of the kings. They have the authority to impose their rule over the Jewish people in all places and to judge them whether they consent or not. This is derived from Genesis 49:10: "The staff will not depart from Judah" - this refers to the exilarchs of Babylon.

Any judge who is fit to adjudicate cases and was given license to serve as a judge by the exilarch has the authority to act as a judge throughout the entire world, whether in Eretz Yisrael or in the diaspora. Even though either or both of the litigants do not desire to argue the case before him, they are required to do so despite the fact that he does not have the authority to adjudicate cases involving financial penalties. Any judge who is fit to adjudicate cases and was given license to serve as a judge by the court in Eretz Yisrael has the authority to act as a judge throughout Eretz Yisrael and in the cities which are located on its boundaries even though the litigants do not desire to argue the case before him. In the diaspora, by contrast, the license granted him does not afford him the authority to compel the litigants to appear before him. Although he has the sanction to adjudicate cases involving financial penalties in the diaspora, he may adjudicate such cases only when the litigants consent for him to judge. He does not have the authority to compel the litigants to accept his rulings unless he is granted such authority by the exilarch.

When a person is not fit to act as a judge because he is not knowledgeable or because he lacks proper character and an exilarch transgressed and granted him authority or the court erred and granted him authority, the authority granted him is of no consequence unless he is fit. To cite a parallel: When a person consecrates an animal with a physical blemish to be sacrificed on the altar, the holiness does not encompass it.

A king may not be enthroned except by the High Court of 71 judges. A minor Sanhedrin for every tribe and every city may be appointed only by the High Court of 71 judges. A tribe that has been led to apostasy in its entirety, a false prophet, or a case in which the High Priest might be liable for capital punishment, may be judged only by the High Court of 71 judges. Financial cases involving a High Priest, by contrast, may be adjudicated by a court of three. Similarly, the determination of a rebellious elder or a city led to apostasy and the decision to cause a woman suspected of adultery to drink the waters which test her may only be done by the High Court. Similarly, the decisions to extend the city limits of Jerusalem and the limits of the Temple Courtyard, to enter a voluntary war, and to measure the distance between a corpse and the nearby cities may be done only by the High Court of 71 judges. These concepts are derived from Exodus 18:22: "All the major matters will be brought to you."

Cases involving capital punishment may not be judged by a court with less than 23 judges, i.e., a minor Sanhedrin. This applies not only to instances where humans are judged with regard to capital punishment, but also when animals face such judgment. Therefore an ox which is stoned to death and an animal used in bestial sexual practices is condemned to death only by a court of 23 judges. Even when a lion, a bear, or a cheetah that has been domesticated and which has owners kill a human, it is executed based on the judgment of a court of 23. When, however, a snake kills a human, even one ordinary person may kill it.

When a person who spreads a malicious report concerning his wife, at the outset, the case is judged by a court of 23. For there is the possibility of a capital case arising if the husband's claim proves true and the woman is to be stoned to death. If the husband's claim is not substantiated, and the woman's father comes to demand payment of the fine, the matter may be judged by a court of three. What is the source which teaches that capital cases may be judged only by a court of 23? Although this is a matter conveyed by the Oral Tradition, there is an allusion to it in the Torah. Numbers 35:24-25 states: "And the congregation shall judge... and the congregation shall save...." Implied is that there must be the possibility of a congregation judging - and condemning him to death - and a congregation saving - and seeking his acquittal. Now a congregation is no less than ten. Thus there are at least 20 judges. We add three judges so that there not be an equally balanced court and to allow the possibility of "following after the inclination of the majority."

Lashes are decided upon by a court of three judges. Even though the person may die when lashes are administered to him.

Decapitating the calf is performed by five judges.

The enlargement of the month is decided upon by three judges.

The enlargement of the year is decided upon by seven judges. All of the above must possess semichah as we explained.

Cases involving financial penalties, robbery, personal injury, the payment of double for a stolen article, the payment of four and five times the value of a stolen sheep or ox, rape, seduction, and the like may be adjudicated only by three expert judges who have received semichah in Eretz Yisrael, Other cases of financial law, e.g., admissions of financial liability and loans, do not require an expert judge. Even three ordinary people, or even one expert judge may adjudicate them. For this reasons, cases involving admissions of financial liability, loans, and the like may be adjudicated in the diaspora. Although a court in the diaspora is not referred to as Elohim, they carry out the charge of the court of Eretz Yisrael. This charge does not, however, give them license to adjudicate cases involving financial penalties.

The courts of the diaspora adjudicate only cases that commonly occur and which involve financial loss, e.g., admissions of liability, loans, and property damage. Matters that occur only infrequently, by contrast, even though they involve financial loss, e.g., an animal that injures another, or events that commonly occur, but do not involve financial loss, e.g., a double payment for theft, are not adjudicated by the judges of the diaspora. Similarly, all the financial penalties which our Sages imposed against a person who punches a colleague, slaps a colleague, or the like are not adjudicated by the judges of the diaspora. Whenever a person is required to pay half the damages for the destruction of property the matter is not adjudicated by the judges of the diaspora, with the exception of the half payment for damages caused by pebbles propelled by one's animals. For that is a reimbursement for financial loss and is not a financial penalty.

Whenever the injuries a person suffers are evaluated by calculating his worth as one calculates the worth of a servant, the payment is not expropriated by the judges of the diaspora. Therefore if a person injures a colleague, compensation for the damages, the pain, and the embarrassment for which he is liable is not expropriated by the judges of the diaspora. Compensation for the inability to work and medical expenses is, by contrast, expropriated in the diaspora, because they involve a financial loss. The Geonim ruled in this manner and stated that it is a commonplace matter to expropriate compensation for the inability to work and medical expenses in the diaspora.

The judges of the diaspora do not exact payment when an animal injures a person, because this is an uncommon occurrence. When, by contrast, a person damages an animal belonging to a colleague, he must pay the complete damages to his colleague regardless of where this takes place, just as he is responsible if he ripped his garments, broke his utensils, or cut down his produce. Similarly, when an animal causes damage by eating or by treading, since its owner is forewarned that this is its inherent natural tendency, it is a common matter and the damages are expropriated by the judges of the diaspora. This applies whether it damaged another animal, e.g., it rubbed against it, it consumed produce that it would naturally eat or the like, or it damaged food or utensils by treading upon them in which instance he is obligated to pay full damages. Payment for all of these damages can be expropriated by the judges of the diaspora. If, however, an animal was not prone to cause damage, then it caused damages to the extent that the owner was warned, and then it caused damage again, e.g., it bit, it butted with its body, it lay down, it kicked, or it gored, these damages are not expropriated by the judges of the diaspora. The rationale is that there is no concept of the owner of an animal being forewarned in the diaspora. Even if an animal caused its owner to be forewarned in Eretz Yisrael, and then it was taken to the diaspora where it caused damage, the damages are not expropriated, because this is an uncommon occurrence.

Why is there no concept of warning an owner in the diaspora? Because testimony must be given against the owner in the presence of a court. And the concept of a court applies only with regard to judges who have been given semichah in Eretz Yisrael. Accordingly, if a court of judges from Eretz Yisrael were in the diaspora, just as they have the authority to judge laws involving financial penalties in the diaspora; so, too, testimony regarding an animal can be delivered in their presence in the diaspora.

When a person steals or robs, the principal can be expropriated by the judges of the diaspora. They do not, however, expropriate the double payment.

The judges of the diaspora do not expropriate payment in every situation where a person would be liable to make compensation based on his own statements. For the payment to a maiden's father for blemishing her virginity and for the embarrassment she suffers, and a person who must pay an atonement fee because his ox killed another person are situations where a person must make compensation, because of his statements. For example, he said: "I seduced so-and-so's daughter," or "My ox killed so-and-so." Nevertheless, such payments are not expropriated by the judges of the diaspora.

Judgments involving situations where a person's actions served as a direct cause of damage are not equivalent to laws involving k'nasot and they may be adjudicated by the judges of the diaspora.

Similarly, the laws applying to a person who gives money belonging to a colleague to gentiles - even if he merely threatens to do so - may be adjudicated by the judges of the diaspora.

The custom of the yeshivot of the diaspora is that even though they do not expropriate money due as k'nasot, they place the person who causes the damage under a ban of ostracism until he satisfies the plaintiff or goes with him to Eretz Yisrael to have the case adjudicated. Once the person who causes the damage pays the amount that he would be held liable for, the ban of ostracism is lifted whether the person who suffered the injury is appeased or not. Similarly, if the person who suffered the injury seizes an amount of property belonging to the person who causes the damage equivalent to the amount he would be awarded by the court, we do not expropriate it from his possession.

When one person is an expert judge and he is known by many to possess such knowledge, although he is allowed to judge cases involving financial law alone, an admission of liability made in his presence is not considered as an admission made in the presence of a court. This applies even if he possesses semichah. When, by contrast, a court is composed of three judges, even though they do not possesses semichah, and even if they are ordinary men and are not referred to as Elohim, an admission made in their presence is considered as an admission made in a court of law. Similarly, if a person denies an obligation in their presence and witnesses come and testify against him, he is established as one who has lied. He cannot offer another claim, as we have explained. The general principle is: With regard to the admission of financial responsibility, cases involving debts, and the like, their authority is the same as that of a court composed of judges possessing semichah with regard to all matters.

The following laws apply whenever a judge adjudicates a case involving financial matters and errs. If his error involves matters that are revealed and known - e.g., a law that is explicitly stated in the Mishnah or the Gemara, the ruling is reversed. The situation is returned to its original status and the judgment required by halachah is rendered. If it is impossible to return the matter to its original status, e.g., the person who unwarrantedly received the money traveled overseas, or he was a stubborn and strong person, the judge is not liable. Although he caused a loss, he did not have the intent of doing so. Similar laws apply if a judge ruled that a substance that was pure was impure, that an animal that was kosher was unacceptable and had it fed to the dogs, or the like.

Different principles apply if the judge errs in a case requiring a decision to be made by using one's logic to weigh alternative positions, for example, a case arouse involving the subject of a difference of opinion among the Sages of the Mishnah or the Sages of the Gemara where it was not explicitly stated whose opinion the halachah follows. The judge decided to follow one opinion without knowing it had already been universally established practice within the Torah community to follow the other view. In such a situation, if the judge was an expert who had been given license to adjudicate cases by the exilarch, or even if he had not been given such license, but the litigants voluntarily accepted him as their judicial authority, the ruling is reversed. The rationale is that he is an expert. If the ruling cannot be reversed, he is not liable to make restitution. This applies both to a judge who received permission from the exilarch or one received permission from a Jewish court to adjudicate cases in Eretz Yisrael, but not to serve as judge in the diaspora, as explained.

Different rules apply if the person who erred in a question of logical deduction was an expert judge, but he had not received license to adjudicate cases, nor was he accepted by the litigants as an authority, or was not an expert, but was accepted by the litigants to adjudicate their case according to Torah law. If he personally took property from one litigant and gave it to the other, his actions are irreversible and he should pay the damages from his own resources. If, however, he did not personally take the property from one and give it to the other, the decision should be reversed. If the decision cannot be reversed, he should pay the damages from his own resources.

When, however, a person is not an expert and was not accepted by the litigants adjudicates a case, even though he was given permission to act as a judge, he is considered as one of the men of force and not as a proper judge. Therefore, the judgment he renders is of no consequence. This applies whether he erred or whether he did not err. Either one of the litigants may withdraw and have the case adjudicated by a proper court. If such a judge erred and personally gave property from one litigant to the other, he is obligated to pay from his own resources. He may then regain the money from the litigant to whom he gave property unlawfully. If one litigant paid the other because of the ruling of such a judge and the recipient is unable to return the money or if the judge rendered an object ritually impure or gave meat that was kosher to the dogs to eat, the judge must bear the loss as is the law regarding anyone who causes damages. For such a person has the intent of causing damages.

When a judge errs and obligates a person who is not required to take an oath to do so, and in order to free himself from the obligation to take the oath, this person negotiated a compromise with the other litigant, the compromise may be revoked. Even though he affirmed the compromise with a kinyan, it is of no substance. He agreed to pay or to waive the other person's liability only to free himself from the oath to which the person who erred obligated him. And whenever a kinyan is carried out on the basis of an error, it is annulled. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

When two people are involved in a dispute concerning a judgment, one states: "Let us have the matter judged here," and the other says, "Let us ascend to the Supreme Court, lest these judges err and expropriate money contrary to the law," we compel the latter litigant to have the matter adjudicated locally. If he asks the judges: "Write down the rationale why you have rendered this judgment against me and give it to me, lest you have erred," they must write down their rationales and give him the transcript. Afterwards, they expropriate what he owes. If the local judges feel the need to ask for clarification regarding a matter from the Supreme Court in Jerusalem, they should write down their question and send it. After their inquiry, the judgment should be rendered in the local court on the basis of the answer written to them by the Supreme Court.

When does the above apply? With regards to judgments dependent on claims issued by both litigants or a situation when a lender desires to have the case adjudicated locally and the borrower says: "Let us go to the Supreme Court." If, by contrast, the lender says: "Let us go to the Supreme Court," we compel the borrower to ascend with the lender, as implied by Proverbs 22:7: "A borrower is a servant to the lender." Similarly, if a person claims that his colleague injured or damaged his person or his property or stole from him, and the plaintiff desires to ascend to the Supreme Court, the local court compels the defendant to ascend together with him. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

When does the above apply? When the person from who property was stolen, the person who suffered injury or damage, or the lender has witnesses or proof that support his claim. When, however, his claim is unsupported, we do not obligate the defendant to leave his locale. Instead, he takes an oath there and is freed of obligation.

Similar concepts apply in the present age, when there is no Supreme Court, but there are places where there are great sages whose expertise is renown and there are other places where there are scholars who are not on that level. If the lender says: "Let us go to this-and-this place in this-and-this land to have the case adjudicated by so-and-so, the great sage," we compel the borrower to go with him. This was the practice continually in Spain.

The following law applies when one of the litigants says: "Let so and so act as a judge for me," and the other litigant says: "Let so and so act as a judge for me." Together the two judges which were chosen by each of the litigants respectively choose a third judge and the three of them adjudicate the case for the two litigants. In this manner, a true judgment will emerge. Even if the judge chosen by one of the litigants is a great sage who has received semichah, the one litigant cannot compel the other litigant to have him adjudicate the case. Instead, he also chooses a judge he desires.

The following rules apply when a litigant accepts his own or an opposing litigant's relative or another person who is unacceptable to serve as a judge or a witness in his case. If he affirms his commitment with a kinyan, he cannot retract his consent. If he did not affirm his commitment with a kinyan, he can retract his consent until the case is concluded. Once the verdict is rendered and the unacceptable judge ruled in his verdict - or a verdict was rendered on the basis of the testimony of an unacceptable witness - that money should be expropriated, the litigant may not retract. The above laws also apply if a litigant accepted a person who is disqualified because he committed a transgression as two witnesses to testify concerning him or as a court of three judges to rule concerning his interests. Similarly, it applies regardless of whether he gave his consent at the risk of forfeiting rights and waiving a claim that he is pressing or he gave his consent at the risk of having to pay what the plaintiff demands of him because of the testimony of this unacceptable witness or because of the ruling of this unacceptable judge.

Similarly, the following rules apply when a person was obligated by a court to take an oath to a colleague and the person to whom the oath must be given state: "Take an oath on your own life, and be freed of liability," or "Take an oath on your own life that your claim is justified and I will give you everything that you claim." If he affirms his commitment with a kinyan, he cannot retract his consent. If he did not affirm his commitment with a kinyan, he can retract his consent until the case is concluded. Once the case is concluded and he took an oath as stipulated, he cannot retract and is obligated to pay.

Similar laws apply when a person was obligated to take a sh'vuat hesset and he reversed it and obligated the plaintiff. If he affirmed his consent with a kinyan or the plaintiff took the oath, the defendant cannot retract.

Similarly, when a person was not obligated to take an oath and yet he said: "I will take an oath in response to your claim," if he affirmed his statement with a kinyan, he cannot retract. If he did not affirm his statement with a kinyan, he has the right to retract until the judgment is concluded and he actually takes the oath, even though he made his commitment in court.

When a person was obligated by a court, and then brought witnesses or proof to vindicate himself, the judgment is rescinded and the case should be tried again. Although the judgment was already rendered, whenever he brings support for his claim, the judgment is rescinded. Even if the judges tell him: "Bring all the proofs that you have within 30 days," a litigant may have the judgment rescinded although he brings proof after 30 days. What can he do if he did not discover the proof within 30 days, but found it afterwards?

If, however, the litigant completed stating his claims, he cannot have the judgment rescinded. What is implied? The judges asked him: "Do you have witnesses supporting your claim?" He replied: "I do not have witnesses." "Do you have proof of your position?" "I do not have proof," he answered. In such a situation, if the court judged him and held him liable, the judgment is not rescinded. Although when he sees that he was being held liable, he declared: "So-and-so and so-and-so come forward and testify on my behalf" or he produced written proof from his money-belt, it is not significant. We do not pay any attention to his witnesses or his proof.

When does the above apply? When the proof was in his possession and the witnesses were together with him in the country. If, however, he said: "I have neither witnesses, nor proof," and afterwards, witnesses came from overseas or a leather satchel belonging to his father where legal documents were held had been entrusted to another person and that person came and supplied him with proof, he may call on these witnesses and/or this proof and have the ruling rescinded. Why may he have the ruling rescinded? Because he could claim: "The reason I said: 'I don't have any witnesses' and 'I don't have any proof is because they were not available to me." Whenever he could make such a claim and there is substance to his words, he is not considered to have completed stating his claims when he originally stated: "I have no witnesses...." He may bring the witnesses and/or proof and have the judgment rescinded. Accordingly, if he explicitly states: "I have no witnesses at all, neither here or overseas, nor any written proof, neither in my possession or in the possession of others," he cannot have the judgment rescinded.

When does the above apply? With regard to an adult who was held liable and then brought written proof or witnesses after completing the statement of his arguments. Different concepts apply, however, with regard to an heir who was a minor when the person whose estate he inherited died and a suit was lodged against him because of that person after he came of age. Even though he stated: "I have neither witnesses, nor proof," and after he departed from the court after being held liable, others told him: "We know testimony that favors your father that will cause this judgment to be rescinded," or "The person whose estate you inherited entrusted this written proof to me," he may bring the testimony or the proof immediately and have the judgment rescinded. The rationale is that a minor is not aware of all the proofs possessed by the person whose estate he inherited.

The following rules apply when a person affirmed his consent to the following agreement with a kinyan: If he does not come on this-and-this day and take an oath, his colleague's claim would be accepted and that colleague could take whatever he claims without taking an oath. Alternatively, if he does not come on this-and-this day, take an oath, and collect his due, he forfeits his right to the claim. Nothing is to be granted him and his colleague is released of liability. Should that day pass and he not come, the stipulation is binding and he forfeits his rights. If, however, he brings proof that he was held back by forces beyond his control on that day, he is not bound by his agreement. He may take an oath against the claim issued by his colleague as before. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

When a court reaches a split decision - some say that the defendant is not liable, and others say that he is liable, we follow the majority. This is a positive mitzvah of Scriptural origin, as Exodus 23:2 states: "Follow after the inclination of the majority." When does the above apply? With regard to financial matters and with regard to laws involving questions of what is forbidden and what is permitted, what is impure and what is pure and the like. With regard to capital cases, different laws apply if there is a difference of opinion whether the transgressor should be executed or not. If the majority rule to exonerate him, he is exonerated. If, however, the majority rules that he is guilty, he should not be executed until there are at least two more judges who hold him guilty than who exonerate him. According to the Oral Tradition, we learned that the Torah warned against this saying Ibid.: "Do not follow the majority to do harm." That is to say that if the majority are inclined "to do harm," i.e., to execute the defendant, you should not follow them until there is a significant inclination, and there is a majority of two judges who rule that he is guilty. This is implied by (Ibid.): "to follow the inclination of the majority and influence the judgment." A positive inclination may be made on the basis of a majority of one, a harmful inclination, on the basis of a majority of two. All of these concepts are based on the Oral Tradition.

The following laws apply when there is a difference of opinion within a court of three judges with regard to a monetary issue: If two say the defendant's claim should be vindicated and one says that he is liable, his claim is vindicated. If two say that he is liable and one says his claim should be vindicated, he is held liable. If one says that his claim should be vindicated and one says he is liable, or two say that his claim should be vindicated or that he is liable and the third judge says: "I do not know," we add another two judges. Thus five judges debate the matter. If three say the defendant's claim should be vindicated and two say that he is liable, his claim is vindicated. If three say that he is liable and two say his claim should be vindicated, he is held liable. If two say that his claim should be vindicated and two say he is liable, and the fifth judge says: "I do not know," we add another two judges. If, however, four say his claim should be vindicated or that he is liable and one says: "I don't know," or three say his claim should be vindicated and one says that he is liable, and the fifth says: "I don't know," we follow the majority. This applies whether the judge who says: "I don't know" is the same who said "I don't know" at the outset or another individual. If, in this situation as well, the opinions are evenly balanced and one says: "I don't know," or in any situation that there is a doubt, we continue to add two more judges until we reach 71 judges. If, after reaching 71, the issue is still unresolved, i.e., 35 hold him liable, and 35 wish to vindicate his claim and one says: "I don't know," they debate the matter until the judge who has not made up his mind sides with one of the opinions and thus there will be 36 who vindicate him or 36 who hold him liable. If neither that judge or another changes his opinion, the matter remains unresolved and the money is allowed to remain in the possession of its owner.

Whenever a judge says: "I don't know," he is not required to explain the rationale for his statements and explain the reason why he is in doubt. In contrast, a judge who rules that a litigant's claim is vindicated must state why he vindicates the claim, or if he holds him liable, he must state why he holds him liable.

When all the judges of a Sanhedrin begin their judgment of a case involving capital punishment and say that the defendant is liable, he is exonerated. There must be some who seek to exonerate him and argue on his behalf, but yet the majority hold him liable. Only then he is executed.

The following rules apply when there is a difference of opinion in a minor Sanhedrin. If twelve judges say that he should be exonerated and eleven say that he should be held liable, he is exonerated. If twelve say that he is liable and eleven say that he should be exonerated or eleven say that he should be exonerated and eleven say that he is liable, and one says: "I don't know," we add two judges. Even if there are twelve who wish to exonerate him and twelve who hold him liable, and one who one says: "I don't know," we add two judges. The rationale is that the judge who says: "I don't know," is considered as if he does not exist, for he cannot change his mind and explain why the defendant should be held liable. Thus after the addition, there are 24 judges aside from the person who says: "I don't know." If twelve say that he should be exonerated and twelve say that he is liable, he is exonerated. If eleven say that he should be exonerated and thirteen say that he is liable, he is liable. This applies even if one of the original judges says: "I don't know." For there are two more judges who rule that he is liable. If twelve say that he should be exonerated and twelve say that he is liable, we add two judges. And similarly, if the balance is not broken, we continue to add two judges until there is at least one more judge who rules that he should be exonerated or at least two more judges who rule that he should be held liable. If there are an even number of judges on both sides, and one says: "I don't know," or if the number of judges who rule that he is liable is only one more than those who rule that he should be exonerated, we continue to add judges until we reach 71. The following rules apply when the court reaches that size. If 36 say that he should be exonerated and 35 say that he is liable, he should be exonerated. If 36 say that he is liable and 35 say that he should be exonerated, they debate back and forth against each other until one of them sees the other's perspective and either exonerates him or holds him liable. If such a change in perspective does not take place, the judge of the greatest stature declares: "This judgment has become aged," and he is released. If 35 say that he is liable and 35 say that he should be exonerated, and one says "I don't know," we release him. If 34 say that he should be exonerated and 36 say that he is liable, and one says: "I don't know," he is held liable. For there is a majority of two judges who hold him liable.

When there is a difference of opinion in the Supreme Sanhedrin, whether with regard to a law involving capital punishment, monetary law, or other matters of Torah law, we do not add judges. Instead, they debate against each other and the ruling follows the majority. If their difference of opinion involves whether a person will be executed, they should debate against each other until they either exonerate him or hold him liable.

When one of the judges in a case involving capital punishment rules to acquit the defendant or to hold him liable, not because this is his own opinion which he arrived upon the basis of his own decision, but rather he was swayed after his colleague's words, he commits a transgression, as implied by Exodus 23:2: "Do not respond to a dispute with an inclination." According to the Oral Tradition, this command is interpreted to mean that, when the judges are determining the verdict, a person should not say: "It is sufficient for me to adopt so-and-so's understanding." Instead, he should say what he thinks himself.

Included in this interdiction is a prohibition against a judge who had proposed a rationale to exonerate a defendant in a capital case to propose a rationale to convict him. This is also implied by: "Do not respond to a dispute with an inclination." When does the above apply? In the give and take among the judges. At the time of the verdict even a judge who had proposed a rationale for acquittal may join the others who vote for conviction.

When a scholar offers a rationale for acquittal and then dies, we consider it as if he is alive and advocating this position.

If a judge says: "I can offer a rationale to acquit him" and then lost the power of speech or died before he could explain the rationale for acquittal, it is as if he does not exist.

When two judges mention one rationale, even if they cite different prooftexts, they are only counted as one.

According to the Oral Tradition, we learned that with regard to cases involving capital punishment, we do not ask the judge of the highest stature to render judgment first, lest the remainder rely on his opinion and not see themselves as worthy to argue against him. Instead, every judge must state what appears to him, according to his own opinion.

Similarly, with regard to cases involving capital punishment, we do not begin with a condemnatory statement, but rather one which points towards acquittal. What is implied? We tell the presumed transgressor: "If you did not commit the transgression concerning which testimony was given concerning you, do not fear the words of the witnesses.

When one of the scholars makes a statement with regard to a case involving capital punishment: "I can teach a rationale which would convict him," we silence him. If he states: "I can teach a rationale which will exonerate him," he is raised up and included in the Sanhedrin. If his words are of substance, we heed his statements and he never descends. If his words are not of substance, he does not descend from the court for that entire day. Even if the defendant himself says: "I can teach a rationale which will exonerate myself," we heed his statements and he is counted among the judges, provided his words are of substance.

When a court errs with regard to a case involving capital punishment and convict an innocent person, ruling that he is guilty, and later they discover a rationale that would require that the ruling be nullified and he be vindicated, they nullify the ruling and retry the case. If, however, they erred and acquitted a person liable to be executed, the judgment is not nullified and the case is not retried. When does the above apply? When they erred with regard to a matter that the Sadducees would not acknowledge. If, however, they erred with regard to a matter that the Sadducees acknowledge, we retry the case to convict him. What is implied? If they said that a person who has adulterous or incestuous anal intercourse is not liable and they released him, he is retried and executed. If, however, they said a person who merely entered the woman's anus with the crown of his organ is not liable, and they released him. He is not retried. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.

What are the differences between cases involving financial matters and cases involving capital punishment? Cases involving financial matters are adjudicated by three judges, while cases involving capital punishment are adjudicated by 23. In cases involving financial matters, we begin the judgment either with a statement to the defendant's detriment or his advancement, while with regard to cases involving capital punishment, we begin with a statement which points towards acquittal, as we explained, and we don't begin with one which points toward his conviction. In cases involving financial matters, we make a decision based on a majority of one whether it is to the defendant's detriment or in his support, while with regard to cases involving capital punishment, we acquit him on the basis of a majority of one, but convict him only when there is a majority of two. In cases involving financial matters, we retry a judgment whether doing so is to the defendant's detriment or his advancement, while with regard to cases involving capital punishment, we retry a judgment if it will lead to acquittal, but not if it will lead to conviction, as we explained. In cases involving financial matters, everyone - both the judges or the scholars - is entitled to advance any rationale whether it is to the defendant's detriment or in his support. With regard to cases involving capital punishment, by contrast, everyone - even the students - may advance a rationale leading to acquittal, but only the judges may advance a rationale leading to conviction. In cases involving financial matters, a person who advanced a rationale to the defendant's detriment may change his mind and advance a rationale in his support. Conversely, one who advanced a rationale in the defendant's support may change his mind and advance a rationale to his detriment. With regard to cases involving capital punishment, by contrast, a judge who advanced a rationale for conviction may advance a rationale for acquittal, but a judge who advanced a rationale for acquittal may not change his mind and advance a rationale for conviction. At the time the judgment is being rendered, however, he may vote to be counted among those favoring conviction, as we explained. Cases involving financial matters are adjudicated during the day, but the verdict may be rendered at night. Cases involving capital punishment are adjudicated during the day and the verdict must also be rendered during the day. The verdict in cases involving financial matters is rendered on that very day, whether it is to the defendant's detriment or in his support. With regard to cases involving capital punishment, by contrast, a verdict of acquittal is rendered on that very day, but a verdict of conviction is not rendered until the following day.

For this reason, we do not adjudicate cases involving capital punishment on Fridays, nor on the days preceding festivals. The rationale is that the defendant may be convicted and it is impossible to execute him on the following day, but it is forbidden to postpone his execution until after the Sabbath. Hence, we imprison him and begin his trial on Sunday.

According to Scriptural Law, cases involving financial law can be adjudicated at all times, as Exodus 18:22 states: "They shall judge the people at all times." According to Rabbinic Law, cases are not adjudicated on Fridays.

All of the same laws that apply to cases involving capital punishment apply also to cases involving lashes and exile, except that cases involving lashes are adjudicated by three judges. None of these distinctions are made with regard to the judgment of an ox that is stoned except for one, that the judgment is adjudicated by 23 judges.

The laws which pertain to a mesit, a person who entices others to serve false divinities, differ from those pertaining to others liable for capital punishment. We hide witnesses to observe his act. He does not need a warning as must be given to others who are executed. If he departed from the court after being acquitted, and someone said: "I know a rationale that will lead to his conviction," he is returned and retried. If he was sentenced to death and someone said: "I know a rationale that will lead to his release," he is not retried. The court does not advance arguments in defense of a mesit. An elderly person, a eunuch, and a person who does not have sons are placed on the court which judges him, so that they will not have mercy on him. For cruelty to those who sway the people after emptiness brings mercy to the world, as implied by Deuteronomy 13:19: "so that G-d will turn away from His fierce anger and grant you mercy."

With regard to cases involving monetary matters and similarly questions of ritual purity and impurity, the judge of the greatest stature gives his ruling first and the other judges hear his ruling. With regard to laws involving capital punishment, we begin from the side. The words of the judge of the highest stature are not heard until the end.

With regard to cases involving monetary matters and similarly questions of ritual purity and impurity, a father and his son and a teacher and his student are counted as two judges. With regard to cases involving capital punishment, lashes, and the sanctification of the moon and the declaration of a leap year, a father and his son and a teacher and his student are counted as one.

The concept that a father and a son are counted as one or as two applies when one is a member of the Sanhedrin and the other was one of the students attending the court who said: "I can contribute a rationale that will lead to his vindication," or "...to his being held liable." We listen to his words and enable him to participate in the debate, and he is counted in the polling of the judges.

At the time of the final judgment, relatives are not included. For judges who are related to each other are not acceptable to rule together, as will be explained.

When a student was wise and understanding but is lacking sufficient knowledge of the tradition, his master may convey to him the tradition which he requires with regard to these laws and then he may serve as a judge even in cases regarding capital punishment.

All individuals are acceptable to judge cases involving financial laws, even a convert, provided his mother is a native-born Jewess. A convert may judge a fellow convert even if his mother is not a native-born Jewess. Similarly, a mamzer and a person who is blind in one eye are acceptable to adjudicate financial disputes. Cases involving capital punishment, however, may be judged only by priests, Levites, and Israelites with lineage acceptable to marry into the priesthood. not one of them may be blind even in one of his eyes, as we explained.

How are cases involving capital punishment judged? When the witnesses come to the court and say: "We saw this person violate such-and-such a transgression," the judges ask them: "Do you recognize him? Did you give him a warning?" If they answer: "We do not recognize him," "We are unsure of his identity," or "We did not warn him," the defendant is exonerated.

Both a Torah scholar and a common person need a warning, for the obligation for a warning was instituted only to make a distinction between a person who transgresses inadvertently and one who transgresses intentionally, lest the person say: "I transgressed inadvertently." How is a warning administered? We tell him: "Desist..." or "Do not do it. It is a transgression and you are liable to be executed by the court..." or "to receive lashes for it." If he ceases, he is not liable. Similarly, if he remains silent or nods his head, he is not liable for punishment. Even if he says: "I know," he is not liable for punishment until he accepts death upon himself, saying: "It is for this reason that I am doing this." In such a situation, he is executed. He must commit the transgression directly after receiving the warning, within the time to offer a salutation. If he waits longer than that, a second warning is necessary. The warning is acceptable whether it was administered by one of the witnesses or by another individual, even a woman or a servant. Even if the transgressor hears the voice of the person administering the warning, but does not see him, and even if he himself administers the warning, he should be executed.

If the witnesses say: "He was given a warning and we recognize him," the court intimidates them. How do they intimidate them in cases involving capital punishment? They say: "Maybe you are speaking on the basis of supposition, or on the basis of hearsay, one witness from another witness, or maybe you heard from a trustworthy person?" "Maybe you do not know that ultimately we will subject you to questions and crossexamination?" "Know that cases involving capital punishment do not resemble those involving financial matters. With regard to financial matters, if there is any deceit, a person can make financial restitution and receive atonement. With regard to capital punishment, the victim's blood and the blood of his unborn descendants are dependent on the murderer until eternity. As it is said with regard to Cain, 'The voice of the blood of your brother is crying out.' The Torah uses the plural form of the word blood, implying his blood and the blood of his descendants. "For this reason, man was created alone in the world. This teaches us that a person who eliminates one soul from the world is considered as if he eliminated an entire world. Conversely, a person who saves one soul is considered as if he saved an entire world. "All the inhabitants of the world are created in the image of Adam, the first man, and yet no one person's face resembles the face of his colleague. Therefore each person can say: 'The world was created for me.' "If you might say: 'Why should we enter this difficulty?' It is written Leviticus 5:1: 'If he witnessed, observed, or knew....' If you will say: 'Why should we become responsible for shedding the defendant's blood? It is already said: 'At the destruction of the wicked, there is joy. ' If they stand by their word, the witness of the greater stature is brought into the court alone and he is questioned and cross-examined, as will be explained in Hilchot Edut. If his testimony appears to be factual, the second witness is brought into the court, and he is questioned as the first one was. Even if there are 100 witnesses, each one is questioned and cross-examined. If the testimony of all the witnesses is accurate, we begin the judgment with a statement that tends to acquittal as stated. We tell him: "If you did not transgress, do not fear their words." Then we judge him. If grounds for acquittal are found, he is released. If they do not find grounds for acquittal, the defendant is imprisoned until the following day. On that day, the Sanhedrin divides itself into pairs and they examine the judgment. They eat little and do not drink wine throughout that entire day. They debate the matter throughout the night, each one with his comrade or alone. On the morrow, they come to the court early. Each of those who voted for acquittal state: "I am the one who voted for acquittal yesterday, and I still favor that ruling." Each of those who voted for conviction state: "I am the one who voted for conviction yesterday, and I still favor that ruling," or "...I have changed my mind and I vote for acquittal." If they erred in that regard, or did not know who voted for conviction or who voted for acquittal on the basis of one rationale and hence are considered only as one, as we explained, the two scribes of the court remind them, for they write down the rationale given by each one of them. We begin the judgment. If they find a rationale to acquit him, they acquit him. If it is necessary to add judges, they add. If there is a majority of judges who seek to convict him, and he is convicted, he is taken out to be executed immediately. The place where the court conducts the execution is outside the court and removed from it, as implied by Leviticus 24:14: "Take the blasphemer outside the camp...." It appears to me that it should be approximately 6 mil , the distance between the court of Moses our teacher which was before the entrance of the Tent of Meeting and the extremities of the camp of the Jewish people.

After a defendant has been convicted, we do not delay the matter, but instead execute him immediately. Even if a woman is pregnant, we do not wait until she gives birth. Instead, we give her a blow against the womb so that the fetus will die first. If, by contrast, she is already in the throes of labor, we wait until she gives birth. Whenever a woman is executed, it is permitted to benefit from her hair.

When a person is being taken out to be executed and a sacrifice of his has already been slaughtered, we do not execute him until the blood of his sin offering or guilt offering has been sprinkled on the altar for his sake. If, however, he was already convicted and the animal designated as a sacrifice has not been slaughtered already, we do not wait until the sacrifice is brought, for we do not prolong his judgment.

When a person is sentenced to death, he is taken out of the court and led to the place of execution. One person stands at the entrance to the court with flags in his hands and a horse distant from him. An announcement is made before him: "So-and-so is being taken to be executed in this-and-this manner, because he violated this prohibition, in this place at this time. So-and-so and so-and-so are the witnesses. If there is anyone who knows a rationale leading to his acquittal, let them come and tell us." If a person says: "I know a rationale that leads to his acquittal," the person with the flags waves them and the rider on the horse races to bring the defendant back to the court. If a factor leading to his acquittal is found, he is released. If not, he is taken back for execution. If the defendant himself says: "I know a rationale that leads to my acquittal," even though there is no substance to his words, he is returned to the court once or twice. We suspect that perhaps out of fear, he could not present his arguments and when he is returned to the court, he will be composed and will state a substantial reason for acquittal. If they return him to the court, and it is discovered that his words are without substance, for a third time, he is taken to be executed. If on this third occasion, he also says: "I know a rationale that leads to my acquittal," we return him to the court - even several times - if his words are substantial. For this reason, two scholars are sent to accompany him and listen to his statements on the way. If his words are of substance, he is returned to the court. If not, he is not returned. If an argument leading to his acquittal is not discovered, he is brought out for execution. The witnesses are the ones who execute him in the manner for which he is liable. When a murderer is not executed by his witnesses, all other people are obligated to execute him. Approximately ten cubits from the place of execution, he is told to confess. For all those who are executed should confess. For if they confess, they receive a portion in the world to come. If he does not know how to confess, we tell him: "Say 'may my death atone for my sins.' Even if he knows that he was the victim of false testimony, he should confess in this manner.

After he confessess, he is given a granule of frankincense dissolved in a cup of wine, so that he will lose control of his mind and become drunk. Afterwards, he is executed in the manner for which he is liable.

The wine, the frankincense, the stone used to execute a person stoned to death, the sword used to decapitate a defendant, the cloth used for strangulation, the pole on which a blasphemer or an idolater is hung after being executed, the flags that are waved before those being executed, and the horse that runs to save him all are paid for from communal funds. Anyone who wants to donate them may donate them.

The court does not attend the funeral of the executed person. Whenever a court has a person executed, they are forbidden to eat for the remainder of that entire day.. This prohibition is included in the interdiction (Leviticus 19:26 : "Do not eat upon the blood." A meal of comfort is not given the relatives of those executed by the court. This too is derived from the above verse. These acts are forbidden, but they are not punishable by lashes.

When a person is held liable for the death penalty during Chol HaMoed, the court prolong their analysis of his judgment. The judges eat and drink. Afterwards, shortly before sunset, they conclude the judgment and have him executed.

Mourning rites are not held for those executed by the court. Their relatives come and inquire about the well-being of the witnesses and the well-being of the judges to show that they have no bad feelings against them in their hearts and that they acknowledge that their judgment was true. Although they do not observe the mourning rites, they do observe aninut. For aninut is solely a reflection of the feeling in one's heart.

When a person was sentenced in one court, fled, and brought to another court, we do not reopen his case. Instead, wherever two people will arise and state: "We testify that this person was sentenced to death in this court and that so-and-so and so-and-so are those who testified against him," he is executed. When does the above apply? To a murderer. Other people who are obligated to be executed are not given that punishment until the witnesses who originally testified against them come and testify that they were sentenced to death. The witnesses must then execute the convicted themselves. The above applies provided testimony is given in a court of 23 judges.

When a person was sentenced to death by a court in the diaspora and fled to a court in Eretz Yisrael, we reopen his case at least. If he comes before the same court who sentenced him in the diaspora, we do not reopen his case, even though they sentenced him in the diaspora and now they are in Eretz Yisrael.

Four types of execution were given to the court: stoning, burning, decapitation with a sword, and strangulation. Stoning and burning are explicitly mentioned in the Torah. Moses our teacher taught that whenever the Torah mentions the death sentence without any further description, the intent is strangulation. When a person kills a colleague, he should be decapitated. Similarly, the inhabitants of a city that goes astray are executed by decapitation.

Every one of these forms of execution involves a positive commandment for the court to execute a person with the form of death for which he is liable. A king has permission to execute using only one of them - by decapitation.

Whenever a person is obligated to be executed and the court did not execute him, the judges negated the observance of a positive commandment, but do not transgress a negative commandment. There is one exception: a sorcerer. If they do not kill him, they violate a negative commandment, as Exodus 22:17 states: "Do not allow a sorcerer to live."

Stoning to death is a more severe form of execution than burning. Burning is a more severe form than decapitation, and decapitation is more sever than strangulation. When a person is liable to be executed with two different forms of execution, he should be executed with the more severe form. This applies whether he committed two transgressions, one after the other, or he committed one transgression which involved two death penalties. Even if he was sentenced to be executed for the less severe form of execution and afterwards, committed a transgression punishable by the more severe form, should he be convicted, he is executed in the more severe manner.

Both men and women are executed in these four ways.

Whenever people who are all liable to be executed are mixed together, each one of them is executed in the less severe manner.

When a person who has been sentenced to death becomes mixed together with others and it is unable to distinguish him from them, and similarly, when a person who was not convicted becomes mixed together with others who have been convicted and sentenced to death and it is unable to distinguish him from them, they are all released from liability. The rationale is that we complete the judgment of a person only when he is present.

When a convicted person fights for his life and it is impossible for the court to have him bound so that he can be executed in the manner in which he is obligated to die, the witnesses should kill him in any manner they can, for he has been sentenced to death. No one else, however, has the right to kill him first. For this reason, if the hands of the witnesses are cut off, the convicted person is released. If, however, at the outset, the witnesses did not have hands, the convicted person should be executed by others. When does the above apply? To all people who are liable to be executed by the court with the exception of a murderer. When, however, a murderer has been sentenced by the court every person should pursue him using any means possible to kill him until he is executed.

All of the people executed by the court should not be buried in their family plots together with the entire Jewish people. Instead, the court sets aside two different burial plots: one for those who are stoned and those who are burnt, and the other for those who are decapitated and strangled. This is a halachah conveyed by the Oral Tradition. When the flesh of the corpse decomposes, they would gather the bones and rebury them in their ancestral plots. The relatives may make a coffin and shrouds in which to rebury the bones.

The court must be very patient with regard to laws involving capital punishment and ponder the matter without being hasty. Whenever a court executes a person once in seven years, it is considered a savage court. Nevertheless, if it happens that they must execute a person every day, they do. They do not, however, judge two cases involving capital punishment on the same day. Instead, one is judged immediately, and the other on the following day. If, however, the two people committed the same sin and are punished with the same form of execution, e.g., a man and a woman who committed adultery, we judge both of them on the same day. Therefore if an adulterer had relations with the daughter of a priest, since he is executed by strangulation and she is burnt to death, they are not executed on the same day.

Cases involving capital punishment are adjudicated only when the Temple is standing. It is also necessary that the High Court hold its sessions in the Chamber of Hewn Stone in the Temple. This is derived from the statements of Deuteronomy 17:12 with regard to a rebellious elder: "who refuses to heed the priest." According to the Oral Tradition, it was taught: "At a time when there is a priest offering sacrifices on the altar, cases involving capital punishment are adjudicated." This applies provided the court is holding sessions in its place.

At the outset, when the Temple was constructed, the Supreme Sanhedrin would hold session in the Chamber of Hewn Stone in the Courtyard of the Israelites. The place where the judges would sit was not consecrated. For only kings of the House of David were permitted to sit in the Temple Courtyard. When the moral character of the Jewish people declined, the Sanhedrin went in exile. They traveled to ten different places in exile, the last being Tiberias. Afterwards, until the present age, the Supreme Sanhedrin has never been convened. And it is an accepted tradition, that in the future, the Sanhedrin will first convene in Tiberias, and from there, they will proceed to the Temple.

40 years before the destruction of the Temple, capital punishment was nullified among the Jewish people. Although the Temple was still standing, since the Sanhedrin went into exile and were not in their place in the Temple, these laws could not be enforced.

In the era when cases involving capital punishment were adjudicated in Eretz Yisrael, such cases could also be adjudicated in the diaspora, provided the members of that court received semichah in Eretz Yisrael. As we have already stated, the Sanhedrin exercises judicial authority in Eretz Yisrael and in the diaspora.

How is the mitzvah of stoning carried out? Four cubits from the place of execution, we remove the clothes of the person to be stoned; we do, however, cover his sexual organ in front. A woman is not executed naked. Instead, she is allowed to wear one cloak. The place of execution was two storeys high. The convicted person ascends there with his hands tied, together with his witnesses. One of the witnesses pushes him at his loins from behind, he falls over, landing on his heart on the ground. If he dies because of this, they have fulfilled their obligation, for Exodus 19:13 states: "Or he will be cast down or stoned," creating an equation between a person who has a stone fall upon him with one who himself falls on the earth. If he does not die after this fall, the witnesses pick up a stone that is so large it requires two people to carry it. The second witness lets go and the first casts the stone on the convicted person's heart. If he dies because of this, they have fulfilled their obligation. If not, he should be stoned by the entire Jewish people, as Deuteronomy 17:7 states: "The hand of the witnesses shall be raised up against him first to execute him, and the hand of the entire nation afterwards."

An idolater should be stoned at the gateway to the place where he performed the transgression. If the majority of the population of a city are gentiles, he should be stoned at the entrance to the court. This concept has been conveyed by the Oral Tradition. The term "to your gates" where Deuteronomy 17:8 states that an idolater should be executed refers to the gate where he performed the transgression and not the gate where he was sentenced.

The mitzvah of executing a person by burning is performed as follows: The convicted is placed in fertilizer until his knees. A firm cloth is placed within a soft cloth and they are wound around his neck. The two witnesses are positioned on either side and each pull the cloths toward himself until the convicted opens his mouth. Tin, lead, and the like are melted down and then poured into his mouth. The molten metal descends and burns his innards.

The mitzvah of decapitation is performed as follows: We cut of his head with a sword as the kings do.

The mitzvah of executing a person by strangulation is performed as follows: The convicted is placed in fertilizer until his knees. A firm cloth is placed within a soft cloth and they are wound around his neck. Each of the two witnesses pulls the cloths toward himself until the convicted expires.

It is a positive commandment to hang a blasphemer and an idolater after they have been executed, as implied by Deuteronomy 21:23: "A person who is hung is cursing G-d." This refers to the blasphemer. With regard to an idolater, Numbers 15:30 states: "He blasphemes G-d." A man is hung, but a woman is not hung, as implied by Deuteronomy 21:22: "When a man has sinned and is condemned to die, after he is executed, you shall hang him...."

How is the mitzvah of hanging carried out? After the convicted is stoned, a beam is implanted in the ground with a rafter protruding from it. The two hands of the corpse are intercrossed and he is hung close to sunset. He is released immediately. If not, a negative commandment is transgressed, as Ibid.:23 states: "Do not let his corpse tarry overnight on the beam."

It is a positive mitzvah to bury the persons executed by the court on the day of their execution, as Ibid. states: "For you shall surely bury him on that day." Not only those executed by the court, but anyone who leaves a deceased overnight without burying him transgresses a negative commandment. If, however, a burial is delayed overnight to honor the deceased, e.g., to bring a coffin or shrouds, there is no transgression.

We do not hang a person on a tree that is still growing from the ground, only from one which has been detached. In this way, the tree will not have to be chopped down before the person's burial. For the tree on which the executed is hung is buried with him, so that it will not be an unfavorable remembrance, causing people to say: "This is the tree on which so-and-so was hung." Similarly, the stone, the sword, and the cloths used for execution are all buried near the deceased, but not in his actual grave.

The Torah mentions 18 people who are executed by stoning. They are: a) a person who engages in relations with his mother, b) with his father's wife, c) his daughter-in-law, d) a maiden who was consecrated, e) a man involved in homosexual relations, f) a man who sodomizes an animal, g) a woman who has relations with an animal, h) a blasphemer, i) an idolater, j) a person who gives his descendants to Molech, k) a person who divines with an ov, l) a person who divines with an yidoni, m) a person who entices others to worship idols, n) the people who lead a city to idol worship, o) a sorcerer, p) a person who desecrates the Sabbath, q) a person who curses his father or his mother, and r) a wayward and rebellious son.

There are 10 people who are executing by burning: a) a priest's daughter who commits adultery, b) a person who has relations with his daughter, c) with his daughter's daughter, d) with his son's daughter, e) with his wife's daughter, f) with the daughter of his wife's daughter, g) with the daughter of his wife's son, h) with his mother-in-law, i) with the mother of his mother-in-law, and j) with the mother of his father-in-law. The latter prohibitions apply if the man has relations with them during his wife's lifetime. After his wife's death, these relations are punishable by kerait alone like other incestuous relationships.

There are two who are decapitated: a murderer, and the inhabitants of a city enticed to idolatry.

There are six who are executed by strangulation: a) an adulterer, b) a person who wounds his father or mother, c) a person who kidnaps a fellow Jew, d) a rebellious elder, e) a false prophet, and f) a person who prophecies in the name of a false deity. Thus the court executes individuals for a totality of 36 prohibitions.

Just as it is a mitzvah to execute a person who is obligated to be executed; so, too, it is a positive commandment to give lashes to a person who is obligated to receive lashes, as Deuteronomy 25:2 states: 'And the judge should cause him to fall and will have him beaten in his presence.' Although transgressions punishable by lashes are adjudicated by three judges, lashes are equivalent to execution.

Lashes are administered in the present age in any place, according to Scriptural Law in the presence of three judges who were given semichah. This punishment is not, however, administered in the presence of three ordinary people.

All the lashes that are administered by the judges of the diaspora in every place are 'stripes for rebellious conduct.'

A person is not punished by lashes unless his transgression was observed by witnesses and they administered a warning to him. The witnesses are questioned and cross-examined in the same manner as they are in cases involving capital punishment. The following laws apply when a person transgresses a negative commandment that can be corrected by a positive commandment. Before the transgressor violates the negative commandment, witnesses must administer a warning, telling him: 'Do not perform this activity. If you perform it and do not fulfill the positive commandment associated with it, you will receive lashes.' If, after receiving such a warning, the transgressor violates the commandment and does not fulfill the positive commandment, he receives lashes. Although the warning involved uncertainty, - for if he fulfills the positive commandment, he will be released unpunished - an uncertain warning is considered as a warning.

The following rules apply when a person performs a prohibited act that is punishable both by lashes and execution by the court, e.g., he slaughtered an animal and its offspring on the same day as a sacrifice to a false divinity. If he was warned that his act is punishable by execution, he is stoned to death and is not given lashes, for he is obligated for a more severe judgment. If he was given a warning only for lashes, he receives lashes.

There is no need for the two witnesses who obligate a person for lashes, to observe other than at the time the transgression is committed. The prohibition itself, by contrast, can be established on the basis of one witness. What is implied? One witness said: 'This substance is fat from the kidneys, 'These grapes were grown together with grain in a vineyard, 'This woman is a divorcee or a zonah." If a person partook of this food or had relations with these women after he was warned, he receives lashes, despite the fact that the essence of the prohibition was established by one witness. When does the above apply? When he did not contradict the witness when he established the prohibition. If, however, he said: "This is not fat," "She is not a divorcee," and then he partook of the food or had relations with the woman after his denial, he does not receive lashes until the prohibition was established through the testimony of two witnesses.

If the person remained silent when the one witness testifies to establish the prohibition, and after he violated the transgression and was warned, he issued a claim to contradict the witness, his words are not accepted. Instead, he receives lashes.

How are lashes administered? The transgressor's two hands are bound to a pillar on either side. The community attendant takes hold of his clothes and pulls downward. If they tear at the front, that is satisfactory; if the tear at the sides, that is satisfactory. He continues until he uncovers his heart. The rationale is that he should not administer lashes on his garment, as indicated by Deuteronomy 25:2: "And he shall strike him," i.e., "him," and not his garment. A stone is placed behind him. The attendant who administers the lashes stands on it. He holds a strap of calf's leather that is folded into two, and a second one, making four, and two straps of donkey leather attached to it that rise and descend with it. The strap is a handbreadth wide and it is long enough to reach the transgressor's belly. The handle of the strap is a handbreadth wide.

The man administering the lashes should be heavily endowed with knowledge and minimally endowed with physical power. He should lift up the strap with both his hands and strike him with one hand, with all his power. He should strike him with a third of the lashes on his front, i.e., on his breast, between his nipples, and two thirds of the lashes on his back, one third on one shoulder and the other third on the other shoulder.

The person receiving the lashes should not stand, nor should he sit. Instead, he should bend over as Deuteronomy 25:2 states: "The judge shall cast him down." The verse continues: "And he shall strike him before him." This implies that the attention of the judge should be focused upon him. He should not look at other matters while having him lashed. From this, we learn that two people are never lashed at the same time.

Through the time the person is being lashed, the judge of the highest stature reads the passage Deuteronomy 28:58 "If you are not careful to heed and to perform... in an extraordinary way, G-d will increase the blows against you and your offspring...." He should have the intent to complete the passage with the lashes. If the lashes are not completed, he should return to the beginning of the passage and read it again - and again if necessary until all the lashes are administered. The judge of intermediate stature counts the lashes and the third judge tells the attendant before each blow: "Strike him." Throughout the entire time he administers the lashes, he does so following the judge's instruction.

If the person receiving the lashes dies while receiving them, the attendant administering them is not liable. If he added another blow to the estimate arrived at by the judges and the person receiving the lashes dies, the attendant is exiled. If he does not die, the attendant is held liable for transgressing a negative commandment, as Deuteronomy 25:3 states: "Do not add." Similarly, any other person who strikes a colleague violates a negative commandment. If a person who was given permission by the Torah to strike a colleague is warned not to strike him more than is required to punish his wickedness, certainly, this applies with regard to other people. For this reason, whenever a person strikes a colleague - even a servant - with a blow for which the victim would not receive a p'rutah in damages, the offender should be lashed. If, however, the blow is worth a p'rutah in damages, the offender is not lashed. The rationale is that he is obligated to make financial restitution, and a person never both receives lashes and is required to make financial restitution, as explained previously in several places.

How are lashes administered to a person liable to receive them? According to his strength, as indicated by Deuteronomy 25:2: "According to his wickedness by number." The number 40 stated in the following verse is mentioned to teach that more than 40 lashes are never administered even if the person is as healthy and as strong as Samson. When, by contrast, a person is weak, the amount of lashes is reduced. For if a weak person is given many lashes, he will certainly die. Therefore our Sages said: that even a very healthy person is given only 39 lashes. For if accidentally an extra blow is administered, he will still not have been given more than the 40 which he was required to receive.

When the court estimates how many lashes the condemned is able to bear, the estimation is made in numbers that are divisible by three. If it was estimated that he could bear 20, we do not say that he should be given 21, so that the number of lashes will be divisible by three. Instead, he is given 18 lashes. If the court estimated that he could bear 40 lashes, but when they began lashing him, they saw that he was weak and that he would not be able to bear more than the nine or twelve lashes that he already received, he is released. If they estimated that he could bear twelve and after he was lashed, they saw that he was strong and could bear more, he is released. He is not lashed more than the original estimate.

If, on a specific day, it was estimated that he could bear twelve lashes to be given on that day, but he was not lashed until the following day, and on the following day, he is able to bear eighteen, he receives only twelve. If it was estimated on one day that if he was lashed on the following day, he could bear twelve and he was not lashed until the third day, at which time he was strong enough to bear eighteen, he should be given eighteen lashes. The rationale is that at the time the estimation was made, it was reckoned that he would not be lashed until a later date. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

The following rules apply when a person was obligated to receive several sets of lashes whether for the transgression of several sins, or he performed one deed that involved several transgressions and hence, caused him to be liable for several sets of lashes. Everything depends on the judges. If they made one estimation for both transgressions, he receives lashes and is absolved. If not, he is given lashes, given time to recuperate, and then given lashes again. What is implied? He was held liable for two transgressions punishable by lashes. The court estimated that he could bear 45 lashes, once he receives these 45, he is absolved from further punishment. If, however, they estimated the amount of lashes he could bear for one transgression, and they gave him three, nine, or thirty lashes according to their estimation, we wait until he is healed, and estimate how many lashes he can bear for the second lashing until he is given all the lashings for which he is obligated.

When it was estimated that a person could bear a specific number of lashes, they began lashing him and he became discomfited because of the power of the blows and either defecated or urinated, he is not given any more lashes. This is derived from Deuteronomy 25:3: "and your brother will be degraded before your eyes." Since he was discomfited, he is absolved. If, however, he became discomfited from fear before being beaten, even if he became discomfited when he was taken out from the court to be lashed, and even if he became discomfited on the previous evening, he is given all the lashes that it was estimated that he could bear. If one estimation was made for two transgressions punishable by lashes, and he becomes discomfited, whether in the midst of the first set of 40 or the second set of 40, he is absolved. If the lash became severed in the midst of the second lashing, he is absolved. If it became severed in the midst of the first lashing, he is absolved from the first set of lashes, but is given the lashes of the second set.

If they bound him to the pillar to be lashed, and he severed the ties and fled, he is absolved. We do not force him to return.

Whenever a person sins and is lashed, he returns to his original state of acceptability, as implied by the verse: "And your brother will be degraded before your eyes." Once he is lashed, he is "your brother." Similarly, all those obligated for kerait who received lashes are absolved for kerait.

When a High Priest sins, he is lashed on the basis of the judgment of a court of three like people at large. Afterwards, he returns to his position of eminence.

When, by contrast, the head of the academy transgresses, he is given lashes in the presence of a court of three, but does not return to his position of authority. He also is not reinstated as one of the other judges of the Sanhedrin. The rationale is that we ascend higher in matters of holiness, and do not descend.

These are the individuals who receive lashes: a) anyone who transgresses a negative commandment punishable by kerait, but which is not punishable by execution by the court, e.g., a person who eats either fats, blood, or chametz on Passover, b) anyone who transgresses a negative commandment punishable by death at the hand of heaven, e.g., a person who eats tevel, or a priest who eats terumah that is ritually pure, while he is in a state of ritual impurity, c) anyone who involves a negative prohibition that involves a deed, e.g., a person who eats milk and meat or who wears sha'atnez. When, however, a prohibition does not involve a deed, i.e., a gossiper, a person who takes revenge, or who bears a grudge, and a judge who hears a false report, a violator does not receive lashes.

Whenever a prohibition does not involve a deed, it is not punishable by lashes except for a person who takes a false oath, a person who transfers the sanctity of one sacrificial animal to another, and one who curses a colleague using G-d's name. Similarly, any prohibition punishable by execution by the court, e.g., "Do not commit adultery," or do not perform labor on the Sabbath is not punishable by lashes. Whenever a prohibition requires financial recompense, e.g., "Do not rob," or "Do not steal," it is not punishable by lashes. Whenever a prohibition can be corrected by the performance of a positive commandment, e.g., "Do not take the mother together with the offspring," or "Do not complete the reaping of the corners of your field," it is not punishable by lashes, unless one does not perform the positive commandment. Similarly, a prohibition of a general nature is not punishable by lashes. All other Scriptural prohibitions are punishable by lashes.

What is meant by a prohibition of a general nature? A prohibition that includes many matters, e.g., Leviticus 19:26,: "Do not eat over the blood." Similarly, if the Torah states: "Do not do this and this," since a prohibition was not explicitly stated with regard to each deed, these prohibitions are not punishable by lashes unless the Torah divides them into separate prohibitions or it is conveyed via the Oral Tradition that they have been divided. What is implied? Exodus 12:9 states: "Do not partake of it partially roasted or cooked." If a person partakes of a portion of the Paschal sacrifice while it is partially roasted and another portion that has been cooked at the same time, he does not receive two sets of lashes, only one. With regard to Chadash, Leviticus 22:14 states: "You shall not partake of bread, roasted grain, or fresh grain...." A violator is liable for three sets of lashes for these three transgressions. According to the Oral Tradition, we learned that a distinction is to be made. It is also written: "There shall not be found among you one who passes his son or daughter through the fire, one who divines...." Even though all the matters are included in one prohibition, in other places, the Torah distinguishes them as separate prohibitions, as Leviticus 19:26 states: "Do not augur and do not read omens." This teaches that each one is a separate prohibition. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.

The following rules apply when a person receives lashes in a court because of the violation of a prohibition punishable by kerait, and then received lashes a second time for the violation of that same prohibition - e.g., he ate forbidden fat, received lashes for it, and then ate forbidden fat again and received lashes for it. If he eats such fat a third time, he is not given lashes. Instead, he is compelled to enter a kipah, a narrow place that is his height where he cannot lie down. He is given meager portions of bread and water until his digestive tract contracts and he becomes ill. Afterwards, we feed him barley until his stomach bursts.

When a person violates a prohibition punishable by kerait or by execution by the court and received a warning beforehand, if he nodded his head, or remained silent and did not acknowledge the warning, we do not execute him, as explained above, nor do we give him lashes. If he repeats this transgression, receives a warning, nods his head, or remains silent, we neither execute him or give him lashes. If he repeats this transgression a third time, receives a warning, even though he merely nodded his head or remained silent, he is placed in a kipah until he dies. All these individuals who did not acknowledge the warning they received are given "stripes for rebellious behavior" for they did at least commit a sin. Even a person who violates a Rabbinic prohibition is given "stripes for rebellious behavior."

When a person steals one of the sacrificial vessels from the Temple, curses G-d's name using the name of a false divinity, or has relations with an idolatrous gentile woman, the court does not deal with this matter. Instead, the zealous strike them. Whoever slays them merits. Similarly, when a priest served in the Temple while ritually impure, his priestly brethren would not bring him to court. Instead, the young priests take him out of the Temple Courtyard and crack his head open with logs. It is a Scriptural decree that the court does not execute a person or have him lashed because of his own admission. Instead, the punishments are given on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses. Joshua's execution of Achan and David's execution of the Amalekite convert because of their own statements was a directive of immediate relevance only or was by royal fiat. The Sanhedrin, however, may not execute or lash a person who admits committing a transgression, lest he become crazed concerning this matter. Perhaps he is one of those embittered people who are anxious to die and pierce their reins with swords or throw themselves from the rooftops. Similarly, we fear that such a person may come and admit committing an act that he did not perform, so that he will be executed. The general principle is the disqualification of a person's own testimony is a decree of the king.

There are a total of 21 negative commandments that are punishable by kerait, but which are not punishable by execution by the court, for which lashes are administered. They are: i) a person who has relations with his sister; ii) ...with his father's sister; iii) ...with his mother's sister; iv) ...with the sister of his wife; v) ...with his brother's wife; vi) ...with the wife of the brother of his father; vii) ...with a woman in the niddah state; viii) a person who eats forbidden fat; ix) ...blood; x) ...leaven on Passover; xi) ...on Yom Kippur; xii) a person who performs forbidden labor on Yom Kippur; xii) a person who partakes of sacrificial meat after the designated time; xiv) ...of sacrificial meat disqualified as piggul; xv) ...of sacrificial meat while ritually impure; xvi) a person who enters the Temple Courtyard while ritually impure; xvii) a person who slaughters a consecrated animal outside the Temple; xviii) a person who burns a consecrated animal as a sacrifice outside the Temple; xix) a person who prepares the anointing oil for personal use; xx) a person who anoints himself with the anointing oil for his own benefit xxi) a person who prepares the incense offering for his personal use;

There are a total of 18 negative commandments that are punishable by death by the hand of heaven, whose transgression involve a deed, for which lashes are administered. They are: i) a person other than a priest who partakes of primary terumah whether it was ritually pure or ritually impure; ii) a person other than a priest who partakes of terumat ma'aser; iii) a person other than a priest who partakes of the first fruits after they entered Jerusalem; iv) a person other than a priest who partakes of challah; v) a person who partakes of tevel before the primary terumah and terumat ma'aser were separated from it; vi) a person who partakes of the product of dough from which challah was not separated; vii) a priest who partakes of terumah that was ritually pure while he was in a state of ritual impurity; viii) a priest who entered the Holy of Holies for a purpose other than sacrificial worship; ix) a priest who departed from the Temple in the midst of the sacrificial worship; x) a Levite who performed the service of the priests; xi) a person other than a priest who performs service in the Temple; xii) a person who does not wear all the priestly garments; he is considered as if he is not a priest and receives lashes if he serves in the Temple; xiii) a priest who serves in the Temple while in a state of ritual impurity; xiv) a person who was intoxicated from wine who served in the Temple; xv) a person who immersed himself to emerge from a state of ritual impurity but must still wait until the end of the day to attain a state of purity who served in the Temple; xvi) a priest who served in the Temple although he did not yet bring the required sacrifices to attain atonement; xvii) a person who let his hair grow long who served in the Temple; xviii) a person whose clothes are ripped who served in the Temple;

When, however, a person serves in the Temple without sanctifying his hands and feet, although he is worthy of death, he does not receive lashes, because he has violated only a positive commandment. Similarly, the following three - a prophet who withheld his prophecy or transgressed his own prophecy and a person who violated the words of a prophet - although they all are worthy of death - they do not receive lashes. For their transgression stems from a positive commandment, as Deuteronomy 18:15 states: "And you shall listen to him." In all contexts, a prohibition that stems from a positive commandment has the status of a positive commandment and lashes are not administered because of it.

13There are a total of 168 negative commandments that are neither punishable by kerait, nor by execution by the court, for which lashes are administered. They are: i) a person who fashions an idol; ii) a person who makes an image for artistic purposes; iii) a person who turns to idolatry with any deed; iv) a person who erects a monument; v) a person who plants a tree in the Temple; vi) a person who places down an engraved stone on which to prostrate oneself; vii) a person who takes a vow in the name of a false divinity; viii) a person who takes an oath in the name of a false divinitiy; ix) a person who derives benefit from a false divinity; x) a person who rebuilds a city destroyed because it was swayed to idolatry; xi) a person who benefits from the property of such a city; xii) a person who follows the statutes of the gentiles; xiii) a diviner; xiv) an augurer; xv) a reader of omens; xvi) a person who casts spells; xvii) a necromancer; xviii) a person who erases G-d's name, or the like, e.g., he destroys a stone from the altar or destroys wood consecrated to the Sanctuary; xix) a person who extinguishes fire from the altar; xx) a person who ascends the altar with steps; xxi) a person who enters the Temple Courtyard with impure garments; xxii) a zav and the like who enters the Temple Mount; xxiii) a person who removes the staves of the ark; xxiv) a person who removes the High Priest's breastplate from his ephod; xxv) a person who tears the collar of the High Priest's cloak; xxvi) a person who offers anything else than the commanded offerings on the golden altar; xxvii) a priest who enters the Sanctuary while not in the midst of sacrificial worship; xxviii) a priest with a physical deformity who enters the Sanctuary; xxix) a priest with who enters the Sanctuary while intoxicated; xxx) a priest with a physical deformity who performs sacrificial worship; xxxi) an uncircumcised priest who performs sacrificial worship; xxxii) a priest who performs the tasks of the Levites; xxxiii) a priest who enters the Sanctuary with uncut hair; xxxiv) a priest who enters the Sanctuary with torn clothes; xxxv) a person who consecrates an animal with a physical deformity; xxxvi) a person who slaughters such an animal as an offering; xxxvii) a person who sprinkles the blood of such animals on the altar; xxxviii) a person who burns the fats of such animals on the altar; xxxix) a person who offers an animal with a physical deformity on behalf of gentile; xl) a person who produces a blemish in a consecrated animal at the time the Temple is standing; xli) a person who performs labor with consecrated animals; xlii) a person who shears consecrated animals xliii) a person who makes a fire-offering of yeast or honey; xliv) a person who allows the remainder of the meal-offerings to leaven; xlv) a person who offers a sacrifice without salt; xlvi) a person who offers a present given to a prostitute or an animal given in exchange for a dog; xlvii) a person who adds oil to the meal-offering of a sinner; xlviii) a person who adds frankincense to such an offering; xlix) a person who adds oil to the meal-offering of a sotah; l) a person who adds frankincense to such an offering; li) a person who separates the head of a bird brought as a sin offering from its trunk; lii) a person who transfers the holiness of one animal to another; liii) a person who partakes of sacrificial meat after it became ritually impure; liv) a person who partakes of sacrifices that have been disqualified; lv) a priest who partakes of the meat of sacrifices of the most sacred order outside the Temple courtyard; lvi) a non-priest who partakes of the meat of sacrifices of the most sacred order after their blood has been sprinkled on the altar; lvii) a non-priest who partakes of the meat of a firstborn animal; lviii) a daughter of a priest who married a non-priest who partakes of the breast and the foreleg given to the priests; this applies even after the death of her husband; lix) a chalalah who partakes of terumah; lx) a person who partakes of sacrifices of lesser sanctity outside of Jerusalem; lxi) a person who partakes of sacrifices of lesser sanctity before their blood is sprinkled on the altar lxii) a person who partakes of an unblemished firstborn animal outside of Jerusalem; lxiii) a person who partakes of the second tithe after it had entered Jerusalem once it had been taken outside Jerusalem again; lxiv) a priest who partakes of the first fruits after they entered Jerusalem, but before they were placed down in the Temple Courtyard; lxv) a priest who partakes of the first fruits after they were placed down in the Temple Courtyard and were then taken outside Jerusalem again; lxvi) a person who partakes of ma'aser sheni in Jerusalem after it became impure, before it was redeemed; lxvii) a person who is ritually impure who partakes of ma'aser sheni which was pure in Jerusalem; lxviii) a person who partakes of ma'aser sheni - and similarly, any other consecrated food - while in a state of acute mourning; lxix) an uncircumcised person who partakes of sacrificial meal or terumot; lxx) a person who partakes of a meal offering brought by a priest or any other sacrifice that should be totally consumed by the fire of the altar; lxxi) a person who partakes of the meat of the sin-offerings that are burned and any other sacrifices that must be burnt; lxxii) a person who slaughters the Paschal sacrifice while he possesses chametz; lxxiii) a person who breaks a bone from the Paschal sacrifice; this applies with regard to the first sacrifice or the second sacrifice; lxxiv) a person who removes meat from the Paschal sacrifice outside the company of people partaking of it; lxxv) a person who partakes of meat from the Paschal sacrifice outside of that company; lxxvi) a person who partakes of meat from the Paschal sacrifice partially roasted or cooked; lxxvii) a person who purposely derives benefit from consecrated property; lxxviii) a person who partakes of tevel from which the tithes, even the tithe for the poor, has not been separated, even though the terumot have been separated; lxxix) a person who partakes of the meat of an animal that was condemned to be stoned to death, even if the condemned animal was slaughtered correctly; lxxx) a person who eats meat from a non-kosher animal; lxxxi) ... a non-kosher fowl; lxxxii) ... a non-kosher fish; lxxxiii) a person who partakes of a flying teeming animal; lxxxiv) ... an earthbound teeming animal; lxxxv) ... an aquatic teeming animal; lxxxvi) ... an animal that crawls on the earth even though it does not reproduce; lxxxvii) ... worms from fruit after they emerged from the fruit; lxxxviii) a person who eats carrion; lxxxix) ... an animal that was critically injured; xc) ... a limb from a living animal; xci) ... the sciatic nerve; xcii) ... meat cooked with milk; xciii) a person who cooks meat with milk; xciv) a person who partakes of fresh grain before the bringing of the omer; xcv) a person who partakes of orlah; xcvi) a person who partakes of kilai hakerem; xcvii) a person who partakes of chametz in a mixture on Pesach; xcviii) ...after midday on the fourteenth of Nissan; xcix) a person who maintains possession of chametz on Pesach, e.g., he causes his dough to leaven; c) a person who drinks wine used as a libation for false deities; ci) a nazarite who partakes of the products of the vine; cii) ... cuts his hair, ciii) ...who contracts impurity imparted by a corpse; civ) a person who shaves the hair next to a blemish of tzara'at cv) a person who cuts off signs of tzara'at or removes them with fire; cvi) a person who tills a wadi where the neck of a calf was broken to atone for an unsolved murder; cvii) a person who sows in Eretz Yisrael in the Sabbatical year; cviii) a person who trims a tree in the Sabbatical year; cix) a person who reaps freely growing produce in the Sabbatical year without deviating from his ordinary pattern; cx) a person who harvests fruit in the Sabbatical year without deviating from his ordinary pattern; cxi) a person who sows in the Jubilee year; cxii) a person who reaps in the Jubilee year without deviating from his ordinary pattern; cxiii) a person who harvests fruit in the Jubilee year without deviating from his ordinary pattern; cxiv) a person who destroys the produce from the corners of his harvest without giving it to a poor person; cxv) a person who collects the grapes that grow individually in his vineyard and does not give them to a poor person; cxvi) a person who collects the grain that falls from the reapers and does not give it to a poor person; cxvii) a person who collects the grapes that grow in underdeveloped clusters in his vineyard and does not give them to a poor person; cxviii) a person who takes a forgotten sheaf and does not give it to a poor person; cxix) a person who takes a mother bird together with her young and does not send away the mother bird; cxx) a person who sows mixed species of seeds together while sowing in Eretz Yisrael; cxxi) a person who sows mixed species in a vineyard in Eretz Yisrael; cxxii) a person who grafts mixed species of trees; this prohibition applies in every place; cxxiii) a person who mates mixed species of animals; this prohibition applies in every place; cxxiv) a person who leads mixed species of animals; this prohibition applies in every place; cxxv) a person who muzzles an animal while it is working; this prohibition applies in every place; cxxvi) a person who slaughters an animal and its offspring on the same day; this prohibition applies in every place; cxxvii) a person who takes security from a colleague and does not return it to him when he requires it; cxxviii) a person who takes security from a widow and does not return it to her; cxxix) a person who takes utensils used in the preparation of food as security; cxxx) a lying witness who is not penalized financially; cxxxi) a person who strikes a colleague with a blow that does not require a p'rutah to be paid as compensation; cxxxii) a wayward and rebellious son after the first testimony was delivered against him; cxxxiii) a person who spreads a libelous report about his wife who is discovered to have lied; cxxxiv) a person who curses a colleague using G-d's name; cxxxv) a person who takes a false oath cxxxvi) a person who takes an unnecessary oath cxxxvii) a person who abrogates his vow; cxxxiii) a person who goes beyond the Sabbath limits on the Sabbath; cxxxix) a person who performs a forbidden labor on a festival; cxl) a person who removes the hair at the corner of his head; cxli) a person who removes the hair at the corner of his beard; cxlii) a person who gouges his flesh because of a person's death; cxliii) a person who shaves his head because of a person's death; cxliv) a person who tatoos himself; cxlv) a person who wears shaatnez; cxlvi) a person who chops down a fruit tree for a destructive purpose; cxlvii) a man who wears the garments of a woman; cxlviii) a woman who wears the garments of a man; cil) a priest who contracts impurity because of contact with a corpse; cl) a priest who consecrates a woman classified as a zonah and has relations with her; cli) a priest who consecrates a divorcee and has relations with her; clii) a priest who consecrates a woman classified as a challalah and has relations with her; cliii) a High Priest who had relations with a widow even though he did not consecrate her; cliv) a person who remarries his divorcee after she has been consecrated by another man; clv) a person who marries a woman who is obligated to perform yibbum; clvi) a man who has relations with a woman outside the context of marriage; clvii) a mamzer who marries a native-born Jewess and has relations with her; clviii) a person with crushed testicles who marries a native-born Jewess and has relations with her; clix) a person who castrates another man, or a male animal, beast, or fowl; clx) a rapist who divorces his victim and does not remarry her; clxi) a person who spreads a libelous report about his wife, divorces her without remarrying her; clxii) a person who enjoys intimacy with a woman forbidden him even though he did not engage in sexual relations; such a person is suspect of forbidden sexual activity; clxiii) a person who marries out of the faith; clxiv) an Ammonite convert who marries a native-born Jewess and had relations with her; clxv) a Moabite convert who marries a native-born Jewess and had relations with her; clxvi) a king who takes more wives than allowed by the Torah; clxvii) a king who acquires more horses than allowed by the Torah; clxviii) a king who acquires more wealth than necessary; Thus there are a total of 207 violations which are punishable by lashes. An acronym for them is yilaku zerim The strangers will be lashed.

A court does not inflict punishment on the basis of conclusions which it draws, only on the basis of the testimony of witnesses with clear proof. Even if witnesses saw a person pursuing a colleague, they gave him a warning, but then diverted their attention, punishment is not inflicted on the basis of their testimony. Or to give a graphic example, the pursuer entered into a ruin, following the pursued and the witnesses followed him. They saw the victim slain, in his death throes, and the sword dripping blood in the hand of the killer, since they did not see him strike him, the court does not execute the killer based on this testimony. Concerning this and the like, Exodus 23:7 states: "Do not kill an innocent and righteous person." Similarly, if two people testified that a person served a false deity in different circumstances, e.g., one saw him serve the sun and warned him, while the other saw him serve the moon and warned him, their testimonies are not combined. This can also be inferred from the verse: "Do not kill an innocent and righteous person." Since there is a rationale on which basis he could be held innocent and righteous, he should not be executed.

Anyone who has done something for which the penalty is murder by the hands of a beit din while in [a state of] ones [coerced action], beit din shall not put them to death, even if they were required to die rather than transgress [the law in question]. Even if one were to desecrate G-d's name while in [a state of] ones, one is not put to death, as it says: "But you shall do nothing to the girl" (Deuteronomy 22:26) - this is a warning to beit din that they shall not punish the one in [a state of] ones.

When a man is compelled to engage in relations with a woman forbidden to him, he is liable for execution by the court. The rationale is that an erection can only come about willingly. When a woman is raped, by contrast, she is absolved. This applies even if, in the midst of the rape, she says: "Allow him to continue." It is her natural inclination that overcame her.

It is forbidden for the court to have compassion for the killer. The judges should not say: "Since this person has already been killed, what advantage is there in killing another person," and thus be lax in executing him. This is implied by Deuteronomy 19:13: "Do not allow your eyes to take pity. You shall eliminate innocent bloodshed." Similarly, it is forbidden for the court to take pity on a person who was obligated to pay a fine. They should not say: "He is poor. He acted unintentionally." Instead, they should exact the entire payment from him without compassion, as Ibid.:21 states: "You shall not take pity." Similarly, in questions of monetary law, one should not show mercy to the poor, saying: "He is indigent and the other litigant is wealthy. Since both I and the wealthy man are obligated to provide for the poor person's livelihood, I will vindicate him in judgment and thus he will derive his livelihood with honor." With regard to this, the Torah warned Exodus 23:3: "Do not glorify the indigent in his dispute," and Leviticus 19:15: "Do not show favor to the poor." It is forbidden to show favor to a person of stature. What is implied? Two people come before one for judgment, one a wise man of stature and one, an ordinary person. One may not ask about the welfare of the person of stature first, nor treat him with favor, nor show him honor, lest this cause the other litigant to become tongue-tied. Instead, the judge should not turn to either of them in a personal manner until the judgment is concluded. This is derived from [Ibid.: "Do not glorify the countenance of a person of stature." Our Sages said: One should not say: "This man is affluent; he is the son of people of stature, how can I embarrass him and witness his humiliation." With regard to this, it is written: "Do not glorify the countenance of a person of stature."

If two people come before a judge one observant and one wicked, he should not say : "Since he is wicked and it can be presumed that he is lying and conversely, it can be assumed that the other litigant does not falsify his statements, I will be biased against the wicked in judgment." With regard to this, Exodus 23:6 states: "Do not be biased in the judgment of the poor person." The intent is even if a person is poor in the observance of mitzvot, do not be biased in his judgment.

Leviticus 19:15: "Do not act perversely in judgment" refers to a person who distorts the judgment and vindicates the litigant who should be held liable and obligates the litigant who should be vindicated. Similarly, a person who delays rendering judgment and extends his deliberations even though the matter is clear-cut in order to aggravate one of the litigants is also considered as one who acts perversely.

A person who is haughty when rendering judgment and hurries to deliver a judgment before he examines the matter in his own mind until it is as clear as the sun to him is considered a fool, wicked, and conceited. Our Sages commanded: "Be patient in judgment." And similarly, Job 29:16 states: "When I did not understand a complaint, I would investigate."

A judge who begins comparing a judgment that is brought before him to a judgment that was already rendered with which he was familiar is considered as wicked and haughty when rendering judgment if there is a scholar in his city who is wiser than him and he fails to consult him. Our Sages comment: "May evil upon evil befall him." For these and similar concepts stem from haughtiness which leads to the perversion of justice. Proverbs 7:26: "She cast down many corpses" refers to a student who has not reached the level where he can deliver rulings, but does so. Awesome are all she has slain" Ibid. refers to a scholar who has reached the level where he can deliver rulings, but does not do so. The latter denunciation applies provided his generation requires his services. If, however, he knows that there is another scholar capable of rendering decisions, and therefore he refrains from doing so, he is praiseworthy. Whenever a person refrains from becoming involved in a judgment, he removes the responsibility for antagonism, theft, and false oaths from himself. A person who is haughty in rendering judgment is foolish, wicked, and arrogant.

A student should not give a ruling in the presence of his teacher unless he is three parseot removed from him. This distance is the length of the encampment of the Jews in the desert.

A person should not say: "All of the above applies with regard to a judgment that involves the expropriation of a large sum of money from one person to another." Instead, a judgment involving 1000 maneh and one involving a p'rutah should be regarded as identical with regard to all matters.

Judges should not sit down to adjudicate a case involving less than a p'rutah. If, however, they were required to adjudicate a complaint involving a p'rutah, they render a judgment even if ultimately, the outcome concerns less than a p'rutah.

Anyone who perverts a judgment against another Jew transgresses a negative commandment, as Leviticus 19:15 states: "Do not act perversely in judgment." If the litigant was a convert, he transgresses two negative commandments, as Deuteronomy 24:17 states: "Do not distort the judgment of a convert." If he was an orphan, the transgressor violates three negative commandments as that verse continues: "...the judgment of an orphaned convert."

It is a positive commandment for a judge to adjudicate righteously, as Leviticus 19:15 states: "Judge your colleagues with righteousness." What is meant by a righteous judgment? Equating the litigants with regard to all matters. One should not be allowed to speak to the full extent he feels necessary while the other is told to speak concisely. One should not treat one favorably and speak gently to him and treat the other harshly and speak sternly to him.

When there are two litigants, one wearing precious garments and the other degrading garments, we tell the litigant who carries himself honorably: "Either clothe him as you are clothed for the duration of your judgment or dress like him, so that you will be equal. Afterwards, stand judgment."

One of the litigants should not be allowed to sit, while the other stands. Instead, they both should stand. If the court desires to seat both of them, they may. One should not be seated on a higher plane than the other. Instead, they should sit on the same level. When does this apply? During the give and take of the arguments. When, however, the judgment is being delivered, both litigants must stand, as Exodus 18:13 states: "And the people stood before Moses." What is meant by the delivery of the judgment? The announcement: "So and so, you are vindicated? So and so, you are liable." When does the above apply? To the litigants. The witnesses, by contrast, must always stand, as Deuteronomy 19:17 states: "And the two men shall stand."

When a Torah scholar and a common person come to adjudicate a dispute, the Torah scholar is seated. And the common person is instructed to sit. If, however, he does not sit, it is of no consequence. A student who wishes to have a dispute adjudicated should not come early and sit before his teacher if he desires to have him adjudicate the case. If, however, each one of the judge's students had a fixed time to read before the judge and one of them came to read at the time of his judgment, it is permitted for the judge to hear the case.

It has already become customary in all the courts throughout Israel after the era of Talmud, in all the yeshivot, to have the litigants and the witnesses sit so that there will be no controversy. For we do not have the power to establish the judgments of our faith in a firm manner.

If there were many litigants before the judges, precedence should be give to a case involving an orphan to one involving a widow, as implied by Isaiah 1:17: "Judge an orphan, enter in a dispute on behalf of a widow." A case involving a widow receives precedence over a case involving a Torah scholar. A case involving a Torah scholar takes precedence over a case involving a common person. And a case involving a woman takes precedence over one involving a man, because the shame felt by a woman is greater.

It is forbidden for a judge to hear the words of one of the litigants before the other comes or outside the other's presence. Even hearing one word is forbidden, as implied by Deuteronomy 1:16: "Listen among your brethren." A judge who listens to only one litigant violates a negative commandment, as Exodus 23:1 states: "Do not bear a false report." Included in this prohibition is a warning to a person who listens to malicious gossip, one who speaks malicious gossip, and one who bears false testimony. Similarly, each litigant is warned not to tell his arguments to a judge before the other litigant comes. With regard to this and similar matters, Exodus 23:7 states: "Keep distant from words of falsehood."

A judge should not hear from a translator. If he understands the language of the litigants and listens to their arguments, but is not fluent in their language in order to respond to them, he should appoint a translator to inform them of the ruling and the rationale why this person's claim was vindicated and the other was held liable.

A judge must listen to the arguments of the litigants and restate their claims, as evident from I Kings 3:23 which states: "And the king said: 'This one says: "Mine is the son who lives and your son is the one who is dead."...'" He should determine the just resolution of the judgment in his heart and then pronounce judgment.

What is the source which teaches that a judge should not justify the arguments of one of the litigants? "Keep distant from words of falsehood." Instead, the litigant should tell the judge what appears correct to him and the judge should remain silent. He should not teach one of the litigants an argument at all. Even if the plaintiff brings only one witness, the judge should not say: "We do not accept the testimony of one witness." Instead, he should tell the defendant: "See, he has testified against you." Preferably, he will acknowledge the other's claim, saying: "He testified truthfully." The judge should not ignore the witness's testimony unless the other litigant says: "He is only one witness and I do not accept his testimony." Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.

If a judge sees a vindicating argument for one of the litigants and realizes that the litigant is seeking to state it, but does not know how to articulate the matter, sees that one was painfully trying to extricate himself with a true claim, but because of his anger and rage, he lost touch of the argument, or sees that one became confused because of his intellectual inadequacy, he may assist him somewhat to grant him an initial understanding of the matter, as indicated by Proverbs 31:8: "Open your mouth for the dumb person." One must reconsider the matter amply, lest one become like a legal counselor.

When two people come before a judge, one soft and one harsh - before he hears their words, or even after he hears their words, but does not know the direction in which the judgment is leaning - he has the license to tell them: "I will not involve myself with you," lest the harsh litigant be held liable and seek vengeance from the judge. After he hears their words and knows in which direction the judgment is leaning, he does not have the license to tell them: "I will not involve myself with you," as Deuteronomy 1:18 states: "Do not be intimidated by any person." That verse implies that one should not say: "So-and-so is wicked, maybe he will kill my son, set fire to my crops, or cut down my trees." If he was an expert appointed to judge the many, he is obligated to involve himself with them in all circumstances.

Similarly, if a student was sitting before his master and became aware of a factor that would vindicate a poor person and obligate his rich adversary, he transgresses the above commandment if he remains silent. Concerning such matters, Exodus 23:7 states: "Keep distant from words of falsehood." What is the source which teaches that a judge should not have an underdeveloped student sit before him? It is written: "Keep distant from words of falsehood."

From where do we know that a student who sees his teacher erring in a particular matter of judgment, should not say, "I will wait for him until the conclusion of the judgment, at which time I will point out his error. I will then construct the argument correctly, so that the judgment will be quoted in my name"? The Torah therefore says, "Distance yourself from falsehood."

It is a Mitzvah to tell the parties at the beginning 'do you want Din (strict justice), or Pesharah (arbitration)?' If they want Pesharah, we seek out a compromise for them. A court that always does Pesharah is praiseworthy. Of them the verse says, “A just peace was made in your gates.” What kind of peace is also justice? We must conclude that this is Pesharah. As it is stated regarding King David, “And David made justice and righteousness to the nation.” What is the justice that has with it righteousness? We must conclude that it is arbitration. This is before the verdict, even if you heard their words and know which way the verdict leans. Once the case finished, and he said “Ploni, you are innocent, and Almoni, you are liable,” you may not do Pesharah, rather, let the Din pierce the mountain.

Although the litigants agreed to a compromise in court, they have the authority to demand a judgment until they confirm their commitment to the compromise with a kinyan.

A compromise has greater legal power than a judgment. If two ordinary people rendered a judgment, their judgment is not binding and the litigants need not accept it. If, however, such individuals negotiated a compromise and the litigants affirmed their agreement with a kinyan, they may not retract.

After leaving the court, it is forbidden for any of the judges to say: "I was the one who vindicated you or held you liable and my colleagues differed with me. What could I do? They outnumbered me." If he says this, he is among those to whom the words of censure, Proverbs 11:13,: "He proceeds gossiping, revealing secrets" is applied. An incident occurred with regard to one student who revealed the private conversations in the House of Study 22 years later. The court had him removed from the House of Study and denounced him as "a revealer of secrets."

If either of the litigants asks the court to compose a record of the judgment, they write it for him in the following manner: "So-and-so came to this-and-this court with so-and-so, the opposing litigant, claiming this-and-this. He was vindicated" or "...held liable." The record is given to him without it mentioning the names of those who vindicated him or those who held him liable. Instead, it says merely "From the statements of the court of such-and-such, so-and-so was vindicated."

This was the custom of the men of Jerusalem: "They would bring the litigants into the court and listen to their statements and claims. They would then bring in the witnesses and listen to their statements. Afterwards, the judges would have all others removed and would debate the matter among themselves until they came to a decision. Afterwards, they would call the litigants in and the judge of the greatest stature declares: "So-and-so, your claim is vindicated; so-and-so, you are liable." In this way, the litigants do no know which judge vindicated him and which judge held him liable.

When a judge knows that a colleague is a robber or a wicked person, it is forbidden for him to sit in judgment with him, as it is stated: "Keep distant from words of falsehood." This is the practice that would be followed by Jerusalem's men of refined character: They would not sit to participate in a judgment unless they knew who would sit with them. They would not sign a legal document unless they knew who would sign with them. And they would not enter a feast until they knew who would be joining them.

Deuteronomy 16:19 states: "Do not take a bribe." Needless to say, this command applies if the intent is to pervert judgment. The verse is teaching that it is forbidden for a bribe to be given even to vindicate the just and to obligate the one who is liable; the judge transgresses a negative commandment. Such a person is included in the malediction, Deuteronomy 27:25: "Cursed be he who takes a bribe." He is required to return the bribe if he is demanded to by the giver.

Just as the recipient transgresses a negative commandment; so, too, does the giver, as [Leviticus 19:14] states: “Do not place a stumbling block before the blind.”

Any judge who sits and seeks to amplify his reputation in order to cause the wages of his attendants and scribes to be enhanced is included among those who seek after profit. This is what the sons of Samuel did. Hence I Samuel 8:3 describes them as being "inclined to profit and taking bribery." The above applies not only to a bribe of money, but a bribe of all things. An incident occurred concerning a judge who stood up in a small boat, as he was crossing a river. A person extended his hand and helped him as he was standing. Later that person came before the judge with a case. The judge told him: "I am unacceptable to serve as a judge for you." Another incident took place where a person removed a feather of a fowl from a judge's scarf and another person covered some spittle that was lying before the judge and the judge told them: "I am unacceptable to serve as a judge for you." Another incident took place concerning a person who brought one of the presents given to priests to a judge who was a priest. The judge told him: "I am unacceptable to serve as a judge for you." And another incident took place concerning a sharecropper of a field belonging to a judge who would bring him figs from his field every Friday. Once he came earlier and brought him the figs on Thursday, because he had a judgment over which he desired that the judge preside. The judge told him: "I am unacceptable to serve as a judge for you." This applies although the figs belonged to the judge. Since he brought them earlier than the ordinary time, that favor caused him to be disqualified as a judge.

Whenever a judge borrows an article, he is unacceptable to serve as a judge for the person who lent him the article. When does the above apply? When the judge does not have articles to lend him in return. If, however, the judge possessed articles to lend in return, it is acceptable for him to serve as a judge, for that person will also borrow from him.

Whenever a judge takes a wage for adjudicating a case, his judgments are nullified. This applies only when it is not evident that he is receiving compensation for losing his wages. If, however, he was involved in his profession and two people came to him for a judgment and he told them: "Provide me with a person who will work in stead of me and I will adjudicate your case or pay me for the wages that I will forfeit," this is permitted. This leniency is permitted provided it is evident that the wage is merely in lieu of his hire, but no more and he takes equal payment from both of the litigants, receiving payment from each one in the presence of the other.

A judge may not adjudicate the case of a friend. This applies even if the person is not a member of his wedding party or one of his more intimate companions. Similarly, he may not adjudicate the case of one he hates. This applies even if the person is not his enemy and one whose misfortune he seeks. Instead, the two litigants must be looked upon equally in the eyes and in the hearts of the judges. If the judge does not know either of them and is not familiar with their deeds, this is the fairest judgment that could be.

Whenever two Torah scholars hate each other, they are forbidden to act as judges together. For this will lead to a contorted judgment. The hatred each one of them bears for the other will cause him to overturn his colleague's words.

A judge should always see himself as if a sword is drawn on his neck and Hell is open before him. He should know Who he is judging, before Whom he is judging, and Who will ultimately exact retribution from him if he deviates from the path of truth, as indicated by Psalms 82:1: "G-d stands among the congregation of the Almighty." And II Chronicles 19:6 states: "See what you are doing. For you are not judging for man's sake, but for G-d's."

Whenever a judge does not render a genuinely true judgment, he causes the Divine presence to depart from Israel. Whenever a judge expropriates money from one litigant and gives it to the other unlawfully, G-d exacts retribution from his life, as Proverbs 22:23 states: "He will exact payment from the soul of one who exacts payment." Conversely, when a judge adjudicates a case in a genuinely true manner for even one moment, it is as if he has corrected the entire world and he causes the Divine Presence to rest within Israel, as implied by the verse: "G-d stands among the congregation of the Almighty." If a judge will ask: "Why should involve myself in this difficulty?" He should know that it is written: II Chronicles, loc. cit.: "He is with you in the matter of judgment." Nor should the judge worry about erring. A judge may only base his judgment on what his eyes see.

At the outset, a judge should always look at the litigants as if they were wicked and operate under the presumption that both of them are lying. He should adjudicate according to his perception of the situation. When they depart, having accepted the judgment, he should view them both as righteous, seeing each of them in a favorable light.

A judge may adjudicate cases involving monetary law bases on factors that he is inclined to regard as true and concerning which he feels strongly in his heart are correct even though he does not have proof of the matters. Needless to say, that if he personally knows that a matter is true, he may judge the case according to his knowledge. What is implied? A person was obligated to take an oath by the court. A person who the judge regards as trustworthy and upon whose word the judge relies tells him that this person is suspect to take a false oath. The judge may reverse the obligation for the oath and place it on the other litigant, allowing him to take an oath and collect his claim because the judge relied on the statements of this person. Moreover, even if he regards a woman or a servant as trustworthy, should he feel strongly that the matter about which they are speaking is correct, he may rely on their statement and judge accordingly. Needless to say, if he himself knows that a person is suspect to take a false oath, he may judge accordingly. Similarly, when a promissory note comes before him and a person upon whom he relies - even a woman or a relative - says that it has been repaid, if he trusts his word, he may tell the bearer of the note: "Payment will be required only when an oath is taken." Similarly, if the alleged debtor is also indebted to another person, the judge may have the debtor pay the creditor whose promissory note was not impugned at all and leave the promissory note that was impugned by the person's testimony unpaid. Or he may reject the promissory note and not consider it in judgment if he sees fit. Similar laws apply if a person comes and claims that he entrusted an article to so-and-so who died and identified the article with extremely precise descriptive marks. If the claimant did not frequent the home of the deceased, and if the judge knows that the deceased did not have the means to own such an article and he firmly believes that the article did not belong to the deceased, the article may be expropriated from the heirs and given to the person provided he has the means to own it and identified it with descriptive marks. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. These matters are solely given over to the heart of the judge to decide according to what he perceives as being a true judgment. Why then did the Torah require two witnesses? Because when two witnesses appear before a judge, he must judge according to their testimony whether or not he knows it to be true.

All of the matters mentioned above are the fundamental standard of law. Nevertheless, when courts which were not fitting - not necessarily courts which were not upright, but even those whose deeds were just, but whose judges were not sufficiently wise and masters of understanding - proliferated, the majority of the courts among the Jewish people agreed not to reverse oaths unless there was clear proof that a litigant was suspect of taking a false oath. Similarly, they agreed not to disqualify a promissory note on the basis of the testimony of a woman or an unacceptable witness, nor accept their testimony with regard to all other judgments, nor to judge according to the inclinations of one's thoughts without firm knowledge. The rationale for this stringency is to prevent any simple person from saying: "My heart trusts this person's words and my mind relies on this." Similarly, we do not expropriate property from orphans unless there is clear proof . We do not rely on the judge's opinion, the evaluation of the deceased's financial capacity, or that of the claimant. Even though a trustworthy person delivered testimony concerned a certain matter and the mind of the judge was inclined to believe that he was telling the truth, he should hesitate in judgment. He should not reject his testimony. Instead, he should mediate between the litigants until they accept the testimony of the witness or agree to a compromise. Alternatively, the judge may withdraw from the case.

What is the source which teaches that a judge who knows that a claim is contrived should not say: "I will deliver a judgment and the responsibility will lie with the witnesses"? It is written Exodus 23:7: "Keep distant from words of falsehood." What shall he do? He should question and cross-examine the witnesses exceedingly, following the cross-examination process employed in cases involving capital punishment. If it appears to him according to his understanding that there is no deception, he should deliver a judgment. If, however, a) he still has hesitations because he feels that deception is involved, b) he does not rely on the testimony of the witnesses although he cannot disqualify them, c) he feels that one of the litigants is a deceiver and a beguiler and misled the witnesses even though they are fit to testify and testified honestly, it is only that the litigant led them astray, or d) that from the things that were said, he feels that there are hidden factors which they do not desire to reveal, in these and in all similar matters, it is forbidden for him to deliver a ruling. Instead, he should withdraw from this judgment and allow it to be decided by someone whose heart is at peace with the matter. These matters are given over to a person's heart. Concerning these Deuteronomy 1:17 states: "Judgment is G-d's."

A court has the authority to administer lashes to a person who is not required to receive lashes and to execute a person who is not liable to be executed. This license was not granted to overstep the words of the Torah, but rather to create a fence around the words of the Torah. When the court sees that the people have broken the accepted norms with regard to a matter, they may establish safeguards to strengthen the matter according to what appears necessary to them. All the above applies with regard to establishing directives for the immediate time, and not with regard to the establishment of halachah for all time. An incident occurred where they had a man lashed for engaging in relations with his wife under a tree. And an incident occurred concerning a person who rode on a horse on the Sabbath in the era of the Greeks and they brought him to the court and had him stoned to death. And an incident occurred and Shimon ben Shetach hung 80 women on one day in Ashkelon. All of the required processes of questioning, cross-examination, and warnings were not followed, nor was the testimony unequivocal. Instead, their execution was a directive for that immediate time according to what he perceived as necessary.

Similarly, at any time, and in any place, a court has the license to give a person lashes if he has a reputation for immorality and people gossip about him, saying that he acts licentiously. This applies provided the rumor is heard continuously, as we explained, and he does not have any known enemies who would spread this unfavorable report. Similarly, a person with such an unsavory reputation may be humiliated and scorn may be heaped on his mother in his presence.

Similarly, at all times, a court has the prerogative to declare money belonging to others as ownerless. It may destroy those funds or give them to whomever they see fit to close any breaches in the faith and to strengthen its observance or to penalize a stubborn and difficult person. The Book of Ezra 10:8 states: "Whoever fails to come in three days according to the advice of the officers and the elders will have all of his property confiscated." From this we learn that when a court declares property ownerless, their declaration is effective.

Similarly, a judge may apply a ban of ostracism or excommunication to a person to whom these measures would not ordinarily be applied according to his perception of what is necessary at that time. He should state that he is ostracizing him or excommunicating him on his own conviction and should publicize his transgression in public. This is indicated by Judges 5:23: "'Curse Meroz,' said the angel of G‑d. 'Curse him. Those who dwell with him are cursed, because they did not come to the aid of G-d's people.'"

Similarly, a judge may enter into a controversy with a person with whom it is necessary to enter into controversy, cursing him, having him beaten, having his hair pulled out, and compelling him to take an oath to G-d against his will so that he will not perform or that he did not perform a specific action, as Nechemiah 13:25 states: "I entered into controversy with them; I cursed them; I beat people among them; I tore their hair out, and I made them take an oath to G-d."

Similarly, he may have a person's hands and feet bound. He may imprison him and have him pushed to the ground and dragged, as Ezra 7:26 states: "Judgment will be speedily administered to him, to be executed, to be uprooted, to be punished by a loss of property, and to be imprisoned."

All of the above measures should be applied according to the judge's perception that it is appropriate that the violator be punished in this manner or the situation at large requires it. All of his deeds should be for the sake of heaven and the honor of people at large should not be light in his eyes. For consideration of their honor overrides the observance of a Rabbinic prohibition. Certainly, this applies with regard to the descendants of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob who uphold the Torah of truth. He must take care not to ruin their honor and act only to increase the honor of the Omnipresent. For whenever a person debases the Torah, his person will be degraded for people at large. Conversely, when a person honors the Torah, his person will be honored by people at large. And there is no other honor for the Torah except to follow its statutes and judgments.

It is forbidden for a judge to assert himself in a lordly and haughty manner over his community. Instead, he should conduct himself with humility and awe. Any leader who casts unnecessary fear upon the community not for the sake of heaven will be punished. And he will not see a son who is a Torah scholar, as implied by a non-literal reading of Job 37:24: "Therefore people fear him - he will never see anyone with a wise heart."

Similarly, a judge may not treat them with capriciousness even though they are common people. He should not step over the heads of the holy people. Even though they are simple people and lowly, they are the descendants of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and the hosts of G-d whom He led out of Egypt with great power and a strong hand. He should patiently bear the difficulty of the community and their burden like Moses our teacher, as Numbers 11:12 states concerning him: "As a nursemaid will carry an infant." And Deuteronomy 1:16 states: "And I commanded your judges." This is a admonition to the judges to bear the community like a nursemaid carries an infant. Take an example from Moses, the master of all prophets whom the Holy One, blessed be He, sent to Egypt, about whom Exodus 6:12 states: "And I commanded them concerning the children of Israel." The Oral Tradition relates that G-d told Moses and Aaron to accept this mission even though the people would curse them and stone them.

Just as a judge is commanded to fulfill this mitzvah; so, too, the community is commanded to show honor to a judge, as Deuteronomy 1:18 states: "And I commanded you...." This is a command to the community that they should treat a judge with awe. He should not act in a demeaning manner in their presence, nor should he conduct himself in a frivolous manner.

When a person is given a position of leadership over the community, he is forbidden to perform work in the presence of three people, lest he be demeaned in their eyes. Now if performing work in public is forbidden to him, certainly, it is forbidden for him to eat and drink or to become intoxicated in the presence of people at large and in the gatherings of the common people and in friendly get-togethers. Woe to those judges who conduct themselves in this manner, disgracing the Torah of Moses. They debase its judgments and lower them to the earth, casting them in the dust, bringing about harm to them and their descendants in this world and in the world to come.

It is forbidden to conduct oneself capriciously in relation to the agent sent by the court. For the word of the court's agent is accepted as that of two witnesses with regard to the question of ostracism. Were he to say: "So-and-so disgraced me," "...disgraced the judge," or "...refused to appear in court," that person is ostracized on the basis of his statements. We do not, however, have a document recording the ban of ostracism composed until two witness come and testify that he refused to appear in the court.

An agent of the court is not liable for relating unfavorable gossip for telling the court about these matters. Whenever anyone causes aggravation to the agent of the court, the court has the license to have "stripes for rebellious conduct" administered to him.

When the agent of the court orders a person to appear in court, saying: "So-and-so sent me," and mentioning the name of only one of the judges, a document declaring his ostracism cannot be composed against the litigant unless the agent summons him in the name of all three judges. When does the above apply? When the agent went and conveyed this message on a day on which it was not known that the court to hold session. On a day on which it is known to hold session, by contrast, everyone knows that all of the judges gather together. Even though the agent came and conveyed the message in the name of only one judge, it is as if he came in the name of all three.

When a person is summoned by the court and does not appear in court, a ban of ostracism is pronounced against him. This ban is recorded in a legal document; he is liable to pay the fee of the scribe who composes the document. When he comes to court, this document is torn. If such a document was composed because a litigant did not accept a judgment, it may be torn up when he states that he is willing to accept it. When a court summons a litigant to appear on a certain day and he does not appear at all that day, a document recording the ban of ostracism is composed that evening. When does the above apply? When he lived in the city and stubbornly refused to come. If, however, he lived in the outlying villages and would go in and go out from the city at times, we summon him to appear in court on Monday, Thursday, and the following Monday. If the second Monday passes without him appearing, we do not compose a ban of ostracism until the following day.

We do not summon a person to court during the month of Nissan, nor during the month of Tishrei, because the people are occupied with the preparations for the festivals. Nor is a summons issued for Friday, or for the day preceding a festival. We do, however, issue a summons in Nissan, for him to appear after Nissan, and a summons in Tishrei, for him to appear after Tishrei. We do not, however, issue a summons on Friday for a litigant to appear after the Sabbath. The rationale is that everyone is busy on Friday.

When a person was located in a city and the agent of the court went to summon him, but could not find him, a court date is not set until the agent finds him and conveys this information. Different rules apply if he lives in a village outside the city. If he is accustomed to coming on that day, the agent may tell one of his neighbors, even a woman: "If so-and-so comes, inform him that the court summoned him to appear at this time." If he does not come that day, he is placed under a ban of ostracism that evening. When does the above apply? When the way which he is wont to follow does not pass the place of the court. If, however, his path passes the court, he is not placed under a ban of ostracism until the agent notifies him himself. For perhaps the neighbors will not notify him. For they will rationalize: "His path passes past the entrance to the court. Certainly, he visited them and was released." Similarly, if he will not come into the city until the following day, we do not rely on the neighbors, for perhaps they will forget and fail to notify him.

The following laws apply when a person comes to the court and accepts the judgment issued against him, he is told to make financial restitution, but does not do so. He is not placed under a ban of ostracism until he is given a warning on Monday, Thursday, and the following Monday. If he does not pay by that time, he is placed under a ban of ostracism until he pays what he is liable. If he waits 30 days and does not seek to have the ban of ostracism lifted, he is excommunicated.

Anyone who curses one of the judges of Israel transgresses a negative commandment, as Exodus 22:27 states: "Do not curse a judge." Similarly, if a person curses a nasi, whether the head of the Supreme Sanhedrin or a king, he transgresses a negative commandment, as the verse continues: "Do not curse a prince among your nation." This prohibition does not apply only to a judge or a nasi. Instead, anyone who curses any other Jew receives lashes, as Leviticus 19:14 states: "Do not curse a deaf-mute." Why does the verse mention a deaf-mute? To teach you that even when a person who cannot hear and thus will not be bothered by being cursed, the person pronouncing the curse is lashed. It appears to me that a person who curses a child who is embarrassed receives lashes; the child resembles a deaf-mute.

A person who curses a deceased person is not liable. Since a person who curses any Jewish person is liable, why did the Torah set aside a special prohibition for a judge and for a nasi? For the person to be liable for two transgressions. Thus we learn that a person who curses any Jew, whether a man, woman, or child receives one set of lashes. If he curses a judge, he receives two sets of lashes. If he curses a nasi, he receives three sets of lashes. And if the son of a nasi curses his father, he is liable for four transgression, the three for which all others are liable and one for cursing his father.

A person who curses himself receives lashes just as one who curses others, as Deuteronomy 4:9 states: "Take heed and guard your soul." Whether a person curses himself, a colleague, a nasi, or a judge, he does not receive lashes unless he curses using one of G-d's names: Yaw, Elohim, Shaddai, or the like, or with one of the descriptive terms used to characterize G-d, e.g., the Merciful One, the Vengeful One, or the like. Since a person is liable if he cursed a colleague with any of these descriptive terms, he is also liable if he cursed him in any other language. For the names with which the gentiles refer to the Holy One, blessed be He, are comparable to all of these descriptive terms. The term arur ("cursed") can imply an oath, a curse, and a ban of ostracism.

A person is not punished by lashing unless he is given a warning in the presence of two witnesses as applies with regard to the transgression of any other negative commandment. If, however, a warning was not issued, a curse was uttered without mentioned G-d's name or a descriptive term, e.g., he said merely: "Cursed be so-and-so," the curse was uttered indirectly, e.g., he said: "May so-and-so not be blessed unto G-d," or "May G-d not bless so-and-so," or the like, he is not lashed.

Even though he is not lashed, a person who curses a Torah scholar is placed under a ban of ostracism. And if the judges desire to have "stripes for rebellious conduct" administered to him, they can have him beaten and punished as they see fit, for he disgraced a learned elder. If he denounces a common person, the judges may punish him as they see necessary according to the needs of the situation, depending on the person who gave the verbal abuse and the one who receives it.

Although a judge or a nasi has the right to look past affronts to his honor, he cannot look past being cursed. Similarly, with regard to other people, even though the person who was cursed is prepared to look past the matter, the person who uttered the curse is lashed, for he committed a transgression and incurred liability. If, however, a person is obligated to be placed under a ban of ostracism, because he conducted himself in an unbridled manner in court, and the judges desire to look past the affront to their honor and not impose a ban of ostracism, they have that license, provided it will not lead to a decline in the honor of the Creator. For example, people at large were repudiating the words of the Torah and the judges. Since the people overstepped the bounds, the court must act firmly and punish as they see necessary.

When any person has a judgment adjudicated by gentile judges and their courts, he is considered a wicked person. It is as if he disgraced, blasphemed, and lifted up his hand against the Torah of Moses our teacher. This applies even if their laws are the same as the laws of the Jewish people. This is indicated by Exodus 21:1: "These are the judgments that you shall place before them." "Before them" and not before gentiles; "before them" and not before ordinary people. The following procedure should be carried out if the gentiles have a powerful law enforcement system and the opposing litigant is a stubborn and powerful person from whom one cannot expropriate property through the judicial system of the Jewish people. One should summon him before the Jewish judges first. If he did not desire to come, one may receive license from the court and salvage one's property from the litigant by having the case tried in a gentile court.