Sales

A purchase is not sold by what one says, even when witnesses testify on such. How [does this work]? [If a seller says to an buyer for example] "This house I sell to you", "This wine I sell to you", "This slave I sell to you", then they decide a price. The buys wants [such a deal] and says, "I purchased it", and the seller wants [such a deal] and says, "I sold it". They say to witnesses, "Be witnesses for us so that [you can testify] that one sold and one bought". Indeed however, this [their testimony] is worthless, and it is as if they never talked. This is true for the giving and receiving of gifts.

But if a purchase is sold by one of the ways in which it can be sold [properly], the buyer acquires it and there is no need for witnesses at all. Neither one of them [the seller and the buyer] can renege on such.

How is an acquisition made? Landed property can be acquired in one of three ways: a) through the transfer of money, b) through the transfer of a deed of sale, or c) through chazakah (manifesting one's ownership).

How is property acquired through the transfer of money? If one person sold another person a house or a field, and the purchaser gave him the money agreed upon, he acquires it. When does the above apply? In a place where it is not customary to write a deed of sale. In a place where it is customary to write a deed of sale, however, the purchaser does not acquire the property until a deed is composed. Landed property cannot be acquired for less than a p'rutah's worth.

If the purchaser makes the following stipulation: "If I desire, I will acquire it through the transfer of money, or if I desire I will acquire it through the transfer of a deed of sale," and gives money on the basis of this stipulation, it is established as a binding condition. Once the money has been paid, the seller cannot retract, because of the stipulation. The purchaser can, however, retract until the deed of sale is written. Similar laws apply if the seller makes such a condition.

When a person tells a colleague: "Give so and so a maneh and you will acquire my house," once the colleague makes the payment, he acquires the house. This is an extension of the laws applying to a guarantor.

How is property acquired through the transfer of a deed of sale? The seller writes for the purchaser on a piece of paper, on a shard or on a leaf. "My field is given to you," or "My field is sold to you." Once the deed reaches the purchaser's hand, he acquires the field, even though there are no witnesses at all, and despite the fact that the document itself is of no financial value. When does the above apply? When a person sells his field because it is undesirable. With regard to other landed property, by contrast, even though the deed of sale reaches the purchaser's hand and is signed by witnesses, the purchaser does not acquire the property until he pays its price.

How is property acquired through the manifestation of ownership? If a person sold a colleague a house or a field or gave him such properties as a gift, the purchaser or the recipient acquires the property when he locks the entrance to the property, encloses the property with even the slightest portion of a fence or breaks through even the slightest portion of one of the walls surrounding the property, provided his deeds bring him benefit. When does the above apply? When the person manifests his ownership in the presence of the seller or the one who gives the gift. If, however, he does so outside the presence of the seller or the one who gives the gift, the seller or the giver must tell him: "Go, manifest possession over it and acquire it." If this statement is made, and afterwards the purchaser or the recipient manifests possession, he acquires the property even if he acts outside the presence of the previous owner.

When a person sells a house to a colleague and gives him the key, it is as if he told him: "Go, manifest possession over it and acquire it." Similarly, if a person sells a colleague a cistern, once he gives him its bucket it is as if he told him: "Go, manifest possession over it and acquire it." When he manifests his possession, he acquires it.

What is meant by saying that one who locks a property acquires it? For example, when a person sells a house or a courtyard whose entrance was open, and the purchaser locked the entrance and then opened it; the purchaser is considered to have acquired it, for he used it in a way that brings benefit.

What is meant by saying that one who encloses the property with even the slightest portion of a fence acquires it? For example, there was a fence that people could climb over easily, and the purchaser added a small portion to its height, making it ten handbreadths high thus causing it to be difficult to climb over. His deeds are of benefit and he acquires the property. Similarly, if there was an opening in the fence that allowed people to enter only with difficulty, and the purchaser widened it even slightly, allowing people to enter easily, his deeds are of benefit and he acquires the property.

If the purchaser placed down a rock in a way that causes benefit - e.g., he completed an irrigation channel that brought water to the field - or he removed a rock in a way that causes benefit - e.g., he opened a dammed irrigation ditch and let water flow into the field - he acquires it. The same applies in all analogous situations.

The following rules apply when a person sells a colleague a field that is located next to one of that colleague's fields, or gives him such a field as a gift. Once the colleague breaks down the partition that separates the two fields from each other and makes them one large field, he acquires it. If, however, he merely walks the length and breadth of the new property, this walking serves no benefit and it therefore does not serve as a manifestation of his ownership. When he sells him a path for vineyards, however, the purchaser does acquire it by walking, for that is its purpose.

How wide is the path that a person acquires by walking? If it is defined by barriers, he acquires an area at least large enough to enable him to lift one foot up and place the other next to it. If it is not defined by barriers, he acquires a width sufficient to allow him to walk carrying a package of twigs on his head and turn around with it.

If the property being sold is a rocky patch that cannot be enclosed with a fence and an entrance, nor can it be sowed, the way in which a person manifests his ownership and acquires it is to spread produce upon it, to have an animal stand there, or to use it in another way.

When a person sells a field to a colleague, and the colleague enters and sows it, plows it and leaves it fallow, collects its produce, prunes it or the like, he acquires it, for he has manifested his ownership. Neither of them may retract. Similarly, if the seller collects a basket of produce and gives it to the purchaser, the purchaser acquires the field. This is considered manifestation of ownership, for the seller revealed his intent of transferring ownership of the field to the purchaser in an outright way, so that its produce would be his.

A gentile cannot acquire property by manifesting his ownership over it. He can acquire a property only through the transfer of a legal document after money has been paid. A Jew who comes on account of a gentile is considered like a gentile and can acquire property only through the transfer of a legal document. Any entity that is attached to landed property is considered like landed property and can be acquired through the transfer of money, the transfer of a deed of sale or through chazakah. If, however, the produce no longer needs the nurture of the land - e.g., grapes that are ready to be picked - it is considered movable property with regard to the laws of acquisition. And like movable property, the laws of deception apply with regard to their sale.

Just as landed property itself is acquired through the transfer of money, the transfer of a deed of sale or chazakah, so too, the rental of land is finalized through the transfer of money alone, the transfer of a deed of sale alone, or chazakah, and neither party can retract.

When a person sells a colleague ten fields in ten different countries, the purchaser acquires them all by manifesting his ownership over one of them. Even if one of the fields was located on a high mountain and another in a valley - and thus the manner in which one is tilled differs from the other -nevertheless, by manifesting his ownership over one of them, the purchaser acquires them all.

A Canaanite servant is considered as landed property with regard to the laws of acquisition, and can be acquired through the transfer of money and a deed of sale, or through chazakah.

What manifestation of ownership is effective in acquiring a servant? Making use of him as one makes use of a servant in the presence of his previous master. What is implied? If the servant unties his new master's shoe, puts on his shoe, carries his articles to the bathhouse, undresses him, anoints him, combs his skin, dresses him or lifts him up, the master acquires the servant. Similarly, if the master lifts up the servant, he acquires him.

If the new owner pushes the servant and brings him close to him, he acquires him, for a Canaanite servant can be acquired through meshichah in this manner. If, however, he called the servant and he came to him, or the servant's previous owner told him to go to the purchaser, and he followed those instructions, the new owner does not acquire him until he pushes him or until he makes use of him in the manner described above. If the new owner manifests his ownership over the servant outside the presence of the previous owner, the previous owner must tell him: "Go, manifest your ownership and acquire him" for the kinyan to be effective.

A servant below the age of majority is considered like an animal and can be acquired through both the processes by which an animal is acquired and those by which servants are acquired. Therefore, he can be acquired by meshichah even though the new owner did not push him.

Livestock, whether light or heavy, can be acquired through meshichah. When lifting an animal is possible, it need not be lifted, because it may receive a blow when placed back on the earth. If a person lifts it up, he acquires it. Lifting up an object serves as a kinyan in all places, while meshichah is effective as a kinyan only in a corner off the public domain, or in a courtyard whose ownership the buyer and the seller both share. Meshichah is not effective as a kinyan in the public domain or in a courtyard whose ownership is not shared by both the seller and the purchaser.

How does one acquire an animal through pulling it? It goes without saying that if he pulled it and it walked, or rode it and it walked, he has acquired it. But even if he called it and it came, or he hit it with a stick and it ran before him; since it has lifted an arm and leg he has acquired it. And this is when he has pulled it in front of the owner. But if he did not pull it in front of the owner, the owner must tell him, before he pulls it, "Go, pull it, and acquire it."

When a person sells a herd to a colleague or gives it to him as a gift, if he gives him the mashkuchit - i.e., the animal that leads the herd, that all the others follow - he does not have to tell him, "Perform meshichah and acquire it." For giving him this animal is tantamount to saying: "Go, perform meshichah and acquire it." Thus, once the purchaser or the recipient performs meshichah with the herd, he acquires it, even if he performs meshichah outside the presence of the previous owner.

When a person tells a purchaser or a recipient of a gift: "Perform meshichah over an animal and then you will acquire it," or "Perform chazakah over property and then you will acquire it," he does not acquire it if he performs meshichah or chazakah. For the expression "you will acquire it" is in the future tense and implies that he has not transferred ownership to him yet. Instead, the seller or the giver of the gift must say: "Go, perform chazakah and acquire it," "Go, perform meshichah and acquire it," or the like, using an expression that implies that he will acquire it at the time he performs meshichah or chazakah.

When a person tells a colleague: "Perform meshichah with an animal and you will acquire it after 30 days," and he performs meshichah, he does not acquire it. If he told him "...acquire it now and after 30 days," he acquires it, even if it is standing in a swamp on the thirtieth day. For this resembles a situation in which an acquisition was made in the present, conditional on a stipulation, in which instance, when the stipulation is met, the transaction becomes effective. Whenever a person uses the expression "with the intent that...," it is as if he said that the transaction would take effect from the present.

The following rules apply when a person sells an animal to a purchaser or gives it as a gift and tells the purchaser or the recipient: "Acquire it in the manner in which people normally acquire it." If he performs meshichah or hagbahah, he acquires it. If, however, he rides upon it a distinction is made: If this is done in the field, he acquires it. If it is done in the city, he does not acquire it, for it is not common for people to ride in a city. For this reason, if the purchaser or recipient is an important person - who is accustomed to riding in a city, a very base person - who is not concerned about riding through the city, e.g., a person who raises animals or servants, or a woman, or if the animal is in the public domain where many walk, it can be acquired by riding, provided the rider causes the animal to proceed.

Animals or other movable objects are acquired with money according to the Torah, and once the money is given then the object is acquired, and neither can go back. But the Sages established that movable objects would only be acquired with lifting or pulling that which is not lifted.

What is implied? When a person gathers together a heavy load of wood, flax or the like that cannot be lifted up, this load cannot be acquired through meshichah, for it can be unbound, and each individual piece of wood can be lifted up. The same principle applies in other similar situations. In contrast, a large load of nuts, peppers, almonds or the like that no one person could lift up, can be acquired through meshichah. For if one untied the load and separated it, lifting each individual item would involve great difficulty. The same principle applies in other similar situations.

With regard to a ship: since it is impossible to lift it up, and it is very difficult to pull it - this is possible only when many are involved - our Sages did not require meshichah. Rather, they ruled that it can be acquired through being handed over (mesirah). The same principles apply in all similar situations. If the seller tells the purchaser, "Go, perform meshichah and acquire the ship," the ship cannot be acquired until one pulls it after oneself, shifting its position entirely, moving it from the place where it had been resting. For the seller had specified that it be acquired solely through meshichah.

From the above, one may conclude that a person who purchases movable property may retract, even though he has paid for his purchase. Similarly, the seller can retract until the purchaser lifts up the object of sale or performs meshichah on an article that is not usually lifted up, or the seller gives the purchaser an article that is not usually pulled. When, however, the purchaser lifts up the object of sale, performs meshichah on an article that is not usually lifted up, or is given an article that is that is not usually pulled, he acquires it. Neither party can retract, and the purchaser is compelled to pay if he has not done so already.

Why did our Sages make such an ordinance with regard to movable property? This is a decree, enacted lest a purchaser pay for an article and before he takes possession of it, it be destroyed by factors beyond his control - e.g., a fire breaks out and burns it, or thieves come and take it. If the article is considered as in the possession of the purchaser, the seller may hesitate and not endeavor to save it. For this reason, our Sages ordained that the article remain within the possession of the seller, so that he will attempt to save it. For if it is destroyed, he is obligated to pay.

Thus, if a purchaser paid for an article and it was destroyed by forces beyond his control before he took it, the purchaser may tell the seller: "Give me the article I purchased or return my money." Even though there are witnesses who saw that the article was destroyed by forces beyond control, the seller could not save it, and he was not lazy regarding the matter, the seller must return the money. For our Sages ordained that a kinyan is finalized through meshichah. For this reason, if the purchaser owned the house in which the article that was sold was held, and he was renting it to the seller, our Sages did not ordain that the article must be acquired through meshichah. For the article that was sold is in the domain of the purchaser. In this instance, once he pays the money, the sale is concluded, and neither can retract.

Similarly, if a person rented the place where the movable property that was sold was stored, he acquires the movable property, and neither can retract, even though he did not lift up the object of sale, perform meshichah on it or have it given him. For the object has entered his domain. As we have already explained, the rental of landed property is finalized through the transfer of money, the transfer of a rental contract or through chazakah.

When a person transfers ownership of landed property and movable property simultaneously, once the purchaser or the recipient acquires the landed property through the transfer of money, the transfer of a deed of sale or through a chazakah, he acquires the movable property together with it. This applies whether he sold both types of property, gave them both as gifts, sold the movable property and gave the landed property as a gift or sold the landed property and gave the movable property as a gift. When the purchaser or the recipient acquires the landed property, he acquires the movable property.

When does the above apply? When the movable property was collected within the landed property. If, however, it was in another place, it is necessary for the seller to tell the purchaser: "Acquire the movable property by virtue of your acquisition of the immovable property." Even when the movable property is in another country, and the seller tells the purchaser: "Acquire the movable property by virtue of your acquisition of this landed property," once the purchaser acquires the landed property, he acquires the movable property together with it, even though the movable property was not collected within the landed property. If the seller did not tell the purchaser: "Acquire the movable property by virtue of your acquisition of this landed property," the purchaser does not acquire the movable property. Even the smallest amount of landed property is sufficient to be used to acquire any movable property one desires by virtue of its acquisition.

Different rules apply when a person transfers ownership of a field to one person and movable property to another person, even though he tells the latter: "Acquire the movable property by virtue of your colleague's acquisition of this landed property." Although the recipient manifests ownership over the landed property, the other does not acquire the movable property. If, however, this person seizes possession of it after the seller desires to retract, it should not be removed from his possession, for he took possession of it after his colleague acquired the landed property by virtue of whose acquisition this movable property was to be acquired.

When a person desires to transfer ownership over servants and landed property at the same time, although he manifests ownership over the servants, he does not acquire the landed property. Similarly, although he manifests ownership over the landed property, he does not acquire the servants unless they are standing within the landed property. Even though the seller tells the purchaser: "Acquire the servants by virtue of your acquisition of this landed property," the purchaser does not acquire the servants unless the servants are within the landed property. The rationale is that a servant goes from place to place on his own volition.

When a person transfers ownership of servants and movable property at the same time, the purchaser does not acquire the servants by performing meshichah on the movable property. If he manifested his ownership over the servants, he did not acquire the movable property, unless the servant was carrying the movable property. Moreover, the servant must be bound, so that he cannot walk.

The following laws apply when a person transfers ownership of both an animal and the articles it was bearing at the same time. Although he performs meshichah of the animal and acquires it - he does not acquire the articles it was bearing until he lifts up or performs meshichah on the articles themselves, if it is not customary to lift them up. The rationale is that an animal is like a walking courtyard, and thus, what it bears is not acquired by its owner. Therefore, if the animal was bound, by performing meshichah on it, one also acquires the articles it was bearing.

When the seller tells the purchaser, "Perform meshichah over this animal in order to acquire the articles on it," since he does not transfer ownership of the animal itself - even if the purchaser performs meshichah on the animal while it is bound - he does not acquire the articles on it, unless he performs meshichah on those articles themselves.

The following rules apply when a flowerpot with a hole was owned by one person, and the plants growing in it by another person. If the ownership of the flowerpot was transferred to the owner of the plants, he acquires it when he performs meshichah. If the ownership of the plants was transferred to the owner of the flowerpot, he does not acquire it until he manifests his ownership over the plants themselves.

The following rules apply when both a flowerpot with a hole and the plants growing in it were owned by one person, and he desired to transfer ownership of the entire entity to another person. If that person manifests his ownership over the flowerpot with the intent of acquiring the plants, he does not even acquire the flowerpot. If he manifests his ownership over the plants with the intent of acquiring both them and the flowerpot, he acquires the flowerpot. This is implied by the teaching: Property that is not on lien to the seller's obligations can be acquired together with property that is on lien to the seller's obligations. For the plants in the flowerpot with a hole are considered as if they are planted in the earth. And whenever an entity is attached to the ground, it is considered to be landed property, as we have explained.

As we have already explained, produce that is ready to be harvested is considered as though it has already been harvested, and can be acquired only through hagbahah or other procedures by which movable property is acquired.

The following laws apply when flax is attached to the earth, but is dry and no longer needs the nurture of the earth. If the owner tells another person: "Clean the smallest portion of this land for me, and acquire it as a rental property together with all the flax on the entire surrounding field, once he uproots even the slightest amount, the renter acquires the entire quantity, on the basis of this stipulation. If, however, the original owner transferred ownership over the flax through a sale or a gift, the recipient acquires only what he uproots, for that is what he has lifted up. The same principles apply in other analogous situations.

Containers owned by a person can acquire articles on his behalf wherever he has permission to place them down. Once movable property enters this container, neither can retract; it is as if the article were lifted up or placed in his home. Therefore, a person's containers cannot acquire articles on his behalf in the public domain or in a domain belonging to the seller unless the seller tells him, "Go, acquire the article with this container." Similarly, if the purchaser first acquired the container and lifted it up, and afterwards placed it down in the domain of the seller and bought produce from him, once the produce is placed in this container, he acquires it. Since the seller derives satisfaction from selling the container, he does not object to the container being placed in his domain.

Just as containers belonging to the purchaser do not acquire articles for him when placed in the seller's domain, so too, containers belonging to the seller do not acquire articles for the purchaser even when they are within the purchaser's domain.

Mesirah may be used to acquire an article only in the public domain, or in a courtyard that is not owned by either the seller or the purchaser. Meshichah may be used to acquire an article only in a corner off the public domain or in a courtyard that is owned jointly by the seller and the purchaser. Hagbahah may be used to acquire an article in any place.

The following rule applies when an article that could be acquired through meshichah is located in the public domain, and is drawn by the purchaser into his own domain or into a corner of the public domain. As soon as he removes a portion of the article from the public domain, he acquires it.

When there is a load of produce in the public domain and, after having established a price, the purchaser draws it into his own domain or into a corner of the public domain he acquires it, even if he has not measured it. Similarly, if, while in the public domain, the purchaser measures produce that he purchases, he acquires it, item by item, for as he measures it, he is lifting it up.

If, by contrast, the seller measures the produce into containers belonging to the purchaser, the purchaser does not acquire it. For a purchaser's containers cannot acquire on his behalf in the public domain. If the produce is located in a domain belonging to the purchaser, once the seller agrees to sell the produce, the purchaser acquires it, even if he does not measure it. If the produce is located in a domain belonging to the seller, or in a domain belonging to a person to whom the seller has entrusted it, the purchaser does not acquire the produce until he lifts it up, or until he removes it from the seller's domain by renting its place, or the like, as we have explained.

The following rules apply when the produce is located in a corner of the public domain or in a domain belonging to both the seller and the purchaser -or even if it is in a domain belonging to the purchaser, but in containers belonging to the seller- and the seller agreed to sell the produce, and has begun to measure it into containers belong to the seller. If the seller tells the purchaser: "I will sell you a kor of produce for 30 sela," he can retract even at the last se'ah, because the produce is in his containers, and he has not completed the measurement. For the containers belonging to a seller do not acquire for a purchaser, even in the purchaser's domain. If he told him: "I will sell you a kor of produce for 30 sela, i.e., each se'ah for a sela" the purchaser acquires each se'ah, one by one as it is measured.For since the seller mentioned the price for each individual se'ah, each of those units is a distinct entity. Whenever the seller lifts up a se'ah and pours it into the measure, the sale of this unit is concluded. The rationale for this law is that the produce is not located in a domain belonging to the seller, nor is it in the public domain. If the produce was not held in the containers of the seller, the purchaser would acquire it once a price was agreed upon, since it is located in his domain even though it had not been measured, as has been explained in the previous halachah.

Similar rules apply when a person sells wine or oil to a colleague in a corner of the public domain or in a courtyard belonging to both the seller and the purchaser, or in a domain belonging to the purchaser, and the measure belongs to the broker. Before the measure is filled, the liquid remains the seller's. Once the measure is filled, the liquid becomes the purchaser's. Neither of them can retract.

Similar rules apply if produce is held in a corner of the public domain or in a courtyard belonging to both the seller and the purchaser, the measuring container does not belong to either of them, and the seller was measuring. Before the measure is filled, it remains in the possession of the seller. Once the measure is filled, however, it becomes the purchaser's.

The following rules apply when the measure belongs to either the purchaser or the seller, and it has marks indicating the halfway point, thirds, quarters and the like. Once the produce reaches one of those markings, that portion is acquired even though the entire measure has not been filled. For every marking is considered to be a measure in its own right. For the measure belongs to one of them, and he relies on its markings.

Maintain awareness of this significant general principle: When a person acquires movable property, he acquires it, if he establishes the price and afterwards lifts up the article. If first he lifts it up and puts it down, and then a price is established afterwards, he does not acquire it because he lifted it up at the outset. Instead, it is only when he lifts it up after a price is established, or performs meshichah on an object that is not ordinarily lifted up.

When an object that has a standard and known price is sold, and the purchaser lifts it up, he acquires it, even though he and the seller agree on the price only after he lifts it up. Similarly, with regard to other means through which movable property is acquired. The acquisition must be made after the price of the article is established, unless there is a standard price for the article, as has been explained.

For this reason, the following rules apply if a person draws donkey-drivers and the produce their beasts are carrying and porters bearing containers filled with produce into his home. If the produce is measured before a price is established - even if the purchaser is the one who measures - or they established the price and then the seller measures the produce, both the seller and purchaser are entitled to retract. Different rules apply if the purchaser unloaded the produce and brought it into his home. If a price was established and then the seller measured, neither can retract. For the seller had made a commitment to sell. If he measured before a price was established, both can retract, because he has not made a commitment to sell. This applies even if the purchaser measures.

The following rules apply if a person takes utensils from a craftsman in order to inspect them to see whether he will purchase them. If they have a fixed price, and they are destroyed by forces beyond his control while in his possession, he is responsible for their value. The rationale is that since they are of a fixed value, they are considered to have entered his domain at the time he lifted them up. The above applies under two conditions: a) he lifts the utensil up with the intent of acquiring it in its entirety, and b) the article being sold would be appreciated by a purchaser. When, however, the seller is repelled by an article and seeks - and indeed pursues - an opportunity to sell it, it remains in the domain of the seller until a price is established and the purchaser lifts it up afterwards.

All the above rules apply whether the purchaser himself performs meshichah on an object, lifts it up or manifests ownership over it, or tells another person to lift it up, perform meshichah or manifest ownership. The other person acquires for the purchaser. This also applies with regard to other acts of acquisition.

The exchange of any movable property brings about a binding transaction. What is implied? If a person exchanges a cow for a donkey, or wine for oil, once one performs meshichah or lifts up the article that he intends to acquire, the other person acquires the second form of movable property stipulated in the exchange, wherever it is located. It is considered to have entered his domain, even though he has not performed meshichah upon it. The above applies although both parties to the transaction are particular about the price, have determined how much this article is worth and how much the other article is worth, and exchanged them after making that determination.

When a person exchanges a donkey for a cow and a lamb, if he performs meshichah on the cow but not on the lamb, the acquisition is not concluded, for he did not complete the meshichah. The same principle applies in all analogous situations.

When one is not precise about the amount of money involved in a transaction, the money is considered in the same way as other types of movable property, and its exchange brings about a binding transaction. What is implied? A person scooped up coins without weighing them or counting them, but rather took an estimated amount, said: "Sell me your cow...," or "...this wine, for these coins," and gave him the coins, the transaction is completed; neither party may retract. Since this is an uncommon situation, our Sages did not require the purchaser to perform meshichah.

Similarly, movable property can be acquired without meshichah in the following situation. Reuven sold movable property to Shimon for 50 zuz. Shimon acquired the movable property and obligated himself to pay Reuven the price agreed upon. After Shimon became obligated to Reuven for these 50 zuz, he desired to sell wine, an animal, a servant or other similar movable property. Reuven told him: "Sell that object to me for the 50 zuz that you owe me for the sale," and Shimon agreed. Reuven acquires the movable property regardless of where it is located, even though he neither performed meshichah nor lifted the object up. The rationale is that this also is an abnormal circumstance, and our Sages did not require meshichah. When, by contrast, a person is in debt for reasons other than a sale, and his creditor tells him: "Sell me the movable property for the debt that you owe me," even though both agree, the transaction is not completed until he lifts up the object, performs meshichah on an object that is not usually lifted up, or acquires it through other means by which movable property can be acquired.

Landed property, servants, livestock and all other movable property can be acquired through the kinyan referred to as chalifin. This way of finalizing a transaction is so commonly used that it is also referred to as kinyan. The fundamental manner in which such a transaction is effected is as follows: The purchaser gives the seller any type of article and tells him: "Acquire this article in exchange for the courtyard,..." "...wine,..." "...animal,..."or "...servant that you sold me in exchange for this and this amount of money." Once this statement is made, when the seller lifts up the article and acquires it, the purchaser acquires that landed property or that movable property even though he did not perform meshichah or pay the money. Neither of the parties involved can retract.

Such a transaction may be completed only through the use of a utensil. A utensil is effective, however, even if it is not worth a p'rutah. Such a transaction may not be completed using an article from which it is forbidden to benefit, nor with produce, nor with a coin. Such a transaction may not be completed using an article belonging to the seller; only one belonging to the purchaser.

When a third party transfers a utensil to the seller so that the purchaser will acquire merchandise that was designated, the purchaser acquires it. Even though he transfers the utensil to him with the intent that it be returned, the transaction is binding, and the purchaser acquires the merchandise intended. For a gift that is given with the stipulation that it be returned is nevertheless considered a gift. Moreover, even if the seller does not take hold of the entire utensil that was transferred to him in exchange for his merchandise, but rather holds a portion of it, and the person transferring the utensil to him holds the other portion, the purchaser acquires the merchandise, provided [the seller] holds a portion of the utensil that can itself be considered to be a utensil, or grabs it in a manner in which he would be able to pull the entire utensil from the hands of the person transferring it into his own possession. Therefore, if the person transferred a portion of a garment to a seller, the seller must hold a portion of the garment the size of three fingerbreadths. Thus, if he cuts off the portion that he is holding, it would be considered a utensil in its own right. For a portion of a garment the size of three fingerbreadths is considered a garment, as has been explained with regard to the subject of the ritual impurity of garments. Similarly, if the seller holds on to a portion smaller than three fingerbreadths but could pull the entire garment into his possession, the purchaser acquires the merchandise being sold.

The above concepts are reflected in the expression used in legal documents: "And we performed a kinyan with so and so with a utensil that is acceptable to be used to conduct a transaction." "A utensil" excludes produce and the like. "That is acceptable" excludes objects from which it is forbidden to benefit. And "to be used to conduct a transaction" excludes a utensil belonging to the seller.

This transaction need not be performed in the presence of witnesses. Instead, even if it was performed only in the presence of the seller and the purchaser, the transaction is finalized. For the only reason the Torah required witnesses with regard to monetary laws is to prevent a person from denying what transpired. A seller, one who gives a gift, rents out an object, lends an object or the like does not require witnesses. Whenever the second party finalizes the transaction through one of the accepted practices - lifting the article up, meshichah, transferring it, chalifin, the payment of money, the transfer of a legal document or through manifesting ownership - the transaction is concluded, even when there are no witnesses present.

Although a person who sells or gives an article confirms the transaction with a kinyan chalifin, both of them may retract as long as they are discussing the matter. This applies even when the kinyan was performed in the presence of witnesses. If they concluded discussing the matter, neither may retract even though the transaction was not observed by witnesses. Just as the seller and the giver may retract, so too, the purchaser and the recipient may retract as long as they are discussing the matter. This leniency does not apply with regard to other kinyanim.

There are many matters that do not require a kinyan, and indeed there is no reason to perform a kinyan with regard to them - e.g., a person who frees his slave, divorces his wife, appoints an agent, issues a protest with regard to a sale, nullifies a protest or waives a colleague's obligation to pay a debt or return an entrusted object. Similar laws apply to other analogous situations.

It has become customary in the majority of places to perform a kinyan to confirm certain of the above matters and the like, even though it is not necessary. The witnesses say: "We performed a kinyan with so and so, confirming that he appointed so and so as an agent," "...waived the debt that so and so owed him," or "...nullified the protest he had issued concerning this bill of divorce," or the like.

Such a kinyan, which is customarily performed with regard to these matters, is of no consequence except to demonstrate that the parties involved were not acting facetiously or in jest when making the statements, but had in fact made a resolution in their hearts before making the statements. Therefore, if a person says: "I am making my statements with a full heart, and I have resolved to do this," nothing else is necessary.

A kinyan is of no consequence with regard to statements that are of no substance. What is implied? If it is stated in a legal document: "We performed a kinyan with so and so, confirming that he will travel to sell merchandise with so and so," "...that they will form a craft partnership," "...that they will divide a field between themselves," or the like, this is considered a kinyan with regard to words, and it is of no consequence. The rationale is that the person did not transfer to his colleague a specific and known entity, neither the entity itself or the fruits of that known entity.

Although produce cannot be used for chalifin, as explained, it can be acquired through chalifin like other movable property. With regard to a coin, by contrast, just as it cannot be used for chalifin, it cannot be acquired through chalifin. Thus, a coin cannot be acquired through a kinyan chalifin, and it cannot be used for a kinyan chalifin to acquire other articles.

Slabs of gold and silver are regarded in the same way as pieces of raw iron or copper. They are like other movable property and can be acquired through chalifin and exchanged for each other, as has been explained. Coins of silver, gold and brass are all considered to be money received as payment for other movable property. If one gives one of these as payment for movable property, one does not acquire it until one performs meshichah or lifts it up, as has been explained. None of these coins can be acquired through kinyan chalifin, or used for such a kinyan.

When does the above apply? When one is acquiring other movable property, servants or landed property with these coins. When, however, gold dinarim are being exchanged for silver coins, the gold coins are considered to be "produce." Similarly, copper coins are considered to be "produce" with regard to silver coins.

What is implied? If a person gave a colleague a dinar of gold for 25 dinarim of silver, the owner of the gold acquires the silver even though it has not yet been transferred into his domain. The owner of the silver is obligated to give his colleague 25 silver dinarim, as he committed himself. If he committed himself to give new silver coins, he must give new ones; if he committed himself to give old coins, he must give old ones. If, however, the owner of the silver gave 25 silver dinarim for one gold dinar, the transaction is not concluded until he takes the gold dinar. Both parties have the right to retract.

Similarly, if a person gave a colleague 30 isar of copper for a dinar of silver, the owner of the copper acquires the silver even though it has not yet been transferred into his domain. The owner of the silver is obligated to give his colleague a silver dinar, as he committed himself. If he committed himself to give a new silver coin, he must give a new one; if he committed himself to give an old coin, he must give an old one. If, however, the owner of the silver gave a silver dinar for 30 copper isar, the transaction is not concluded until he takes the copper isarot. Both parties have the right to retract.

Similarly, bad coins that were disqualified by the ruling kingdom or municipal authorities, or dinarim that are not acceptable as legal tender in that country - i.e., coins that are not used for exchange unless they are changed for others, these are considered to be produce with regard to all matters. They may be acquired through a kinyan chalifin; when they are transferred, money is acquired; and the transfer of money does not acquire them, as is true with regard to other produce.

One who rents a house to another without specification may not evict them without notifying them thirty days in advance, so as to enable them to find a place and not be thrown into the street, and at the end of those thirty, they must leave. When does this apply? In the summer, but during the rainy season they may not evict them at all, from Sukkot until Pesach...

If three people the lender, the borrower and a third party (the intended recipient) are standing together and the lender tells the borrower, "Give the maneh that you owe me (whether an entrusted article or a loan) to so and so the third party," that third party acquires the maneh in question. None of the three can retract. Our Sages described this law as a dictate whose reason cannot be explained. Therefore, one cannot derive any other precept from it.

If Reuven owed Shimon 100 zuz and told Levi: "Give Shimon the 100 zuz that I owe him, and I will repay you," or "...I will make a reckoning with you"- although both Levi and Shimon agree, all three have the potential to retract. Even if Levi pays Shimon a portion of Reuven's debt he is not bound to pay the remainder. Therefore, if Levi does not pay Shimon the entire debt, Shimon may demand payment for the remainder of the debt from Reuven.

When a person sells a promissory note to a colleague or gives one to him as a gift, the physical transfer of the note does not bring about a transfer of the obligation it carries. For he transferred only the proof of the debt. And that proof is not something that can be grasped by the hand.

How indeed can the promissory note be acquired? The seller must write to the purchaser: "Acquire the promissory note of so and so and all the obligations associated with it," and then give him the promissory note. Thus, the note is acquired through the writing and through being transferred. There is no need for witnesses with regard to the actual transfer. Witnesses are necessary, however, for the debt to be collected. The debtor can tell the purchaser: "Who is to say that my creditor did in fact write to you that the debt is transferred and give you the promissory note?"

The transfer of the ownership of promissory notes is a Rabbinical institution. According to Scriptural law, there is no way to acquire the proof of an obligation; only an actual object can be acquired. Therefore, a person who sells a promissory note to a colleague can still waive the debt. Even his heir has the right to waive the debt.

When a woman brings her husband a promissory note as part of her dowry, she cannot waive payment of it without his approval, because her domain has become his.

When a person transfers ownership of even the smallest amount of property to a colleague and by virtue of its transfer also transfers the ownership of a promissory note, the purchaser acquires the note regardless of where it was located, although a written statement was not made and the document was not transferred to the purchaser. It appears to me that in this instance as well, the original creditor has the right to waive payment after selling it. Similarly, if a person sells land and writes a deed of sale even though the purchaser is not present, when the purchaser manifests his possession over the land he acquires the deed regardless of where it is located.

The following rules apply if a person tells a colleague: "Take possession of this field on behalf of so and so, and compose a deed of title for him." Although the agent manifests ownership over the land on behalf of the recipient, the giver can retract his statement concerning the legal record of the present unless it has already been given to the recipient, despite the fact that he cannot rescind his gift of the field.

If, however, the giver told the agent: "Take possession of the field with the stipulation that you write the deed of title," even though the agent manifests ownership over the land on behalf of the recipient, the original owner can retract both with regard to the deed and with regard to the field until the deed of title reaches the hand of the recipient of the gift.

Whenever a person pays money, but does not perform meshichah on the produce, although the purchaser does not acquire the movable property, as we have explained, the person who retracts - whether the purchaser or the seller - is considered not to have conducted himself in a Jewish manner. He is liable to receive the adjuration referred to as mi shepara. Even if the purchaser only made a deposit, if either of the parties involved retracts, that party is eligible to receive the adjuration referred to as mi shepara.

What does receiving the adjuration referred to as mi shepara involve? He is cursed in court and told: "May He who exacted retribution from the generation of the flood, the generation who were dispersed, the inhabitants of Sodom and Amorah, and the Egyptians who drowned in the sea, exact retribution from a person who does not keep his word." After this curse is administered, the seller should return the money.

The following laws apply when a purchaser pays - either completely or partially - for movable property that he desires to purchase and then retracts and the seller tells him, "Come and collect your money." The money is considered to be an entrusted object. If it is stolen or lost, the seller is not responsible for it. If, however, the seller retracts, the money is considered to be within his domain, and he is responsible for it even though he tells the purchaser, "Come and collect your money." This applies until he receives the adjuration mi shepara and tells the purchaser afterwards: "Come and collect your money."

When a person is owed a debt by a colleague and tells him: "Sell me this jug of wine for the debt that you owe me," and the seller agrees, it is considered as if the purchaser paid the money at that time. If either party retracts, he is liable to receive the adjuration mi shepara. Moreover, if he sold him landed property in exchange for the debt, neither party is allowed to retract. This applies even if the money given as a loan is no longer in the seller's possession at the time of the sale.

When a person purchases landed property, servants or other movable property from a colleague, a price is agreed upon, and the purchaser leaves collateral in place of the money, the transaction is not completed. Either of the two can retract; he is not even liable to receive the adjuration mi shepara.

The following rules apply when a verbal agreement alone was concluded with regard to the sale, a price was established, and the purchaser made a mark on the article so that he will have a sign that it is his. Even though the purchaser did not pay any money at all, if either of the parties retracts after the purchaser made the mark, he is liable to receive the adjuration mi shepara. Moreover, if it is the accepted local business custom that making a mark constitutes a binding act of contract, by making that mark, the purchaser completes the transaction. Neither can retract, and the purchaser is liable to pay the price agreed to.

It is a clear fact that this law applies only when the mark is made in the presence of the seller, or if the seller says: "Mark your purchase." For this indicates that he has agreed to transfer ownership, as explained with regard to chazakah and meshichah.

When a person agrees to a transaction with a verbal commitment alone, it is appropriate for him to keep his word even though he did not take any money at all, did not make a mark on the article he desired to purchase, nor leave security. If either the seller or the purchaser retracts, although they are not liable to receive the adjuration mi shepara, they are considered to be faithless, and the spirit of the Sages does not derive satisfaction from them.

And also someone who says he will give a gift to his fellow man, and does not give, is considered untrustworthy. When is this so? When the gift is small because the recipient trusted the giver to give it. But with a large gift there is no loss of trust, because the recipient does not believe he will give him what was said, until he acquires them with a proper act of acquisition.

The following rule applies when a person gave money to a colleague to purchase landed property or movable property, and the agent left his colleague's money in his domain and went and purchased the object for himself with his own money. The purchase he performed is concluded; he is, however, considered to be a man of deceit.

If the agent knows that the seller has affection for him and honors him and would sell the article to him, but not to the person who charged him with purchasing it, the agent is permitted to buy it for himself. He must, however, return and notify the one who sent him. If he is afraid that another person will come and purchase the article before him, he may purchase the article for himself and then notify the one who sent him.

Several Rabbinic authorities have ruled that if the agent purchased the article for himself using the money entrusted to him by his colleague after considering it to be a loan, he is considered to have purchased the article for himself. We accept his claim: "I considered the money that I was given to be a loan." I differ and maintain that this ruling is not true. Instead, the purchase belongs to the principal, as will be explained with regard to the laws of an investment partnership.

The following rules apply when three people give money to one agent to purchase an article for them: If the monies were mixed together, and the agent used only a portion of the money to purchase the article, the article is considered the property of all the purchasers, and they divide ownership of it according to their share of the money. This applies even if the intent of the agent was that the article be purchased by only one of them.

If the money of one of the partners was bound up and sealed, and that money was used to complete the purchase, the partner whose funds were used alone acquires ownership. This applies even if the agent intended that the article be acquired by all the partnership as a joint enterprise.

The following rules apply when a person sold his field to a colleague for 1000 zuz, the purchaser paid a portion of the funds, and the seller was repeatedly demanding payment of the remainder. Even if there was only one zuz remaining unpaid, the purchaser does not acquire the entire field. This applies even if the seller had a deed of sale composed or the purchaser manifested ownership.

In the above situation, if the purchaser retracts, the seller is given the upper hand. If he desires, he can tell the purchaser: "Here is your money," or he can tell him: "Acquire a portion of the land equivalent to the money that you paid me." In this instance, he gives the purchaser the land of least value. If the seller retracts, the purchaser is given the upper hand. If he desires, he can tell the seller: "Give me my money," or he can tell him: "Give me a portion of the land equivalent to the money that I paid." In this instance, he takes the choicest portion of the land. If the seller was not repeatedly demanding payment of the remainder, the purchaser acquires the entire property. Neither can retract. The remainder of the money unpaid at the time of sale is considered as any other debt.

If a person sold his field because it was of inferior quality, even when the seller repeatedly demands payment of the remainder of the money, the purchaser acquires the entire property, and he is not entitled to retract. For the reason the seller is pursuing the purchaser and demanding payment is not that he has not agreed to transfer ownership, but to prevent the purchaser from retracting.

The same law applies with regard to the sale of movable property. Although the purchaser draws produce after him and brings it into his domain, if the seller repeatedly demands payment of the remainder of the money, the purchaser does not acquire the goods. The person who retracts has the lower hand, as has been explained above, unless the seller sold the goods because of their inferior quality. In such an instance, the purchaser acquires all the goods.

When a person buys a field worth 100 zuz for 200, and the seller repeatedly demands payment of the remainder of the money, the status of the transaction remains an unresolved question: Is the person considered to be one who sold his field because of its inferior quality, and he is demanding payment only because he sold it for more than its worth? Or he is not considered to be one who sold his field because of its inferior quality, and he is demanding payment because he did not decide to complete its sale until he received all the money? Because the matter is unresolved, neither party is allowed to retract. If the seller seizes possession of a portion of the property that was sold equivalent to the worth of the money left unpaid, it should not be expropriated from his possession.

When a person acquires something from a colleague and pays him money, but errs in the amount of money he gave him the transaction is valid. If afterwards the seller lodges a claim against the purchaser, saying: "You were supposed to pay me 100 zuz, and you paid me only ninety," the transaction is still viable. The purchaser must, however, pay the additional ten zuz. The above applies even though several years have passed since the transaction and applies with regard to the sale of both landed property and movable property.

The following rules apply when a person tells a colleague: "If I sell this field, it will be sold to you retroactively from the present time for 100 zuz" and confirms this with a kinyan. If the seller later sells it to another person for 100 zuz, it is acquired by the first person. If he sells it for more than that amount, the second person acquires it. The rationale is that by saying: "If I sell," he meant "If I sell it with the same approach that I have now." And this person did not want to sell it; he sold it only because of the additional amount that the other person added on. It is as if he were forced to sell.

If the seller told the first purchaser: "If I sell this field, it will be sold to you retroactively from the present time for the price to be evaluated by a court of three," the price need be agreed on by only two of the three. If he said: "As dictated by three," all three must agree. If he said: "As evaluated by a court of four," all four must agree. For the sale to the first purchaser to take effect, the judges must agree on the price, and he must sell it to another person as they agreed. Afterwards, the first purchaser acquires the property. If three or four people evaluate it and the seller says: "I will not sell it until three or four others evaluate it," we do not heed him. For he confirmed his commitment to sell retroactively with a kinyan.

The following rules apply when a person sells an article to the Temple treasury. If the representative of the treasury asks him: "How much are you selling it for?" and the person says: "Ten zuz" even if it is worth 100, once he said ten he cannot retract. For making a promise to the Most High is considered equivalent to transferring the article in question to the possession of a colleague.

Whether a representative of the treasury buys or sells an article, he is always given the upper hand if there is a fluctuation in the article's value. What is implied? If the representative paid with money from the Temple treasury, but did not perform meshichah on the produce, although the value of the produce increases, the Temple treasury nevertheless acquires the produce, as prescribed by Scriptural Law. If the value of the produce decreases, the Temple treasurer may retract, for he did not perform meshichah, and the legal power of an ordinary person should not be greater than that of the Temple treasury. Similarly, if the Temple treasurer sold an article that had been consecrated, the purchaser performed meshichah, but did not pay for it, and then the value of the article decreases, the transaction is finalized. For the legal power of an ordinary person should not be greater than that of the Temple treasury. If the value of the article increases, the representative of the treasury may retract, for he did not accept payment, and consecrated articles may be acquired only through the payment of money, as implied by the verse: "And he shall give the money and it will be established as his." The representative of the treasury is not liable to receive the adjuration mi shepara.

Property belonging to orphans is governed by the same rules as those governing the Temple treasury. What is implied? When orphans sell produce, and meshichah is performed on the produce, but they have not yet received the money for it, they may retract from the agreement if the value of the produce increases. For like consecrated property, property belonging to orphans can be acquired only through the transfer of money. If the value of the produce decreases the transaction should be allowed to stand. For the legal power of an ordinary person should not be greater than the legal power of orphans.

Similarly, if orphans received payment, but meshichah was not performed on their produce before it increased in value, they may retract as may ordinary individuals. If, however, the value of the produce decreased and the purchasers desire to retract, they may do so, but they must receive the adjuration mi shepara, as would be the law with regard to others. They are allowed to retract because if we required them to keep the produce, as would be required by Scriptural Law, this would be a disservice to the orphans. For if this were the law, when the orphans desire to sell an object, they would never find anyone who would be willing to pay them money unless the object were handed over first.

Similar principles apply if orphans purchase produce and perform meshichah on the produce, but have not yet paid for it. If the value of the produce increases, the legal power of an ordinary person should not be greater than their legal power. Therefore, the transaction should be allowed to stand." If the value of the produce decreases, they are not allowed to retract. For this would be a disservice to them. If they were given this privilege, should they desire to purchase produce, they would not find anyone who would sell it to them before they made payment.

If the orphans paid for produce but did not perform meshichah, and then the value of the produce decreases, they may retract, for the legal power of an ordinary person should not be greater than their legal power. If the value of the produce increases, the sellers may retract if they desire and receive the adjuration mi shepara. For if the law were that the orphans acquire the produce by the payment of money, the seller would tell them that the produce was destroyed by fire or another factor beyond human control after the produce entered their property, at the time payment was made.

On four occasions during the year, our Sages restricted their enactments and applied Scriptural Law with regard to the purchase of meat, for on these days, all people need meat. The times are the day before Shemini Atzeret, the day before the first day of Pesach, the day before Shavuot and the day before Rosh HaShanah. What is implied? If a butcher had a steer that was worth even 100 dinarim, and he took one dinar from the purchaser in exchange for meat that he would slaughter, he cannot retract, even if enough money is not collected to pay for the entire value of the steer. Instead, the butcher is compelled to slaughter against his will. He is forcibly made to slaughter the steer and provide the purchaser with meat. For this reason, if the steer dies before being ritually slaughtered, the purchaser suffers the loss.

When a person compels a colleague to sell an article and to take the money for the purchase - even if he hung him until he sold the article - the purchase is binding. This applies with regard to movable property and landed property. We say that since he compelled him, he committed himself to selling. This applies even if the seller did not take the money in the presence of witnesses. Therefore, if the seller issues a protest before he sells and tells two witnesses: "Know that the reason I am selling this and this article - or this and this property - is that I am being compelled against my will," the sale is nullified. Even if the purchaser was in possession of the article or the property for several years, it may be expropriated from him, at which point, the seller returns the money.

The witnesses must know that the seller is selling because of compulsion, and that he is actually being compelled against his will. Any record of a protest that does not contain the statement: "We the witnesses know that so and so the seller acted under compulsion - is not a valid protest.

When does the above apply? With regard to a person who conducts a sale or who negotiates a compromise. With regard to a gift or a waiver of a debt, if the person issues a protest before giving the gift, the gift is nullified even though the person was not compelled to give the gift. The rationale is that with regard to a gift, the factor that is significant is the expression of the giver's will. Since he does not wholeheartedly desire to transfer ownership, the recipient does not acquire the gift. Waiving a debt is equivalent to giving a gift.

Whether one compels a colleague to sell by hitting him, by hanging him or by threatening to employ a measure against him through gentiles or through Jews, he is considered to have been compelled against his will. An incident occurred with regard to a person who had rented an orchard from a colleague for ten years, and the landlord of the orchard lost the debt contract. After the tenant derived benefit from the orchard for three years,the tenant told the owner: "If you do not sell it to me, I will hide the rental contract and claim that I purchased it." The Sages explained that this is considered to be compulsion. The same principles apply in all similar situations. For this reason, if the landlord issued a claim against the tenant in court and the tenant denied it and claimed that the orchard was his, and afterwards, the landlord issued a protest, and then sold the property to the tenant who denies having rented it, the sale is nullified, for there are witnesses that the landlord was compelled against his will. These are the witnesses in whose presence the tenant denied the rental of the property in court, and they are the witnesses before whom the protest was issued.The same principles apply in all similar situations.

When does the above apply? With regard to a person who forces a colleague to sell. He is considered a chamsan because he compels a colleague to sell his property against his will. When, however, a person steals property - is established as a thief - and afterwards purchases the field that he stole the sale is nullified automatically. The seller does not have to issue a protest, as explained in Hilchot Gezelah.

The witnesses to the protest may themselves sign the deed of sale concerning which the protest was issued to them; their participation is of no consequence. Even if the seller tells them in the presence of the person who is compelling him: "I am selling the property willfully, without compulsion," the protest is still viable. Just as the other person compelled the seller to sell unwillingly, he compelled him to say that he was selling it willingly.

Similarly, if the seller admitted in the presence of witnesses that he received money after he issued a protest, he is not obligated to return anything to the thief. We say that the person compelling him compelled him to make this admission. This statement is not heeded for the witnesses already knew that he was compelled against his will. If, however, the robber counted money out to the seller in the presence of the witnesses, the seller is obligated to return the money when the sale is nullified.

If the witnesses to the sale testified that the seller nullified the protest, the protest is nullified. If the seller tells the witnesses to the protest: "Know that every kinyan in which I engage to negate a protest, and a protest regarding a protest are all nullified. I am engaging in them only because of the factor compelling me, of which you are aware. I do not ever have the intention of transferring my property to the person compelling me," the sale is nullified despite the fact that the seller performed a kinyan to nullify his protest, in the manner we have explained.

When a person transfers ownership of an article - whether landed property or movable property - and establishes conditions that can be fulfilled the conditions are binding - whether established by the seller or the purchaser. If the conditions are fulfilled, then the ownership of the object is transferred. If the conditions are not fulfilled, the ownership of the object is not transferred. We have already described the laws governing conditional agreements in Hilchot Ishut.

When does the above apply? When a person stated a condition and then carried out a kinyan transferring ownership of the article through one of the accepted procedures. For then, he is obligated to fulfill the condition. If, however, the person did not perform a kinyan, but merely entered into a conditional agreement stating that if this condition is fulfilled he will transfer ownership, and if it is not fulfilled he will not transfer ownership, the transfer of ownership is not effected even if the condition is fulfilled. This is considered an asmachta - i.e., he made his transfer of ownership dependent on the performance of certain deeds. An asmachta is never binding, for the person transferring ownership did not make a firm decision in his heart to transfer ownership.

What is implied? A person sold a house to a colleague or gave it to him as a present, on condition that the recipient travel to Jerusalem with the seller on a given day. If the recipient manifests ownership over the house, he acquires it when he travels to Jerusalem with the seller on the date stated. If that day passes and he does not make the journey, he does not acquire it. If, however, the owner made a condition and told the potential purchaser: "If you go with me to Jerusalem on this and this day...," or "If you bring me this article, I will give you this house," or "...I will sell it to you at such and such a price," although the person travels with him on that day or brings him the article, he does not acquire the house. This applies even if the potential purchaser manifests his ownership over the house after he fulfills the condition, for this is an asmachta. The same laws apply in all analogous situations.

For this reason, the following rules apply if a purchaser gives security to a colleague and tells him: "If I retract, I waive ownership of the security in your favor," and the seller says: "If I retract, I will double your security." If the purchaser retracts, the seller acquires the security, because it is in his possession. But if the seller retracts, we do not require him to double the security. For his promise was an asmachta and is not binding.

A similar principle applies if a debtor paid a portion of a debt and the creditor entrusted the promissory note to a third party after the debtor made the following statement: "If I do not pay the remainder until such and such a date, return the promissory note." If the date arrived and the debtor did not pay, the third party should not give the promissory note to the creditor. For this agreement is an asmachta.

Similarly, all the conditions that people establish between themselves, even when confirmed by witnesses and a legal document - e.g., "If such and such will take place..." or "If you do such and such, I will give you a maneh" or "...I will transfer ownership of this house to you, but if this does not take place..." or "if you do not do such and such, I will not transfer ownership," or "...I will not give you," are considered asmachta'ot. Even though the potential recipient performs the desired action, or the event occurs, he does not acquire the promised article. For his intent is undefined, being dependent on whether or not the stipulation will be met.

Whenever a person says: "Acquire an entity upon fulfillment of a condition, retroactive to the present time," it is not considered an asmachta at all, and the transaction is binding. For if the person had not made a definite commitment to transfer ownership, he would not have transferred ownership retroactively to the time of the agreement. What is implied? If a person says: "If I return between now and such and such a date, you acquire this house retroactively to the present time," and his commitment is affirmed by a kinyan the transaction is binding if he returns within the set time. The same applies with regard to all similar situations.

When a person sells a courtyard or a field and specifies at the time of the sale that he is selling the property in order to travel to a particular place, or because there has been a drought and he desires to buy wheat with the money he receives for his courtyard, it is considered as if he sold the property conditionally. Therefore, if it rained after he made the sale, or wheat was imported and sold at a lower price, or he was prevented from travelling to that land, or factors did not facilitate his journey or his purchase of wheat, the seller may return the money he received and have the land returned to him. For he stated that he was selling the property only for the sake of performing a specific act - and that act was not performed. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.

If, however, a person sells landed property without making any explicit statement, the sale is final even though he had the intent in his heart that he was selling the property for a particular reason, and even if it is apparent that he is selling the property for that reason. The rationale is that he did not make an explicit statement, and thoughts in a person's heart are of no consequence in business transactions.

The following rules apply if one transferred ownership of an entity to a colleague and stipulated that he acquire it on the condition that he give or sell that entity to another person. If the person gives or sells the entity to that person, the transaction is binding. If he does not fulfill the stipulation and sells it to another person, or does not give or sell it to the person intended within the time frame established, the original transaction is not binding. Similarly, if the seller or the purchaser of an article establishes a condition that the article be returned at a specific time or returned at that time in exchange for money, the transaction is binding, and the article must be returned as stipulated.

Different rules apply in the following situation. A person sold landed property to a colleague. The seller made a stipulation, saying: "When I acquire money, return this land to me." The produce of the land belongs to the seller. If the seller made the sale without stipulating a condition, and the purchaser said on his own volition: "When you acquire funds, bring them to me, and I will return this property," the stipulation is binding. The purchaser can derive benefit from the property; doing so is not considered "a shade of interest," because the purchaser voluntarily obligated himself by this condition.

An incident occurred concerning a woman who sent an agent, Reuven, to purchase a courtyard for her from one of her relatives, Shimon. Shimon, the seller, said to Reuven, the agent: "If I acquire funds, so and so, my relative, should return this property to me." Reuven answered him: "You and so and so are relatives. You are so close, you are like brother and sister" - i.e., it is as if he were saying, "It is very likely that she will return it to you, and that she will not show concern about such a matter." Afterwards, the matter was brought to the Sages, and they ruled that the agent did not purchase anything. For the relative selling the field did not rely on the agent's words, since they were not a clear reply. Therefore, the seller did not make a final decision to transfer ownership. Similar principles apply in other analogous situations.

When a kinyan confirming an asmachta is made in a prominent court, it is considered as binding. This applies, provided the person involved entrusts the legal documents involved to the court, and provided he is not acting under duress.

What is implied? A person entrusted his promissory note or his receipt to the court and engages in a kinyan, stating that if he does not come by such and such a date, the promissory note should be given to the other litigant. If the date arrives without the person's coming, the note should be given. If he was prevented from coming by a river or by illness, the promissory note should not be given to the other litigant. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations, provided that this is done in the presence of a prominent court.

When a person undertakes a financial obligation to another person without making any stipulation, he becomes liable although he did not owe that person anything previously. He is giving him a present; this is not an asmachta. What is implied? A person tells witnesses: "Serve as witnesses that I owe so and so a maneh," he composes a legal document that states that he owes the other person a maneh even though it is not observed by witnesses, or he told the other person in the presence of witnesses: "I owe you a maneh as recorded in a legal document." In the latter circumstance, even though he did not tell the witnesses to serve as witnesses, since he said "as recorded in a legal document," it is as if he told them: "Serve as witnesses that I am obligated." Even though both parties admit - and the witnesses know - that the giver did not owe the recipient anything, he accepted an obligation on himself and becomes liable, as a guarantor does. The majority of the geonim ruled in this manner.

The following rules apply when a person accepts an obligation on himself that is unlimited in nature - e.g., he says: "I obligate myself to feed you..." or "...to clothe you for five years." Even though he affirms his commitment to the recipient with a kinyan, he is not liable. For this resembles a present, and yet there is no specific and known entity that is being given as a present. My masters ruled in this manner.

If so, why is a person who makes a commitment to his wife to provide food for her daughter from a previous marriage obligated to provide for her? Because he made this commitment at the time of their marriage. And the matter resembles entities that are acquired although only a verbal commitment is made.

When the sages of Spain desired to make a kinyan with regard to an asmachta, they would adhere to the following guidelines: They would establish a kinyan with one party that he is obligated to the other party one hundred zuz. After he has undertaken such an obligation, a kinyan is made with the person to whom he indebted himself, that as long as this and this condition prevails or if he does such and such, the obligation is waived, effective retroactively to the time of the agreement, but that if this condition does not prevail or if he does not do such and such, he will sue him for the payment of the money for which he obligated himself. This is the procedure that is followed in all stipulations that are made between a man and his wife with regard to engagements and other similar matters.

It is forbidden for a seller or a purchaser to take unfair advantage of a colleague, as Leviticus 25:14 states: "When you sell an entity to your colleague or purchase an entity from a colleague, one man should not take unfair advantage of his brother." Even though such a person transgresses a negative commandment, he is not punished by lashes, because the funds can be returned. Whether the person intentionally deceived his colleague or did not know that this transaction involved taking unfair advantage, he is obligated to pay the unwarranted gain.

How much unfair gain must there be in a transaction for the one who profits to be required to return it? An even sixth. What is implied? If a person sold an article worth six zuz for five, or for seven, or one worth five zuz for six, or one worth seven zuz for six, it is considered to be unfair gain. The transaction is completed, and the person who profited is required to return the entire amount of unfair gain to the one who suffered the loss.

If the unfair gain was even the slightest amount less than that - e.g., the person sold an article worth sixty dinarim for fifty dinarim and a p'rutah, he is not required to return anything. For it is common for people to waive any loss less than one sixth of the article's value.

If the unfair gain was even the slightest amount more than one sixth - e.g., one sold an object worth 60 dinarim for 50 minus a p'rutah, the transaction is nullified. The purchaser may return the object without the transaction being completed at all. The person who took the unfair gain, however, is not entitled to retract if the purchaser desires and seeks to maintain possession of the article, even though the transaction is nullified. The person who received the unfair gain is not obligated to return it unless the unfair gain exceeds a p'rutah. If the unfair gain was exactly a p'rutah, he is not obligated to return it, because the laws of ona'ah do not apply with regard to a p'rutah.

Until when does the purchaser have the right to demand the return of the unfair gain or the nullification of the transaction? Until he has time to show the article to a merchant or to a relative. If he waits longer, even if he purchased an article worth 100 zuz for 200, he may not nullify the transaction.

With regard to whom does the above apply? To a purchaser. For the article he purchased is in his possession, and it is common for him to show it to others. The seller, by contrast, always has the opportunity to demand the return of the unfair gain. Needless to say, this applies with regard to the nullification of the sale. For he does not know the correct price of the article he sold until he sees a comparable article being sold. Accordingly, if the merchandise was a standard article that does not vary -e.g., peppers, or the like - he is given merely the time it takes to check the current market price.

Similarly, if it is known that an article comparable to the one he sold came into the seller's possession, he realized that he had erred regarding the initial sale, but he did not protest, he can no longer protest, for he has already waived his claim.

Just as the laws of ona'ah apply with regard to an ordinary person, so too, they apply with regard to a merchant, although he is knowledgeable concerning prices. Just as the laws of ona'ah apply with regard to produce and animals, so too, they apply with regard to coins.

What is implied? If a golden dinar was valued at 24 silver dinarim, and it was exchanged for 20 dinarim or 28 dinarim, the unfair gain must be returned. If the unfair gain was more than that, the exchange is nullified. If it is less than that, it is considered as if the other party waived his right to that money.

Similarly, if a sela was lacking a sixth of its weight, and sela'im were being exchanged by number, rather than by weight, the unfair gain should be returned.

Until when is the recipient obligated to return a dinar or a sela'im? In large cities, the amount of time necessary to show the coin to a money-changer. In villages, where a money-changer is not frequently found, until the end of the week. The rationale is that only a money-changer recognizes sela'im, whether they are lacking, and their worth. Similar concepts apply with regard to sellers of books, and sellers of gems and pearls. The purchaser has the right to retract if the seller took unfair advantage of him until he has time to show the article he purchased to a merchant who is expert in such matters, wherever such an expert may be found. For not everyone is expert in the appraisal of such matters. Therefore, if there was no expert available in that country, and after a considerable amount of time the purchaser took the object to another place, or an expert came and stated that the price was in error, the purchaser may retract.

The following rules apply when a person gives a sela that is lacking in weight to a colleague. Should he be able to identify it, even after twelve months, the recipient may return it. If it will be accepted as currency, albeit with difficulty, the recipient may not return it after a lengthy time has passed, unless the giver accepts it as an expression of commitment beyond the measure of the law.

The following rules apply in a situation where a person sold a colleague an article worth four zuz for five. As mentioned above, ordinarily, the transaction would be nullified. In this instance, however, before the purchaser had the opportunity to show the article to a merchant or to a relative, its price rose to seven zuz. The purchaser has the right to retract, and not the seller. For the purchaser will tell the seller: "If you had not taken unfair advantage of me, you would not have the right to retract. Now, because you have taken unfair advantage, do you think you should have the right to retract? Should a sinner receive reward?"

Similarly, if one sold an object worth five zuz for four, and then its value decreased to three, the seller has the right to retract and not the purchaser. For the seller will tell the purchaser: "By deceiving me, you did not gain the right to retract."

If a person sold an article worth five zuz for six, and before the purchaser had the opportunity to show the article to a merchant, its value increased to eight, the seller is obligated to return the zuz of unfair gain. For the transaction is completed and the seller is obligated to reimburse the purchaser for the unfair gain. When the article increased in value afterwards, it increased in value while in the possession of the purchaser. Similarly, if a person sold an article worth six zuz for five and its value decreased to three, the purchaser is obligated to return the zuz of unfair gain. For the transaction is completed, and the article decreased in value while in the possession of the purchaser.

When a person exchanges one article for another, or one animal for another, the laws of ona'ah do not apply. This is true even when he exchanges a needle for a necklace, or a lamb for a donkey. This person may desire the needle more than the necklace. When, however, a person exchanges produce for produce, the laws of ona'ah do apply, regardless of whether the produce is evaluated before the sale or after the sale.

When a person purchases an article with coins without measuring their number, volume or weight - e.g., he took a handful of coins and said: "Sell me your cow for these" - this is considered an exchange. The transaction is completed, and the unfair gain must be returned, as explained above. This law also applies if someone purchases fruit without measuring its number, volume or weight for a sela or two. The transaction is completed and the unfair gain must be returned. When a homeowner sells his personal belongings, the laws of ona'ah do not apply. For a man would not sell his personal belongings unless he were offered an exorbitant amount of money.

Although a person tells a colleague, "We are completing this transaction on the condition that you do not hold me responsible for the unfair gain," the laws of ona'ah apply. When does the above apply? When the statements are made without being explicit. In such an instance, the other party does not know how much money he is forgoing in favor of his colleague. Needless to say, this is the law when one tells the other: "We are completing this transaction on the condition that there is no ona'ah involved," for ona'ah is involved. If, however, one explicitly mentions the amount of unfair gain, the laws of ona'ah do not apply, because all conditions that are accepted by both parties are binding in cases of financial law.

What is implied? If the seller tells the purchaser: "I am selling you this article for 200 zuz although I know it is worth only 100. I am selling it to you on the condition that you do not hold me responsible for the unfair gain," the laws of ona'ah do not apply. Similarly, if the purchaser tells the seller: "I am purchasing this article from you for a maneh although I know it is worth 200. I am purchasing it from you on the condition that you do not hold me responsible for the unfair gain," the laws of ona'ah do not apply.

When a person buys and sells in a faithful manner, the laws of ona'ah do not apply. What is implied? The seller tells the purchaser: "I purchased this article for such and such, and I am making this and this amount of profit," the laws of ona'ah do not apply.

When a person buys and sells in a faithful manner and purchases many different utensils and garments in one lot, he should not calculate and sell the inferior items in a faithful manner, and the superior items according to their value. Instead, he should sell either the entire lot in a faithful manner, or the entire lot according to its value. The seller may include the cost of porters, donkey drivers and his lodgings in the cost of the article. He may not, however, add his own wages as a worker to the cost. Instead, he must say: "I am taking this and this amount as profit," and be specific about that amount.

The laws of ona'ah do not apply with regard to a gentile. This is implied by Leviticus 25:14, which states: "When you sell an entity... or purchase an entity..., one man should not cheat his brother." If a gentile takes unfair advantage of a Jew, he is required to return the unfair gain according to our laws. Dealings with a gentile should not be more severe than dealings with a fellow Jew.

The laws of ona'ah do not apply with regard to the following objects: landed property, servants, promissory notes and consecrated property. Even if one sells one of these entities that is worth one thousand zuz for one zuz, or an entity worth one zuz for one thousand zuz, the laws of ona'ah do not apply.This is derived from Leviticus 25:14, which states: "Or when you purchase an entity from the hand of your colleague." "From the hand of indicates that the verse is referring to an article whose ownership is transferred from hand to hand, thus excluding landed property. And this also excludes servants, for an association has been established linking the laws governing them to those governing landed property. It also excludes promissory notes, since one is not purchasing the note itself. It merely serves as proof of the obligation it records. "Your colleague" excludes consecrated property.

When does the above apply? When one sells one's own property. When, by contrast, an agent makes the slightest error with regard to the value of either movable property or landed property, the transaction is nullified. It appears to me that the same laws apply to a guardian entrusted with the property of orphans. If he makes the slightest error with regard to the value of either movable property or landed property, the transaction is nullified. He is not considered comparable to a court, because he is merely one individual.

The following laws apply when a court sells either movable property or landed property belonging to orphans, and errs. If they erred with regard to less than one sixth of the value of the object, it is considered as if the unfair gain is waived, as is the law with regard to an ordinary person. If they erred with regard to one sixth, the transaction is nullified. If the court did not desire to nullify the transaction, but instead have the unfair gain returned, they may. For the legal power of an ordinary person should not be greater than that of a court.

It appears to me that if a court sold landed property or servants belonging to orphans at an unfair price, selling entities worth 100 zuz for 200, the purchaser cannot retract. For the legal power of an ordinary individual should not be greater than that of orphans. Similarly, if a guardian of orphans sells landed property or servants at an unfair profit, the purchaser cannot retract because of the unfair profit, as is the law with regard to an ordinary individual.

When brothers or partners divide movable property, they are considered like purchasers. If there is unfair gain less than one sixth of the article's value, the transaction is completed, and there is no need to return anything. If the unfair gain exceeds one sixth, the transaction is nullified. If it is an even sixth, the transaction is completed and the unfair gain must be returned. If the involved parties made an agreement to divide the property according to the evaluation of judges, and the judges erred with regard to a sixth or more, the division is nullified. For when judges who make an evaluation reduce or increase the value of an article by a sixth, the transaction is nullified.

Livestock, pearls, a sword, and a Torah scroll are considered like other movable property, and the laws of ona'ah apply to transactions involving them. There are no entities in which the laws of ona'ah do not apply, except the four entities mentioned by our Sages. And even with regard to these entities, this is true provided the person is buying or selling his own property, as we have explained.

Just as the laws of ona'ah do not apply to the purchase of landed property, so too, these laws do not apply to the rental of landed property. Even if one rents a large hall for only one dinar a year, or a small coop for a dinar a day, the laws of ona'ah do not apply.

When a person hires a worker to work for him - whether with regard to movable property or with regard to landed property - the laws of ona'ah do not apply. It is as if he is purchasing him for that time, and the laws of ona'ah do not apply with regard to servants.

There is an unresolved doubt in the following situation. A person hires a contractor to sow a field, the contractor claims to have sowed it in a proper manner, and witnesses testify that the contractor sowed fewer seeds than are supposed to be sown. We are unsure whether the laws of ona'ah apply because of the seeds, or whether these laws do not apply because of the land. Therefore, the funds should not be expropriated from the defendant, nor is he required to take anything but a Rabbinic oath, because of the connection the dispute has to landed property.

The laws of ona'ah apply with regard to the rental of a utensil or an animal. For rental is considered to be a sale for a day. Thus, if there is an unfair gain of one sixth or more - regardless of whether this unfair gain is taken at the advantage of the owner or the person who rents the article - the unfair gain must be returned. This applies even when a lengthy period of time has passed since the transaction.

It appears to me that the laws of ona'ah apply with regard to a contractor. What is implied? A person agreed to weave a particular garment for ten zuzim, or to sew a particular cloak for two zuzim. If there is unfair profit involved, the laws of ona'ah apply. Either the contractor or the owner of the garment may always retract as a seller may.

We have already explained that if a person buys and sells in a faithful manner, saying "This is the extent of profit that I am making," the laws of ona'ah do not apply. Even if he says: "I purchased the article for a sela, and I am selling it for ten," this is permitted. Nevertheless, the court is obligated to regulate prices and appoint officers of the law, so that people at large will not be able to reap whatever profit they desire. Instead, the court should regulate that a person should earn only a profit of a sixth. A seller should not profit more than a sixth of his investment.

When does the above apply? With regard to articles on which our lives depend - e.g., wine, oil and fine flour. With regard to herbs - e.g., costus, frankincense, and the like - by contrast, a set limit is not established by the court. The seller may take any measure of profit he desires.

Profit may not be taken twice when selling eggs. The first merchant who sells them may take a profit, and the person who buys them from him must sell them at cost.

It is forbidden to do business in Eretz Yisrael with articles on which our lives depend. Instead, one person should bring from his produce heap, and another person should bring from his produce heap, so that they sell cheaply. In places where oil is abundant, it is permitted to do business with oil.

Produce on which our lives depend should not be stored for the future in Eretz Yisrael or in any place that is predominantly inhabited by Jews, for this causes anxiety for the Jewish people. When does the above apply? When a person purchases such produce in the market place. When a person stores his own produce, he may store the kav that he possesses.

It is permitted to store produce during three years: the year before the Sabbatical year, the Sabbatical year and the year following the Sabbatical year. In a year of drought, one should not store even a small measure of carobs, because one brings a curse on the market prices. Whoever causes prices to rise or who stores produce in Eretz Yisrael or in a place primarily inhabited by Jews is likened to one who lends money at interest.

When does the above apply? With regard to produce on which our lives depend. It is, however, permitted to store spices like cumin and pepper in Eretz Yisrael and to transport them from place to place like other herbs.

We may not take produce on which our lives depend - e.g., wine, oil and fine flour - from Eretz Yisrael to the diaspora or to Syria. Nor may such produce be taken from the domain of one king to the domain of another king in Eretz Yisrael.

The inhabitants of a city are permitted to establish fixed prices for any commodities they desire, even meat and bread. They may establish conditions stating that anyone who violates these guidelines will be punished in such and such a fashion.

Similarly, craftsmen in a specific profession may establish provisions and agree that one should not work on the day on which another is working or the like, and that anyone who violates these guidelines will be punished in such and such a fashion.

When does the above apply? In a city where there is not a distinguished sage to correct the conduct within the city and improve the ways of its inhabitants. If, however, there is such a distinguished sage, a condition established by craftsmen is not effective without the ruling of the sage. They may not punish or inflict loss on anyone who does not accept their stipulation, unless that stipulation was made with the consent of the sage. Whoever causes a colleague a loss because of a stipulation that was not made with the consent of the sage is liable to pay.

Just as the prohibition against ona'ah applies with regard to business transactions, it applies with regard to speech, as Leviticus 25:17 states: "A person should not abuse his colleague, and you shall fear your G-d. I am the Lord"; this refers to verbal abuse.

What is implied? If a person is one who has repented, one should not say: "Remember your initial deeds." If a person is a descendant of converts, one should not tell him: "Remember your ancestors' deeds." If a convert comes to study the Torah, one should not tell him: "Should a mouth that ate meat from animals that were not ritually slaughtered and that were trefah come and study the Torah that was given by the Almighty?" If a person was afflicted by illness and suffering or he is forced to bury his children, one should not speak to him in the manner that Job's friends addressed him Job 4:6-7: "Your fear of G-d was for your own security.... Can you recall anyone who was innocent who perished?"

If donkey drivers are seeking grain, one should not tell them: "Go to so and so," if one knows that this person has never sold grain. If a question regarding a point of knowledge was raised, one should not ask a person who has never studied that field of knowledge: "How would you answer this question?" or "What do you think about this matter?" The same applies to other matters of this like.

Whoever abuses a convert, whether in financial transactions or verbally, transgresses three prohibitions, as Exodus 22:20 states: "Do not abuse a convert..." this refers to verbal abuse- "and do not oppress him" - this refers to taking unfair financial advantage of him. This teaches that anyone who verbally abuses a convert transgresses three negative prohibitions: "A person should not abuse his colleague," and "One man should not take unfair advantage of his brother," "Do not abuse a convert."

Similarly, if a person oppresses a convert and takes unfair financial advantage of him, he transgresses three negative prohibitions: "A person should not abuse his colleague," "One man should not take unfair advantage of his brother," and "Do not oppress him."

Why does a person transgress the prohibition against verbal abuse when he takes unfair financial advantage of a convert, and the prohibition against taking unfair financial advantage if he verbally abuses him? Because the Torah uses the word ona'ah with regard to both these prohibitions, without being more specific, and repeats these two prohibitions with regard to a convert explicitly: "Do not abuse" and "do not oppress him."

Verbally abusing a person is more severe than taking unfair advantage of him financially. For the latter can be repaid, while the former can never be repaid. The latter involves only the person's possessions, while the former involves his person. And with regard to verbal abuse, Leviticus 25:17 states: "And you shall fear your G-d," for the matter is one of feelings. With regard to all matters of feeling, the Torah states: "And you shall fear your G-d." Whenever a person cries out because of verbal abuse, he is answered immediately, as implied by the conclusion of the above verse: "...I am G-d."

When a person sells an item to a colleague by measure, by weight or by number, and errs to the slightest degree, the colleague may seek redress at any time. The principles of ona'ah apply only with regard to an object's value. An error in calculation, by contrast, is always reason to seek redress.

What is implied? A person sold a colleague 100 nuts for a dinar, and then it was discovered that he gave him 101 or 99. The transaction is binding, and the extra or missing nut must be returned. This applies even if several years have passed. Similarly, if it is discovered that more or less money was given than the amount originally agreed upon the error should be corrected. This applies even if he performed a kinyan attesting to the fact that his colleague does not owe him anything. For the kinyan was performed under mistaken premises. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.

Similarly, when a person sells a colleague landed property, a servant, an animal or movable property, and there is a defect in the property that the purchaser was not aware of, he may return it, even though several years have passed. For the transaction was concluded under erroneous premises. The above applies provided he did not use the purchased article after he discovered the blemish. If, however, he made use of it after he discovered the blemish, he is considered to have forfeited his right to retract, and he may not return the article.

We do not evaluate the diminution in value caused by the blemish. Instead, even if one sold a colleague a utensil worth ten dinarim, and a blemish was discovered that reduced its value by an isar the purchaser may return the utensil. The seller may not tell him: "Here is an isar, the decrease in value caused by the blemish." For the purchaser may say: "I desire a perfect article." Conversely, if the purchaser desires that the transaction stand, but seeks to be reimbursed for the diminution in value caused by the blemish, the option is given to the seller. He may tell him: "Either purchase the utensil as is for the full price, or take your money and depart.

Whenever there is a blemish that the people of a city agree is serious enough to warrant the nullification of a transaction, the article should be returned. Whenever the people agree that a fault is not considered to be a blemish, the article should not be returned unless the purchaser explicitly stated that he refused to accept even the slightest blemish. The rationale is that whenever a person conducts business without making any specific demands, it is assumed that he is following the prevailing customs of the community.

Whenever a person purchases an article without making any specific statements, it is assumed that he desired to purchase an article that is perfect, without any blemish. Even if the seller explicitly said: "This article is sold to you on the condition that you do not return it as blemished," the purchaser may nevertheless return the article unless the purchaser says: "I accept any blemish that I will discover in this article although it causes it to be worth such and such less." For when a person waives money that is due him, he must know how much he is waiving and make an explicit statement to that effect, as applies with regard to the laws of ona'ah.

When a person sells a cow to a colleague and states that it has some blemishes that are obvious and some blemishes that are not obvious, and the cow does not possess any of the blemishes that are obvious, but does possess one of the blemishes that are not obvious, the transaction is considered to have been concluded under erroneous premises. The cow may be returned although the blemish that was discovered was mentioned explicitly. The rationale is that the purchaser will say: "Since I saw that the cow did not possess any of the apparent blemishes that you mentioned, I said to myself: 'In the same manner, it does not have any of the blemishes that are not apparent. Why did the seller mention them? To make me feel good about my purchase.' "

What is implied? The seller says: "This cow is blind; it is lame; it bites and it crouches suddenly," and it is discovered that the cow only bites or only crouches suddenly, the transaction is considered to have been concluded under erroneous premises. If the cow possesses all the blemishes the seller mentioned, the transaction is not considered to have been concluded under erroneous premises. Similarly, if the cow is lame but not blind, and it is discovered that it bites, the transaction is not considered to have been concluded under erroneous premises.

The following rule applies if the seller shows the purchaser a blemish that the cow possesses and tells him: "It has this blemish and also these other blemishes." Although the cow possesses all or several of the non-obvious blemishes that the seller mentioned, the transaction is not considered to have been conducted under false premises.

Similarly, if a person sells a maidservant to a colleague and says: "She has only one hand; she limps; she is blind; she is a maniac; she is an epileptic," and she does not possess any of the blemishes the seller mentioned, but she is epileptic, the transaction is considered to have been conducted under false premises. The same principles apply in all analogous situations.

On this basis, I maintain that if a person sells an article to a person for 100 dinarim and tells him: "This article is not worth more than one zuz, and I am selling it to you on the condition that the laws of ona'ah do not apply to me," the laws of ona'ah do apply. For the purchaser will say: "Since I saw the seller say that it was only worth a zuz, I realized that he was only trying to make me feel good about my purchase. "The above holds true until the seller explicitly mentions the amount of unfair gain involved in this purchase - or mentions a figure that is close to that, concerning which a person could possibly err. For then we know that the purchaser certainly waived his right to this money. It is fitting to rule according to this logic.

When a person sells a manservant or a maidservant, the purchaser may not return it because it possesses blemishes that do not prevent the man or woman from working. These blemishes are called simpon. If the simpon was evident, the purchaser saw it at the time of purchase.If it was not always evident - e.g., a mole in its flesh, a scar from a dog-bite or a foul odor coming from the mouth or the nose - he may not return it, for these blemishes do not prevent the servant from working. And servants are not for the purpose of physical intimacy, but to perform work.

If the servant has extremely uncomfortable boils or a sickness that weakens his strength, or if he is epileptic or insane, it is considered to be a blemish, because this prevents him from working. Similarly, if he has tzara'afi or other conditions that are revolting, it is considered to be a blemish, because a person is repelled by them, and therefore he will not use this servant to serve food or drink. Similarly, if he is discovered to be an armed robber, this is considered to be a blemish that destroys his entire worth. For the ruling authorities will seize him and execute him. Similarly, if he has been conscripted by the ruling authorities, this is considered to be a blemish for which the servant can be returned, for the king will seize him to work for him whenever he desires. If, however, the servant is discovered to be a thief, a pilferer, a kidnapper, one who constantly tries to escape, a glutton or the like, the purchaser may not return him unless he explicitly stated that he refused to accept a servant with any of these qualities. For all servants can be assumed to possess these undesirable attributes.

The following laws apply when a person sells seeds of garden vegetables to a colleague, when the seeds themselves are not eaten. If the seeds do not grow, the seller is responsible to reimburse him for the money that he took from him. For we can assume that he purchased the seeds to sow them. The above applies provided that the seeds did not grow because of a problem with the seeds themselves. If, however, the reason they did not grow is that the land was smitten with hail or the like, the seller is not responsible for the loss, for perhaps the reason that the seeds did not grow is the hail. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.

If, by contrast, a seller sold seeds that are eaten - e.g., wheat or barley -and the purchaser sowed them, and they did not grow, the seller is not responsible to reimburse the purchaser.Even if he sold him flax seeds, which most people purchase to sow, the seller is not responsible if they are destroyed when they are sown, since there are some who eat these seeds. If, however, the purchaser notifies the seller that he is purchasing the seeds with the intent of sowing them, the seller is responsible for them. The same applies to objects that are purchased for medicinal purposes or for dyes. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.

From the above, we can derive the following law. Whenever a person purchases an item from a colleague and informs him that he intends to transport it to another city to sell it there, and after he transported it there a blemish which nullifies the sale was discovered, the seller may not tell the purchaser: "Bring my article here." Instead, the seller must reimburse the purchaser, and the seller must take the trouble of returning the article to its original place or selling it in the place to which it was transported. Even if the article was lost or stolen after the purchaser notified the seller, it is considered to have been in the seller's domain. Different laws apply, however, when the purchaser did not tell the seller that he was planning to transport the article to another country and transported it nevertheless. If he then discovered a blemish, the article is considered to be in the domain of the purchaser until he returns it with its blemish to the seller.

When a person purchases produce and discovers a blemish, and afterwards the article is lost or stolen, the article is considered in the domain of the purchaser until he returns it to the seller. If the produce becomes wormy and is spoiled because-of the length of time it had been kept, it is considered to be in the domain of the seller. If the purchaser realized the difficulty and should have notified the seller, but failed to do so, the produce is considered to be in his domain.

When a person sells an ox to a colleague and it is discovered to have tendencies to gore, the seller can excuse himself from responsibility by saying: "I sold it to you for the purpose of slaughter."When does the above apply? When the purchaser buys oxen for both slaughter and plowing. If, however, the seller knows that the purchaser purchases oxen only to plow, the transaction is considered to have been conducted under false premises, and it is nullified. The same principles apply in all analogous situations.

The following rule applies when a person sells an animal to a colleague for slaughter, the purchaser slaughters it, and it is discovered to be trefah. If it can definitely be determined that it had been trefah when it was purchased,the purchaser should return the slaughtered animal, and the seller must return the money. From this ruling, we can derive the following principles that apply when a seller sells an entity that possesses a blemish, and the purchaser makes another blemish before he discovers the first blemish. If the purchaser creates the blemish in the process of performing an act that would ordinarily be performed - e.g., one who slaughters an animal that is trefah - he is not liable. If, however, he deviates from ordinary practice and makes another blemish before he discovers the first blemish, he should return the article to its owner and reimburse him for the blemish that he made.

The following rules apply when a person purchases a garment and cuts it with the intent of making a cloak from it. If, because of the cut he made, he discovers a blemish in the fabric, he may return the pieces. Should he sew the cloak and then discover the blemish in the fabric, he may return it. If he has increased its value, he may collect from the seller the value of the increase his sewing generated. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.

The following principles apply when a person sells landed property to a colleague, the purchaser derives benefit from the property, and afterwards discovers a blemish in it. If he desires to return the land to its owners, he must reimburse them for all the benefit that he derived. If it was a courtyard and he dwelled in it, he must pay them rent.

When a person sells an article with a blemish that is not recognized, and the article that is sold becomes destroyed because of that blemish, the seller must return the money that he received.

What is implied? A person sold an ox that did not have molars. The purchaser placed that ox together with his cattle, placed food before all of them, and they ate. He did not realize that the ox he had purchased was not eating until it died of starvation. In such an instance, the purchaser may return the corpse to the seller, who is required to return his money to him. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.

Different rules apply if the seller is a broker who purchases from one person and sells to another without keeping the animal in his possession. For this reason, we assume that the broker did not know of the blemish. Therefore, the broker is required to take a Rabbinic oath that he did not know of the blemish, and then he is absolved of responsibility. The rationale is that the purchaser had the responsibility of checking the ox he purchased independently and returning it to the broker before it died. The broker would then have returned it to the one who sold it to him. Since the purchaser did not do this, he caused himself a loss. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.

The following rules apply when a person slaughters a firstborn animal, sells its meat, and then the purchaser discovers that the seller had not shown it to an expert: What the purchaser ate is not taken into consideration, and the seller is required to return to the purchaser the money he paid. The seller should receive the remainder of the meat from the purchaser and return his money to him. Similarly, if a butcher slaughters a cow and sells it, and it is discovered that it was trefah, what the purchaser ate is not taken into consideration, and the seller is required to return the purchaser's money to him.The meat that was not eaten should be returned to the butcher, ] and he should return the money to the purchaser.

If the purchaser sold the meat that was trefah to gentiles, he should come to an understanding with the butcher with regard to the money for the trefah; the butcher should then return the remainder to him. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.

When a person sells meat to a colleague and it is discovered to be the meat of a firstborn animal, or he sells produce and it is discovered to be tevel, or wine and it is discovered to be wine used for idolatry, what the purchaser consumed is not taken into consideration, and the seller is required to return the money he paid to the purchaser. The same laws apply to any substance from which it is forbidden to partake according to Scriptural Law. This applies both when the prohibition is punishable by karet, or when there is merely an ordinary prohibition involved. Different rules apply if one sells an object that is forbidden by Rabbinic law to be eaten. If the produce exists, one should return the produce and receive in return the money originally paid. If, however, one ate them, then one has benefited from it, and the seller is not obligated to return anything to the purchaser. Whenever it is forbidden to benefit from an object - whether by Scriptural or Rabbinic law - the seller must return the money he received.There is no binding legal convention governing such a sale.

There are four states applicable with regard to a seller: a) The seller sold wheat assuring the purchaser that it was of a high quality, and it was discovered to be of a low quality. In such an instance, the purchaser may retract, but not the seller. b) If the purchaser convinced the seller that the wheat was of a low quality, and it was discovered to be of a high quality. In such an instance, the seller may retract, but not the purchaser. c-d) If the produce was said to be of a low quality, and it was discovered to be of a low quality, but not of the absolutely lowest quality, or he assured him that it was of a high quality, and it was discovered to be of a high quality, but not of the absolutely highest quality, we see if there was an unfair gain of one sixth of its value. If there was, neither may retract, but the unfair gain must be returned.

If, however, a person claims to be selling red wheat and in fact, it is white, white wheat and in fact, it is red, olive wood and in fact, it is from a wild fig tree, or wild fig wood and in fact, it is from an olive tree, wine and it is discovered to be vinegar, vinegar and it is discovered to be wine, both the seller and the purchaser can retract. For the object of the sale is not of the type that the seller stated he was selling. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.

When a person sells wine to a colleague and the purchaser transfers it to his own containers, even if it turns into vinegar immediately, the seller is not held responsible for it. This law applies even if the purchaser says: "I am purchasing it to use for cooking." If the seller knew that his wine was turning sour, the transaction is considered to have taken place under false pretenses. Different laws apply if a person sold a colleague wine, and it remained in the seller's containers and turned into vinegar. If the purchaser told the seller: "I need this for cooking," and the wine turns sour, the purchaser may return it and say: "Here is your wine and your containers. I did not buy it to drink, but rather to use for cooking a little bit at a time." If the purchaser did not say: "I need this for cooking," he may not return it. For the owner may tell him: "Why didn't you drink it immediately. You should not have left it until it turned sour."

The following rules apply when a person sells a barrel of beer to a colleague in a barrel belonging to the seller. If the beer becomes like vinegar within the first three days [after the sale, the change is considered to have taken place in the seller's domain and he must return the money he received. From that point onward, the change is considered to have taken place in the purchaser's domain.

The following rules apply when a person sells a barrel of wine to a colleague who intends to sell it little by little. If half or a third of the wine becomes sour, it may be returned to the seller. If, however, the purchaser changes the hole for the spout, or the market day came and he was lax and did not try to sell the wine, it is considered to be in the purchaser's domain. Similar laws apply when a person accepts a barrel of wine from a colleague with the intent of transporting it to a particular destination and selling it there. If the price of the wine decreases or it becomes sour before it reaches the destination, it is considered to be in the purchaser's domain, for the barrel and the wine are his. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.

When a person tells a colleague: "I am selling you fragrant wine," he is responsible for the wine to retain its fragrance until the holiday of Shavuot. If he tells him: "I am selling you aged wine," he must give him wine from the previous year. If he mentions vintage wine, it must be in its third year and must retain its flavor without turning sour until the holiday of Sukkot. In a locale where there is a well-known custom, everything is determined by the local custom.

When a person tells a colleague: "I am selling you this cellar of wine for cooking," or merely "...a cellar of wine," the purchaser accepts the fact that the wine from ten containers out of one hundred will not be of as high a quality and will already have begun to sour. If more wine changes flavor, he has not acquiesced.

If the seller told the purchaser: "I am selling you a cellar of wine for cooking," or he told him: "I am selling you a barrel of wine," he must provide him with wine that is entirely of high quality and fit to be used for cooking. If he told him: "I am selling you this cellar of wine," he should provide him with wine similar to that sold in a store - i.e., of average quality, neither bad nor good. If he told him, "I am selling you this cellar," and did not mention that it contained wine, the purchaser must accept it, even if it was all vinegar. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.

When a person tells a colleague: "I am selling you a wooden kneading tray," or "I am selling you a beam for an olive press," he may not give him a piece of wood that is fit to have a kneading tray hewn out from it, or a beam that is fit to be made into a beam for an olive press. Instead, he must give him a kneading tray that has already been fashioned or a beam for an olive press that has already been fashioned, one that any person seeing it will say: "This is a kneading tray," or "this is a beam for an olive press." Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.

It is forbidden to deceive people with regard to a business deal or to beguile them. This prohibition applies equally to Jews and to gentiles. If a seller knows that the article he is selling has a blemish, he must notify the purchaser about it. It is even forbidden to beguile a person with false flattery.

One may not improve the appearance of a man being sold as a servant, nor of an animal, nor of old utensils, by making them appear to be new. One may, however, improve the appearance of new utensils, by polishing them, ironing them and beautifying them as much as necessary.

One may not feed a man water in which bran was cooked, which causes his body to swell, making his face appear larger. One may not paint one's face with rouge and the like. One may not inflate intestines that are being sold in a butchery, nor may one soak meat in water. All practices similar to the above are also forbidden. One may not sell a gentile meat from an animal that was not ritually slaughtered on the pretense that it was ritually slaughtered, although religiously there is no difference to him whether or not ritual slaughter was performed.

It is permitted to remove the husks from kernels of grain or beans, provided one does not do so only on the top of the grain sack, for doing so creates a false impression that the entire quantity has been husked. It is permitted for a merchant to distribute roasted seeds and nuts to children and maidservants so that they will frequent his establishment. A merchant may discount the ordinary market price of an item to increase his volume of customers. The other merchants in the market place may not prevent him from doing so, nor is this considered to be deceiving a customer.

One may not mix two batches of the same species of produce together. This applies when both batches are freshly harvested. Certainly, it is forbidden to mix produce harvested previously with freshly harvested produce. This applies even when previously harvested produce is more expensive than the freshly harvested, because the purchaser may desire to store the produce for an extended time. An exception was made with regard to wine, and it is permitted to mix stronger wine with lighter wine during the time the wine is fermenting alone, because one improves the flavor of the other. If the flavor of the wine added is distinct, it is permitted to mix them at any time. For whenever an entity is distinct, its presence can be detected by a purchaser. And therefore, mixing it in is permitted.

Water may not be mixed together with wine that one intends to sell. When water has been mixed with a person's wine, he should not sell it in a store unless he notifies the customers. He should not sell it to a merchant, even if he notifies him, lest the merchant deceive others. In a place where it is customary to add water to wine, one may do so, provided one does so at the time the wine is fermenting.

A merchant may take from five wine vats and store the mixture in one tank. He may take from five granaries and store the mixture in one warehouse, as long as he does not intend to mix the produce.

It is forbidden to mix dregs with either wine or oil. Mixing even the slightest amount is forbidden. One may not even mix the dregs produced yesterday with the dregs produced today. If, however, one pours wine from one container into another, one may add the dregs to the wine.

When a person sells "refined oil" to a colleague, the purchaser refuses to accept any dregs at all. If he sells him oil without mentioning any descriptive term, the purchaser is willing to accept that one and a half log from every 100 log will be dregs. And he accepts the fact that the remainder of the oil will have dregs; thus, it will be murky, with dregs being suspended in the oil in addition to the quantity of dregs that is standard in that locale.

When does the above apply? When he pays the money in Tishrei, when oil is cloudy, and receives the oil in Nisan according to the measure of Tishrei, which is larger because of the unrefined oil above. If, however, the purchaser takes the measure given in Nisan, which is smaller because the oil has already become clear, he accepts only the measure of dregs mentioned in the previous halachah.

When a person sells wheat to a colleague, the purchaser accepts that he will receive one fourth of a kav of legumes for every se'ah. When he purchases barley, he accepts that he will receive one fourth of a kav of dried-out kernels for every se'ah. When he purchases lentils, he accepts that he will receive one fourth of a kav of pebbles for every se'ah. When he purchases figs, he accepts that he will receive ten wormy ones for every hundred. If a person sells any other type of produce to a colleague, the purchaser accepts that he will receive one fourth of a kav of dirty produce for every se'ah. If the amount of lower quality produce exceeds these measures, the seller must sift the entire batch and give the purchaser sifted and cleaned produce that has no undesirable qualities.

All of the above applies only in a place where there is no established custom. In a place where there is an established custom, everything follows the established custom.

There are places where it is customary for all produce to be sold when it has been cleaned and sifted, removing all foreign bodies, and for the wines and the oils to be clear, without selling any dregs at all. And there are other places where produce is sold even when there are half dregs, or there is half the amount of sand, straw or another substance in the produce. Therefore, in such a locale, if a person takes a stone from a colleague's grain heap, he must reimburse the owner as if the stone he took were wheat. For if he had left it there, it would have been sold as part of the measure of wheat.'If one would say, "Let him return the stone," this is forbidden, for it is forbidden to mix even the slightest amount of foreign substances into produce.

When a person sells barrels in the Sharon in a place where there is no established custom, the purchaser accepts that out of 100 barrels, he will receive ten that are of inferior quality. Even these must, however, be attractive and fixed with pitch.

It is forbidden for a person to sell a colleague landed property or movable property concerning which there is a dispute or a judgment pending, until he notifies the purchaser. This law applies even if the seller is responsible for the property if it is expropriated from the purchaser. The rationale is that a person does not desire to pay money for an object and then be forced to enter into litigation concerning it, because he is being sued by others.

When a person sells landed property to a colleague and claims of ownership are filed by others - after the purchaser acquires the property through one of the established modes of acquisition, but before he makes use of it - the purchaser may retract; there is no blemish greater than this. Before he has even made use of his purchase, claimants come and demand it. Therefore, the transaction should be nullified and the seller should return the money and enter into litigation with the claimants. If the purchaser made any use of it whatsoever, even if he merely threw down its property marker and joined it to his own adjacent property, he may not retract. Instead, he must enter into litigation with the claimants. If they are successful in expropriating it from him in court, he may seek settlement from the seller, as is the law with regard to all from whom property is expropriated.

Whenever a person sells landed property, a servant or other movable property, he is responsible for them. What is implied? If a litigant expropriates the purchased article from the purchaser because of the seller, the purchaser may collect all the money he paid from the seller, because the article was taken because of him. This law applies with regard to all sales, even if the purchaser does not explicitly make this stipulation, but purchases the article without any qualification. Even if he purchases landed property by virtue of the transfer of a legal document, and the seller's responsibility is not mentioned in the document, the seller is responsible for the property. The fact that his responsibility is not mentioned is considered to be a scribal error.

When does the above apply? When the purchased article was expropriated from the purchaser in a Jewish court. For example, the purchased article was movable property and it was proven that it was obtained by theft or robbery, or landed property was taken by robbery, or a creditor of the seller came and expropriated it from the purchaser. All the above applies if the expropriation was dictated by a Jewish court. If, however, a gentile expropriates the purchased article from the purchaser, whether through an edict of the king or through a secular court, the seller is not responsible for the article. Although the gentile claims that the seller stole this article or robbed him of it and brought witnesses to that effect, the seller is not liable at all. For the expropriation of the article by gentiles is considered to be beyond the seller's control, and a seller is not liable for losses that are beyond his control.

When a person sells landed property to a colleague and the seller makes a stipulation that he will reimburse the purchaser for any loss of this property due to factors beyond his control, he is liable to pay even if a gentile comes and seizes by force the property due to the seller. If, however, a stream that was watering the field dries up, the flow of a stream deviates and makes a portion of land into a pool, or an earthquake comes and destroys it, the seller is not liable. For matters of this nature are both beyond one's control and infrequent. It would not have occurred to a seller to think about such an abnormal matter at the time he made this stipulation. Similarly, any other factor beyond one's control that is abnormal is not included in this stipulation.

This same principle applies with regard to any condition that is made with regard to monetary matters. We analyze the intent of the person making the stipulation. We include within its scope only matters that are well-known that we would assume to have been taken in within the stipulation, because they would have been in the mind of the person making the stipulation at that time.

An incident occurred concerning a person who hired sailors to transport sesame seeds to a certain place. He made a stipulation with them that they are responsible for any loss that occurs because of factors beyond their control until the sesame seeds reach their destination. And then, the river on which they expected to transport the cargo ceased flowing. Our Sages said: This is an abnormal factor beyond their control. They are not likely to transport these sesame seeds on an animal to that place. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.

When a person sells landed property to a colleague and the seller explicitly stipulates that he is not responsible, the seller is not held responsible. This applies even if it becomes known with certainty that the property was stolen, and it is expropriated from the purchaser. Needless to say, should a creditor of the seller come and expropriate it from the purchaser, the seller is not liable to reimburse him. For any stipulation that is made with regard to financial matters is binding.

The following rule applies when Reuven sold a field to Shimon without taking responsibility for it, and Levi comes and expropriates it from Shimon based on a claim against Reuven. If he desires, Reuven can enter into litigation with Levi. Levi cannot protest: "What business do you and I have together? You have no responsibility for the property." For Reuven will tell him: "I do not want Shimon to have any claims against me, for he has lost money on my account."

The following rule applies when Reuven sold a field to Shimon without taking responsibility and then repurchased it from him requiring Shimon to take responsibility. If a creditor of Reuven comes to expropriate the field from him, he may not require Shimon to pay for it. Although he did not accept responsibility when he sold it to Shimon, he took responsibility with regard to himself, that he should not be the seller and then expropriate the property himself. If, however, a creditor of Jacob, their father, comes and expropriates the property from Reuven, Reuven may demand payment of the entire worth of the field from Shimon. For Shimon accepted responsibility for the field when he sold it back to Reuven, while Reuven did not accept any responsibility for others when he sold it to Shimon.

The following rules apply in the situation to be described. A person wanted to purchase an article from a colleague. The seller said: "I will sell it to you for 200 zuz,"but the purchaser said: "I will not purchase it for more than a maneh." They each returned home. Afterwards, they came together again and the purchaser took possession of the article by meshichah without making any further statements. If it was the seller who made the proposition to the purchaser and gave him the article, he is required to give him only a maneh. If, however, it was the purchaser who performed meshichah without making any further offers, he is required to pay 200 zuz.

The following rule applies when a person purchases an article from one of five people, but is unsure of the identity of the seller, and each of the five claims that he was the seller. The purchaser should place the money for the item among them and depart. The money should remain in custody until the false claimants admit that it is not theirs or Elijah comes. If the purchaser is pious, he should pay each one of the claimants to fulfill a moral and spiritual obligation.

Different rules apply when a person purchased an article from one of five people, did not pay at the time, denied taking the article by making a false oath and then repented and wanted to make restitution. If all five demanded payment from him, saying, "I am the one from whom you denied taking the article, and to whom you made a false oath," and he says, "I do not know," he is obligated to pay each of them, because he committed a transgression.

The seller's word is accepted when he says: "I sold the article to this one, and I did not sell the article to this one."When does this apply? When the article that he is selling is in his possession. If, however, the article is no longer in his possession, his statements are given no more credence than those of one witness, and the laws applying to him with regard to this testimony are no different from those applying to other people, for he is no longer involved in the matter concerning which he testified. Therefore, if a seller took money from two people, one intentionally and one gave him money against the seller's will, and the seller does not know the identity of the person from whom he took money intentionally and that of the person who gave him money against his will, there is no testimony at all. Each of the persons must take an oath holding a sacred article, as dictated by our Sages. Each then receives half of the purchased article and half the money. This applies whether the article is in the hands of the seller or both of the claimants are holding it.

The principle, "When a person desires to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is upon him," is applied in all the following situations and in other similar ones: The purchaser claims: "You sold the article to me," and the seller claims that he did not; The seller claims that he sold the article to the purchaser, and the purchaser did not pay for it; The purchaser claims that he paid the money, but did not perform meshichah; The purchaser claims that he performed meshichah without seeing a particular blemish, and the seller claimed to have appraised him of it beforehand; or One of them claimed that the transaction had been made conditional on a stipulation, and the other denied that.

In the above instances, if the plaintiff does not prove his claim, the defendant who denies the claim must support his own claim with a sh'vuat hesset. If he admits a portion of the plaintiff's claim, or the plaintiffs claim is supported by one witness, the defendant must take an oath, as mandated by Scriptural Law, as applies with regard to all other claims.

The following rules apply when a person tells a storekeeper: "Give me a dinar's worth of produce," and the storekeeper gives it to him, and the produce is placed in the public domain. If the storekeeper demands payment of the dinar and the purchaser replies "I paid you the money, and you put it into your pocket," the purchaser is required to take an oath as ordained by our Sages, holding a sacred object. Afterwards, he may take the produce. The rationale is that the produce has already left the domain of the seller and was placed in the public domain. If the produce was in the domain of the purchaser, he would be required to take only a sh'vuat hesset, and then he would be freed of responsibility. If the produce was in the domain of the storekeeper, the storekeeper would be required to take a sh'vuat hesset, and the produce would remain his.

Different rules apply if a purchaser gives a dinar to a storekeeper to take produce that has been placed down in the public domain. If the storekeeper says: "The dinar that you just gave me is payment for produce that I previously gave you and that you took to your home. I never sold you this produce that is now placed in the public domain," the storekeeper must take an oath to support his claim while holding a sacred object. The produce is then returned to the storekeeper, for he never admitted selling it to the purchaser. And if the produce was located in his store, all that would be required of him would be a sh'vuat hesset, as explained in the previous halachah.

Similar rules apply when a person gives a dinar to a money-changer to take coins when the coins are piled in the public domain. If the money-changer admits to having sold the coins and he has not taken the dinar, the purchaser must support his claim by taking an oath while holding a sacred object and may then take the coins. If, however, the money-changer does not admit to having sold the coins to the purchaser, even though he admits taking a dinar from the purchaser at this time, for he claims that the dinar is payment for coins that the purchaser already took home, the money-changer must support his claim by taking an oath while holding a sacred object. The coins are then returned to his store.

The following laws apply when a person exchanges a cow and a donkey, and the cow bears a calf, or one sells a maidservant and she gives birth. The seller claims: "She gave birth before I sold her." The purchaser claims: "She gave birth after I purchased her." The purchaser must bring proof of his claim to be granted possession. This ruling applies even if the seller says: "I do not know when she gave birth." Indeed, even if the cow is located in a swamp or the maidservant in a corner of the public domain, they are considered to be in the possession of the seller until the purchaser brings proof of his claim. If the purchaser does not bring proof of his claim, the seller must take an oath while holding a sacred object to support his claim. This applies with regard to the offspring of a cow. With regard to the offspring of a maidservant, by contrast, he is required only to take a sh'vuat hesset. For an oath associated with a sacred object is never taken with regard to servants or landed property, as explained in Hilchot To'en V'Nit'an.

If one says: "I do not know when the offspring was born," and the other also does not know, and the offspring is located in a domain that does not belong to either of them, it should be divided. If one says: "The offspring was born in my domain," and the other remains silent, the one who makes the claim is awarded the offspring.

The following rules apply when a dispute arises concerning a seller who owns two servants, one an adult and one a minor, or two fields, one large and one small. The purchaser claims: "I purchased the greater one," while the seller claims: "You purchased the smaller one." The burden of proof lies with the purchaser. If he does not substantiate his claim, the seller should take a sh'vuat hesset that it was the smaller one that he sold and he is allowed to keep the larger one.

If the purchaser says: "I purchased the greater one," and the seller remains silent, the purchaser is awarded the greater one. If the seller says: "I do not know," the burden of proof lies on the purchaser. If he does not substantiate his claim, the seller should take a sh'vuat hesset that he does not know which article was purchased, and the purchaser is awarded only the smaller one.

Whenever a doubt over responsibility for an article arises the burden of proof lies on the person in whose domain the doubt arises. What is implied? A person exchanges a cow for a donkey, and the owner of the donkey performs meshichah on the cow, but before the owner of the cow can perform meshichah on the donkey, the donkey dies. The burden of proof is on the owner of the donkey to verify that the donkey was alive at the time meshichah was performed on the cow. The same principle applies in all analogous situations.

The following laws apply when someone sold an animal to a butcher before its slaughter, but the money had not yet changed hands, it was slaughtered, and afterwards, a needle was discovered in the animal's second stomach that had pierced it from side to side. If a drop of blood is found upon it, it is clear that it became trefah before its slaughter. If a scab had formed over the wound, it is clear that it became trefah three days before its slaughter. If a scab had not formed over the wound, there is a lack of clarity concerning the matter, and the butcher must bring proof that the disqualifying factor arose before the purchase. This decision is rendered because the cow was in his possession when the doubt arose. If he cannot bring proof to this effect, he must pay the money due to the seller, as explained above.

The following rules apply when a person transfers a non-specific entity to a colleague. If the species being sold is known, even though its measure, its weight and its number are not known, the transaction is binding. If the species is not known, the transaction is not binding.

What is implied? If a person tells a colleague: "I am selling you this heap of wheat for this and this amount," "I am selling you this cellar of wine for this and this amount," or "I am selling you this bag of figs for this and this amount," the sale is binding, even though the measure of the grain heap, the weight of the figs and the number of containers of wine is unknown. These principles apply even if the quantity is greater or less than the estimation of the seller or the purchaser. The laws of ona'ah apply, and the purchase price is compared to the market price, as explained.

If, however, a person tells a colleague: "I will sell you whatever this house contains for this and this amount," "...whatever this chest contains,..." or "whatever this sack contains for this and this amount," the purchaser agrees and performs meshichah, the transaction is not binding. For the purchaser did not make a binding commitment, since he does not know what the receptacle contains, whether straw or gold. This is no more than gambling. The same applies in all analogous situations.

Similarly, if a person tells a colleague that he is selling him wheat for ten dinarim, but does not stipulate how many se'ah he is selling him, he must give him an amount of wheat equivalent to the market price at the time of the sale. Should either of the parties retract after the money has been paid, because they do not agree to the market price at the time of the sale, that party must receive the adjuration mi shepara, as explained.

When a person sells property to a colleague to build a house or a barn for cattle, he should give him a place four cubits by six cubits. Similarly, when a person agrees to build a wedding home for a colleague's son or a home for a widowed daughter he should build a home of this size. If he sells him property to build a large house, he should give him a space eight cubits by ten cubits. If he sells him a place for a reception hall, he should give him a space ten cubits by ten cubits. A place for a garden of a courtyard is twelve cubits by twelve cubits. The height of a structure is half of its combined length and width.

Similarly, when a person sells a property to a colleague for a family burial plot or if a person agrees to prepare a burial plot for a person, he should build a crypt beneath the earth and prepare for eight graves, three on one side, three on the other side and two opposite the entrance to the crypt. The measure of the crypt should be four cubits by six cubits, and each grave should be four cubits long, six handbreadths wide and seven handbreadths deep. Thus, there should be a cubit and a half between each of the graves on the sides and two cubits between the graves opposite the entrance.

When a person sells a colleague a place in his own field to make an irrigation ditch to water a parched field, he must give him a ditch two cubits wide, with a cubit on each side for its banks. If he sells him a place for an irrigation ditch that uses a pipe, he must give him a ditch that is a cubit wide, with half a cubit on each side for its banks.

The seller may plant trees on this land at the banks of the ditch, but he may not sow grain there, for grain weakens the land and damages the irrigation ditch. Should this land at the banks of the ditch become washed away, the purchaser may replace it by taking from the earth in that field. For the seller's acceptance of the fact that an irrigation ditch will pass through his field is conditional to this stipulation.

The following rules apply when a person sells a colleague a path in his field. If he sells him a path for one person, is he must give him a path two and a half cubits wide, so that a donkey and its burden can pass on the path.ffff If he sells him a path that leads from one city to another, he must give him a path that is eight cubits wide. If he sells him a path for use as a public thoroughfare, he should give him a path that is sixteen cubits wide.

A path for a king and a path to a grave have no limits. It appears to me that this is considered as if one sells an object whose species is not identified, in which instance the transaction is not binding.

If a person sells a colleague a place for relatives to stand and eulogize a person who has passed away,he must give him a place large enough to sow four kabbim of grain.

When a person tells a colleague: "I am selling you a cistern and its walls," he must give him a wall three handbreadths wide.

The following rules apply when a person sells a field to a colleague and while defining the boundaries of the field draws one boundary line long and another short. If the field on the boundary line that he drew longer belongs to only one person, the purchaser does not acquire any more land on that side of the field than on the side that he drew short. If the fields on that side belong to two individuals, the purchaser acquires the land as separated by a diagonal.

If the fields on the east and the west belong to Reuven, and those on the north and the south belong to Shimon, when drawing the map, the seller must write "the boundary of Reuven" on two sides and "the boundary of Shimon" on two sides.

If the seller drew three boundary lines, but did not draw the fourth, the purchaser acquires the entire field. With regard to the fourth boundary, however, he does not acquire it. If the fourth boundary is included within the other boundaries, and it is not designated by a row of palm trees, and it is not large enough for nine kabbim of grain to be sown within, the purchaser also acquires the fourth boundary. If it is not included within the other boundaries, and it is designated by a row of palm trees, or it is large enough for nine kabbim of grain to be sown within, the purchaser does not acquire the fourth boundary. If it is included within the other boundaries, but it is designated by a row of palm trees, or it is large enough for nine kabbim of grain to be sown within, or it is not included within the other boundaries, but it is not designated by a row of palm trees, nor is it large enough for nine kabbim of grain to be sown within, the matter is entrusted to the court, and they divide it in the manner in which they see fit.

If the seller designates only the corners of the property, without designating the entire boundary line in each direction, or he designates two corners in an L-shape, or he designates certain portions in each direction,the purchaser does not acquire the entire property. Instead, he acquires only the portion the seller transfers to him and the portion granted to him by the judges.

If a person sells a colleague a bayit in a larger building, although he drew for the purchaser the external boundaries of the entire building, and there are some who would call the entire building a bayit, the purchaser acquires only the apartment; he merely made the boundaries appear larger. Had he sold him the entire building, he would have written in the deed of sale: "I did not retain ownership of anything in this sale." Similarly, when a person sells a field in a large valley, although he drew him the boundaries of the entire valley, he merely made the boundaries appear larger.

When a person tells a colleague: "I am selling you fields," we interpret his intent to be the very minimum that would justify the use of the plural term: two. If he tells him: "...all my fields...," then all his fields, even three or four are acquired by the purchaser, with the exception of gardens and orchards. If he tells him: "...my property...," even his gardens and orchards are sold. If he tells him: "...all my property...," everything he owns, even his servants, his buildings, all the movable property that he is known to own, including even the tefillin he wears on his head, are encompassed in the sale.

When a person tells a colleague: "I am selling you one of my homes," or "...one of my oxen," he is required only to give him the smallest one. If one of the oxen dies or one of the homes collapses, the seller may show the purchaser the one that died or collapsed and tell him that it is his, for the claim of the person possessing the deed of sale is considered at a disadvantage.

When a person tells a colleague: "I am selling you a field from the house of Chiyya," and he possesses two fields that are described in this manner, the purchaser acquires only the lesser one. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.

The purchaser's claim is favored in the following situation: A person tells a colleague: "I am selling you Reuven's field." When the purchaser comes to make use of the field that is popularly known by that name, the seller tells him: "This is not the field that was owned by Reuven. It is only called that by people, but it never belonged to him. This is the field that belonged to Reuven" he says, pointing to another field. "I purchased it from him, and this is the field that I sold to you." The seller must prove his claim. If he does not prove it, the purchaser acquires the field that is popularly known as belonging to Reuven. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations. We follow the name that is accepted universally.

When a person tells a colleague: "I am selling you half a field," we should evaluate the worth of the entire field, and the seller should give the purchaser a portion worth half the value of the entire field, from its lesser portion. Similarly, when a person tells a colleague: "I am selling you the southern half of a field," we should evaluate the worth of the entire field, and the seller should give the purchaser a portion worth half the value of the entire field from its southern half. Implicit in such an agreement is a commitment by the purchaser to make a place for a fence in his portion, including a small trench three handbreadths wide behind the fence, but close to it - and a larger trench, six handbreadths wide, outside the fence - and to leave the width of a handbreadth between the two trenches. All this is necessary to prevent a marten or the like from jumping from one field to the other.

The following rules apply when a person owns half of a field: If he tells a colleague: "I am selling you the half of the field that I own," the purchaser acquires the entire half. If he tells him: "I am selling you half the field that I own," the purchaser acquires only one fourth. The following rules apply when a seller tells a purchaser: "These are the boundaries of the field from which a portion is divided...," "...is separated...," or"...is apportioned for you."If he tells him: "And these are its boundaries,"the purchaser acquires half. If he does not specify its boundaries, the purchaser acquires merely a portion on which he could sow nine kabbim.

A person cannot transfer ownership over an article that has not yet come into existence. This applies with regard to a sale, with regard to a present or with regard to the disposition of an oral will. What is implied? If a person states: "What my field will produce is sold to you," "What this tree will grow is given to you," "Give so and so the offspring that this animal bears," the recipient does not acquire anything. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.

When a person sells the fruit of a date palm to a colleague, he may retract even after the fruits of the date palm have already come into existence. If the purchaser harvests the fruits, they are not expropriated from him. If either of them retracts, he is not required to receive the adjuration mi shepara.

When, however, a person sells produce at the market price, although the seller was not in possession of the type of produce, the seller is obligated to purchase the amount of produce he pledged, and give it to the purchaser. If he retracts, he must receive the adjuration mi shepara.

The following rules apply when a person sells produce at the market price, promising to give four se'ah for a sela. Even if the grain was in stalks, the transaction is completed, and if he retracts, the seller is liable to receive the adjuration mi shepara, provided either of the following stipulations is met: a) the seller shows the purchaser that he possesses grain in his storehouse, or b) the purchaser tells the seller in the market place: "I am relying on you." If the purchaser did not tell the seller: "I am relying on you," the seller does not consider this to be a firm agreement, and he is not required to receive the adjuration mi shepara if he retracts. For he says to himself: "Perhaps the purchaser also made such an agreement with another individual and he does not actually require this wheat."

An entity that is not in the possession of the seller cannot be acquired; it is like an entity that has not come into existence. What is implied? When a seller says: "What I will inherit from my father is sold to you," "What my net will bring up from the sea is sold to you," or "When I purchase this field, it is sold to you," the purchaser does not acquire anything. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.

When a person was on his deathbed and the heir desired to sell some of the dying person's property to spend the money for the sake of the burial, our Sages ordained that if the heir says: "What I will inherit from my father today is sold to you," the sale is binding. The rationale is that since the son is poor, if he is forced to wait until his father dies to sell the property, the corpse will remain unburied and be disgraced. Similarly, provisions were made for a poor fisherman who has nothing to eat. If he says: "What my net brings in today from the sea is sold to you," the sale is binding. This was ordained to provide for his livelihood.

If a son sold property belonging to his father during his father's lifetime, but the son died in his father's lifetime, the son's son may expropriate the property from the purchasers. The rationale is that his father sold something that had not entered his domain. Thus, the property remained in the domain of the grandfather, and the grandson inherited the estate of his grandfather. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.

The following rules apply when a person gave a colleague landed property as a present, and together with it gave him 100 dinarim through a kinyan agav. If the dinarim existed in his domain at the time he gave the present, when the recipient acquired the field, he also acquired the dinarim. If. however, the giver does not have a dinar, we do not obligate the giver to give the recipient 100 dinarim until the recipient brings proof that the giver possessed dinarim at the time the recipient acquired the present. The same principles apply to other movable property that a person desires to transfer together with landed property through a kinyan agav. If the movable property is not in the domain of the seller or the giver at the time the recipient acquires the present, he does not acquire it. For a person may not transfer ownership over an article that is not in his domain.

When a person has entrusted an object to a colleague for safekeeping, he may transfer ownership over it, either through a sale or through a gift. The rationale is that an entrusted object is in the domain of its owner, and we operate under the presumption that the entrusted object continues to exists If, however, the person to whom the article was entrusted denies receiving it, the owner may not transfer ownership of it. It is as if the article were lost; it is not in his domain. Different rules apply with regard to a loan. Since a loan is given with the intent that it be spent, it cannot be transferred except through a ma'amad sh'loshtam, a convention that is not based on a motivating reason, as we have explained. If the loan was supported by a promissory note, the creditor may transfer ownership of the promissory note with a written authorization and the transfer of the note, for there is an entity that can be transferred through which one can acquire the encumbrance it contains.

Just as a person may not transfer ownership of an article that has not yet come into existence, so too, he may not transfer ownership of an article to someone who has not come into existence. Even a fetus is considered to be someone who has not come into existence, and thus, when a person wishes to endow a fetus with an article, the transaction is not binding. If, however, the fetus is the person's son, the transaction is binding. The rationale is that a person feels great closeness to his son.

When, however, a person tells his wife: "I will give my property to the children that you will bear," the children do not acquire anything. Since the woman was not pregnant at the time the present was given, the children had not yet reached a stage at which it could be said that a person feels great closeness for them.

When a person desires to transfer ownership of property to an animal, the transfer is not effective at all. If a person attempted to transfer part of his property to an animal or to a person who did not exist, and afterwards told a colleague: "Acquire a share of my property as this animal does," or "... as this fetus does," [the colleague does not acquire anything. If he tells him: "You and this animal shall acquire my property," or "You and this fetus ... ," the person acquires half of the property.

A person cannot transfer ownership - neither through a sale nor through a present - over an object unless it has substance. If it has no substance, ownership of it cannot be transferred.

What is implied? A person cannot transfer ownership over the fragrance of an apple, the taste of honey, the color of crystal or the like. Therefore, when a person desires to transfer ownership of the right to partake of the fruits of this date palm or to dwell in this home, the recipient does not acquire anything. For the transaction to be effective, the owner must transfer the house itself for the sake of dwelling in it, or the tree itself for the purpose of eating its fruit, as will be explained.

The law of consecrated property, the law of the poor, and the law of vows are not like the law of ordinary [things]. [If] in his acquisition of these, a person says, "All the offspring of my animal will be consecrated to the Temple treasury"; or, "will be forbidden to me"; or, "I will give them to charity"--even if it is not consecrated because it does not exist--the person is [still] obligated to keep his word, as it says [in Num. 30:3], "All that comes from his mouth, he must do."

Since this is so, if a person on his death bed commands and says, "All that this tree produces [should be given] to the poor," or, "All the profit from this house [should be given] to the poor]," the poor acquire them.

There are Geonim who differ on this matter and say that the poor only acquire in the way an ordinary person acquires. Therefore, they do not acquire a thing that does not yet exist It is not my opinion that a person is commanded to transfer [his property]. He is commanded to uphold his pledge to charity or to consecrate [his property], as he is commanded to uphold his vow, as we explained in [Mishneh Torah] Arakhin.

A person can transfer ownership over a property itself with regard to the produce it yields. This applies with regard to a sale, with regard to a present or with regard to an oral will. This is not considered to be transferring ownership of an entity that has not come into existence. For the article itself exists, and the person is transferring ownership over its produce. To what can the matter be compared? To a person who rents a house or a field to a colleague, in which instance he did not transfer ownership over the property in its entirety, but rather merely the right to derive benefit from it.

What is implied? A person sold or gave away a field with regard to its produce for a limited time, or for the entire lifetime of the seller or of the purchaser. Similar rules apply to a person who sells or gives away a tree for its fruit, a sheep for its shearings, an animal or a maid-servant for her offspring or a servant for his work. In all such instances, the sale or the present is binding.

There is an unresolved question if a sale is binding when a person sells his servant with regard to his fine - i.e., whether the fine which is imposed if the servant is gored by an ox and killed should be given to the purchaser or not. Therefore, the purchaser does not acquire the money; if he seizes it from the servant's owner, it is not expropriated from him.

When a person sells a tree to one person and its fruit to another, when making the first sale he did not leave over the rights to the fruit. Therefore the second purchaser does not acquire anything. If, however, a person sells a tree and leaves its fruit to himself, it is considered as if he retained the branches, the place where fruit grows, even if he did not explicitly say so. The rationale is that when a person retains property for himself, he acts generously.

When a person sells landed property for a specific time, the sale is binding. The purchaser may use the body of the land as he desires and derive benefit from it throughout the duration of the sale. At the end of the specified time period, the property returns to its original owner.

What is the difference between a person who sells landed property for a specific time and one who transfers ownership of it with regard to its produce? A person who purchases land with regard to its produce may not change the form of the land. He may not build, nor may he destroy. When, by contrast, a person purchases land for a specific time, he may build and destroy. During that specific time, he may act in the same manner as does one who purchases the land forever.

What is the difference between a person who sells a field with regard to the produce it yields, and a person who sells a colleague the produce of a particular field? When a person sells the produce of a particular field, the purchaser has no right to use this field at all. He is forbidden even to enter, except to take out his produce. The owner of the field, by contrast, may do whatever he desires within. When, by contrast, a person sells a field with regard to the produce it yields, the owner of the field may not enter the field without the consent of the purchaser, and the purchaser may use the field as he desires.

What is the difference between a person who purchases a field with regard to the produce it yields, and a person who rents a field from a colleague? A person who purchases a field with regard to the produce it yields may plant trees or seeds within it whenever he desires or leave it fallow. A renter does not have this right, as will be explained with regard to rentals. A renter does not have the right to sublet the property. One who buys the property may, however, sell the rights he purchased to another person.

When a person sells the benefit to be obtained from a dovecote or the benefit to be obtained from a beehive to a colleague, the sale is binding. He is not considered to have sold an entity that has not come into existence. For he is not selling the doves that will be born or the honey that will be produced in the beehive. Instead, he is selling the dovecote with regard to the benefit it produces, and the beehive for its honey. The seller can be compared to a person who rents a stream of water to a colleague, in which instance the renter may derive benefit from everything he catches within. Similarly, when a person sells a dovecote with regard to its benefit, it is as if he sells a tree with regard to its fruit. And the laws applying to both of them are like those applying to a person who rents a house, as we have explained in Halachah 1. Such a person may derive all the possible benefits from the property. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

The owner of the dovecote does not acquire the eggs and the fledglings in the dovecote until they fly. This is a Rabbinic decree, enacted as a safeguard to the prohibition, Deuteronomy 22:6: "Do not take the mother with the young." Therefore, if a person wants to transfer the ownership of these eggs or these fledglings to a colleague, he should rap on the dovecote so that the mothers will fly away, lifting themselves up from the ground. He should then transfer ownership of the dovecote to his colleague via a kinyan chalifin, by virtue of the transfer of landed property, or via another means of acquiring movable property.

When a person purchases the benefit to be derived from a dovecote from a colleague, he is not entitled to take all the fledglings that will be born from the time of the purchase onward. If he did that, the mothers would fly away and he would destroy the dovecote entirely. Instead, he should leave enough of the fledglings so that the dovecote will remain populated.

How many of the fledglings must he leave? If there were mother doves and female fledglings at the time he sold the benefit from the dovecote, he should leave the first pair of offspring that the mothers will bear, so that the mothers will be able to establish rapport with the first pair and with the female fledglings that were with them from the time of the sale. He should also leave two pairs of fledglings from those that the daughters who were in the dovecote from the time of the sale bear, so that the daughters will be able to establish rapport with these two pair that they bore. Whatever offspring are born after the first two pair from the daughters and the first pair of the mother belong to the purchaser.

When a person purchases the benefit to be gained from a beehive from a colleague, he may take three swarms of bees - one after the other. After that, he should take a swarm and leave a swarm to populate the beehive.

When a person purchases blocks of a beehive from a colleague, he should leave at least two blocks in the beehive, so that the bees do not fly away and abandon the hive.

When a person purchases olive trees from a colleague to cut down as lumber, he must leave two fistfuls of the tree above the ground before cutting. If he purchases a wild fig tree that was never cut down, he must leave three handbreadths before cutting. If he purchases a wild fig tree that was cut down previously, he must leave two handbreadths. For other trees, one handbreadth must be left before cutting. For reeds and vines, he must leave the lowest knot above the ground. With regard to palm trees and cedar trees, the purchaser should dig out its roots, for it will not grow again.

When a person sells three trees within his field, even three small newly planted trees, or three growths of one tree, the purchaser also acquires the land necessary to nurture them. Even if the trees dry up or are chopped down, he still owns the land necessary to nurture them. The purchaser also acquires all the other trees between them.

How much land is necessary to nurture them? The land beneath them, between them and beyond them, in which a person picking fruit can stand together with his basket. This place - the place in which a person picking fruit can stand together with his basket - may not be sown by either the buyer or the seller unless the other agrees.

When does the above apply? When the three trees that he purchases are positioned like the three feet of a range on which a pot is placed - i.e., two parallel to each other and the third equidistant between them, but not on the line connecting them. There must be at least four cubits between each tree, and no more than sixteen cubits.

From where does one measure? From the wide portion of the trunk of the tree. In the following situations, by contrast, the purchaser does not acquire land: the trees were not standing in such a position, they were closer together than four cubits or more distant than sixteen cubits; he purchased one after the other; he sold him two trees in the midst of his field and the third on the boundary line; the purchaser bought two trees in one person's field and one in a field belonging to a colleague; or a cistern, an irrigation ditch or the public domain was interposed between the purchaser's three trees. Therefore, the purchaser does not acquire the trees between the trees he purchased. If his trees dry up or are cut down, he has no further rights.

The following rules apply whenever a person purchases three trees and therefore acquires land: If the trees grow and a new branch emerges outward from the trunk, it should be cut off, so as not to limit the passage of the owner of the field. All the twigs and small branches that emerge from the trees - even those that emerge from the roots - belong to the owner of the trees, for he has acquired the land.

When a person purchases two trees in a field belonging to a colleague, the purchaser does not acquire any land. Therefore, if one of his trees dies or is cut down, he has no further right to the land. If his two trees grow and produce twigs and small branches, they should be cut off, lest they grow into the earth and appear as a third tree. Then the purchaser would tell the seller: "You sold me three trees and I have a right to the land."

The following laws apply to all the branches that the owner of the trees trims from them. Any branches that grow from the portion of the trunk that sees the sun belong to the owner of the trees. The branches that grow from the roots and do not see the sun belong to the owner of the field. With regard to palm trees, the owner of the tree does not acquire any of the branches, for they do not grow from the trunk.

When a person sells landed property but retains the rights to the trees, he also retains possession of half of the land. For if he did not retain possession of the land, the purchaser would tell him: "Uproot your trees." Similarly, if he retains the rights to two trees, he also retains possession of the land appropriate for them. For if he did not retain possession of the land, the purchaser would tell him: "Uproot your trees."

When a person sells trees, but retains possession of the land, the owner of the trees acquires possession of the land necessary for them, as we have explained. If a person sold the land to one person and the trees to another, and the purchaser of the trees manifested his ownership over the trees, and the purchaser of the land manifested his ownership over the land, the purchaser of the trees acquires the trees and half the land, while the purchaser of the land acquires only half the land.

When brothers divide an inheritance, one taking an orchard and one taking a field of grain, the owner of the orchard receives four cubits in the field of grain next to the orchard. He is granted this land because we assume that they divided the land with this stipulation in mind. It need not be stated explicitly, because it is something that is well known.

The following rules apply when a person sells a field containing date palms to a colleague and specifies that he is selling him the field with the exception of one specific tree. If it is a valuable and high-quality tree, we assume that he retained ownership of that one date palm alone; the remainder belong to the purchaser. If the date palm that he specified that he was retaining is inferior, we assume that he surely retained ownership over the others, and the purchaser does not acquire any of the date palms at all.

The following rules apply when a person sells a field to a colleague and tells him that he is selling it to him with the exception of the trees. If it contains only date palms, the seller retains ownership over the date palms. If it contains only vines, the seller retains ownership over the vines. Similar rules apply if it contains only one other type of tree. If the field contains vines and date palms, the seller retains ownership over the vines alone. If it contains other trees and vines, the seller retains ownership over the other trees alone. Similarly, if it contains other trees and date palms, he retains the other trees alone. The rationale is that whoever sells, sells generously, If the seller retains ownership over date palms, he retains ownership over only those date palms that are tall and that one must ascend by means of a rope. The others belong to the purchaser. If he retains ownership over trees, he retains ownership over only those trees that will not be bent over by a yoke. Those that can be bent over by a yoke belong to the purchaser and are considered to be part of the field.

The following rules apply when a person tells a colleague, "I am selling you land and date palms." Even if there are no date palms on the land that he was intending to sell, if he desires to transfer ownership of two other date palms, the transaction is binding. The purchaser does not have the option of saying: "I am purchasing only land that has date palms growing on it." If, however, the seller tells him: "I am selling you land with date palms," the sale is binding only when there are at least two date palms on the land. If not, it is considered a transaction entered into under false premises, and it is nullified. If the seller tells the purchaser: "I am selling you land for date palms," it need not have date palms. This expression indicates merely that the land is fit to grow date palms.

When a person sells an orchard to a colleague, he must write: "Acquire the date palms, the dates and the palm branches." Although the purchaser acquires all of these entities even when they are not explicitly mentioned in the deed of sale, mentioning them makes the wording of the document articulate. Similarly, when a person sells landed property to a colleague, he must write: "I have not retained ownership over anything in this sale," to prevent judgments and claims from arising.

The following rules apply when a person sells a house to a colleague: Even though he writes in the deed of sale: "I have transferred ownership of its depths and its heights," he must write to him: "Acquire from the ground of the earth's depths to the heights of the sky." For the heights and the depths of the property are not transferred when no specification is made. If he said that he was transferring ownership of the heights and the depths, the purchaser would acquire the height - i.e., the atmosphere alone- and the depths, what is under the ground. He does not acquire what is in their midst. When, however, he writes: "From the ground of the earth's depths to the heights of the sky," he acquires a water receptacle and a cistern that are in the midst of the earth and the pathways that are in between the ceiling and the top of the building.

When a person sells a home on the condition that the upper storey remains his, he retains possession of that portion of the building. If he desires to extend projections from it, he has the right. If it falls, he may rebuild it. And if there was a third storey built on top of the second and it fell, if he desires to rebuild it, he may build it as it was before it fell.

Although a person sells his grave, the path to his grave, the place where the funeral procession stands in honor of the departed, or the place where eulogies are recited, the family may come and bury the deceased there or perform any of the other rites against the will of the purchaser. This privilege was granted lest the failure to do so blemish the honor of the family. They must pay the purchaser for the grave in which the deceased was buried. This provision is granted even though it was not stated explicitly in the original deed of sale.

When a person sells an entity that has appurtenances, he is not including the appurtenances in the sale unless that is explicitly stated. What is implied? If a person sold a house, he did not sell the patio around the house, even though it opens to the house. When does the above apply? When the patio is four cubits or more wide. If it is smaller than this, it is considered to be part of the house. Similarly, a loft that is above a house and that opens up to it through an opening in the ceiling of the house is considered to be part of the house.

When a person sells a house, he is not including a room that is located behind the house in the sale. This applies even when it is included in the external borders of the property that the seller draws for the purchaser. Nor does the sale include the roof if it is four cubits wide and possesses a guardrail that is ten handbreadths high. Nor does it include a water receptacle hollowed out in the ground or a cistern that is built within a pit projecting above the ground. This applies even when he sold him the height and the depth of the property, as we have explained above.

The seller must purchase a path from the purchaser in order to gain access to the water receptacle or the cistern that he retained. For when a person sells property, he sells generously. If at the time of the original sale, the seller tells the purchaser: "I am selling you the house with the exception of the water receptacle or the cistern," he does not have to buy a path to the cistern. Similarly, when a person purchases a water receptacle or a cistern alone, the purchaser does not have to purchase a path. Instead, he may enter the seller's house and proceed as far as the cistern and fill his container.

The following rules apply when there are two rooms, one inside the other: If one sold them to two separate people or gave them to two separate people, neither of the recipients has the right to make a path through the other's property. Needless to say, this applies if the original owner gave the external room away and sold the inner one. If, however, he sold the outer room and gave away the inner room, the recipient of the inner room has the right to make a path for himself through the outer room. The rationale is that a person is more generous when he gives than when he sells.

When a person sells a house, he also sells the oven, the range, the door frames that are attached with mortar, the door, the beam, the lock, but not the key. He also sells a mill that is permanently affixed in the ground, but not one that is movable. He sells the wooden base on which a mill is positioned, but not the container into which the flour descends. Nor does he sell the blocks for the feet of a bed, nor the window frames, even though they are affixed with mortar, for they are intended for decoration. When the seller says that he is selling the house and all its contents, all of the above are also sold.

When a person sells a courtyard, he includes in the sale any water reservoirs, vaults or cellars that are located in it, all the outer and inner buildings, the buildings that contain sand and the stores that open to it. The stores that do not open to it, by contrast, are not included in the sale. If stores open both inside and outside the courtyard the following rules apply. If the majority of the activity performed within them is performed within the courtyard, they are included in its sale. If not, they are not included in the sale. Movable property located in the courtyard is not included in the sale. When the seller says that he is selling the courtyard and all its contents, all of the above are also sold. Regardless of what he said, a bathhouse or an olive press located within are not sold.

When a person sells an olive press, he includes in the sale the large stone that is affixed in the ground, upon which the olives are ground, the cedar beams that are used for support when the olives are being ground, the storage reservoirs and the storage containers in which the crushed olives are placed. These are called mafrechot. Not included in the sale is the upper millstone. When the seller says that he is selling the olive press and all its contents, all of the above are also sold. Regardless of what he said, the blocks that are used to press the olives, the apparatus that rotates the stone, the beam, the sacks and the leather sacks used in the press are not sold.

When the seller says: "I am selling you an olive press and all its accessories," all of the above are sold. The following rules apply if there are stores outside the olive press where olives or sesame seeds are spread out. If when the seller drew the external boundaries, he included these, they are all included in the sale. If not, the purchaser acquires only what is inside the building of the press itself.

When a person sells a bathhouse, included in the sale is the plank room where people sit while they are naked, the storehouse for the containers in which water is placed, the room where there are benches in the courtyard of the bathhouse where people sit when they are clothed, and the towel room in which they dry themselves. Not included in the sale are the planks, the water containers, the benches or the towels themselves. When the seller says that he is selling [the bathhouse] and all its contents, all of the above are also sold. Regardless of what he said, he did not include in the sale the pools that provide water for the bathhouse in the summer and in the winter, nor the lumber shed where wood is stored. When the seller says: "I am selling you a bathhouse and all its accessories," all of the above are sold, even though they are located outside [the bathhouse itself.)"

When a person sells a town, included in the sale are the homes, the water reservoirs, vaults, cellars, bathhouses, dovecotes, olive presses, aqueducts in the town and near the town, the woods that surround the town, the fields that are known to be part of the town, the pens for wild animals, fowl and fish that face the town, even though they are distant from it. Not included in the sale is the movable property the town contains. When the seller says that he is selling the town and all its contents, the movable property is also sold. Regardless of what he said, he did not include in the sale fields that are not known to be part of the town, the villages that surround it, the woods that are distant from it, its portion of a sea, its portion of dry land, or the pens for wild animals, fowl and fish that do not face the town.

When a person sells a field, included in the sale are the stones that support the fence and the stones that are placed on the sheaves, for they are necessary elements of the field. Also included in the sale are the planed reeds that are placed under the vines to support them, the grain that is attached to the ground even though the time for its harvest has come, a place where reeds grow that is less than the area necessary to sow a fourth of a se'ah of grain, even though the reeds that grow there are thick and strong, the hut for the watchman which is made with mortar, even though it is not a permanent structure, a carob tree even though other trees have not been grafted upon it, wild fig trees that have not been cut down yet, even though their trunks are thick, and all the date palms it contains. The following articles, by contrast, are not included in the sale: the stones that are not structured to support the fence, and the stones that are not placed on the sheaves, even though they are prepared for these purposes, the reeds in the vineyard that are not placed under the vines even though they have been planed, made flat and prepared for this purpose, and the grain that has been uprooted from the ground even though it still requires the field. When the seller says that he is selling the field and all its contents, these are also sold.

Regardless of what the seller said, he did not include in the sale a place where reeds grow that is the size of an area necessary to sow a fourth of a se'ah of grain - even though the reeds growing in it are thin and small - a small block of spices that has a name of its own - e.g., it is called so and so's rose garden - the hut for the watchman, which is not made with mortar even though it is affixed to the ground, a carob tree upon which other trees have been grafted, and stumps of wild fig trees that have been cut down even though they are thin. Nor is a water reservoir, a grape press or a dovecote - whether complete or destroyed - included in the sale.

The seller must purchase from the purchaser a path in order to proceed to the water reservoir, grape press or dovecote that he retained in the field. If the seller explicitly said: "The field is sold with the exception of these items," he does not have to purchase a path.

When do the above restrictions with regard to what is included in a sale apply? With regard to a seller, for the purchaser should have explicitly stated that these entities are being included in the sale. Since he did not make such a statement, he does not receive them. When, however, a person gives a present, the recipient acquires all the entities mentioned above - whether a field, a house, a courtyard or an olive press - that are being transferred. The general principle is that when a person gives landed property as a present, the recipient acquires everything that is attached to it unless the giver specifies otherwise.

Similarly, when brothers divide an inheritance, and one acquires a field, he acquires all the articles associated with the field. When a person takes possession of the property of a convert who dies, if he takes possession of a field, he acquires all of the above. And when a person consecrates a field, he consecrates all of the above.

Even with regard to a seller and a purchaser, all the above concepts apply with regard to these matters only when there is not a fixed custom or known terms commonly used with regard to every individual article. In a place where it is customary that a person who sells a particular entity includes in the sale other particular entities, those entities are included in the sale even if they are not mentioned explicitly, for we rely on the custom. Similarly, in a place where the term "house" refers to the house alone, or the term "house" refers not only to the house but to all of its surroundings and everything that is upon it, we follow the meaning common in that locale. Similarly, when a person sells a courtyard, a field, a town or movable property, with regard to everything we follow the meaning of the terms that are used by all the local people.

This is a fundamental principle: With regard to all matters of commerce and trade, we follow the commonly accepted meanings of the terms used by people of that place, and the local business customs. When, however, there are no local business customs or commonly accepted meanings of terms, and instead, one person will have this intent and another, another intent, we follow the guidelines explained by the Sages in these chapters.

When a person sells a ship, included in the sale are the mast, the sail, its anchors, the ropes used to steer it, the ramp and the ladder with which one ascends to the ship and descends to its lower deck, and the reservoir of drinking water it contains. Not included in the sail is the beitzit - the small boat in which one sails to land, the dugit - the small boat with which the sailors fish - the servants who work on the ship, or the sacks and the merchandise that it contains. When the seller tells the purchaser: "I am selling you a ship and everything it contains, they are all included in the sale.

When a person sells a carriage, he has not sold the mules if they are not attached to it. If he sells the mules, he has not sold the carriage. If a person sells a yoke, he does not sell the oxen. If he sells the oxen, he does not sell the yoke. This applies even in a place where, when some people say "oxen," they are referring to a yoked team.

When a person sells a single yoke, he also sells the cow. When he sells a cow, he does not sell its yoke. When he sells a wagon, he sells the oxen. When he sells oxen, he has not sold the wagon. In all these matters and the like, the price of the article is no proof of the seller's intent.

When a person sells a donkey, included in the sale are the saddlecloth and the saddle, even though they are not on the donkey. The saddle-bags and a riding seat for women are not included in the sale, even if they are on the donkey at the time of the sale.

The price paid for an article is not considered to be proof of the seller's intent. If the purchaser erred with regard to a sum that one might ordinarily err, the laws of ona'ah are applied, or the transaction is nullified, as is the law with regard to any seller and purchaser. If, however, the error is inordinately greater than one would make, the transaction is not nullified. We assume that the extra money is a present that the purchaser gave the seller, and the purchaser receives merely a donkey without its saddlebags. The same applies in all analogous situations: We do not bring proof of the seller's intent from the price.

When a person sells a maid-servant, included in the sale are all the garments she is wearing, even if there are one hundred. Nevertheless, jewelry - e.g., a bracelet, a nose ring, a finger ring or a choker worn around the neck - are not included in the sale. If the seller says: "I am selling you a maid-servant and everything that is upon her," even if she is wearing articles that are worth 100 maneh, they are all included in the sale.

If a person tells a colleague, "I am selling you a pregnant maid-servant," or "I am selling you a pregnant cow," the fetus is sold together with the mother. If a person tells a colleague, "I am selling you a nursing maid-servant," or "I am selling you a nursing cow," the infant or the calf is not included in the sale. If a person tells a colleague, "I am selling you a nursing donkey, the donkey colt is included in the sale, because no one ever sells a donkey for its milk.

If a person tells a colleague, "I am selling you the head of this servant," or "... of this donkey," half of the animal is included in the sale. Similar laws apply with regard to any organ on which the life of the animal depends. If the seller tells the purchaser: "The hand of this servant..." or "the forearm of this donkey is sold to you," an evaluation is made between them. Similar laws apply with regard to any organ on which the life of the animal does not depend. If he tells him: "I am selling you the head of this cow," only the head is included in the sale, for the head of a cow is always being sold in butcher shops.

When a person sells the head of a large animal, the feet are not included in the sale. If he sells the feet, the head is not sold. If he sells the windpipe, the liver is not sold. If he sells the liver, the windpipe is not sold. With regard to a small animal, however, different laws apply. When a person sells the head, the feet are included in the sale. If he sells the feet, the head is not sold. If he sells the windpipe, the liver is sold. If he sells the liver, the windpipe is not sold.

When a person sells a water reservoir, the water is not included in the sale. When he sells a garbage dump, the garbage is included in the sale. When he sells a beehive, the bees are included in the sale. When he sells a dovecote, the doves are included in the sale.

Do not let the fundamental principles governing these matters escape your eyes. These are the accepted local customs, and the commonly accepted meaning of terms for every particular entity. In a place where there is no local custom defined, and a term does not have a specific meaning that excludes a more encompassing conception, we follow these principles that were explained by our Sages, as stated previously.

The following rules apply when a person tells a colleague: "I am selling you a parcel of earth fit to sow a kor." If the land contains small hollows that are ten handbreadths deep even if they do not contain water, or rocks that are ten handbreadths high, they are not included in the above measure.The rationale is that a person does not want to pay money for one parcel of land and have it appear as two or three parcels. The purchaser acquires these rocks and hollows as part of the parcel of land fit to sow a kor without paying for them. If the hollows or the rocks are smaller than ten handbreadths, they are measured together with the remainder of the field.

When does the above apply? When together, the area of all the rocks and the hollows was no more than the area necessary to sow four kabbim and was contained within an area where at least five kabbim could be sown, and was contained within the majority of the field. If the area of the rocks and the hollows is more than the area necessary to sow four kabbim that area is very spread out, or it is contained within a lesser area than one in which five kabbim could be sown, they are not included in the measure of the field, even if they are not ten handbreadths high or deep. All the following situations are questions left unresolved by the Talmud: The majority of the area necessary to sow four kabbim is contained in a small portion of the field, a small portion of the area necessary to sow four kabbim is contained in the majority of the field, the rocks are in a straight line, in a circle, in a triangle, they are in the shape of a star, or in a jagged line. In all these instances, because of the doubt involved, we follow the principle: One who desires to expropriate money from a colleague must prove his contention.Similarly, if there is earth on top and a rock beneath it, or a rock on top and earth beneath it, there is an unresolved doubt among our Sages, and the above principle is followed.

If there is one large rock, even if it is only as large as the area necessary to sow a quarter of a kav, it is not included in the measurement. If a rock is next to the border of a field, even if it is very small, it is not included in the measurement. If there is some earth between the rock and the boundary, there is an unresolved doubt among our Sages.

When the seller tells the purchaser: "I am selling you a parcel of earth like the area fit to sow a kor" different rules apply. Even if it has hollows that are ten or more handbreadths deep or stones that are ten or more handbreadths high, they are included in its measure.

When a person tells a colleague: "I am selling you a parcel of earth fit to sow a kor, as measured with a rope" the measurement must be exact. If the land is even slightly smaller, the purchaser may reduce the payment proportionally. If it is even slightly larger, the extra amount should be returned to the seller.

When the seller tells the purchaser: "I am selling you a parcel of earth fit to sow a kor," it is as if he said "approximately a parcel of earth fit to sow a kor, perhaps more, perhaps less." The following laws apply. If the measure was one twenty-fourth less - i.e., a fourth of a kav, for each parcel of earth fit to sow a se'ah, it is considered to be within the terms of the original agreement. If the deviation is larger than that, he should calculate the amount due for all the parcels of land fit to sow a fourth of a kav that are either lacking or additional. He should deduct from the price for the entire amount that is less than the parcel of earth necessary to sow a kor or make restitution to the seller for everything that is more than that amount.

How should restitution be made to the seller? If the additional amount is less than an area fit to sow nine kabbim, the purchaser should return to the seller the percentage of the price paid at the time of the sale. This is done to strengthen the position of the seller. If the extra portion of land is located next to another field belonging to the seller, the purchaser should return the land itself. For the seller can include it with his other fields and will not suffer any loss. If the additional amount is more than an area fit to sow nine kabbim, the purchaser should return to the seller a fourth of a kav for each parcel of earth fit to sow a se'ah. If the remainder besides these fourths of-a-kav parcels is an area fit to sow nine kabbim, the purchaser should give the seller these fourths of-a-kav parcels and the additional land. If the seller does not desire the land, the purchaser has the option of paying the seller according to the price at the time of purchase.

When does the above apply? When the land was inexpensive at the time of the sale and rose in value at the time when restitution is being made. If, however, the land was expensive and decreased in value, we tell the purchaser: "If you desire, pay him for the entire additional amount, giving him the price at the time of the sale. If you desire to give him land, give it to him according to its present value."

The same laws that apply to an area fit to sow nine kabbim in a field apply to an area fit to sow half a kav in a garden. If there is less than half a kav in addition to the fourths of a kav for each parcel of earth fit to sow a se'ah, the purchaser is required only to return money. If there is an additional half kav, the purchaser should pay him for all the additional fourths and the extra amount or return the land to him even if its price decreased at the time it is being returned.

When a person sells a field and it becomes a garden while in the possession of the purchaser, or he sells a garden and it becomes a field while in the possession of the purchaser, there is a doubt whether the laws are determined according to its state at the time of the sale or its immediate state.

When a person tells a colleague: "I am selling you a parcel of earth fit to sow a kor, as measured with a rope, perhaps more, perhaps less," or if he says: "I am selling you a parcel of earth fit to sow a kor, perhaps more, perhaps less, as measured with a rope," one should follow the less committing of the implications. The purchaser does not receive more according to the principle: "When a person desires to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is on him," whether the seller's statements imply more or less.

When a person sells a colleague a parcel of land fit to sow a kor and states signs and boundaries for it that are a sixth less or a sixth more than the area fit to sow a kor, the sale is binding. If it is less than that amount by more than a sixth, the seller must subtract from the sum the purchaser pays. If the field was more than a sixth larger, the purchaser should give him either money or land as appropriate for the extra amount. If the extra amount was less than an area fit to sow nine kabbim in a field, or less than an area fit to sow half a kav in a garden and it was not located next to a field belonging to the seller, the purchaser should return the appropriate amount of money.

The following rule applies when a person sells to a colleague a field with which the colleague is familiar and knows its boundaries. Even if he tells him that its measurement is 200, and in truth it is only 150 the sale is binding. For he knew the field and accepted it. By saying its measure is 200, he was stressing its importance. It is as if he had said: "It is as valuable as a field that is 200 in measure."

When a person tells a colleague: "I am selling you this and this parcel of land fit to sow a kor" even though when measured, it is fit to sow only a letech, the sale is binding. For he sold him a place that was called "fit to sow a kor." For this reason, the seller must bring proof that the parcel of land is called "fit to sow a kor." Similarly, if a person tells a colleague: "I am selling you my vineyard in this and this place," even if there are no vines on the land, the sale is binding, provided the place is described as a vineyard. Similarly, if a person tells a colleague: "I am selling you this orchard," even if there are no pomegranates on the land, the sale is binding, provided the place is described as an orchard. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.

All the above rules apply only in a place where there is no prevailing local custom, as we have explained. When, by contrast, there is a prevailing local custom, that custom should be followed. Similarly, we follow the implied meanings of the expressions used by the majority of the local people.

There are three types of individuals whose purchase is not considered a binding purchase, nor is their sale considered a binding sale according to Scriptural Law: a deaf mute, a mentally incapable or emotionally unstable individual, and a minor. Our Sages, however, ordained that a deaf mute and a minor may buy and sell in order to guarantee their livelihood.

How does a deaf person buy and sell? Both a deaf mute and a deaf person who can speak may buy and sell through gestures. This applies with regard to movable property, but not with regard to landed property. Moreover, even with regard to movable property, his deeds are not binding until he has been tested many times and the matter is considered thoroughly by the court.

Different rules apply with regard to a mute who can hear but cannot speak, or someone who has lost the ability to speak. Both sales and purchases in which he engages are binding, as are the presents which he gives, whether movable property or landed property is involved, provided he is tested as one tests with regard to a bill of a divorce, or he writes instructions by hand.

Neither a sale nor a purchase involving a mentally incapable or emotionally unstable individual is binding, nor are the presents he gives effective. Instead, the court must appoint a guardian for such a person, just as it appoints guardians for minors.

The following rules apply when a person is at times unable to control his behavior and capable of doing so at other times - e.g., an epileptic. During the times he is capable of controlling his behavior, all of his financial undertakings are binding. He can acquire property for himself and for others like any other ordinary person. When he is not in control, his deeds are not binding. Witnesses to a transaction must research the matter carefully - perhaps the transaction was concluded at the conclusion of a period of mental instability, or when an unstable period began.

The following rules apply to a minor: Until he is six years old, he may not transfer property to others at all. From the age of six until he attains majority, he should be tested. If he possesses an understanding of the nature of financial transactions, any purchases or sales he undertakes, and any presents he gives, are binding. This applies whether a large matter or a small matter is involved, whether he is giving a present while healthy or he is dispensing his property on his deathbed. As we have explained, this is a Rabbinic decree, instituted so that the minor will not be forced to remain idle, without finding anyone to sell to him or buy from him. And this applies only with regard to movable property. With regard to landed property, a minor cannot sell or give property away until he attains majority.

When does the above apply? With regard to a minor who does not have a guardian. If, however, the minor has a guardian, his transactions, even those involving movable property, are of no consequence unless they are approved by the guardian. If the guardian does desire to approve a purchase, a sale or a present of movable property, it is binding.

We test a minor to see whether or not he possesses an understanding of the nature of financial transactions. For there are some minors who are wise and astute and understand such matters even at age seven, and there are others who do not understand financial transactions even when they reach the age of thirteen. When a minor who does not have a guardian and who possesses a good understanding of financial matters errs with regard to the appraisal of an object, the same laws that apply to an adult apply to him. If the error is less than a sixth of the value of the object, he is considered to have waived the difference. If it is a sixth, the unfair gain must be returned, and if it is more than a sixth, the transaction is nullified, as we have explained. I maintain that a purchase or a sale of movable property in which a minor engages is not binding unless the transaction is concluded by meshichah. If, however, a minor paid money for an article and then reneged, the transaction is nullified.The minor is not required to receive the adjuration mi shepara. If, however, others renege on their commitment to him, they are required to receive the adjuration mi shepara.

Similarly, if a kinyan sudar was made with a minor or the purchaser rents the place on which the movable property was located, and the minor retracted, the purchaser does not acquire the movable property.For property cannot be expropriated from a minor through legal process. And a kinyan established by a minor is of no consequence. For a kinyan depends on a legal document, and witnesses will not sign a legal document unless the parties involved are above the age of majority.

Similarly, if a minor purchased movable property and sought to finalize the transaction with a kinyan sudar or by renting the place where the movable property was located, he does not acquire the movable property until he performs meshichah. The rationale is that he cannot acquire property using any of the legal processes that are used by an adult. Proof of this thesis can be drawn from the fact that a male minor does not acquire by virtue of the presence of property in his courtyard, nor by virtue of the presence of property within the radius of four cubits next to him. The rationale is that these are effective with regard to the acquisition of property, because of the principle of agency, not as an extension of his physical person, as will be explained. It is improper that a kinyan sudar and the rental of the place where property is located should be more effective than the acquisition of property by virtue of its presence in one's courtyard. Different rules apply with regard to a female minor. She is given the right to acquire property by virtue of its presence in her courtyard, as an extension of her physical person. Therefore, she may finalize the acquisition of movable property with a kinyan sudar or by renting the place where the movable property was located.

It appears to me that when a minor acquires landed property, pays its price, and manifests possession over the property, it should remain in his possession, despite the fact that he cannot sell property. The rationale is that it is as if the minor were not in our presence. And we follow the principle: we may acquire a benefit for a person outside his presence, but we cannot cause a loss for a person outside his presence.

When a minor attains majority - i.e., a male over thirteen years old and a female over twelve, when they manifest signs of physical maturity - any purchase, sale or present of movable property that he or she undertakes is binding. This applies even if he or she does not possess an understanding of the nature of financial transactions. With regard to landed property, by contrast, his deeds are not effective unless he is past majority and possesses an understanding of the nature of financial transactions.

When does the above apply? With regard to his own property. With regard to landed property that he inherited from his parents or from other deceased persons, his sale of this land is not effective until he is twenty years old. This applies even though he has manifested signs of physical maturity and possesses an understanding of the nature of financial transactions. This restriction was applied lest the youth sell the land cheaply, because he is attracted by money, and he has not become settled within ordinary worldly ways.

When a youth below the age of twenty gives a present of landed property - whether he gives it while healthy or as part of the distribution of his property in an oral will - it is binding. The rationale is that unless he received significant benefit, he would not have given it. Moreover, this is a rare occurrence. Our Sages said: "Let his present endure, so that his words will be heeded."

When does the license for a youth to sell property inherited from his father after he reaches twenty apply? When he has manifested signs of physical maturity or manifested signs of being sterile. If, however, he did not manifest signs of physical maturity or sterility, he is still considered a minor, and a sale of landed property that he makes is not binding - even with regard to property that he acquires himself - until he reaches the age of 35.

The following rule applies when a youth sells landed property - that he either purchased or inherited - and then dies, and his heirs maintain that he was a minor at the time of the sale. If they seek to have an examination made, we do not heed their desire to debase his remains. Moreover, it is questionable whether the examination would be of any value, because the appearance of these physical signs changes at the time of death. A further rationale to accept the validity of the sale is that we accept the presumption that witnesses would not sign a deed of sale unless they knew with certainty that the seller had attained majority.

When a youth who is below the age of twenty sells property that he inherited, he may expropriate it from the purchaser, whether before the age of twenty or after the age of twenty. When he expropriates the property, he may also expropriate the value of all the produce of the property that the purchaser has consumed. If the purchaser undertook expenses or planted or sowed, we evaluate the amount due him, but he must return the remainder. This is the way my masters have ruled. I maintain that even if a minor sells property that he inherited, if he does not protest immediately after he becomes twenty, he is no longer able to protest. The rationale is that since the seller took the money, and the purchaser used the land with his consent after he attained the age of twenty without his protest, the acquisition of the property by the purchaser is confirmed, because the seller showed his appreciation of his sale.

A drunken man is considered to be responsible for his actions. A sale, a purchase or a present involving him is binding. If, however, his drunken state approaches that of Lot- i.e., he is so drunk that he does not realize what he is doing - his deeds are of no consequence. It is as if he were a mentally incompetent person or a child below the age of six.

When a person sells landed property or movable property to a colleague and someone acquires the property on the purchaser's behalf without the purchaser's knowledge, the option is given to the purchaser. If the purchaser desires to acquire the property, the seller cannot retract. If the purchaser does not desire to acquire the property, the property returns to its original owner. Therefore, a deed of sale can be written for a seller even when the purchaser is not present. The purchaser, however, is always required to pay the scribe's fee. This applies even if a person sells his field because it is of inferior quality.

Similarly, when a Canaanite servant buys or sells property, or whether he gives a present or a present is given to him, the option is given to the servant's owner. If he desires to perpetuate the servant's act, the servant's acts are binding. If the master does not grant his consent, the servant's acts are nullified entirely. The master may perpetuate or nullify the servant's act with merely a verbal statement. It is not necessary that he confirm his decision with a kinyan.

Similarly, when a woman sells or gives a present - whether of property belonging to her husband, property defined as nichsei tzon barzel that she brought him, property that he designated for her in her marriage contract, or property defined as nichsei m'log, whether landed property or movable property - the option is given to her husband. This ruling also applies if she purchases property or if she is given a present. If her husband desires to perpetuate the transfer, it is binding. If he desires to nullify it, it is nullified entirely. Different rules apply when a husband sells or gives away property to which his wife shares a connection - e.g., land that she brought to him that was recorded in her marriage contract, land that he designated for her in consideration of goods she brought to the marriage, or property that he designated for her in her marriage contract. Even though the purchaser has the woman confirm her husband's deeds with a kinyan, whatever he has done is nullified, because she may rationalize her actions, stating: "I did it only to generate satisfaction for my husband."

If the husband sold or gave as a present nichsei m'log, whether landed property or movable property, the option is granted the woman. If she desires to nullify the sale, she may. If, however she confirms her husband's actions, the purchaser acquires the property.

The following rule applies when a husband sells movable property that is classified to be nichsei tzon barzel or movable property that he gave his wife from his own property. Although he does not have the right to do so, if he transgresses and sells or gives away such property, it is acquired by the purchasers, and his wife may not expropriate it from them. Similarly, the husband has the right to sell all of his property, even though it is under lien to his wife's marriage contract. If she is later granted the right to expropriate the property, she will expropriate it. This applies unless she first wrote a disclaimer for the purchaser, and confirmed it with a kinyan.

When a woman sells or gives nichsei tzon barzel to her husband, he does not acquire the property. Instead, she may expropriate it from him, as explained in Hilchot Ishut. When a court sells or purchases property on behalf of orphans - whether landed property or movable property - both the purchase and sale are binding. If, however, it gives the orphans' property away as a present, the gift is of no consequence. The rationale is that a person may not give away something that does not belong to him. The same principles apply with regard to an orphan's guardian, whether a guardian appointed by the court or one appointed by the orphan's father before his death.

When a person sells or gives away property on the Sabbath - and needless to say, on the holidays - although he is punished by stripes, his deeds are binding. Similarly, when a person enters into a kinyan chalifin on the Sabbath, the kinyan is binding. After the Sabbath, a legal record may be composed and the property transferred.