Ownerless Property and Gifts

Whoever takes hold of ownerless property acquires it. Any objects found naturally in deserts, rivers and streams - e.g., grass, trees, wild fruit and the like - are ownerless. Whoever first takes hold of such an object acquires it.

When a person catches fish in a sea or in a river, and similarly, when he catches fowl, or various wild beasts, since they are ownerless, he acquires them. He may not, however, hunt in a field belonging to a colleague. Nevertheless, if he snares an animal there, he acquires it. If fish - or wild beasts or fowl - are in vivariums belonging to another person, they belong to the owner of the vivarium. A person who snares an animal there is considered to be a robber. This applies even if the vivarium is large and effort is required to snare the animal.

However, when a person takes a fish from the net of a colleague at sea, or takes a beast from a snare of a colleague set in the desert, this is prohibited by virtue of Rabbinic decree. If the snare could be considered to be a container, and the person took the fish or the animal from the container, he is considered to be a robber.

When a person spreads out a snare in a field belonging to a colleague, and traps a beast or a fowl, he acquires it, even though he does not have permission to do this. If the owner of the field was standing in the field at the time the animal was trapped, and said: "My field acquires this on my behalf," the owner of the field acquires it, and the owner of the snare does not acquire anything.

When fish jump into a boat, they become acquired by the owner of the boat, for the boat is considered to be a protected courtyard. It is not considered to be a moving courtyard, because the boat does not move on its own. It is the water that moves it.

When a convert dies without having fathered a Jew after his conversion, he has no heirs. Instead, the first person who takes hold of his property acquires it. A neighbor does not have the right to buy the property from the person who took hold of it, because this is considered to be a gift.

The following laws apply when there are two fields in an estate that belong to a convert, with one boundary marker between them. If a person manifests ownership over one of the fields with the intent of acquiring it, he acquires it. If he manifests ownership over it with the intent of acquiring both it and the other field, he acquires the field over which he manifested ownership, but he does not acquire the other field. If he manifests ownership over one field with the intent of acquiring only the other field, he does not acquire either of them. He does not acquire the field over which he did not manifest ownership because he did not manifest ownership over it. He does not acquire the field over which he did manifest ownership because he did not manifest ownership with the intent of acquiring it. If he manifests ownership over one field with the intent of acquiring it, the other field and the boundary marker between them, or if he manifests ownership over the boundary marker with the intent of acquiring both fields, there is an unresolved doubt with regard to the matter. If another person comes and manifests ownership over one of the fields itself with the intent of acquiring it, the latter person becomes the legal owner.

Similarly, when two houses are located one within the other, if a person manifests ownership over one of the houses with the intent of acquiring both it and the other house, he acquires only the house over which he manifested ownership. If he manifests ownership over one house with the intent of acquiring only the other one, he does not acquire even the house over which he did manifest ownership.

When a person takes hold over a deed of sale within the estate of a convert with the intent of acquiring the land mentioned in that deed, he acquires only the document itself. He may use it to wrap around the top of a bottle or the like.

When the boundaries of a field belonging to a deceased convert are clearly marked, when a person plunges a spade into the field in one place, he acquires the entire field. If the boundaries of the field are not clearly marked, by plunging the spade into that one place, he acquires only a portion over which a team of oxen will pass when plowing, before the team returns. A boundary marker and a chatzav used to designate boundaries serve as cut-off points with regard to the estate of a convert. Whoever manifests ownership over the field acquires only up to the boundary marker or the chatzav.

Whatever is considered significant to create a separation with regard to the distribution of pe'ah is also considered significant to create a separation with regard to the acquisition of the property of a deceased convert. What is implied? If there was a stream, an irrigation ditch or the like, the person seeking to acquire the field acquires only up to the stream or up to the irrigation ditch. Whatever creates a distinction with regard to the domains of the Sabbath, creates a distinction with regard to the acquisition of the property of a deceased convert - for example, a situation where a private domain or a carmelit is interposed between two fields. Indeed, a distinction is created, even if the two fields were separated by a domain that is considered a distinction with regard to the transfer of a bill of divorce.

Whenever a distinction is created with regard to the laws of ritual impurity, it also applies with regard to the acquisition of the property of a deceased convert. What is implied? A person enters a valley. There is an object that conveys ritual impurity on one side of the valley, and the person does not know whether or not he has reached the place that is ritually impure. Wherever the person would be considered to be ritually impure is considered to be a separate entity from the field as a whole.

The following law applies when there is a large valley containing many fields, all belonging to one convert, and there is no boundary marker, chatzav or any other entity that creates a distinction between them. If one person comes and manifests ownership over a portion of the valley with the intent of acquiring the entire valley, he acquires all the land that is known to be owned by that convert.

When a gentile sells movable property to a Jew or buys movable property, he acquires and transfers the property through meshichah or through the transfer of funds. Different rules apply with regard to landed property. A gentile does not acquire landed property from a Jew without a deed of sale, nor does he transfer property without a deed of sale. For he will not rely on anything but a deed of sale. For this reason, if a Jew purchased a field from a gentile and paid the money for it, but before he could manifest his ownership over it, another Jew came and manifested ownership over it in a manner similar to that described above with regard to the acquisition of the property of a deceased convert, the latter person acquires the land. He must, however, repay the money to the purchaser. The rationale for the decision is that the gentile abrogates his ownership over the property at the time he receives the money. And yet, the Jew purchasing the land does not acquire it until the deed of sale reaches his hand. In the interim, the property is like property in the desert concerning which the rule is: Whoever manifests ownership over it acquires it.

When does the above apply? When there are no known laws enforced by the governing sovereign. If, however, the law of the governing sovereign and his judgment is that only a person whose name is mentioned in the deed of sale - who paid money for the property or the like - can acquire the land, we follow the law of the governing sovereign. For we rule according to all the financial laws of the governing sovereign.

The property of a deceased convert who has no heirs, property that is ownerless, and a field that a gentile sold to a Jew who has not taken hold of it are all governed by the same laws. Whoever manifests ownership over them using a valid chazakah - to be described in Hilchot Mechirah - acquires them, with one exception: eating produce.

What is implied? When a person buys landed property from a colleague and manifests his ownership over it by eating produce, he acquires it, as we have explained. But with regard to the acquisition of ownerless property or property of a deceased convert, even if a person eats produce of a tree for several years, he does not acquire the tree itself or the land itself until he performs a deed involving the land itself or performs a task involving the tree. An incident occurred when a woman ate the produce of a date palm for thirteen years, and then another person manifested ownership over the tree by performing a task involving the tree itself. The incident was brought before the Sages and they ruled that the latter person acquired it.

There are many acts that if performed by a purchaser to prove ownership of property are not effective, but when performed to manifest ownership over ownerless property, property belonging to a deceased convert or the like, are effective in acquiring it. What is implied? When a person finds large palaces constructed on property belonging to a deceased convert or on ownerless property, if he paints them slightly or plasters them slightly - e.g., for a cubit or more opposite the entrance - he acquires them.

When a person makes a design in the property of a deceased convert, he acquires it. If he sets out mattresses in the property of a deceased convert, he acquires it. If he plows a field with the intent of leaving it fallow in the property of a deceased convert, he acquires it. When a person cuts branches of a vine or of a tree, or fronds from a date palm in the property of a deceased convert, if his intent is to improve the tree, he acquires the property. If his intent is to feed the branches to his animal, he does not acquire the property.

What is implied? If the person prunes the branches of the tree from both sides, we can assume that he intends to improve the tree. If he cuts from only one side, it appears that his intent is only for the branches. Similarly, when a person collects wood, grass and stones from a field, if his intent is to improve the land, he acquires the field. If his intent is to collect the wood, he does not acquire the field.

What is implied? If the person collected both large and small branches, we can assume that his intent was to improve the land. If, by contrast, he collected only large branches and not small ones, we can assume that his intent was to collect wood. Similarly, when a person levels the surface of the land, if his intent is to improve the land, he acquires the field. If his intent is to level a place to use as a grain heap, he does not acquire the field.

What is implied? If the person takes earth from a high place and brings it to a lower place, it appears that his intent is to improve the land. If we see that he is not concerned with this and instead throws earth and stones anywhere without concern, we can assume that his intent is merely to level one limited area to use as a grain heap. Similarly, when a person opens a flow of water into a field, if his intent is to improve the land, he acquires the field. If his intent is to catch fish, he does not acquire the field.

What is implied? If the person made only a place for water to enter, it appears that his intent is to improve the land. If he made two openings -one for the water to enter and one for the water to leave - it appears that his intent is to catch fish.

When a person builds large palaces on property belonging to a deceased convert, and another person comes and sets up the doors, the second person acquires the property. The rationale is that the first person did not do anything with the land itself, It is as if he piled up stones on the land, an act that does not bring about his acquisition of the property. Nor is his acquisition effective because by constructing the building he made a fence around the land since this fence is not useful, because the entrance to the building is wide enough and one can pass through it. Setting up the structure of this building is not at all useful until one sets up the doors.

When a person spreads seeds in rows in a field, he does not acquire the field. The rationale is that at the time he sowed the seeds, he did not improve the field at all. And at the time the produce grew, the benefit came as a result of a natural course of events. This is not sufficient for an acquisition to be made.

If a partition existed within the property of a deceased convert, and another person came and built another partition on top of the existing one, he does not acquire the field. This applies even when the first partition sinks into the ground, and the higher partition is still functional. The rationale is that at the time the partition was built, it was not beneficial. And when it became beneficial, the benefit came as a result of a natural course of events.

When a person manifests ownership over property belonging to a deceased convert or ownerless property, without the intent of acquiring it, he does not acquire it despite the fact that he built or erected a fence.

When a person plows on property belonging to a deceased convert under the mistaken conception that it is his own property, he does not acquire it. If he plows on property belonging to one deceased convert, while he thinks that it belongs to another, he does acquire it. For he intended that his deeds acquire ownerless property.

If a convert was holding security belonging to a Jew, and when the convert died another Jew came and took possession of this security, it should be expropriated from him and returned to its owner. The rationale is that when the convert died, his lien on the article was nullified.

When a Jew was holding security belonging to a convert, the convert dies, and another Jew takes hold of the security, the creditor should receive payment for the money owed him from the security. If it is worth more, the second person acquires the remainder.

When does the above apply? When the security was not kept in a courtyard belonging to the first person. If it was kept in such a courtyard, his courtyard acquires it on his behalf, even without his knowledge, as we have explained with regard to an article that is discovered, and the person who takes hold of it afterwards does not acquire anything.

The following rules apply when a convert dies and Jews take possession of his property. If the estate contains Canaanite servants above the age of majority, they acquire their freedom. Servants below the age of majority, by contrast, are regarded as are livestock. Whoever manifests ownership over them acquires them. We have already explained the manner in which a person manifests ownership over servants and acquires them.

The following rules apply when it is rumored that a convert died and Jews take possession of his property, and then it is discovered that he did not die, that he has a child or that his wife is pregnant. They must all return the property. If they all returned the property and then discovered that the first rumor had in fact been true and the convert had died at that time, that his son died before him, or that his wife miscarried, whoever takes possession at this time acquires the property. Those who originally took possession do not acquire it.

When a person gives a gift to a colleague, the recipient does not acquire it until he takes possession through one of the legal processes by which a purchaser takes possession of a purchase. If the giver desires to give him movable property, the recipient must lift up the article, perform meshichah on an article that one would not ordinarily lift up, or acquire that article through one of the other means through which movable property is acquired. If he is giving him landed property or servants, the recipient does not acquire them until he manifests ownership over them as a purchaser would, or until a legal document recording the gift reaches his hand. A verbal statement is not sufficient. The recipient does not acquire the gift, and either one of them still has the option of retracting.

When, by contrast, a creditor forgoes a debt to a colleague or gives him an object that previously had been entrusted to the recipient for safekeeping, such a gift is made final by a verbal statement alone. Nothing further is necessary, as we have explained.

Similarly, if a person tells a colleague: "You owe me a maneh. Give it to this person," the intended recipient acquires it. Neither has the option of retracting. This applies whether he gave the recipient the maneh in payment for a debt he owed him, or whether he gave it to him as a gift. And it applies whether the maneh had been given to the person to whom the giver charged with making the gift as a loan or it had been entrusted to him for safekeeping, as we have explained.

Just as with regard to buying and selling, witnesses are necessary only to reveal the truth of the situation when there are claims and denials, so too, with regard to the waiver of obligations and gifts, witnesses are necessary only because of liars.

Just as a seller must define the property that he sells, as we have explained, so too, a person who gives a gift must define what he is giving. What is implied? If a person writes a deed to a colleague which states: "Land from my property is given to you," or he writes: "All of my property is acquired by you with some exceptions," since he did not identify the property he was giving, and the recipient did not know what he was receiving, the recipient does not acquire anything. The recipient may not demand of the giver: "Give me the least valuable of your properties." Instead, he acquires nothing unless the giver defines the place that he is giving him. Different rules apply, however, if the giver tells the recipient: "I am giving you a portion worth such and such in this and this field." Since he defined the field, even though he did not define the portion of the field, the recipient may collect a portion of that value from the least valuable portion of the field.

The following rules apply whenever a person gives a gift within the context of a conditional agreement. Whether the condition was stipulated by the giver or by the recipient, should the recipient take possession of and acquire the gift, the gift becomes binding when the condition is fulfilled. If the condition is not fulfilled, the gift is nullified and the recipient must return the benefit that he derived. This applies provided that the condition was stated in the proper manner.

We have already explained that with regard to all conditional agreements concerning gifts, purchases and sales, it is necessary that the condition be restated, that the positive dimension of the condition be stated before the negative, that the condition precede the deed, and that the condition is one that is possible to fulfill. If any one of these factors is lacking, the condition is nullified, and it is as if it had never been stated.

Whenever a person uses the expression: "conditional on the following," it is as if he said that the transaction will take effect retroactive to the present time"; he does not have to restate the condition. Some of the geonim have ruled in this manner. And this is also my opinion. My teachers ruled that there is no need to restate the condition or state the positive dimension of the condition first, except in cases of divorce and consecration. There is no proof to substantiate this approach.

Whenever a person gives a gift on the condition that it be returned, the gift is valid. The gift is valid whether the condition was made to return the article immediately, that it be returned after a specific time passes, that it remain as a gift for the entire lifetime of either the giver or the recipient, or that it remain as a gift for the entire lifetime of another person. The above applies both with regard to movable property and landed property. The recipient may derive benefit from the gift for the entire time that it is his.

When a person tells a colleague: "I am giving you this ox as a gift on the condition that you return it," if the recipient consecrates the ox and then returns it, it is consecrated, and he has fulfilled his obligation to return it. If, however, the giver tells the recipient: "I am giving it to you on the condition that you return it to me," the ox is not consecrated. For implied in the condition stated by the owner is that he return to him an article that will be fitting for him to use. The same applies in all analogous situations.

It is forbidden for a Jew to give a gentile a gift without charge. He may, however, give such a gift to a resident alien, as implied by Deuteronomy 14:21: "Give it to the stranger in your gates to eat or sell it to a gentile." To a gentile, it must be sold; it may not be given. To a resident alien, by contrast, it may be sold or given. The reason for the distinction is that we are obligated to sustain a resident alien, as implied by Leviticus 25:35: "A stranger or a resident, he shall live among you."

When a person gives a gift to a Canaanite servant or a married woman, it is acquired by the husband or the owner. There is, however, a distinction between their powers of acquisition. The servant's master acquires the article itself, while the husband acquires merely the right to the benefit from the article.

Even if a person gives a gift to a married woman on the condition that her husband have no authority over it, or to a servant on the condition that his master have no authority over it, the master or the husband acquires it. If, however, one gives a gift to a married woman or to a servant and the giver stipulates that the gift itself may be used for only this or this purpose, the master or the husband does not acquire it.

What is implied? When a person gives a gift to a married woman and tells her: "This money is given to you as a gift on the condition that you use it for clothing, that you use it for beverages or that you do with it what you desire without the permission of your husband," the husband has no authority over it. Similarly, if a person told a servant: "This money is given to you as a gift on the condition that you use it for food and drink, that you use it to obtain your freedom or that you do with it what you desire without the permission of your master," the master has no authority over it. The same principles apply in all analogous situations.

When a person gives all his possessions to a servant as a gift, the servant acquires himself, and he becomes a free man. He then acquires all the other property. If, however, the master retains for himself even the slightest amount of property - even movable property, the servant does not acquire anything. The rationale is that the deed is not a complete bill of freedom, for the master retains some connection to the bill of transfer. Therefore, the servant is not freed, and since he is not freed, he does not acquire anything.

Once a person acquires a gift, he cannot nullify his acquisition. To cite an example: A person received a gift and acquired it. After it entered his domain while he remained silent, he retracted and said: "I do not desire it," "It is nullified," or "I see this blemish in it," his statements are of no consequence. Just as the giver cannot retract, so too, the recipient cannot retract once he has acquired it. The gift that the recipient stated that he did not desire after it entered his possession becomes ownerless. The first person to take possession of it acquires it. For the recipient declared it ownerless after he acquired it. If, however, the recipient protested from the very outset, he does not acquire it , and it should be returned to its original owners.

The following rules apply when a person transfers ownership over an article to a colleague through the agency of a third party. Once the third party takes possession of it - e.g., he performs meshichah on movable property, a deed of transfer of landed property reaches his hand, or he manifests ownership over the land - his colleague acquires the gift, even though it does not reach his hand. The giver can no longer retract. The recipient by contrast has the option in his hand. If he desires, he may accept it. If he does not desire, he need not accept it. For a positive acquisition may be made for his person without his consent, and an obligation cannot be undertaken on his behalf without his consent. If a person desires that a gift be given to him, it is considered to be a positive acquisition. If, however, he does not desire it, a person cannot be forced to accept a gift that is given to him.

There is an unresolved question among our Sages when another person accepts a gift on behalf of the recipient, when the recipient hears about the gift and remains silent, and afterwards he protests and states that he does not desire to receive it. We do not know whether the reason he remained silent at first is that he desired to accept it, and the reason he protested was that he retracted. Or perhaps he remained silent at the outset because nothing had reached his hand at that time. When the article did reach his hand, he protested, and his ultimate statements reveal his original intent. Therefore, if another person comes first and acquires the article himself, it should not be expropriated from his possession. For perhaps the recipient originally acquired the article, and when he said: "I do not desire it," he declared it ownerless, as explained above. Thus, the person who came and took possession of it while it was ownerless acquires it. If, however, the original owner comes and takes the article out of the possession of the person who took it, it should not be expropriated from his possession. The rationale is that perhaps the recipient did not acquire it, for when he said: "I do not desire it," his ultimate statements reveal his original intent. Thus, the person who took possession of it did not acquire it, and it remained in the possession of its original owner.

The above principles can be applied in the following situation: Reuven desired to give 100 dinarim to Shimon. He sent him the 100 dinarim with Levi. If Reuven told Levi: "Acquire these 100 zuz on behalf of Shimon," or "Give these 100 zuz to Shimon," Reuven cannot retract his gift. If, however, he tells him: "Bring these 100 zuz to Shimon," he has the option of retracting until the 100 zuz reach Shimon.

In the above instance, if Levi took the 100 zuz that he was sent to bring to Shimon and looked for Shimon, but could not find him, he should return the money to Reuven. If Shimon died during Reuven's lifetime, Levi should return the money to Reuven or to his heirs. But if Reuven died in Shimon's lifetime, the 100 zuz should be given to Shimon or his heirs. The rationale is that it is a mitzvah to carry out the instructions of a deceased person, even though he gave those instructions while he was healthy. And in this instance, the 100 zuz are still in the possession of the agent.

A person cannot acquire a gift on behalf of a colleague unless the person acquiring the gift is past majority and mentally competent. Both a man and a woman - indeed, even a married woman or a servant or maidservant can acquire property on behalf of another person. A gentile, by contrast, cannot acquire property for a Jew. Since he is not fit to serve as an agent, he can never acquire property on behalf of a Jew. Similarly, just as a Jew cannot serve as an agent for a gentile, he cannot acquire property for a gentile.

When a child reaches the state of understanding that when he is given a stone he throws it away, but when he is given a nut he keeps it, he can acquire property on his own behalf, but he cannot acquire on behalf of others. If he is less mature than this, he cannot even acquire property on his own behalf. Similarly, a mentally or emotionally incompetent person cannot acquire property, neither on his own behalf nor on behalf of others. When a person gives property to a mentally or emotionally incompetent person through the agency of a mentally competent person, the incompetent acquires it. A deaf mute can acquire property on his own behalf, as explained in Hilchot Gezelah.

One may acquire property for a minor - even a newborn child - or an adult, in his presence or outside his presence. A person's courtyard can acquire property on his behalf even though he is not standing there. The rationale is that since the gift reached the person's courtyard, it is as if another person acquired it on his behalf.

When does the above apply? With regard to a courtyard that is safeguarded. Different rules apply with regard to a courtyard that is not safeguarded - e.g., a field or a ruin. In such an instance, a person does not acquire an article unless he is standing next to the courtyard and says: "Let my field acquire the article for me." Similarly, the area within a radius of the four cubits next to where a person is standing can acquire property on his behalf, if he is standing in an alleyway, at the sides of the public domain, which are not crowded with many people or in a field that is ownerless. However, when a person stands in the public domain or in a field belonging to a colleague, he does not acquire the article until it reaches his hand. A female minor may acquire an article by virtue of its presence in her courtyard or within the area within a radius of four cubits of her. A male minor, by contrast, cannot acquire a gift unless it reaches his hand or is acquired on his behalf by another person.

A gift is like a bill of divorce, in that a person cannot transfer words alone to an agent. What is implied? If a person tells three people: "Tell so and so and so and so to compose and sign a deed recording a gift and give it to so and so," his statement is of no consequence. If these people convey these instructions to those witnesses and the witnesses write the deed and give it to the intended recipient, the recipient does not acquire anything. Similarly, if a person tells two people, "Compose and sign a deed recording a gift and give it to so and so," they cannot tell a scribe to compose such a deed. Instead, they must compose it themselves, as applies with regard to a bill of divorce.

When a person writes a deed saying: "I gave such and such a field to so and so," "I gave it to him," or "Behold, it is his," the person named acquires the field when the deed reaches his hand. When, by contrast, the prospective donor writes in a deed: "I will give it to him," the intended recipient does not acquire the property even if witnesses testify with regard to the document. The intended recipient does not acquire the property until the giver tells the witnesses: "Compose a deed recording a gift, and give it to him." Then they should compose the deed and give it. The rationale is that a recipient does not acquire the property given to him until a deed recording the gift reaches his hand or until the giver transfers ownership of the property to him via a third party, as explained.

When a person says: "I gave this and this field to so and so," but the recipient says: "He did not give it to me," we suspect that perhaps the giver had another person acquire it for him. Different rules apply if the giver states: "I composed a deed and gave it to him," and the recipient states: "He did not compose such a deed, nor did he give it to me." If the recipient of the gift himself makes such a statement, the admission of the principal himself is equivalent to the testimony of 100 witnesses. Therefore the giver is entitled to receive the produce of the field. If the son of the recipient is the one who states: "You did not give this field to my father," while the giver maintains: "I wrote a deed and gave it to him," the produce should be entrusted to a third party until the status of the field becomes known.

When a person thought to have received a gift claims: "The object in my possession was not given to me as a gift; instead, I am a watchman for it," or the like, or he says: "The gift was nullified from the outset, because I did not accept it," "I was forced to accept it against my will," "I accepted it by mistake," or the like, his claim is accepted. He is required to take a sh'vuat hesset, and the gift is returned to its original owners.

If the alleged giver of a gift denies giving it, and instead, claims: "You are a watchman over it," "I gave it to you unwillingly," or "It is stolen property that you have," and the person in possession of the disputed article states: "You gave it to me as a gift," the alleged recipient must support his claim with a Rabbinic oath. Afterwards, he is under no obligation.

Whenever a person - whether healthy or sick - gives a gift, the gift must be made publicly and conspicuously. If a person tells witnesses: "Write a deed recording a gift in hiding and give it to the intended recipient," his statement is of no consequence. For he is acting subtly in order to take money belonging to others, for he will sell the property after giving the gift.

Therefore all land gift documents in which it is not written that Ploni, the one giving the gift, told us to sit in the markets or streets and write him this gift in an open and publicized manner, or words to that effect, the document is suspect to be a secret gift and the recipient is not entitled to the gift.

When a person writes two deeds recording a gift for the same field, the first one hidden, and the second public and conspicuous, the person to whom the latter deed was given acquires it. This applies even if the deed recording the first gift does not mention that the gift should be hidden or that it be conspicuous, but just states that a gift should be given, the recipient of the latter document acquires the property,

As explained, when a person issues a protest and then gives a gift, the gift is nullified, even though the person is not being forced to give the gift against his will. The rationale is that with regard to a gift, we follow solely the intent of the giver. Since the giver revealed his intent that he did not desire to give the gift, his gift is nullified. Accordingly, when it is evident that a person did not desire to give a gift, even when he gave the gift in a conspicuous manner, but it was discovered that he had previously given a hidden gift, both gifts he gave are nullified: the first because it was given in a hidden manner, and the second because it is obvious that he did not want to give the gift. For the hidden gift that was discovered is considered like a protest for the second gift.

An incident occurred with regard to a person who desired to marry a woman. She told him: "I will not marry you unless you write me a deed giving me all your property." The man's elder son heard this and objected at being left empty handed. The man said to witnesses: "Go and hide and write a document, granting him all my property as a gift." Afterwards, he wrote a document granting all his property to his prospective bride and married her. The incident was brought before the Sages. They ruled: The son did not acquire the property, nor did the woman acquire the property. The woman did not acquire the property because the man did not willingly compose the document granting her his property. It is as if he had been acting under duress. For by giving the first gift, even though it was nullified - because it was hidden, he revealed his intent. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

The following rules apply when there are two legal documents with the same date, either deeds of sale or deeds recording a gift, applying to one field. If it is customary for the people of that locale to record the hour of the day when the document was signed in the document, the person with the document dated earlier acquires it. If it is not customary for the people of that locale to record the hour in the document, the matter is left to the discretion of the judges. The field is granted to the person whom they feel it is proper to recognize as the owner.

When does the above apply? With regard to a legal document that does not mention a kinyan, but rather the recipient desired to acquire the field through the transfer of this legal document. In such an instance, we do not know who received the legal document first. If, however, both of the legal documents mention a kinyan, the one with whom a kinyan was made first acquires the property. The witnesses should be asked about the matter. Similarly, if there were witnesses who know who received the deed recording the gift first, that person acquires the field.

The following laws apply when there are two legal documents concerning the transfer of one field to one buyer, and they are dated differently. If one legal document records a sale and the other a gift, we do as follows: When the earlier dated document records a gift and the later document a sale, the later document does not nullify the former one. For we assume that the giver wrote the document recording a sale to add his acceptance of responsibility for the field, if expropriated by a creditor. This applies even when the document does not mention this responsibility. For the omission of such responsibility is considered to be a scribal error. Similarly, if the earlier document records a sale and the later document a gift, the recipient acquires the field from the date of the first document. We assume that the seller had the document regarding a gift composed to strengthen the purchaser's position, and to protect him against a possible claim of a neighbor.

Different rules apply if both legal documents mention a sale, or both mention a gift. If the second document adds any fact enhancing the position of the recipient or the purchaser, the first document is valid. We assume that the second was composed only because of the additional points. If no additional points were made in the second document, the second document nullifies the first, and the first owner's responsibility does not begin until the date mentioned in the second document. For this reason, the purchaser must return all the produce that he consumed until the date mentioned in the second document. If there is an annual levy from the king on that field, the giver or the seller is required to pay that levy until the date mentioned in the second document.

Whenever a gift is given, we assess the intent of the giver. If the situation indicates his ultimate intent, we act according to that intent, even if it is not stated explicitly. What is implied? A person's son traveled overseas and the father heard a report that his son had died. The father then signed over all his property as a public and binding gift to a third party, and afterwards his son returned. The gift is not binding, for the situation indicates that if the father had known that his son was alive, he would not have signed over all of his property to the third party. Therefore, if he retained ownership over any of his property - whether landed property or movable property - the gift is binding.

Similarly, when a person assigns all his property to one of his sons, whether the giver is healthy or on his death bed, we assume that he merely made that son the executor of the estate. He receives the same share as the other sons in his estate. It can be presumed that the father's intent was merely that the other brothers should listen to this son. This assumption is followed even if the son in question is an infant, lying in a cradle. If, however, he retained any of his property - whether landed property or movable property - the son acquires the gift given him.

When does the above apply? When he mentioned one son among many sons. If, however, he mentioned one son among many daughters, one daughter among many daughters, or one or another heir among many others, the gift is binding even though he did not retain any property.

Similarly, when a person assigns all his property to his wife - whether the husband is healthy or on his death bed - we assume that he merely made his wife the executor for the heirs. This applies even when he confirmed this with a kinyan. Moreover, this applies regardless of whether the husband's heirs are her descendants, those of another wife or other relatives. If, however, he retained ownership of any property - either landed property or movable property - his wife acquires everything he assigned to her.

To whom does the above apply? To a woman who has already been married. If, however, a person assigns all his property to his wife whom he has merely consecrated or to his divorcee, even if he did not retain any property, she is considered as any other person, and the gift is binding.

When a person assigns all his property to one of his sons and another person, that other person acquires half of the property, and the other half is given to all his sons. The son who is assigned the property is appointed an executor for the other sons.

Similarly, if a person assigns all his property to his wife and to another person, the other person acquires half, and his wife is appointed as an executor for the other half.

Whenever a woman acquires all her husband's property as a gift, she forfeits her right to the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. Therefore, the ketubah should be torn. Accordingly, if a promissory note is claimed against her deceased husband's estate, and the entire estate is expropriated to pay the debt that predated the gift, she is left without anything. She does not collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. The rationale is that we presume that the satisfaction she receives upon hearing that her husband assigned all his property to her is sufficient to cause her to forfeit any other claim she has to his property with the exception of this gift.

Similarly, when a man assigns property to his children - either his sons or his daughters, whether he does so while healthy or on his death bed - and assigns even the slightest amount of landed property to his wife together with them, if she does not protest she forfeits her right to the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. The rationale is that the satisfaction she receives from being made a partner together with his children is great enough to cause her to forfeit her rights to this property. She may not expropriate anything from the property in the estate at the time of her husband's death. She may, however, collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah from money accrued by his estate afterwards.

If, however, the husband merely assigned movable property to her, or he retained a certain portion of his landed property for himself, her ketubah is still valid. It is an enactment of the Geonim that even if he retained some movable property, she is given the right to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah . The rationale is that she will say: "I will collect the money due me from what he retained." Since she is allowed to expropriate from what he retained, she is also given the privilege of expropriating from the remainder of the estate.

When a person assigns all his property to his children and assigns a portion of his property to his wife together with them, and then one of the children dies during his father's life, the woman is allowed to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah from the share of the child who died. For she forfeited only her right to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah from the property inherited by her husband's heirs at the time of his death.

A woman who wishes to marry and writes to transfer all her assets to her son or someone else, and after she marries and divorces, or her husband dies, her gift is null and void. Because she was trying to hide her assets, and she only wrote the transfer to hide her assets from her husband, so that he would not inherit them from her, and when she needs the assets, they would return them to her. Therefore, if she predeceases her husband, the recipient of the gift acquires it. But if she retains any part of her assets even chattels, her gift stands and even if she later divorces, it does not return to her.

Whenever a person gives away all his property, when the gift is nullified and the property reverts to the original owner, the recipient of the gift is not required to return the produce that he ate. For even if a person explicitly states that he is giving a gift with the intent that it be returned after the duration of so and so's life, the recipient is entitled to derive benefit from the fruits produced by the gift, as we have explained.

The following rules apply when a person sends articles from overseas to his household and instructs: "Give these to my children." They should be given to both his sons and his daughters. The gifts that are appropriate for the sons - e.g., books or weapons - should be given to the sons. Those that are appropriate for the daughters - e.g., colored silk garments and golden bracelets - should be given to the daughters. If they are appropriate both for sons and daughters, they are taken by the sons. Similar laws apply when a person sends articles to his home without any instructions. If there are utensils that are appropriate for his daughters, they should be taken by his daughters. It is logical to assume that he sent the gifts for them. If he does not have daughters, or his daughters are married, they may be taken by the wives of his sons, for it is logical to assume that he sent them for them.

When a person celebrates the marriage of his eldest son to a virgin maiden in a home, the son acquires the home. This applies when this is the first time this son is marrying, the father did not marry off another son before him, and the father did not leave any property of his own in the home designated for the son. This ruling resembles a halachah instituted without a reason. Our Sages came to this decision out of their assessment of the person's attitude, feeling that because of his great happiness and love, he decided to transfer the house to him. This is indicated by the fact that he did not leave any of his own property in the home. For this reason, if he left anything of his own, even a small cruse, the son does not acquire the home. If the father designated for the wedding a house and household utensils, although he left a utensil in the home belonging to himself or he kept a storeroom or the like in that home, the son acquires the household utensils he designated. He does not, however, acquire the house.

If he designated both a house and a loft for his son, he acquires the house, but he does not acquire the loft. Similarly, if he designated both a house and a porch, he acquires the house, but not the porch. If the house contained two apartments, one behind the other, the son acquires only the one in which he was married.

With regard to marriages, we have already explained that a special indulgence is granted when a couple is engaged, and the father of the son and father of the bride make commitments, saying: "How much will you give to your son?", "So and so much. And how much will you give for your daughter?", "So and so much." If, afterwards, the groom consecrates the bride, the couple acquire what the parents promised by virtue of their statements alone. Nevertheless, the transfer of property brought about by this consecration does not take effect until the time of the couple's marriage. For the intent of the promise was that the property be given to the couple when married. Also, for the transfer to be effective, the articles that the person promised must exist within his domain, for a person may not transfer an article that does not as yet exist, as we have explained. These promises may not be written down so that the commitment would have the power of a legal document. Therefore, if such a record is made, it is not considered to be a legal document that would give the couple the power to expropriate the property if sold to others.

When a man consecrates a woman, even if he consecrates her by giving her 1000 dinarim, whether she retracts, he retracts, he dies or she dies, the money or article given to effect the consecration never needs to be returned. Instead, it is considered to be an outright gift, which need not be returned.

If the consecration was made erroneously, the money given for that purpose must be returned.

When a man consecrates his sister, the money he gives her is a gift. The rationale is that every man knows that the consecration of one's close relatives is not valid; the person is not making an error. We therefore assume that he made up his mind to give her the money as a gift.

When a person sends betrothal gifts to his intended bride while she is in his father-in-law's home, whether significant or insignificant in size, whether he partook of a betrothal feast there or not, whether he died, she died, or he retracted, all the engagement gifts should be returned with the exception of food and drink.

Similar principles apply with regard to garments of minor value that the prospective groom sent his prospective bride to wear while she was living in her father's home. If she used them and they became worn or lost, they need not be returned. If, however, they are still intact, everything should be returned. They may be expropriated in court. For it is well known that he sent them only as a complimentary gesture.

If, by contrast, the woman retracts, everything must be returned, even the food and drink. For the latter, however, she is required only to pay a lesser amount. The Geonim have agreed that if the food and the drink were worth six zuz, she should pay four if she retracts. For he gave her these gifts only with the understanding that she would not retract.

My masters ruled that when the local custom is that when an engagement is announced every prospective groom makes a feast and hosts all his friends or distributes funds to his helpers, attendants and the like, if he follows the popular custom and she retracts, she should pay the entire amount. For she caused him a financial loss, and whoever causes money belonging to a colleague to be lost must reimburse him. This applies provided he has witnesses to how much he spent. For we do not allow him the option of taking an oath and collecting the sum he claims.

It is a universally accepted custom in most countries that when a man marries, his friends and acquaintances send him money to support the expenses he must undertake on behalf of his wife. Then the friends and acquaintances who sent him this money come and eat and drink with the groom during all - or part - of the seven days of wedding celebration; everything should be done according to the accepted local custom. The money that he is sent is called shushvinut, and the people who send the money and then come and eat and drink with the groom are called shushvinin.

Shushvinut is not an outright gift. For it is plainly obvious that a person did not send a colleague 10 dinarim with the intent that he eat and drink a zuz's worth. He sent him the money solely because his intent was that when he would marry, he would send him money as he has sent him. Therefore, if the sender marries a woman, and the recipient does not return the shushvinut, the sender may lodge a legal claim against the recipient and expropriate the money from him.

He cannot lodge a claim against him unless he marries in the same way as he did. What is implied? If Reuven married a maiden and Shimon sent him shushvinut, and then Shimon married a widow, Shimon cannot demand that he return the shushvinut, for he will tell him: "I will return it to you only for a maiden, as you gave to me." Conversely, if the giver sent the recipient shushvinut for the marriage of a widow, he cannot demand that it be returned for the marriage of a maiden.

If Reuven made a large public reception, while Shimon made a modest private affair, or Reuven married modestly and Shimon made a public affair, he cannot lodge a claim against him. For he can tell him: "I will not do for you anything else than what you did for me."

Reuven married a woman and Shimon sent him shushvinut, and came and ate and drank with him. Afterwards, Shimon married in precisely the same manner as Reuven did, and Reuven came and ate and drank with him, or Shimon called Reuven and he did not desire to come, or Reuven was in the city and heard the herald in a place where it is not customary to give private invitations, but rather everyone who hears the announcement comes, and Reuven heard the announcement and yet did not come, Reuven is obligated to return the entire amount of the shushvinut. For he knew about the wedding and did not come or was given a private invitation in a place where that is the custom, and yet he did not come.

If Reuven was not in the city when Shimon married, he may deduct the cost of the food that Shimon ate at his wedding feast, but must return to him the remainder of the shushvlnut. Similarly, if Reuven was in the city when Shimon married, and he did not invite him or notify him, he may make such a deduction. Moreover, he has a justified complaint, for he should have notified him.

How much should he deduct? These are the deductions customarily made. If Shimon sent him only a dinar, he need not return anything to him, for the dinar is the cost of what he ate. If Shimon sent him between a dinar and a sela half should be deducted.

If he gave more than a sela, we must assess the intent of the sender and the size of the shushvinut. If he is a prestigious person, half of what he gave is deducted. If he is tightfisted and keeps careful account of his expenditures, only what he ate and drank should be deducted, and he must pay him the remainder.

If Shimon dies before he marries, or he marries and dies in the midst of the wedding celebrations, Reuven is not required to give anything to his heirs. For he can tell the heirs: "Bring me my shushvinin; I will gladly celebrate with him and pay my due."

Therefore, if Reuven rejoiced with Shimon and afterwards Shimon died, Shimon invited him to the wedding and he did not come, Reuven was not in the city at the time of Shimon's wedding, or he did not notify him, since Shimon died after the days of rejoicing were concluded, Reuven is obligated to return the shushvinut to Shimon's heirs - either in its entirety or after a deduction has been made - if he did not notify him or if he was not in the city.

Different rules apply if Reuven died, and then Shimon married a woman and the days of rejoicing were concluded. If the local custom is to collect the shushvinut from the heirs, Reuven's heirs are compelled to return the shushvinut. In a place where this is not the local custom, Reuven's heirs are not obligated to pay anything.

If Reuven died after Shimon married a woman and the days of rejoicing were concluded, Reuven's heirs are compelled to pay the shushvinut regardless of the locale in which they live. For their testator was obligated to pay before his death. If he was required to pay the entire sum, they must pay that amount. If a deduction was made, that deduction also applies to them.

Five statements were made concerning shushvinut: a) It may be expropriated by a court of law, for it is only like a loan and not an outright gift; b) It need be repaid only at the required time, when the marriage is held in the same manner as the first person's marriage; this is like a condition of the loan, although he did not explicitly state that he was giving the loan with this intent; c) The prohibition against taking interest is not involved; even if a person sent his colleague a dinar and the colleague sent him ten, it is permissible; the rationale is that he did not send him with the intent that he add; d) It is not nullified in the Sabbatical year; the rationale is that the giver may not demand payment from the recipient until he marries in the same manner as he married; e) The firstborn does not receive a double portion when the shushvinut is returned to the giver's heirs; the rationale is that at the time of the division of the estate, it is not an actual part of the estate, but rather ra'ui; and the firstborn does not receive a double portion of ra'ui, as will be explained with regard to that subject.

When a person offers a colleague money when the latter's financial status suffers, the intended recipient refuses to take it, and the giver takes an oath that he is unwilling that the recipient not accept it, and he presses the recipient until he accepts it, even though the giver did not say so explicitly, the money is considered to be a gift. The same law applies when a person sends a gift of food to a colleague or offers other similar forms of generosity. The giver may not retract and demand repayment unless he explicitly states that he is making the gift as a loan.

When a person sends jugs of wine or oil to a colleague at the time of his wedding, he may not demand repayment in court. These gifts are considered to be deeds of kindness; the laws of shushvinut apply only to money.

A blind, lame or handless person, and similarly, one who feels pain in his head, his eye, his hand, his foot or the like, is considered to be a healthy person with regard to all matters that concern his purchases, his sales or gifts that he gives.

However, when a person becomes ill to the extent that he feels weak throughout his entire body - indeed, because of his illness, his strength has dwindled to the extent that he cannot walk on his feet in the market place, and he is confined to his bed - he is referred to as a sh'chiv me'ra. The laws applying to his gifts differ from those applying to the gifts given by a healthy person. What is implied? When a sh'chiv me'ra gives orders and says: "Give so and so such and such, and so and so such and such" the intended recipients acquire all the property apportioned to them when the sick person dies. This applies whether he issued his instructions during the week or on the Sabbath, and whether or not a written record was drawn up. Nor must his instructions be confirmed by a kinyan for the statements of a sh'chiv me'ra are considered as if they have been written down, and transferred. This is a Rabbinic decree. Nevertheless, although it is only a Rabbinic decree, our Sages conveyed upon this convention the power of Scriptural Law, so that a dying person will not become exasperated, knowing that his words are of no consequence.

Accordingly, if the dying man says: "Confirm my statements with a kinyan" we confirm his statements even on the Sabbath. For this kinyan is unnecessary.

When apportioning his property, a sh'chiv me'ra does not have to say: "You are my witnesses." Instead, whoever hears his statements may serve as a witness. The rationale is that a person does not speak facetiously at the time of his death.

When a sh'chiv me'ra orders that a gift be given to a fetus in its mother's womb, the fetus acquires the property. The rationale is that a person has unique feelings of closeness toward his son, as we have explained.

When a sh'chiv me'ra says: "If my wife gives birth to a boy he should receive a maneh, but if she gives birth to a girl she should receive 200 zuz," if she gives birth to a boy, he receives a maneh, and if she gives birth to a girl, she receives 200 zuz. If she gives birth to both a boy and a girl, the boy receives a maneh, and the girl, 200 zuz. If she gives birth to a tumtum or an androgynous, that child should be given the lesser of the two amounts.

The following rule applies when a sh'chiv me'ra is asked: "To whom should your property be given?" and he replies: "I thought that I had a son or that my wife is pregnant; now that I know that I do not have a son and my wife is not pregnant, my property should be given to so and so." If it is discovered that in fact he had a son or his wife was pregnant - even if afterwards the wife miscarried or the son died - the gift is not binding.

Ownership of a gift given by a sh'chiv me'ra is not transferred until after the death of the sh'chiv me'ra. No one acquires any of the landed property or movable property apportioned to him until after the death of the sh'chiv me'ra.

For this reason, we expropriate money to pay the ketubah, and the living expenses for the deceased's wife and his daughters from the property that the sh'chiv me'ra apportioned to the intended recipients. The rationale is that with his death, his estate became obligated to pay his wife the money due her by virtue of her ketubah and her living expenses, and the recipients of the gifts did not acquire what was given to them until after the death of the sh'chiv me'ra.

When a document recording a gift given by a sh'chiv me'ra mentions a kinyan - whether it involves a portion of the deceased's estate or his entire estate - there are doubts about the matter. Perhaps he did not make up his mind to transfer ownership except via a legal document. In such an instance, the gift would not be effective. For a gift given by a sh'chiv me'ra takes effect only after the principal's death, and a legal document cannot transfer property after the principal's death.

If, however, the kinyan was made solely to augment the legal power of the recipient - e.g., it was written: "And a kinyan was performed to amplify this gift" - the gift is binding.

When a sh'chiv me'ra says: "Compose a record and give to so and so a maneh," but he dies before the record was composed and the gift was given to him, the record should not be composed, nor should the gift be given. We suspect that perhaps the sh'chiv me'ra made up his mind to transfer the gift to the recipient via a legal document, and a legal document cannot effect a transfer after the principal's death.

If, however, he said "Compose a record" solely to augment the legal power of the recipient - e.g., he said; "Give so and so a maneh" - and then he added, "and compose a record and give it to him" - a legal record should be composed, signed and given even after the death of the sh'chiv me'ra.

The following rule applies when a sh'chiv me'ra apportions all his property unconditionally, without retaining anything for himself: If he recovers, the gift is retracted. This applies even if he confirmed his statements with a kinyan to augment the legal power of the recipient. Similarly, it applies whether he apportioned all his property to one individual or to two individuals. The rationale is that we assume that he did not want to give all his property to that persons as a gift, and his intent was that the recipient should not acquire anything until after he died.

If he retains anything for himself - either landed property or movable property - he has given only part of his property as a gift. If such a gift is given without an explicit statement of intent, it is considered to be a gift given by a healthy man, and it is effective from the time it was written. Therefore, it is not retracted upon the recovery of the sh'chiv me'ra. This applies provided he confirms the gift with a kinyan. For a gift given by a sh'chiv me'ra that transfers only part of his property requires a kinyan whether he recovers or does not recover.

When does the above apply? When the person gave the gift without making any explicit statement. In such an instance, we assess his intent and presume that since he retained property, his intent was to transfer the property during his lifetime, like a gift given by a healthy man.

If, however, the dying man explicitly states that he is giving the portion of estate as a gift of a sh'chiv me'ra, which takes effect only after his death, there is no need to confirm it with a kinyan, and if he recovers it is retracted. If, however, he does not recover, the intended recipient acquires that portion of the estate. If such a gift was confirmed by a kinyan, the intended recipient does not acquire the property apportioned to him unless the kinyan was intended to amplify the legal power of the recipient, as explained above.

Do not err: Should a dying man apportion all his property and state explicitly that he is giving everything from the present, and that his gift should take effect during his lifetime - such a gift is not governed by the laws pertaining to a gift of a sh'chiv me'ra. Instead, it is like any other gift given by a healthy person. If the legal document reaches the hand of the recipient, or the giver confirms the gift with a kinyan, the recipient acquires everything, and the giver cannot retract.

When a person on his deathbed gives a gift and, its legal record states: "In life and in death ..." or "From my life and in my death ...," it is considered to be a gift given by a sh'chiv me'ra, because it says "in death." This applies whether the dying man apportions all his property or only a portion of it. The expression "in death" indicates that the intent is that the gift should take effect after the giver's death. It says "in life" only to settle the giver's mind and express a prayer that that he will survive this illness.

Even though a person on his deathbed apportions all the property that he is known to possess, it is considered as if he apportioned only part of his estate. If the sh'chiv me'ra confirmed the gift with a kinyan and then recovered, the gift is not retracted. The rationale is that we suspect that he owns other property in a distant country. This law applies unless the dying man says: "All my property that is these...," or unless it is the common assumption that the person owns only the property that he apportioned. In such instances, the gift is considered to apply to all his property.

The following rules apply when a sh'chiv me'ra apportions all his property to other people. We see whether it appears that his intent was to divide his estate. If that is so, if he dies all the intended recipients acquire the property designated for them. If he recovers, all the gifts are retracted. Different laws apply if, however, it appears that he was reconsidering the matter - e.g., after he made a gift with which he left over part of his property, he paused and then apportioned more, and then paused and then apportioned more and confirmed each of his gifts with a kinyan. If he dies, all the intended recipients acquire the property designated for them. If he recovers, only the final gift he designated is retracted. For this person alone was given all his remaining property.

When a sh'chiv me'ra signs over all his property to one of his servants and then recovers, the gift of the property is retracted. The gift of freedom to the slave, however, is not retracted, for he has already gained the reputation of being a free man.

When a sh'chiv me'ra apportions his property because of his impending death - i.e., he thinks that he will die, and this is obvious from his words - even though a kinyan is made to confirm the gift of a portion of his estate - if he recovers, the gift is retracted.

When a person goes out to sea or on a caravan journey, is being transported in chains, or is dangerously ill, having fallen sick suddenly with a severe infirmity - any of these four individuals is considered to be a person who apportions his property because of his impending death. His statements are considered as if they are written down in a legal document and his property has already been apportioned. If these individuals die, their instructions are carried out. If they are saved and recover, even though a kinyan had been made to confirm the gift of a portion of his estate, the gift is retracted, as is the law with regard to anyone who apportions his property because of his impending death.

The following laws apply when a sh'chiv me'ra passes from one sickness to another. If he does not recover and does not walk unsupported in the marketplace, the gift that he gave is binding.

Different rules apply when the dying man stands and walks supported between the sickness in which he apportioned his property and the sickness from which he died. We have physicians assess whether or not he died from the first sickness that affected him. If this is so, the gift is binding. If not, the gift is not binding. If he walked in the marketplace without a support, no assessment is necessary, and the gifts that he originally gave are nullified.

When there is a record of an oral will made by a sh'chiv me'ra that does not say that he died because of the sickness during which he apportioned his property, and the witnesses are not present to corroborate this, the gift is nullified, despite the fact that he died. For his death is not proof that he did not recover. Perhaps he recovered from the sickness during which he apportioned his property and then contracted another sickness and then died. Therefore, the property is presumed to belong to the legal heirs unless the recipients of the gift bring proof that he died because of the sickness during which he apportioned his property.

When a sh'chiv me'ra instructs those listening to the apportionment of his property: "Do not reveal this gift and do not tell anyone about it until after my death," the gift is binding. It is not considered to be a hidden gift. For at the time when the transfer takes place - i.e., after the testator's death - the testator said: "Reveal the matter."

If he commands due to death he does not have to say make the gift public. Even though it is written unspecified (without an explicit clause to publicize the gift) we are not concerned that it is a concealed gift.

When a sh'chiv me'ra says: "Let so and so take all my property," or "...part of my property," or he uses the verb "take hold of," "acquire," "obtain" - they are all expressions connoting a gift. Similarly, if he says "inherit" or "receive as an inheritance," when the intended recipient is fit to inherit the property, the intended recipient acquires it.

If the sh'chiv me'ra said: "May so and so benefit from my property," "May he stand in it," or "May he be supported by it," the intended recipient does not acquire the property.

The following rules apply when a sh'chiv me'ra apportions all his property to another person. If he is not fit to inherit the property, he is awarded it as a gift. If he is fit to inherit it, he is awarded it as an inheritance. When does the above apply? When the intended recipient is one of the dying man's daughters, one of the members of his household, one of his brothers or one of his other heirs. If, however, the dying man gave his entire estate to one of his sons, we assume that he appointed him an executor, as explained above.

If before a person's death, he was asked: "To whom should your property be given? Perhaps to so and so?", and the dying man answers, "To whom else?" that person is awarded the property. We see whether he is fit to inherit the property. If he is, he is awarded it as an inheritance. If not, he is awarded it as a gift.

When a convert has a son who was not conceived in holiness, since the son is not considered an heir - as will be explained in the section dealing with this subject - the convert cannot give the son his entire estate as a gift given by a sh'chiv me'ra. This applies to his entire estate and to a portion of his estate. The rationale is that when speaking about a potential heir, there is no difference whether one uses wording that connotes an inheritance, or wording that connotes a gift. Thus, if in the situation mentioned above one said that the convert's son should acquire the property, it would be as if he inherited his father's estate.

Therefore, if the dying convert gave his estate as a gift to any other convert as a matnat sh'chiv me'ra, the gift is effective.

When a sh'chiv me'ra acknowledges that he owes a debt of a particular amount to a given person and asks that it be given to him from his estate, his acknowledgement is of consequence and his request is fulfilled. This principle also applies when he states that a given utensil is an entrusted object belonging to another person and should be returned to him, a particular courtyard belongs to another person, a debt that another person is reputed to owe him is in fact owed to another person, or in any analogous situation. Even if a convert acknowledges an obligation to a son who was not conceived in holiness, his statements are binding. Indeed, even if a person acknowledged a debt owed to a gentile, the gentile should be repaid.

When, by contrast, a sh'chiv me'ra orders that a gift be given to a gentile from his estate, we do not heed his words, for it is as if he commanded that a transgression be performed with his property.

If a dying man says: "My servant, so and so, make him a free man," "I made him a free man," or "Behold he is a free man," we compel the person's heirs to free the servant. The rationale is that a servant is obligated to perform certain mitzvot.

If a dying man says: "Generate satisfaction for so and so, my maid-servant," satisfaction should be generated for her. She should be given only the type of work she desires out of all the types of work that are known to be performed by servants in that locale.

When a sh'chiv me'ra apportions all his property to a specific person, and that person says: "I do not desire it," he does not acquire it.

If the intended recipient remained silent, and then protests, he acquires the property. The rationale is that the words of a sh'chiv me'ra are considered as if they have been already recorded in a legal document and the property already transferred. Thus, once the recipient remains silent, he can no longer retract.

When a sh'chiv me'ra apportions his property to one person and then changes his mind and apportions his property to another person, the latter person acquires it. For a sh'chiv me'ra has the right to retract until he dies. The above applies whether he desires to retract the entire amount or only a portion of it, and whether he seeks to retain the property for himself or give it to another person. Even if he apportioned the property to a person and had someone acquire the property on his behalf, and then apportioned it to another person and had someone acquire the property on his behalf, the latter person acquires it. The rationale is that even when a sh'chiv me'ra has someone acquire the property on the recipient's behalf, the transaction is still considered to be a gift given by a sh'chiv me'ra.

If, however, a sh'chiv me'ra apportioned his property to a person, had someone acquire the property on the recipient's behalf and then confirmed the transfer with a kinyan, nothing can be done after the kinyan. He cannot retract - neither to give the property to another person nor to retain it for himself. This applies whether he gave his entire estate or only a portion of it.

When a sh'chiv me'ra retracts part of his apportionment of his estate, the entire apportionment is nullified. What is implied? If he gave all his property to one person, and confirmed his gift with a kinyan to bolster the recipient's legal power, and then retracted and gave part of his property to another person and confirmed his gift with a kinyan to bolster the second recipient's legal power, the second person acquires the property he was given. The first person does not acquire anything. This applies whether the sh'chiv me'ra recovers or dies.

The following rules apply when a dying man gives a portion of his estate as a gift and confirms this with a kinyan, and then gives his entire estate to another person and confirms this gift with a kinyan to bolster the recipient's legal power. If the sh'chiv me'ra dies, the first recipient acquires the portion given to him, and the second recipient acquires the remainder. If the sh'chiv me'ra recovers, the first recipient acquires the portion given to him, and the second recipient does not acquire anything.

When a sh'chiv me'ra consecrates all his property without retaining anything, declares his estate ownerless or divides his estate among the poor -if he recovers, he retracts everything.

If a person conducts a sale while a sh'chiv me'ra, the sale is binding even if he recovers.

Different rules apply when by contrast, a dying man sells his entire estate. If the money itself that he received for the estate is still in his possession, he may retract if he recovers. If, however, he has spent the money, he cannot retract.

The following laws apply when a legal document recording a gift is brought before us, and it does not explicitly state whether the giver was healthy when he gave it, or whether he was a sh'chiv me'ra; the giver claims that he was a sh'chiv me'ra, that he recovered and now desires to retract his gift; the recipient of the gift claims that the giver was healthy and therefore does not have the option of retracting. The recipient must bring proof that the giver was healthy. If he does not find proof, the giver must take a sh'vuat hesset supporting his claim. Afterwards, the landed property remains in the possession of the giver.

Different rules apply if, however, the gift involved movable property, and that movable property is now in the possession of the recipient. Since the recipient could claim: "The movable property is mine," he is allowed to retain possession of the movable property, provided he takes a sh'vuat hesset that the giver was healthy when he gave this gift.

The following rule applies when a person dies, and a legal document recording a gift is discovered tied to his thigh. Even though the document is signed by witnesses and mentions that a klnyan was undertaken to bolster the legal power of the recipients, the document is of no consequence. We assume that after the sh'chiv me'ra had it written, he changed his mind and retracted his gift.

If through the legal document the person transferred ownership over the property to another person, whether he is a legal heir or is not a legal heir, everything stated within takes effect, as is true with regard to all gifts given by a sh'chiv me'ra.

Similar laws apply when a sh'chiv me'ra has a promissory note composed stating that he owes money to a particular person - to one of his sons or to one of his other heirs - and he entrusts that document to a third party. If he tells that third party: "Hold this in your possession," but does not make any further statement, or tells him: "Leave this until I tell you what to do with it," and dies before making any further statements, the document is of no consequence.

When a sh'chiv me'ra says: "Give a maneh to so and so," the maneh should be given after the dying man's death. The rationale is that the words of a sh'chiv me'ra are considered as if they have been recorded in a legal document, and that the property concerned has already been transferred. We do not suspect that the sh'chiv me'ra was referring to a buried maneh.

Similarly, if a sh'chiv me'ra states: "I have loaned money..." or "...entrusted an object to so and so; give it to this and this person," his words are binding, and a ma'amad sh'loshtam is not required. Similarly, if a sh'chiv me'ra says: "Give so and so this particular promissory note," the recipients acquire the debt mentioned in the promissory note, as if the sh'chiv me'ra wrote the transfer on the promissory note and gave it to the intended recipient, even though the promissory note was not actually transferred. An heir does not have the right to waive payment of a promissory note that was given as a matnat sh'chiv me'ra. Why is that when a person sells or gives a promissory note to a colleague, and an heir waives payment, the waiver is binding, while when a sh'chiv me'ra apportions a promissory note as a matnat sh'chiv me'ra, an heir cannot waive payment. The rationale is that the transfer of a promissory note is a Rabbinical ordinance. Therefore, according to Scriptural Law, the promissory note still belongs to the heir. Thus, his waiver of it is of consequence. The transfer of a gift given by a sh'chiv me'ra is also a Rabbinic ordinance. Nevertheless in this instance, our Sages reinforced their decision and conveyed upon it the power of Scriptural Law. Thus, it is as if the recipient acquired the money mentioned in the promissory note according to Scriptural Law, and the money already reached his possession. Thus, the heir no longer possesses any right to it. Therefore, he cannot waive its payment.

The following rules apply when a sh'chiv me'ra states: "There is a maneh belonging to so and so in my possession." If he says: "Give it to him," it should be given to him. If he does not make such a statement, it should not be given to him. We suspect that perhaps he made his original statement only so that it would not be said that his heirs are wealthy.

Therefore, if the sh'chiv me'ra made the statement as a sincere acknowledgement, and there was no suspicion of subterfuge, the money should be given to the person mentioned, even though the sh'chiv me'ra did not explicitly say that it should be given to him.

Similarly, the following rules apply if witnesses observe a father hiding money in a drawer, a chest or a tower, and he says: "They belong to so and so," or "They are ma'aser sheni." If it appears that he is conveying his desires for the use of the money, his words are upheld. If it appears that he is being deceptive, his statements are of no consequence.

The Rabbis also discussed a similar situation. If a person came and told sons: "I saw your father hide money in a drawer, a chest or a tower, and he says: "It belongs to so and so," or "It is ma'aser." If the money is hidden in the sons' house, his statements are of no consequence. If it is in a field, his words should be upheld. The general principle is that whenever the witness could have taken the money if he had wanted to, his words are upheld. If he could not have, his statements are of no consequence.

An incident occurred when a person was upset because of money that he knew that his father had left him, but he did not know where his father had hid it. He was told in a dream: "There was so and so much money. They are in this and this place, but they belong to so and so," or "...but they are ma'aser sheni." He found the exact sum of money in the place that was told him. The question was brought before the Sages and they said: "Words from dreams neither avail nor impair."

When a sh'chiv me'ra acknowledged that he owes so and so a maneh, and afterwards, the orphans state: "At a later date, our father told us that he paid the debt," their word is accepted. They must, however, take a sh'vuat hesset to confirm their claim.

If, however, the sh'chiv me'ra said "Give the maneh to so and so" when making the acknowledgement his statements cannot be retracted. Even if the orphans state: "At a later date, our father told us that he paid the debt," their word is not accepted.

If a sh'chiv me'ra says: "I owe so and so a maneh" and after his death the heirs say: "We gave it to him," their statements are not accepted. Since the sh'chiv me'ra did not say: "Give it," how would they know that they were obligated to give it?

If the dying man said: "Give so and so the money owed him," and the heirs claim to have paid the debt, the heirs are believed. They must, however, take a sh'vuat hesset.

The following rules apply when a sh'chiv me'ra gives a maneh to a third party and tells him: "Bring this maneh to so and so," and the third party goes to the designated recipient, but finds that he has died. If the recipient was alive at the time the sh'chiv me'ra gave the money to the third party, he should give it to the heirs of the intended recipient. The rationale is that the words of a sh'chiv me'ra are considered as if they have been recorded in a legal document, and the object concerned already transferred. If the intended recipient was not alive at that time, the third party should return the money to the heirs of the principal, for a deceased person cannot acquire property.

When a sh'chiv me'ra says: "Give 200 zuz to so and so, 300 zuz to so and so, and 400 zuz to so and so," we do not say that the first person mentioned in the legal record of his statements receives his portion first. Instead, if the estate does not contain 900 zuz, it is divided proportionately. And if a promissory note is issued against the estate, the creditor expropriates from all recipients proportionately. What is implied? If the debt was for 450 zuz, the person granted 200 gives 100, the person granted 300 gives 150, and the person granted 400 gives 200.

If, however, the sh'chiv me'ra says: "Give 200 zuz to so and so. Afterwards, give 300 to so and so, and then 400 to so and so," whoever is mentioned first in the legal record is granted priority. Therefore, if a promissory note against the estate is brought up, the creditor should expropriate the money from the last recipient. If his holdings are not sufficient to satisfy the debt, the creditor should expropriate the money from the one mentioned before him. If his holdings are also not sufficient, the creditor should expropriate the money from the one mentioned before the second to last recipient.

If a sh'chiv me'ra says: "Let so and so live in this house," or "Let so and so partake of the fruits of this palm tree," his words are of no significance. The rationale is that he did not transfer an object of substance. For living and eating are like speech and sleep, which cannot be transferred. If, however, the sh'chiv me'ra said: "Give this house to so and so, so that he may live in it," or "Give so and so this tree, so that he may partake of its fruits," his statements are effective. The rationale is that he transferred the entity itself mentioned in the gift with the intent that benefit be derived. This entity is an object of substance. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

When a sh'chiv me'ra says: "This property of mine should be given to banai," his daughters are not included among the recipients. Even when the descendants of the sh'chiv me'ra include only one son and a daughter, or one son and the son of another son, and he used the expression banai - which is a plural term - the estate should be given to his son alone. For one son can be referred to as "my sons."

When a sh'chiv me'ra says: "My property should be given to Tovia," and then dies, and a person named Tovia comes and claims the estate, it should be given to him. If, however, it is established that the claimant is referred to as "Rav Tovia," the estate should not be given to him. Nevertheless, should the sh'chiv me'ra be familiar with the claimant and be on first name basis with him, the estate should be given to him although he is generally referred to as Rav Tovia.

The following principles apply when two claimants come, and it is established that they are both called Tovia. If one of them is a Torah scholar and the other is not, the Torah scholar receives precedence. If neither of them is a Torah scholar, but one is a neighbor or a relative, the neighbor or relative receives precedence. If one is a neighbor and the other is a relative, the neighbor is given precedence. If both of the claimants are relatives, neighbors or Torah scholars, the judges should act on their own assessment of the circumstances; the estate should be given to the claimant whom they think the deceased intended. Similar principles apply if there are several intended recipients.

If a sh'chiv me'ra says: "My property should be given to so and so, to so and so, and to so and so," the intended recipients should divide the estate equally. This applies even if 100 people are mentioned.

When a sh'chiv me'ra says: "My property should be given to so and so and to my sons," the estate should be divided between them. The person named receives half, and all his sons together receive the other half. An incident occurred concerning a person who told his wife: "My property should be given to you and my sons." Our Sages said: She should receive half of the estate, and all the sons should divide the other half.

If a sh'chiv me'ra says: "My property should be given to so and so, to so and so, and to the sons of so and so," the sons of so and so receive half of the estate, and the other two people mentioned receive the other half.

When a sh'chiv me'ra says: "So and so should receive a portion of my property," he should receive half. When he says: "Give a portion of my property to so and so," he should be given one sixteenth. There are, however, those who maintain that he should be given one fourth of the estate.

If a sh'chiv me'ra says: "Give so and so a portion of the wine that I possess," the person named should be given one fourth of the wine. If he says: "Give him a portion of the wine to pour into jugs," he has diminished that person's share, and the person named should be given one eighth of the wine. If he says: "Give him a portion of the wine for cooking, the person named should be given one twelfth of the wine. If he says: "Give him a portion of the wine for a small cup, the person named should be given one sixteenth of the wine. For he revealed that his intent was to give him merely a small portion.

One should not extrapolate from the measures mentioned with regard to any other matters.

When a sh'chiv me'ra says: "Let my wife receive a portion like one of the sons," she should be given a portion the size of that given to each of the sons. If sons are born to the deceased after he has made this deposition of his property, they are added to the sons who existed at the time the will was made, and she receives a portion equal to that given to each of them. What is implied? If the sh'chiv me'ra had three sons at the time he made his will, and two more sons were born to him afterwards, she should receive a portion equal to that given the five sons - i.e., one sixth of the estate.

The widow receives a portion only from the property that the deceased owned at the time he made his will. She does not receive a portion of any property he acquires after the will was made. The rationale is that a person cannot transfer ownership of an entity that is not in his possession.

When a sh'chiv me'ra says: "So and so should receive movable property that I own," the person named should receive his personal utensils. He is not, however, given wheat, barley or other similar entities that the deceased owned. If, however, he says: "...all the movable property that I own," the person named receives everything.

Servants are included in the category of movable property, but not a lower millstone or the like. For the lower millstone is attached to the earth.

If the sh'chiv me'ra said: "...everything that can be carried," the intended recipient acquires even a lower millstone and similar objects.

When a sh'chiv me'ra says: "Give my property to so and so," that person receives all his movable property, all his landed property, the garments, the servants, the livestock, the fowl, the tefillin and the other sacred texts; for these are all considered to be property. There is, however, an unresolved question of whether or not a Torah scroll is considered to be "property." Therefore, if the recipient takes possession of it, it should not be expropriated from him.

When a sh'chiv me'ra says: "Give 200 zuz to so and so, my firstborn, as is appropriate for him," he should be given that sum as well as his portion as a firstborn.

In the above situation, if the sh'chiv me'ra said: "Give him 200 zuz as his firstborn portion," the firstborn is given the option: He may take his firstborn portion, or he may take the 200 zuz.

Similarly, if the sh'chiv me'ra said: "Give 200 zuz to my wife so and so, as is fitting for her, she receives that sum and the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. lf he said: "Give her 200 zuz for her ketubah" the option is hers.

If the sh'chiv me'ra said: "Give 200 zuz to so and so, my creditor, as is fitting for him," he receives that sum and the money due him because of the debt. If he said: "Give him 200 zuz for his debt," he may collect only his debt.

If a sh'chiv me'ra said: "Give 400 zuz to so and so and let him marry my daughter," it is as if he gave him two gifts. Whichever he desires, he may take. Therefore, if he desires to take the money but not to marry the daughter, he may do so. If, however, the sh'chiv me'ra said: "Let him take my daughter and give him 400 zuz" he is making the gift conditional. The person mentioned does not acquire the gift unless he marries the daughter.

The following principle applies if a sh'chiv me'ra said: "Give 400 zuz to my daughter as her ketubah" or "...for her ketubah." If it is the custom of the people of that city to add to the appraisal of the dowry and to write a maneh's worth as 200 zuz, the daughter should be given only 200 zuz. For the sh'chiv me'ra did not say "400 zuz" without any modifier, but rather "400 zuz as her ketubah." It is as if he said: "Give her what is necessary so that her ketubah will be appraised at 400 zuz."

If a sh'chiv me'ra said: "Give such and such clothing and such and such articles to my daughter for her dowry," and the price of the garments and the articles decreases afterwards, the heirs profit, and they are required to give her only what she was promised according to the lesser price. Similarly, if a sh'chiv me'ra said: "Give my daughter the 400 zuz, the money from this wine," and the price of wine increases, the heirs profit, and the daughter is given only 400 zuz. An incident occurred concerning a person who was being led off in fetters. He said: "Give so and so 400 zuz from the wine in this and this place." Our sages said: "He should receive 400 zuz from the price of that wine." The condemned man did not intend to give the person named an amount of wine equal in weight to 400 zuz. He intended to give him the monetary amount. He specified the place from which he could collect the money to strengthen the legal power of the recipient. Another incident occurred concerning a man who said: "Give my daughter the date palm," but he left only two halves of a date palm. Our Sages said: "She should receive the two halves of the date palm, for that was his intent. He called them a date palm." And another incident occurred concerning a person who said: "Give so and so a building that contains 100 korim." It was discovered that the building owned by the person who apportioned his property could contain 120 korim. Our Sages said: "He acquires that house, because it appears that this was his intent." For everyone who gives a gift gives generously. The same applies in all analogous situations.

When a sh'chiv me'ra says: "Give my sons a shekel each week," or even if he said: "Do not give them anything but a shekel each week," and it is discovered that a sela a week is necessary to meet their needs, they are given whatever they need. We assume that his intent was not to starve his children, but to encourage them not to live on a very lavish budget.

When a sh'chiv me'ra orders: "Do not eulogize me," he should not be eulogized. If he says: "Do not use funds from my estate to bury me," his words are not heeded. We do not enable him to secure the funds of his children and make himself a burden on the community. For it is forbidden to leave him without a burial. Instead, we compel his heirs to bury him from the funds in his estate.

When a sh'chiv me'ra says: "My son, so and so, should inherit my estate," that son alone should inherit the estate, and not the man's other sons. Similarly, if he makes such statements about one daughter with regard to his other daughters, one brother with regard to his other brothers, or similarly, with regard to other heirs, his words are binding.

If a healthy person makes such statements, his words are of no consequence.

When a sh'chiv me'ra states: "My property should be given to so and so, and after him, to so and so," the second person receives only what the first person leaves over.

If, however, the first person was fit to inherit the estate of the sh'chiv me'ra - e.g., he was one of his sons - the second person does not receive anything. For regardless of the expression used to give a gift to an heir, it is considered as if he were given an inheritance. And an inheritance never ends. This applies even though the giver said: "After him, it should be given to so and so."

If, however, a healthy person gave a gift in this manner and had a deed composed saying: "My property should be given to you, and after you to so and so," the second person receives only what the first person leaves over. This applies whether or not the first person was fit to inherit the estate of the giver.

There is an exception to the principle stated above with regard to a sh'chiv me'ra who says: "My property should be given to you, and after you to so and so," and the first recipient is fit to inherit the giver's estate. If the giver explicitly states: "I am not giving you this property as an inheritance that never ceases, but as a gift, and I have set a limit to it," the second person acquires what the first leaves over. For this reason, if the giver entrusted the money to a third party, or he said: "Give my sons a shekel every week. I am not giving them this money as an inheritance. Afterwards, what remains of the estate after their death should be given to so and so," they should be given only a shekel a week, even though it does not suffice for them.

If a sh'chiv me'ra states: "My property should be given to so and so, and after him to so and so," and the first person named dies, the property is acquired by the second. If the second person named also dies, the property is given to the heirs of the second person. If, however, the second person dies during the lifetime of the first, and the first dies before the sh'chiv me'ra, the property should be given to the heirs of the first person.

Although the second person named receives only what the first person leaves over, it is forbidden for the first person to sell or give as a gift the body of the property that he has been given. Instead, he is entitled to reap the benefits from the property until he dies, at which time the second person acquires the property.

If, however, the first person transgresses and sells or gives as a gift the property, the second person cannot expropriate the property from the recipient. For the second person does not have any right to the body of the property or the benefits from it, but only what remains after the first person dies. Any person who advises the first person named to sell the property is called "wicked." Even if the estate contained servants and the first person granted them their freedom or garments and he made them shrouds for a corpse, his deeds are binding.

When does the above apply? When the first person sold or gave as a gift the property to an outside party. If, however, the first person sold or gave them as a gift to his son or to another heir, his deeds are of no consequence. Similarly, if he gave the property as a gift of a sh'chiv me'ra to an outside party, his deeds are of no consequence. The rationale is that the recipient of a gift given by a sh'chiv me'ra does not acquire it until after the sh'chiv me'ra dies, and when the first recipient dies, the property has already been acquired by the second person named by the original giver.

In the above situation, if the first recipient owes a debt or must pay his wife the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, and the court seeks to collect the debt from this property, even if the first recipient is still alive, the court does not collect the debt from the body of the property itself. Instead, only the proceeds from it are indentured. If the first person dies and his creditor or his wife seeks to expropriate this property, nothing at all is expropriated for them. This applies even when he made them an ipotiki or designated them for his wife so that she could collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah from them. Nothing is expropriated from this property, because it belongs to the second person.

When a sh'chiv me'ra says to an unmarried woman: "My property should be given to you, and after you to so and so," and then the woman marries, her husband is considered to be a purchaser, and the second person may not expropriate the property from him. If the woman was already married when the sh'chiv me'ra said: "...and after you to so and so," the second person may expropriate the property from the husband. The rationale is that since she acquired the property on this condition when she was married, it is as though the sh'chiv me'ra told her explicitly: "After your death, so and so will acquire the property, and not your husband." Therefore, if she sold this property while she was married to her husband, and then died while married to her husband, the property should remain in the possession of the purchaser. For if the husband expropriated the property from the purchaser because his wife sold it while she was married, the second person mentioned by the original giver may expropriate the property from the husband, and then the man who purchased it from the woman may expropriate it from the second person, for she sold the property to him, and the second person is entitled only to property that the woman left over. And the cycle could continue endlessly. Nevertheless, since the only one who spent money for the property is the purchaser, the property is allowed to remain in his possession. An incident occurred with regard to a person who said: "Let my property be given to my mother, and after her to my heirs." He had a married daughter. That daughter died during her husband's lifetime, and also in the lifetime of her father's mother. After she died, the elder woman also died. Our Sages said: The daughter's husband does not inherit that property, for it was only fitting for his wife to inherit, and she did not actually have a right to acquire the property until she had died. If the daughter had left a son or a daughter, they would have inherited the estate, for the expression "heirs" used by the deceased includes even the heirs' heirs. And if the dying man had said: "When the elder woman dies, the estate becomes my daughter's retroactive to the present time," the daughter's husband would inherit it after his wife's death.

When a person has a legal record composed giving property to his son after his death, the body of the property becomes the son's from the time this legal record is composed. The benefit from the property is retained by the father until he dies. Accordingly, the father cannot sell this property, because it has already been given to his son. Nor can the son sell the property, because it is under the father's control. If the father dies and there is produce attached to the ground on this property, it belongs to the son. The rationale is that a person feels a closeness to his son. If the produce has already become detached or it is ready to be harvested, it belongs to the other heirs. If the father transgresses and sells the property, the sale is binding until he dies. When he dies, the son expropriates the property from the purchaser. If there was produce attached to the property, its worth should be evaluated and credited to the purchaser, and the son must pay him for it. If the produce was detached or ready to be harvested, it belongs to the purchaser. If the son transgresses and sells the property, the purchaser does not receive anything until the father dies. If the son sold the property during the father's lifetime, the son died, and then the father dies, the purchaser takes possession of the property when the father dies. The sale of the property by the son is not nullified, because the father possesses only the right to benefit from the property, and possession of the right to benefit from a property is not the same as possession of the property itself.

When the deed recording a gift given by a healthy person states that the gift takes effect "from today and after the person's death," it is considered to be a gift given by a sh'chiv me'ra. The implication is that although he acquires the body of the property from the day of the gift, he may not take possession of it and partake of its fruits until after the giver's death.

The following laws apply with regard to a deed recording a gift, which states that so and so should acquire a particular field after the death of the giver. Whether or not the legal document records a kinyan, since it mentions a date and the giver was alive on that date, the date indicates that he transferred ownership of the property during his lifetime. The recipient may not take possession of it until after the giver's death. This is certainly the intent. For if the giver's intent had been to transfer the property with this document after his death, he would not have dated it. Therefore, even though the document does not state that the gift takes effect "from today and after the person's death," the recipient acquires the property after the giver's death. The reason we write "from the present time" in a legal document although it is dated, is to clarify the matter, even though it is unnecessary.

When a healthy person gives a gift and composes the deed recording it saying: "During my lifetime and in my death," it is a completely binding gift, taking effect during the person's lifetime, for it states: "During my lifetime." The fact that it also states: "And in my death," is as if it states: "from now until eternity." It is an embellishment of the document.

Perfectly righteous men and men of spiritual stature would not receive gifts from other men. Instead, they would trust in G-d, blessed be His name, and not in generous men. And Proverbs 15:27 states: "One who hates gifts will live."