Murderer and the Preservation of Life

Whenever a person kills a human being, he transgresses a negative commandment, as Exodus 20:13 states: "Do not murder." If a person kills a Jew intentionally in the presence of witnesses, he should be executed by decapitation. This is implied by Exodus 21:20, which states that when a person kills a servant, "vengeance will certainly be executed." The Oral Tradition explains that this refers to decapitation. Whether he kills the victim with an iron weapon or burns him with fire, the murderer should be executed by decapitation.

It is a mitzvah for the blood redeemer to kill the murderer, as Numbers 35:19 states: "The blood redeemer shall put the murderer to death." Whoever is fit to inherit the victim's estate becomes the redeemer of his blood. If the blood redeemer did not desire - or was unable - to kill the murderer, or if the victim did not have a relative to redeem his blood, the court executes the murderer by decapitation.

The following rules apply if a father kills his son. If the victim has a son, this son should kill his grandfather, because he is the blood redeemer. If he does not have a son, none of the victim's brothers becomes the blood redeemer who must kill his father. Instead, he should be executed by the court. Both a male and a female may become blood redeemers.

The court is enjoined not to accept ransom from the murderer to save him from execution. Even if he gave all the money in the world, and even if the blood redeemer was willing to forgive him he should be executed. The rationale is that the soul of the victim is not the property of the blood redeemer, but the property of the Holy One, blessed be He. And He commanded, Numbers 35:31: "Do not accept ransom for the soul of a murderer." There is nothing that the Torah warned so strongly against as murder, as Ibid.:33 states: "Do not pollute the land in which you live, for blood will pollute the land."

When a murderer kills willfully, he should not be killed by witnesses or observers until he is brought to court and sentenced to death, as implied by Numbers 35:12 "A murderer should not be put to death until he stands before the congregation in judgment." This law applies to all those liable for execution by the court, who transgressed and performed the forbidden act. They should not be executed until their trial is completed by the court.

When does the above apply? When the person has already transgressed and performed the transgression for which he is liable to be executed by the court. When, however, a person is pursuing a colleague with the intention of killing him - even if the pursuer is a minor - every Jewish person is commanded to attempt to save the person being pursued, even if it is necessary to kill the pursuer.

What is implied? If the rodef was warned and continues to pursue his intended victim, even though he did not acknowledge the warning, since he continues his pursuit he should be killed. If it is possible to save the pursued by damaging one of the limbs of the rodef, one should. Thus, if one can strike him with an arrow, a stone or a sword, and cut off his hand, break his leg, blind him or in another way prevent him from achieving his objective, one should do so. If there is no way to be precise in one's aim and save the person being pursued without killing the rodef, one should kill him, even though he has not yet killed his victim. This is implied by Deuteronomy 25:11-12, which states: "If a man is fighting with his brother, and the wife of one... grabs the attacker by his private parts, you must cut off her hand; you may not show pity."

There is no difference whether she grabs "his private parts" or any other organ that imperils his life. Similarly, the rodef may be a man or a woman. The intent of the verse is that whenever a person intends to strike a colleague with a blow that could kill him, the pursued should be saved by "cutting off the hand" of the rodef. If this cannot be done, the victim should be saved by taking the rodef's life, as the verse continues: "you may not show pity."

This, indeed, is one of the negative mitzvot - not to take pity on the life of a rodef. On this basis, our Sages ruled that when complications arise and a pregnant woman cannot give birth, it is permitted to abort the fetus in her womb, whether with a knife or with drugs. For the fetus is considered a rodef of its mother. If the head of the fetus emerges, it should not be touched, because one life should not be sacrificed for another. Although the mother may die, this is the nature of the world.

The laws of a rodef apply whether a person is pursuing a colleague with the intent of killing him, or a maiden that had been consecrated with the intent of raping her, as reflected by Deuteronomy 22:26, which establishes an equation between murder and rape, stating: "Just as when a man arises against his colleague and kills him, so too, is this matter i.e., the rape of a consecrated maiden." The same principle is reflected by another verse within the passage, which states (Ibid.:27): "The consecrated maiden cried out, but there was no one to save her." Implied is that if there is someone who can save her, he must do so, using all means including taking the life of the pursuer.

The same laws apply with regard to any woman forbidden as an ervah, but not to relations with an animal. With regard to homosexual rape, by contrast, one may save a man from being raped by killing the intended rapist. If one pursues an animal with the intent of sodomizing it, or one seeks to perform a forbidden labor on the Sabbath or to worship idols - although the Sabbath and the prohibition against idol worship are fundamental elements of our faith - the person should not be killed until he commits the transgression and is brought to court, convicted and executed.

If a person pursued a woman forbidden as an ervah, took hold of her and inserted the head of his organ within her,he may not be slain, even though he has not concluded sexual relations. He must be brought to court. If a man was pursuing a woman forbidden as an ervah, and other men were pursuing him to save her, and she tells them, "Let him be, so that he does not kill me," they should not listen to her.Instead, he should be intimidated and prevented from raping her, by maiming his limbs. If he cannot be prevented by maiming his limbs, his life may be taken, as explained above.

Whosoever can save [a pursued victim] by [injuring one] of the limbs [of the pursuer] and he did not bother with [limiting himself to only doing] that [measure], rather he saved [the victim] with the life of the pursuer [i.e.] he killed [the pursuer], this [vigilante] is a spiller of blood [i.e. a murderer] and is liable to death, though a [human] court does not execute him [for this crime].

Whenever a person can save another person's life, but he fails to do so, he transgresses a negative commandment, as Leviticus 19:16 states: "Do not stand idly by while your brother's blood is at stake." Similarly, this commandment applies when a person sees a colleague drowning at sea or being attacked by robbers or a wild animal, and he can save him himself or can hire others to save him. Similarly, it applies when he hears gentiles or mosrim conspiring to harm a colleague or planning a snare for him, and he does not inform him and notify him of the danger. And it applies when a person knows of a gentile or a man of force who has a complaint against a colleague, and he can appease the aggressor on behalf of his colleague, but he fails to do so. And similarly, in all analogous instances, a person who fails to act transgresses the commandment: "Do not stand idly by while your brother's blood is at stake."

When a person sees a rodef pursuing a colleague to kill him, or a woman forbidden as an ervah to rape her, and he has the potential to save the victim and yet fails to do so, he has negated the observance of the positive commandment: "You must cut off her hand," and has transgressed two negative commandments: "You may not show pity," and "Do not stand idly by while your brother's blood is at stake."

Even though lashes are not given as punishment for the transgression of these prohibitions - because they do not involve committing a forbidden deed - they are nevertheless very severe. For whoever causes the loss of a Jewish soul is considered as if he destroyed the entire world, and whoever saves a Jewish soul is considered as if he saved the entire world.

Whenever a person kills a colleague with his hands - e.g., he strikes him with a sword or with a stone that can cause death, strangles him until he dies or burns him in fire - he should be executed by the court, for he himself has killed him.

But a person who hires a murderer to kill a colleague, one who sends his servants and they kill him, one who binds a colleague and leaves him before a lion or the like and the beast kills him, and a person who commits suicide are all considered to be shedders of blood; the sin of bloodshed is upon their hands, and they are liable for death at the hands of G-d. They are not, however, liable for execution by the court.

Which source indicates that this is the law? Genesis 9:6 states: "When a person sheds the blood of a man, by a man his blood shall be shed." This refers to a person who kills a colleague by himself, without employing an agent. The verse continues: "Of the blood of your own lives I will demand an account." This refers to a person who commits suicide.6 "From the hand of every wild beast will I demand an account" Ibid. 9:5 This refers to a person who places a person before a wild beast so that he will devour him. "From the hand of a man, from the hand of one's brother, will I demand an account for the soul of a man" ibid.. This refers to a person who hires others to kill a colleague. In all of the three last instances, the verse uses the expression "will I demand an account," indicating that their judgment is in heaven's hands.

When a Jewish king desires to slay any of these murderers and the like - who are not liable for execution by the court - by virtue of his regal authority, in order to perfect society, he has the license. Similarly, if the court desires to execute them as a result of a immediate fiat, because this was required at the time, they have the license to do as they see fit.

If the king did not execute them, nor did the court deem the time as such to require strengthening the strictures against murder, it should nevertheless have the murderer beaten with severe blows - so that he is on the verge of death - and imprisoned, deprived and afflicted with all types of discomfort in order to strike fear and awe into the hearts of other wicked men, so that this death should not be a stumbling block and a snag for them, causing them to say: "Let me arrange to have my enemies killed the way so-and-so did, and I will not suffer the consequences."

Whether a person kills an adult or an infant that is one day old, a male or a female, he should be executed if he killed him intentionally, or exiled if he killed him unintentionally. With regard to an infant, the above applies provided it was born after a full term pregnancy. If, however, it was born before nine months passed, it is considered to be an inviable birth until it lives for 30 days. If it is killed within those 30 days, the killer should not be executed.

Whether a person kills a healthy person, a sick person who is on the verge of dying, or even a person in his actual death throes, the killer should be executed. If, however, one kills a person in his death throes because of wounds inflicted upon him by others - i.e., he was stricken until he was on the verge of death, and he is in his death throes, the killer should not be executed by the court.

When, by contrast, a person is considered trefah,even though he eats, drinks and walks in the market place, one is not held liable by an earthly court for killing him. Every person is presumed to be physically sound, and a person who kills him should be executed unless it is certainly known that he is a trefah, and the physicians say that his infirmity does not have any remedy for humans and it will surely cause his death, if no other factor does first.

When a person who is a trefah kills another man, he should be killed, as reflected by Deuteronomy 19:19, which states: "And you shall destroy the evil from among your midst." When does this apply? When he committed the murder in the presence of a court. If, however, he committed the murder in the presence of witnesses, he is not liable. The rationale is that the witnesses may be disqualified through hazamah. And if they are disqualified through hazamah, they will not be punished by execution, for they intended merely to have a person who was trefah executed. And whenever the laws of hazamah cannot be applied to testimony, it is not considered to be valid testimony in capital cases.

If a person kills either a Jew or a Canaanite servant, he should be executed. If he kills inadvertently, he should be exiled.

At first, a person who killed a resident alien should not be executed by the court, as implied by Exodus 21:14, which introduces the laws regarding the punishment for murder, by stating: "When a man acts intentionally against his colleague, killing him...." Needless to say, this ruling applies with regard to a gentile. Whether a person kills his own Canaanite servant or a servant belonging to someone else, he should be executed. For a servant has accepted the yoke of mitzvot and has been added to "the heritage of G-d."

What is the difference between killing one's own Canaanite servant and a servant belonging to someone else? With regard to one's own servant, one has the right to strike him. Thus, if one strikes him with a blow that is sufficient to cause death, and he is on the verge of dying, but survives for 24 hours and dies afterwards, the owner should not be executed, although the servant died because of the blow, as Exodus 21:21 states: "But if he survives for a day or two, he shall not be avenged, for he is his property." What is the intent of the phrase "for a day or two"? A day that is like two days - i.e., a full 24-hour cycle.

Different rules apply when, by contrast, one strikes a Canaanite servant who belongs to another person. If one strikes him with a blow sufficient to kill, one may be executed for killing him, as one would be executed for killing any free Jew, even if he does not die because of the blow until several days have passed.

It appears to me that when a person strikes his servant with a knife, a sword, a stone, a fist or the like, and it was assessed that he would die, and he did die, the leniency granted if the servant survives more than 24 hours does not apply. Instead, even if the servant dies a year later, the owner should be executed because of the servant's death. To underscore this point, Exodus 21:20 mentions striking the servant "with a rod." For the Torah has granted the owner permission to beat his servant only with a rod, a staff, a strap or the like, and he may not strike him with murderous blows.

The following rules apply when a person sells his servant and stipulates that the servant must continue to serve him for 30 days - and in those 30 days, either the seller or the purchaser strikes the servant - the leniency granted if the servant survives more than 24 hours does not apply, neither to the seller nor to the purchaser, and the killer should be executed. The rationale is that the servant no longer is the personal "property" of the seller, nor has he entered the domain of the purchaser.

Similarly, if a person is half servant and half free,or there is a servant belonging to two partners, and the owner or one of the owners strikes and kills the servant, the leniency granted if the servant survives more than 24 hours does not apply. For in these cases, there is not an owner who owns the servant as his personal "property." Therefore, the owner should be executed, as would any other person.

The following rule applies when a person strikes a colleague intentionally with a stone or a piece of wood and causes his death. We assess the object with which he was struck, and the place where he was struck, and determine whether or not it is likely that such an article would cause death when used to give a blow in such a place. This is implied by Numbers 35:17-18, which states: "If he struck him with a fist-sized stone that could cause death... or if he struck him with a fist-sized wooden article that could cause death." "That could cause death" teaches that the murder weapon must be such that would likely cause him to die. Striking a person on his heart cannot be compared to striking him on his thigh.

Since the verse states "That could cause death," this phrase also implies that we assess the place where the victim was struck. Just as we assess the object with which he was struck, and the place where he was struck, we also assess the force of the blow. This is implied by the phrase (Ibid.): "a fist-sized stone," from which we infer that we evaluate the force of the hand. For one cannot compare a person who throws a stone at his colleague from a distance of two cubits to one who throws a stone from a distance of ten cubits. At ten cubits, the stone will have more force. Nor can one compare a person who throws a stone at his colleague from a distance of ten cubits to one who throws a stone from a distance of 100 cubits. For over an extended distance, the force of the blow will be diminished.

Similarly, the blow itself and the power of the killer and the victim should be assessed: Is he large or small? Is he strong or weak? Is he healthy or sickly? These and all similar questions should be investigated. This is all implied by the phrase: "That could cause death." It teaches that all the factors involved in the person's death should be assessed.

The Torah did not mention a minimum size with regard to an iron object, as Numbers 35:16 states: "If he struck him with an iron utensil and he dies, he is a murderer." This applies even to a needle, provided the object is pointed like a needle, a spit, a knife or the like. If, however, a person strikes a colleague with a hunk of metal or the like, we evaluate the blow as we would evaluate it if it had been dealt with a piece of wood or a stone.

When a person strikes a colleague without an object and kills him - e.g., he strikes him with his hand or foot or butts him with his head and kills him - we should assess the force of the blow, the strength of the victim and the place where the blow was given. One cannot compare a person poking at a colleague with his finger to one who kicks his colleague with all his strength. Nor can one compare a blow given on the heart to a blow given in the groin. Nor can one compare a weak person who strikes a healthy, strong person to a healthy, strong person who strikes a weak or sickly person.

What is the source that teaches that an assessment must be made in such an instance? Numbers 35:21 states: "Or if he maliciously strikes him with his hand and he dies, the one who strikes him shall certainly die." Although it mentions "with his hand," the verse also states that the blow must be given "maliciously." Implied is that we assess the force of the blow.

Similarly, when a person pushes a colleague from a rooftop, causing him to fall and die, we assess the height of the place from which he pushed him and the strength of the person who was pushed. For an infant who fell cannot be compared to an adult who fell. What is the source that teaches that we must assess the height from which the victim fell? Numbers 35:20 states: "If he pushes him down with hatred." It appears to me that any place that is not more than ten handbreadths high is not considered of sufficient height to kill, as explained with regard to an animal that fell into a cistern.

The same laws apply if a person strikes a colleague with a stone, a block of wood, a clod of earth, a block of salt or sulfur, or a basket full of dust or pebbles, or even if he strikes him with a cake of dried figs. This is implied by the phrase "That could cause death" - i.e., anything that may cause death. And it is the weight of the object that makes it fit to cause death.

When a person pushes a colleague into water or into a fire, an assessment should be made. If the person could ascend, the one who pushed him is not liable for execution. If he could not ascend, the one who pushed him is liable. Similarly, if one held a colleague in water or in fire until he did not have any strength to ascend, and the colleague died, the one who held him is liable, even if he did not push him there at the outset. Similarly, a person is liable for execution in all of the following instances: he held his hand over a colleague's mouth and nose until he left him in his death throes, unable to live; he bound a colleague and left him in the sun or the cold until he died; he built an airtight construction over him that prevented air from coming in; he placed a colleague in a house or a cave and filled it with smoke until he died; or he placed a colleague in an airtight marble building and lit a candle, causing the colleague to die because of the lack of air. In all of these instances, the person who caused the victim's death is executed; it is as if he had strangled him by hand.

Different rules apply, however, in the following instances: A person binds a colleague and leaves him to starve to death; he binds him and leaves him in a place that will ultimately cause him to be subjected to cold or heat, and these influences indeed come and kill the victim; he covers him with a barrel; he uncovers the roof of the building where he was staying; or he causes a snake to bite him. Needless to say, a distinction is made if a colleague dispatches a dog or a snake at a colleague. In all the above instances, the person is not executed. He is, nevertheless, considered to be a murderer, and "the One who seeks vengeance for bloodshed" will seek vengeance for the blood he shed.

Similarly execution is not required in the following instances. A person pushed his colleague into a cistern and there was a ladder that he could have used to climb out, or he shot an arrow at him, but he was holding a shield with which he could protect himself - and another person came and took away the ladder or the shield. Neither of the two is executed by the court. Moreover, even if the person who pushed the victim is himself the one who takes away the ladder, he is not liable for execution. G-d will, however, seek him out and avenge the bloodshed.

When a person throws a stone against a wall, and the stone rebounds and kills a person, the thrower of the stone is liable for execution by the court. For it was propelled by the power of the person who threw it. A similar principle applies with regard to a person playing with a ball, who was given a warning and caused death by throwing it. If the victim was within four cubits of the wall, he is not liable. If the victim was beyond four cubits away, even if he was standing at the end of a distance of 100 cubits, the thrower is liable, provided the ball is of sufficient weight to kill, as explained.

If a person threw a stone upward and it went to the side and caused death, the one who threw it is liable. If a person binds a colleague and puts him in a place where he cannot flee, and then turns a current of water on him, causing him to die, the killer should be executed. This law applies provided the victim dies from the first burst of water that flows because of his deeds.

A person who intended to kill one person and instead killed another is not liable - neither for execution by the court, nor for financial liability, nor for exile. He is not liable for exile because the cities of refuge will not serve as protection for him, as will be explained. Therefore, a person who throws a stone into a group of Jews without the intent of killing any specific person is not liable for execution by the court, even though he in fact kills a person.

Similarly, a killer is not held liable for execution in the following instances. He intended to strike a colleague on his loins, and the utensil was not sufficient to kill if it struck a person on his loins, but it instead struck him on his heart and he died. Or a person intended to strike a colleague on his heart, and the blow was sufficient to kill had it struck him on the heart, but instead it struck the victim on his loins and it was not sufficient to kill an ordinary person if it struck him on his loins, but this person died. In these instances, the killer is not liable for execution by the court, nor is he exiled, because a person who kills intentionally is never exiled. If, however, he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was sufficient to kill him if it struck him on his loins, but it struck him on his heart, killing him, the killer should be executed. Similar principles apply in all analogous instances.

When a person strikes a colleague with a stone or a fist in a manner that could cause his death, but he does not die immediately, an assessment should be made. If the judges assess that the victim would live, the person who struck the blow is liable only to pay the five damages awarded to a person who is injured, and he is released. Even if the victim falls ill, and his situation becomes more serious and ultimately he dies, the person who struck the blow is not held liable. If the judges assess that the victim would die, they should imprison the person who struck the blow immediately and wait to see the outcome. If the victim does die, the person who struck the blow should be executed. If, however, the victim's condition improves, and he becomes healed entirely to the extent that he walks in the marketplace on his feet like other healthy people, the person who struck the blow should pay the damages and should be released.

The Torah's expression על משענתו does not mean that he should walk while supported by a staff or by another person. For even a person who is on the verge of dying can walk leaning on a support. Instead, the intent in this verse is that he walk supported by his own power, without relying on any other factor for support.

If it was assessed that the victim would die, and afterwards his condition improved, but then deteriorated, and ultimately he died, the killer should be executed. We do not make a second assessment after the victim's condition improves, for there is a basis for the assumption that he died because of the original blow.

[If] ten people strike him [the victim] with ten sticks and he dies, whether they struck him one after the other, whether they struck him at the same time, they are all exempt from execution by the court, as it says (Leviticus 24:17) "all the soul of man" until one [alone] killed the entire soul [of the victim]. The same law applies to two people that pushed him [the victim] or forced him into water, or many people are sitting [together] and an arrow emerges from among them and kills, that all are exempted [from court-imposed execution].

A different ruling is rendered in the following instance. Ten people threw stones at a person one after the other, and none of the stones was of sufficient weight to cause death. Afterwards, another person cast a stone that was of sufficient weight to cause death and the victim died. The last person who threw the stone should be executed. If a murderer who was sentenced to execution becomes intermingled with other people, they are all absolved. Similarly, when a murderer who was not convicted becomes intermingled with other murderers who were sentenced to execution, none should be executed. The rationale is that judgment can be passed on a person only in his presence. All the killers should, however, be imprisoned.

The following laws apply when a person kills people, but the witnesses did not observe his act together - instead one saw him after the other did: a person killed in the presence of witnesses, but a warning was not given; or the witnesses to a murder contradicted each other with regard to the fine points of the testimony, but not with regard to the fundamental questions. All those murderers should be forced to enter a kipah.There they are fed parched bread and small amounts of water until their digestive tract contracts. Then they are fed barley until their bellies burst because of the extent of the sickness and they die.

This measure is not taken with regard to other crimes punishable by execution by the court. If a defendant is liable for execution, he should be executed. If he is not liable for execution, he should be released. Although there are other sins that are more serious than murder, they do not present as serious a danger to society as murder does. Even idol worship - and needless to say, incest or the violation of the Sabbath - are not considered as severe as murder. For these sins involve man's relationship with G-d, while murder also involves man's relationship with his fellow man. Whoever commits this sin is an utterly wicked person. All the mitzvot that he performs throughout his lifetime cannot outweigh this sin and save him from judgment. Thus, Proverbs 28:17 states: "A man weighed down with life's blood will flee to the pit." Come and learn from the example of Ach'av King of Israel. He was an idolater so debased in his paganism that I Kings 21:25 says: "There was none like Ach'av who gave himself over to the performance of wickedness in the eyes of G-d." And yet when his merits and sins were weighed in the presence of the Lord of spirits, there was no sin that warranted his destruction and was not counterbalanced by a positive quality, except the blood of Navot. Thus, it is written Ibid. 22:21, in the description of the prophecy of Ach'av's death in battle: "And the spirit came and stood before G-d." Our Sages commented:: "This is the spirit of Navot." And G-d told the spirit (Ibid.:2): "You will persuade him and prevail." Now this wicked man Ach'av did not actually kill his victim with his own hands; he merely brought about his death. How much more so this condemnation should apply when a person kills another with his own hands.

It is a mitzvah to kill minim and apikorsim. The term minim refers to Jewish idolaters or those who perform transgressions for the sake of angering G-d, even if one eats non-kosher meat for the sake of angering G-d or wears sha'atnez for the sake of angering G-d. The term apikorsim refers to Jews who deny the Torah and the concept of prophecy. If there is the possibility, one should kill them with a sword in public view. If that is not possible, one should develop a plan so that one can cause their deaths. What is implied? If one sees such a person descend to a cistern, and there is a ladder in the cistern, one should take the ladder, and excuse oneself, saying: "I must hurry to take my son down from the roof. I shall return the ladder to you soon." Similarly, one should devise other analogous plans to cause the death of such people.

With regard to a gentile idolater with whom we are not at war, a Jewish shepherd of small livestock, and the like, by contrast, we should not try to cause their deaths. It is, however, forbidden to save their lives if their lives are threatened. For example, if such a person fell into the sea, one should not rescue him. Leviticus 19:16] states: "Do not stand idly by while your brother's blood is at stake." This does not apply with regard to such individuals, because they are not "your brothers."

When does the above apply? With regard to a Jew who sins and perseveres in his wickedness, continually repeating it - e.g., shepherds of small livestock who show no consideration for the prohibition against robbery and continue in their perversity. When, by contrast, a Jew commits transgressions, but does not maintain his wickedness continually, merely occasionally sinning for his own personal satisfaction - e.g., one who eats non-kosher food for pleasure - it is a mitzvah to save his life, and it is forbidden to stand idly by when his life is threatened.

Whenever a person kills unintentionally, he should be exiled from the city in which he killed, to a city of refuge. It is a positive mitzvah to exile him, as implied by Numbers 35:25: "He shall dwell there until the death of the High Priest." The court is admonished not to accept a ransom from the killer to enable him to remain in his city, as Ibid.:32 states: "You shall not accept a ransom so that he will not have to flee to his city of refuge."

A person who kills unintentionally is not exiled unless the person whom he kills dies immediately. If, however, he wounds a person unintentionally - even though the court assesses that the victim will die - and the victim indeed falls sick and dies, the killer is not exiled. The rationale is that the death may not have been entirely the killer's fault; perhaps the victim in some way hastened his own death or wind entered his wound and caused him to die. Even if the killer severed the victim's windpipe and esophagus, if the victim remained alive for a short while, the killer is not exiled on his accord. Therefore, it is only when the victim died without entering any death spasms at all, or was killed in a place that was not open to the wind - e.g., a closed marble building, or the like - that the killer is exiled.

When a Jew unintentionally kills a servant or a resident alien, he must be exiled. Similarly, if a servant unintentionally kills a Jew or a resident alien, he should be exiled. Similarly, a resident alien who kills another resident alien or a servant unintentionally should be exiled, for the passage concerning the cities of refuge, Numbers 35:15, describes them as being for "the children of Israel, an alien and the residents among you."

When a resident alien kills a Jew unintentionally, he should be executed, even though he acted unintentionally. The rationale is that a person must always take responsibility for his conduct. Similarly, if a resident alien kills another resident alien because he thought that it was permitted to kill, he is considered to be close to acting intentionally, and he should be executed, for he intended to kill. When one gentile kills another gentile unintentionally, the cities of refuge do not serve as a haven for him, for the above verse states: "For the children of Israel."

When a son unintentionally kills his father, he should be exiled. Similarly, when a father unintentionally kills his son, he should be exiled. When does the above apply? When the father kills the son while not in the midst of Torah study, or when he was teaching his son a profession that is not necessary for him. If, however, he imposes punishment on his son while teaching him Torah, secular knowledge or a profession, and the son dies, the father is not liable for exile.

Similarly, when a teacher strikes a student or an emissary of the court strikes a litigant who refuses to appear in courtand accidentally kills him, he is not liable for exile. This concept is derived from Deuteronomy 19:5, which mentions the punishment of exile for a person who unintentionally kills a colleague while "chopping wood" - i.e., a permitted act. Thus, this punishment is not imposed when a father strikes a son, a teacher strikes a student, or an emissary of the court strikes a litigant, for they unintentionally killed while performing a mitzvah.

At the outset, both a person who killed unintentionally and one who killed intentionally should flee to a city of refuge. The court in the city in which the killing took place sends for the killer and brings him back to that city, as ibid.:12 states: "And the elders of his city shall send and take him from there." If the killer is condemned to execution, he should be executed, as ibid. continues: "And they shall give him to the hand of the blood redeemer." If a person is absolved, he should be released, as Numbers 35:25 states: "And the congregation shall save the killer from the hand of the blood redeemer." And if the killer is sentenced to exile, he should be returned to his previous place, as ibid. continues: "And the congregation shall return him to his city of refuge."

When he is returned to his city of refuge, he is given two Torah sages to accompany him, lest the blood redeemer attempt to kill him on the way. They should tell him: "Do not deal with him in the manner of those who shed blood. It was unintentional that this happened."

When a blood redeemer slays a person who killed unintentionally outside the Sabbath limits of his city of refuge, he is not held liable, as Deuteronomy 19:6 states: "He is not judged as liable to be executed."

The above applies whether he kills him on the road before he enters his city of refuge or if he kills him when returning together with the two who are guarding him. If he enters his city of refuge and intentionally departs beyond its Sabbath boundaries,he has granted license for his life to be taken. The blood redeemer is permitted to kill him. And if another person kills him, that other person is not liable, as Numbers 35:27 states: "There is no liability for his blood."

If the killer leaves his city of refuge unintentionally, whoever slays him - whether the blood redeemer or another person - should be exiled. If the killer is slain within the Sabbath limits of the city of refuge, the one who slayed him should be executed.

The altar in the Temple serves as a haven for killers. This is derived from Exodus 21:14, which states with regard to a person who kills intentionally: "You shall take him from My altar to die." One can derive from this, that one who kills unintentionally should not be killed at the altar. Thus, if a person kills unintentionally and takes refuge at the altar, and the blood redeemer kills him there, he should be executed as if he killed him in a city of refuge.

What serves as a haven is only the top of the altar in the Temple. Moreover, it serves as a haven only for a priest who is in the midst of sacrificial worship. For a person other than a priest, a priest who is not involved in the sacrificial worship, or a priest who was involved in the sacrificial worship but was near the altar or holding on to its horns, the altar does not serve as a haven.

If someone takes refuge on the altar, he is not left there. Instead, he is given guards and taken to a city of refuge. When does the above apply? When one is obligated to be exiled. If, however, a person feared that a king will have him executed as is the king's authority, or that the court will execute him as an immediate directive, and fled to the altar and held on to it, he should be saved. This applies even if he is a commoner. He should not be taken from the altar to die unless he was sentenced to death because of the testimony of witnesses who delivered a warning, as is always required with regard to those executed by the court.

There are three types of unintentional killers.

There is the killer who acts unintentionally in complete ignorance, and this is as it said "as long as he does not lie in wait." And the law is that he should be exiled to a Sanctuary City and take advantage of that, as we have explained.

And there is the unintentional killer who acts as one under compulsion, and where the death is caused by a very rare set of circumstances. And the law is that he is exempt from exile. And if the Blood Redeemer kills him, the Blood Redeemer is liable for a death sentence himself.

And there is the unintentional killer who acts in a way very similar to an intentional killer, that he acts in an almost criminal fashion due to excessive carelessness or negligence. And the law is that there is no exile available for him due to his grave sin, and exile does not provide him atonement. Sanctuary Cities are not meant for him as they exist only for those who have merited exile. Therefore, if the Blood Redeemer finds him anywhere and kills him, the Redeemer is held not guilty.

What should such a person do? Sit and protect himself from the blood redeemer. Similarly, if the blood redeemer slays any of the murderers whose acts were observed by only one witness, or who were not given a warning or the like, the blood redeemer is not liable for execution. Killing such individuals should not be considered more severe than killing a person who killed unintentionally.

What does the above imply? When a person throws a stone into the public domain and it causes death or he tears down his wall into the public domain, and a stone falls and causes death - whether he tears down the wall during the day or during the night - he is considered to be close to having acted intentionally. A city of refuge does not serve as a haven for him. For he should have checked the surroundings and then thrown the stone or torn down the wall.

The following rules apply if a person tears down a wall into a garbage dump at night. If it is likely that people are there, he is considered to be close to having acted intentionally, and a city of refuge does not serve as a haven for him. If people are never found there, the death is considered close to having been caused by forces beyond his control, and he is not liable for exile.

Different rules apply if people would use a garbage dump to relieve themselves at night, but would not use it for this purpose during the daytime. If it happened that a person sat there during the day, and he was killed by a stone that came from a person tearing down his wall, the person who tore down his wall should be exiled. If after the stone began to fall, the person came and sat down, and the stone struck him and caused his death, the person who tore down his wall is not liable to be exiled.

Similarly, if a person threw a stone into the public domain, and after the stone left his hand, the victim stuck his head out from a window and was struck by it, the person who threw the stone is not liable for exile. This is derived from Deuteronomy 19:5, which states: "the iron slips from the wood and finds his fellow." This excludes an instance when the victim causes himself to be found by the iron or other object that causes death.

When a person who hates the victim kills unintentionally, the city of refuge does not serve as a haven for him. This is implied by Numbers 35:23, which states that a person who is exiled: "is not the victim's enemy." We operate under the presumption that one who is an enemy is close to having acted willfully. Who is considered to be an enemy? A person who did not speak to the victim for at least three days because of animosity. Similarly, all the following individuals are considered close to having acted willfully, and a city of refuge does not serve as a haven for them: a) a person who entered an intersection holding an open knife in his hand without realizing that the victim was approaching from the other side and unintentionally stabbed him, causing his death; b) a person who unintentionally pushed a colleague to his death with his body and not with his hands; c) a person who intended to throw a stone that could kill two cubits, and instead threw it four; d) a person who thought that it was permitted to kill; e) a person who intended to kill one person and instead killed another. This applies even if he intended to kill a gentile or an animal and instead killed a Jew.

When a person enters a courtyard of a homeowner without permission, and the homeowner kills him unintentionally, the homeowner is not liable to be exiled as can be inferred from Deuteronomy 19:5, which, when describing a person who must be exiled speaks of one: "Who encounters his colleague in the forest." Our Sages commented: A forest is a place that the victim has the right to enter. Similarly, in all such places, and only in such places, is a killer liable to be exiled. Therefore, if a person enters a carpenter's shop without permission, and a block of wood flies forth and strikes him in the face and kills him, and he dies, the carpenter is not liable to be exiled. If he entered with permission, the carpenter should be exiled.

When a person was lifting a barrel with a pulley to bring it up to a roof, and the the rope broke, causing it to fall on a colleague, or a person was climbing up a ladder and fell on a colleague and killed him, the person who caused the death is not liable to be exiled. This is considered to be something beyond his control. For this is not something that is likely to happen, but is rather an extraordinary occurrence. If, by contrast, a person was lowering a barrel with a rope and it fell on a colleague and killed him, he was descending on a ladder and fell on a colleague, or he was shining with a polisher and it fell on a colleague and killed him, the person responsible should be exiled. This is derived from Numbers 35:23, which states: "And it fell upon him, and he died," implying that the article must descend in an ordinary manner. An object that descends frequently causes damage. Indeed, it is likely that this will happen, for the nature of a heavy object is to descend downward speedily. Therefore, if the person did not hurry and act appropriately and properly while the object descended, he is responsible and should be exiled. The same applies in other analogous situations.

The following rules apply when a butcher was cutting meat and lifted his hands backward while holding a cleaver, and then brought them forward to break a bone, as butchers do. If anyone is killed while he draws the cleaver back - i.e., while he lifts it up in front of him or while he causes it to descend behind him, the butcher is not exiled. If anyone is killed when he brings the cleaver forward - i.e., while he lifts it up behind him or while he causes it to descend in front of him - the butcher should be exiled. This is the governing principle. Whenever the object that kills is descending, the person responsible should be exiled. If it is not descending, he should not be exiled. Even a descent for the purpose of ascent does not cause the person to be exiled.

What is an example of a "descent for the purpose of an ascent"? If a person was ascending on a ladder, and a rung gave way under his feet and fell and caused death, the person climbing is not obligated to be exiled. Similarly, in the following situations, the death is considered close to having been caused by factors beyond the control of the individuals involved and they are not exiled: a) a person intended to throw an article in one direction and it went in another direction, b) a person had a stone in his bosom that he had never been made aware of and when he stood up it fell, or c) a blind man killed someone unintentionally.

If there was a stone in his bosom that he was aware of and he forgot it, and then he stood up, the stone fell and caused death, he is exiled, as implied by Numbers 35:15, which mentions the death taking place "unintentionally." From the use of that term, we can infer that he knew of the stone's existence beforehand. If the iron slips from the axe rebounding from the tree he is chopping, he is not exiled, because this does not come from his own force, but from the effect generated by his force. Thus, it is like a factor that is beyond his control. Similarly, if a person throws a stone into a date palm to knock down dates, and the dates fall on an infant and kill him, the person who throws the stone is not liable to be exiled, because the infant was killed, not by force that he generated, but from the effect generated by his force. Similar principles apply with regard to other blows brought about by analogous situations.

A scholar who is exiled to a city of refuge, his teacher is exiled with him, as it says, "[And he shall flee to one of these cities] and live (Deuteronomy 19:5)." Give him [his teacher]in order that he may live and a scholar must have his teacher because without Torah study, one is thought to be dead. Similarly, if a teacher is exiled, his academy is exiled with him.

When a servant is exiled to a city of refuge, his master is not obligated to provide for his sustenance. The income from his labor, however, belongs to his master. When a woman is exiled to a city of refuge, her husband is obligated to provide for her sustenance. For he cannot tell her: "Take the fruits of your labor in exchange for your sustenance," unless the woman is capable of earning a sufficient amount to provide for herself.

When a killer was sentenced to exile and died before the sentence was implemented, his bones should be taken to a city of refuge and buried there. When a killer dies in his city of refuge, he should be buried there. When the High Priest dies, the bones of the killer may be taken to his ancestral plot.

When any of the other Levites who live in the city of refuge dies, he should not be buried within the city or within its Sabbath boundary. As Numbers 35:3 states: "Their open space will be for their animals, for their property and for all their life." Implied is that these cities were given for life, and not for burial.

When a killer kills accidentally in a city of refuge, he should be exiled from one neighborhood to another. He should not depart from the city. Similarly, when a Levite kills in one of his own cities, he should be exiled to another one of the cities of the Levites. For they all serve as a haven, as will be explained. If he killed outside the cities of the Levites and fled to his own city, that city serves as a haven for him.

When the majority of the inhabitants of a city of refuge are killers, it no longer serves as a haven. This is derived from Joshua 20:4, which speaks of the designation of the cities of refuge and states: "And the killer will speak his words in the ears of the elders of the city." Implied is that there is a distinction between their words and his words. Similarly, a city that does not have elders does not serve as a haven, for it is written: "The elders of that city."

When a killer was exiled to a city of refuge, and the inhabitants of the city desire to show him honor, he should tell them: "I am a killer." If they say, "We desire to honor you regardless," he may accept the honor from them.

A person who was exiled to a city of refuge should never leave his city of refuge, not even to perform a mitzvah or to deliver testimony - neither testimony involving monetary matters, nor testimony involving a capital case. He should not leave even if he can save a life by delivering testimony, or he can save a person from gentiles, from a river, from a fire or from an avalanche. This applies even if he is a person like Yoav ben Tz'ruyah, upon whom the salvation of the entire Jewish people may depend. He should never leave the city of refuge until the death of the High Priest. If he departs, he has allowed for his death, as explained.

When it is said that a killer may return after the death of the High Priest, the intent is a High Priest anointed with the anointing oil, one who assumed his office through wearing his vestments, one who performs the service of a High Priest, and one who was removed from his office. When any of these four die, a killer may return from his city of refuge. When, by contrast, a priest anointed to lead the nation in war dies, a killer may not return, for this priest is considered to be an ordinary priest.

The following individuals are exiled and never return from their exile: a) a person who was sentenced to exile at a time when the office of High Priest was not filled; b) a person who killed a High Priest unintentionally and there was no other High Priest; or c) a High Priest who killed unintentionally and there was no other High Priest.

If, however, the killer was sentenced, but the High Priest died before the killer was actually exiled, he is not required to go into exile. If before the killer was sentenced, the High Priest dies, and another High Priest was appointed in his stead, and then the sentence of exile was delivered, the killer returns after the death of the second High Priest, the one in whose term of office he was sentenced.

If a killer was sentenced and it was discovered that the High Priest was the son of a divorcee or the son of a woman who underwent chalitzah, the High Priesthood is negated. It is as if he were sentenced without there having been a High Priest; he may never leave his city of refuge.

When a killer returns to his city after the death of the High Priest, he is considered to be an ordinary citizen. If the blood redeemer slays him, the blood redeemer should be executed, for the killer has already gained atonement through exile.

Although the killer has gained atonement, he should never return to a position of authority that he previously held. Instead, he should be diminished in stature for his entire life, because of this great calamity that he caused.

Although a person who intentionally injures his father is liable to be executed by the court just like a person who kills another person, if a person unintentionally injured his parents, he is not liable for exile. For the Torah prescribed exile only for a person who unintentionally killed another man, as we have stated.

It is a positive commandment to set aside cities of refuge, as Deuteronomy 19:2 states: "You shall set aside three cities." The practice of setting aside cities of refuge applies only in Eretz Yisrael.

There were six cities of refuge. Three Moses our teacher set aside in TransJordan, and three Joshua set aside in the land of Canaan.

None of the cities of refuge served as a haven until they were all set aside, as implied by Numbers 35:13: "There shall be six cities of refuge for you." And so, Moses informed us that the three cities of refuge in TransJordan did not serve as a haven until the three in the land of Canaan were set aside. If so, why did Moses set them aside? He said: "Since a mitzvah came to my hand, I will fulfill it."

In the era of the King Mashiach, three other cities will be added to these six, as Deuteronomy 19:9 states: "And you shall add three other cities to these three cities." Where are these cities added? In the cities of the Keni, K'nizi, and the Kadmoni, concerning which a covenant was made with Abraham, but which have not yet been conquered. Concerning these cities, the Torah ibid.:8 says: "And if G-d, your Lord, will expand your boundaries...."

The Jewish court is obligated to construct roads leading to the cities of refuge; they should be maintained and widened. Any stumbling block and obstacle should be removed from them. On these roads neither a hill, a valley, nor a river should be left. Instead, a bridge should be built across so as not to impede a person fleeing there. This is all implied by Deuteronomy 19:3, which states: "You shall prepare the road for yourselves." The width of the road to the city of refuge should not be less than 32 cubits. Signs stating "Refuge, refuge," should be written at intersections, so that killers would be aware of the way and turn there.

Every year, on the fifteenth of Adar, the court would send out emissaries to inspect the roads leading to the cities of refuge. Wherever they found flaws, they would have them repaired. If a court was dilatory regarding this matter, it is considered as if they shed blood.

When the cities of refuge were first set aside, they would measure from one city to another to determine whether they were set aside in equal measures. This is also implied by the verse: "You shall prepare the road for yourselves."

The cities of refuge that are designated should not be big cities or metropolises, nor should they be small villages. Instead, they should be cities of intermediate size. They should be located solely in trading places, where water is found. If there is no water near them, water should be diverted toward them. They should located solely in a populated area. If the surrounding populace is reduced, it should be increased. If the number of inhabitants of the city of refuge decrease, priests, Levites, and Israelites should be brought to live there. Snares may not be set in such a city, nor may rope traps be set there, so that the blood redeemer will not come there.

All of the cities of the Levites serve as a haven; each is a city of refuge. This is indicated by Numbers 35:6-7: "And in addition to them, you shall give them 42 cities. All the cities that you shall give the Levites shall be 48 in number." The verse thus established an association between them; all of them serve as havens.

What then is the difference between those cities that are set aside as cities of refuge, and the other cities of the Levites? The cities of refuge serve as havens whether one enters them with the intent of taking refuge or one enters them without that intent; since a killer enters their confines, they serve as a haven for him. The other cities of the Levites serve as a haven only when one enters with that intent in mind. Also, a killer who lives in a designated city of refuge does not have to pay rent. If, by contrast, he lives in another one of the cities of the Levites, he must pay his landlord rent.

Whenever a city serves as a haven, the surrounding area also serves as a haven. When a tree is standing within the limits of a city of refuge and its leaves extend beyond those limits, once a killer comes below its leaves they serve as a haven for him. If a tree stands outside the limits and its leaves extend within those limits, as soon as he reaches its trunk it serves as a haven for him. If the blood redeemer kills him there, he should be executed. Even though the surrounding area of a city serves as a haven, a killer should not dwell there, as [implied by Numbers 35:25: "He shall dwell in it," i.e., not in its surrounding area.

The following procedure should be adhered to when the corpse of a slain person is found lying on the earth, and it is not known who struck him. It is left in place. Five elders from the High Court in Jerusalem come and measure from the corpse to the nearby cities, as indicated by Deuteronomy 21:2: "And your elders and your judges shall go out and measure...." Even if the corpse is found right next to a city, or it is clearly obvious that a particular city is closer, it is a mitzvah to measure.

After they measure and establish which city is closest, they bury the person who was murdered in the place he was found. The elders from Jerusalem return to their city, and the court of the city that was designated brings a calf paid for by all the inhabitants. They bring the the calf to a river that flows forcefully. This is the meaning of the term eitan found in the Torah (Deuteronomy 21:4 .

It should be decapitated there with a cleaver, from behind. The court of that city and all the elders of the city, even if they are 100 in number, must wash their hands at the place where the calf was decapitated. There, in the midst of the river, the elders declare in the holy tongue Deuteronomy 21:7: "Our hands did not shed this blood, nor did we see this with our eyes." Their intent is that the murdered person did not come into their city and they let him leave without giving him provisions for the way, nor did they see him go and they let him leave without accompaniment. The priests then say in the Holy Tongue Ibid.:8: "Atone for Your nation Israel...." They depart. The Holy One, blessed be He, then forgives the shedding of the blood, as the above verse continues: "And the blood will be atoned."

When the judges measure the distance from the corpse to the nearest city, they must measure exactly and not by estimation. They should measure only to a city that has a court of 23 judges. They should never measure, however, to Jerusalem, for the inhabitants of Jerusalem are never required to bring a calf to be decapitated. For Jerusalem was never divided among the tribes, and the mitzvah of decapitating a calf applies "in the land that G-d your Lord is giving you to inherit" Deuteronomy 19:1.

If the corpse is found close to Jerusalem or close to a city that does not have a court, that city should be ignored, and a measurement should be made to the other cities close by. If the corpse is found close to a border city or to a city inhabited by gentiles, no measurement is made at all. For we presume that the person was killed by gentiles.

The city that is closest to the corpse does not bring the calf unless its population is equal to that of the city that is further away. If, however, the population of the city that is further away exceeds that of the closer city, the number of inhabitants becomes the determining factor, and the more populous city must bring the calf.

Although at times the Torah considers number to be a determining factor, and at times proximity to be a determining factor, number carries more weight than proximity.

If a corpse is found equidistant between two cities, and both cities have the same number of inhabitants, they should bring a calf in partnership and make the following stipulation: If this city is the closer, the calf belongs to its inhabitants, and the others are giving them their portion in it as a present. And if the other city is closer, the calf belongs to its inhabitants and the others are giving them their portion in it as a present. For it is impossible to be exact in measurement, even with regard to something that comes about as a result of human activity.

From which portion of the corpse should we measure? From the nose. If the body of a corpse is found in one place and the head in another place, the body is brought to the head, and then the corpse is buried in that place. Similarly, whenever a corpse is found with no one to bury it, the body is brought to the head, and then the corpse is buried in that place.

If many corpses were found next to each other, a measurement should be made from the nose of each one individually. If one city is discovered to be closest to all of them, it brings one calf for all the corpses. If the corpses are found piled one on top of the other, we should measure from the top corpse, since it is lying on top of the others.

Deuteronomy 21:1 states: "When a corpse is found...." Challal, the term used for corpse indicates a person slain with a sword, and not strangled to death, nor a person in his death throes; these are not implied by the term challal. The verse continues "on the earth" - i.e., not buried in a mound; "fallen" and not hanging from a tree; "in the field" - and not floating on the water. "And it is not known who killed him" - thus, if the murderer's identity is known, a calf was not decapitated.

Even if only one witness - or even a servant,a woman, or a person disqualified to serve as a witness because of his transgressions - saw the murderer, the calf would not be decapitated. For this reason, in the later part of the Second Temple Period, when the number of those who murdered overtly increased, the decapitation of the calf was nullified.

If one witness says: "I saw the murderer," and another witness disputes his statement, saying: "You did not see him," the calf would be decapitated. When does the above apply? When the two witnesses came at the same time. If, however, the witness who claims to have seen the murderer came first and testified, his word is believed as would be that of two witnesses in this context. Therefore, if another witness comes and disputes his testimony, claiming that the first witness did not see the murderer, the words of the second witness are of no consequence, and the calf would not be decapitated.

If after the one witness testifies that he saw the murderer, two witnesses come and testify that he did not see him, it is considered as if there are two testimonies of equal weight, disputing each other, and the calf should be decapitated. If a woman says: "I saw the murderer," and another woman disputes her testimony and says: "You did not see," the calf should be decapitated. This applies regardless of whether the women came together or one after the other. If two say: "We saw him," and one says, "You did not see him," the calf should not be decapitated. If one says: "I saw him," and two say, "You did not see him," the calf should be decapitated.

When does the above apply? When the three witnesses mentioned are either all acceptable or all unacceptable. If, however, one acceptable witness says: "I saw the murderer," and two women or two unacceptable witnesses contradict him and say that he did not see him, the calf should not be decapitated.

When two women or two unacceptable witnesses say: "We saw the murderer," and one acceptable witness denies their statements and says that they did not see him, the calf should be decapitated. Even when 100 women or 100 unacceptable witnesses say: "We saw the murderer", and one acceptable witness denies all their statements, all the unacceptable witnesses are considered as if they were one man, with the weight of a single witness.

When three women or three unacceptable witnesses say: "We saw the murderer," and four women or four unacceptable witnesses say: "You did not see him," the calf should be decapitated. This is the guiding principle: With regard to unacceptable witnesses, accept the testimony supported by the most witnesses in all situations.

The law of the cow who's neck is broken is only practiced in the land of Israel and in Transjordan.

The calf that is decapitated may be two years old or younger. If, however, it is two years and one day old, it is not acceptable. Physical blemishes do not disqualify it. Nevertheless, if it is taref, it is unacceptable. For "atonement" is mentioned with regard to it, as it is mentioned with regard to sacrificial offerings.

Deuteronomy 21:3 states: "that has never been worked, and that has never carried a yoke." Accordingly, all types of work disqualify the calf, just as they disqualify a red heifer. Why is "a yoke" then singled out; seemingly it is included with the other tasks in the expression "that has never been worked"? To teach that a yoke disqualifies a calf whether or not it carries it while working. If a calf carries a yoke for a distance of a handbreadth, it is disqualified even though it did not plow with it or perform any work. With regard to other tasks, by contrast, they do not disqualify a calf unless work was actually performed.

Whenever the calf performs a task for its own benefit, that does not disqualify it; for example, the owner spread his garment over it to protect it from flies. Any task that is not for its own benefit - e.g., the owner spread his garment over it, so that it should carry it - disqualifies it. The same applies in all analogous situations, as we have explained in Hilchot Parah.

The calf should be decapitated only during the daytime, for "atonement" is mentioned with regard to it, as it is mentioned with regard to sacrificial offerings. It is acceptable to decapitate it any time during the entire day. Two calves should not be decapitated at the same time, for mitzvot should not be performed in bundles.

It is forbidden to benefit from a calf that is decapitated. It should be buried at the place where it was decapitated. Once it is taken down to the river, benefiting from it becomes forbidden, even though it has not yet been decapitated. Thus, if it dies there or was slaughtered after it was decapitated, one is forbidden to benefit from it, and it should be buried.

If, however, the witnesses are found to be lying, it is permitted to benefit from the calf. What is implied? One witness testified that he saw the murderer, and two witnesses come and negate his testimony, telling him: "You did not see him." If on this basis, the court set aside a calf and brought it down to the river to decapitate it because of their testimony, and these witnesses were disqualified afterwards as lying witnesses, it is permitted to benefit from the calf.

If the murderer was discovered before the calf was decapitated, it should be released and allowed to pasture with the herd. If he was discovered after the calf was decapitated, before it was buried, it should be buried in its place. For at the outset, it was brought because of a doubt. It atoned for this lack of knowledge and served its purpose. Even when the murderer is discovered after the decapitation of the calf, he should be executed, as Deuteronomy 21:9 states: "You shall thus rid yourselves of the guilt for the shedding of innocent blood."

It is forbidden ever to sow seeds or till the river in which the calf was decapitated, as Deuteronomy 21:4 states: "that must never be worked or sown." Whoever performs work with the land itself - e.g., he plowed, he dug, he seeded, he planted, or the like - should be punished with lashes. It is, however, permitted to comb flax there, or to drill stones, for this is similar to weaving a garment there or sewing it there, for these are tasks that are not performed with the land itself. To emphasize this concept, the verse states: "that must never be worked or sown." Implied is that just as sowing involves the land itself, similarly all work that is forbidden there involves the land itself.

When the inhabitants of a city that was closest to a corpse have delayed and have not brought a calf for decapitation, they should be compelled to bring it even though several years have passed. For those who are liable to bring a calf for decapitation remain liable despite the fact that Yom Kippur has passed.

It is a positive commandment for a man to build a guardrail for his roof, as Deuteronomy 22:8 says: "And you shall make a guardrail for your roof." This applies with regard to a building used as a dwelling. But for a warehouse or a cattle barn and the like, there is no necessity. Similarly, any building that is not four cubits by four cubits does not require a guardrail.

A house owned by two partners requires a guardrail. As can be inferred from Deuteronomy 22:8: "For one who falls may certainly fall from it," the obligation stems from the fact that one may fall. If so, why does the verse state "your roof"? To exclude synagogues and houses of study, for they are not intended to serve as dwellings. If the public domain is higher than a person's roof, he does not need to erect a guardrail, for the phrase "For one who falls may certainly fall from it" implies that the guardrail is intended to prevent people from falling "from the roof," and not onto the roof.

The height of a guardrail should not be any less than ten handbreadths, so that a person who might fall will not fall from it. A guardrail must be a partition strong enough to enable a person to lean on it without falling. Anyone who leaves his roof open without a guardrail negates the observance of a positive commandment and violates a negative commandment, as Deuteronomy 22:8 states: "Do not cause blood to be spilled in your home." The violation of this commandment is not punished by lashes, for it does not involve a deed.

...The roof is like every other thing that has danger in itself, and which is possible that a person will make a mistake with it and die. An example is having a pit in one's property, whether it has water or not - one is obligated to make a wall of ten tefachim (32 inches/80cm.) around it, or a covering over it, so a person won't fall in it and die. And so too any stumbling block in which there is a danger to life: it is a positive mitzvah to remove it, and to guard against it, and to be exceedingly cautious about it, as it is written "take care of yourself and guard your life" (Deut. 4:9). And if one has not removed the stumbling blocks that bring people to danger, one has cancelled a positive commandment and transgressed "do not bring bloodguilt" (Deut. 22:8).

Our Sages forbade many matters because they involve a threat to life. Whenever a person transgresses these guidelines, saying: "I will risk my life, what does this matter to others," or "I am not careful about these things," he should be punished by stripes for rebelliousness.

They include: A person should not place his mouth over a conduit through which water flows and drink. Nor should he drink at night from rivers and lakes, lest he swallow a leech without seeing. Similarly, a person should not drink water that was left uncovered, lest a snake or other poisonous crawling animal might have drunk from them, and as a result, the person would die.

These are the liquids that are forbidden if left uncovered: water, wine - even watered-down wine, or wine whose flavor has begun to change to vinegar - milk, honey, and brine. Other liquids are not forbidden if left uncovered, because venomous animals will not drink from them.

When garlic has been crushed or a watermelon cut open and left uncovered, they are forbidden. The same applies in all analogous situations. The prohibition against drinking uncovered beverages does not apply to wine that has been boiled or to unfermented wine. Unfermented wine refers to wine from the time it was squeezed from the grapes until three days have passed. Similarly, the prohibition against drinking uncovered beverages does not apply to wine, water or milk that are hot to the extent that vapor arises from them, nor to liquids into which liquid is descending from above drop after drop, providing the liquid continuously descends. For crawling animals fear bubbles and vapor, and will not drink from them.

The prohibition against drinking uncovered beverages does not apply to water used for pickling, cooking food or cooking vetch. Similarly, this prohibition does not apply when pickled foods, cooked foods or vetch have been left to soak in water, if they have changed the taste of the water. If they did not change the taste, the water is forbidden if left uncovered. Similarly, water in which quince and Syrian pears were washed for a sick person is forbidden if left uncovered.

The prohibition against drinking uncovered beverages does not apply when sharp tasting substances like pepper, or bitter substances like wormwood are mixed with wine to the extent that its flavor changes. The same applies with regard to other beverages.

When a liquid is forbidden if left uncovered, it is forbidden whether it was left uncovered during the day or during the night. This applies even when a person was sleeping beside the liquid. For crawling animals are not afraid of sleeping men. For how long must a liquid be left uncovered to be forbidden? For as long as it takes for a crawling animal to emerge from under the container, drink, and return to its place.

The quantity of water that becomes forbidden if uncovered is an amount in which the venom could remain a distinct entity and cause danger. If, however, there is so much that the venom will be nullified as if it does not exist, the water is permitted. This applies to water contained in utensils or on the ground. The same law applies to other liquids.

The prohibition against drinking uncovered beverages does not apply to a stream that is flowing, even slightly. When a container of wine is left uncovered in a chest, a bureau or a closet, or in a larger container in a pit that is even 100 cubits deep, in a tower that is 100 cubits high, or in a hall that is ornamented and plastered, it is forbidden. If the person checked the bureau or the chest and then put the wine there, it is permitted. If there was a hole in the chest, it is forbidden. How large must the hole be? Large enough for a child to insert his small finger.

When a jug is left uncovered, a person should not drink from it, although nine people drank from it before him without dying. An incident occurred, and it was reported that the tenth person who drank from a jug died, because the venom of the snake sank to the bottom of the jug. And there is venom from some crawling animals that rises to the surface of liquids, and other venom that becomes suspended in the middle. Therefore, everything is forbidden. This applies even if one filtered the liquid with a filter. Similarly, when a watermelon was left uncovered, even if nine people partook of it without dying, a tenth should not partake of it.

Water that was left uncovered should not be poured into the public domain, nor should it be used to settle the dust of a home, nor should it be used to mix mortar, nor should it be used to wash one's face, to water one's animal or an animal belonging to a colleague. It may, however, be used to water a cat.

When dough has been mixed with water that has been left uncovered, it should be burned. This applies even if the dough was terumah. Even if it has been baked, it is forbidden.

When an animal, a beast or a fowl has been bitten by a snake or another poisonous animal, or it ate a poison that could kill a person, and the nature of the poison has not changed in the animal's body, it is forbidden to partake of meat from that animal, because of the deadly danger involved. For this reason, if an animal, a beast, or a fowl was found with its feet cut off, although it is permitted and it is not considered taref because its feet were cut off, it is forbidden because of the possible danger, unless it is checked, because of the possibility that a poisonous crawling animal bit it. How should such meat be checked? If should be roasted in an oven. If the meat does not break into pieces or react differently from ordinary roasted meat, it is acceptable.

Similarly, figs, grapes, zucchini, squash, watermelons and cucumbers that have holes are forbidden, lest a snake or other poisonous animal have bitten them. This applies even if the produce was very large, and regardless of whether it was still growing or detached, even if it was placed within a container, as long as it has moisture, and it is discovered that it was bitten it is forbidden. Even if one saw a bird or a rat sitting and making holes in the fruit, it is still forbidden. Perhaps they made the hole in the place of an existing hole.

When the stem of a grape or a fig has been removed, the produce is not considered to have been left uncovered. Therefore, a person may eat figs and grapes at night without concern. A fig that had a hole, but dried to the extent that it can be considered a dried fig, and a date that had a hole and dries, are both permitted.

It is forbidden for a person to place coins or dinarim in his mouth, lest there be the remnants of dried spittle from a leper or a metzora, or sweat on them. For all sweat from a person is like poisonous venom, except sweat from one's face.

Similarly, a person should not place the palm of his hand under his armpits, lest his hands have touched a leper or a poisonous substance, for "hands are active." A person should not place a cooked dish under the couch on which he is reclining, even though he is in the midst of his meal, lest an entity that could harm him fall into the food without his noticing.

Similarly, one should not stick a knife into an etrog or into a radish, lest a person fall on its point and die. Similarly, it is forbidden for a person to pass under a wall that is leaning, or over a shaky bridge or to enter a ruin. Similarly, it is forbidden to enter all other places that are dangerous for these or other reasons.

Similarly, it is forbidden for a Jew to enter into privacy with a gentile, for they are suspected of bloodshed. Nor should one accompany gentiles on a journey. If a Jew encounters a gentile on a journey, he should make sure the gentile is at his right. If they are making an ascent or a descent together, the Jew should be careful that he should be in the higher position and the gentile in the lower position, but not vice versa, lest the gentile fall on him with the intent of killing him. Nor should a Jew bend down before a gentile, lest he crush his skull.

If a gentile asks a Jew where he is going, he should give him a misleading answer, as Jacob gave a misleading answer to Esau, as Genesis 33:14 states: "Until I come to my master, in Seir."

It is forbidden to take medication from a gentile, unless there is no hope that the sick person will live. It is forbidden to be healed by a heretic, even if there is no hope that the person will live. It is permitted to take a medication from a gentile for an animal, or for an external affliction - e.g., a compress or a bandage. If, however, the affliction involves a danger to life, it is forbidden to take medication from them. The general rule is: One should not take medication from a gentile for any affliction for which one may desecrate the Sabbath.

It is permitted to ask the opinion of a gentile doctor and follow his directives if he says: "This drug is good for you; you should perform these and these treatments." One should not take the prescription from him directly.

It is forbidden to have one's hair cut by a gentile in a private domain, lest the barber kill him. If the person whose hair is being cut is an important personage, it is permitted, because the gentile will be afraid to kill him. It is also permitted for a person who creates an impression of being an important personage for a gentile barber, so that he will fear him and not kill him, to have his hair cut by him.

It is forbidden to sell to a gentile any instrument of war; nor may you sharpen their swords, nor may you sell them any knives, manacles, iron chains, nor bears, lions, nor anything that could cause damage to the public. But you may sell them shields to be used defensively.

Just as it is forbidden to sell such weaponry to a gentile, so too, is it forbidden to sell it to a Jew who will sell it to a gentile. It is permitted to sell weapons to the soldiers of the country in which one lives, because they defend the Jewish inhabitants of the land.

Every article that is forbidden to be sold to a gentile is also forbidden to be sold to a Jewish robber, for by doing so one reinforces a transgressor and causes him to sin. Similarly, anyone who causes a person who is blind with regard to a certain matter to stumble and gives him improper advice, or who reinforces a transgressor - who is spiritually blind, for he does not see the path of truth, because of the desires of his heart - transgresses a negative commandment, as Leviticus 19:14 states: "Do not place an obstacle in front of a blind man." When a person comes to ask advice from you, give him proper counsel.

It is forbidden to give good advice to a wicked gentile or servant. It is even forbidden to counsel him to observe a mitzvah if he perseveres in his wickedness. Daniel was subjected to a test solely because he advised Nebuchadnezzar to give charity, as Daniel 4:24 states: "O King, let my counsel be acceptable to you. Redeem your sins through charity."

When a person encounters a colleague who is on a journey and his animal has fallen under its load, he is commanded to unload the burden from it. This applies whether the animal was carrying a burden appropriate for it, or a burden greater than it could bear. This is a positive commandment, as Exodus 23:5 states: "You shall certainly help him."

One should not unload the animal and depart, leaving the wayfarer in panic. Instead, one should lift up the animal together with its owner, and reload the animal's burden upon it, as Deuteronomy 22:4 states: "You shall certainly lift it up." This is another positive commandment. If one leaves the wayfarer in panic without either unloading or reloading, one has negated the observance of a positive commandment and violated a negative commandment, as Deuteronomy, ibid. states: "You shall not see the donkey of your brother... and conceal yourself...."

When a priest sees an animal fallen in a cemetery, he should not contract ritual impurity to unload and reload it, just as he does not contract ritual impurity to return a lost article. Similarly, if he is an elder, whose practice is not to unload and load animals, since this is beneath his dignity he is not liable.

This is the general principle: If the animal were his own and he would unload and reload it, he is obligated to unload and reload it for a colleague. If he is pious and goes beyond the measure of the law, even if he is a great nasi, and sees an animal belonging to a colleague fallen under a load of straw, reeds or the like, he should unload and load it with its owner.

If one unloaded and reloaded the animal, and it fell again, one is obligated to unload and reload it another time, indeed even 100 times, This is indicated by the verbs עזוב תעזוב and הקם תקים in the proof-texts cited above. For this reason, one must accompany the animal for a parsah, unless the owner of the burden says that it is not necessary.

When does one become obligated to unload and reload together with its owner? When he sees the fallen animal in a way that can be described as an encounter. For Exodus 23:5 states "When you see your colleague's donkey..." and the previous verse states: "When you encounter...." How far a distance is implied? Our Sages determined it as being a distance of 266 2/3 cubits - i.e., 1/7.5 of a mil. If a person was further away from a fallen animal, he is not obligated.

It is a mitzvah from the Torah to unload an animal without charge. Loading it, however, is a mitzvah for which one may charge. Similarly, for the time when one accompanies the animal for a parsah, one may receive payment.

If one finds an animal belonging to a colleague fallen under its load, it is a mitzvah to unload and reload it even if its owner is not present, for "You shall certainly help" and "You shall certainly lift up..." implies that one must fulfill these mitzvot in all situations. If so, why does the Torah say "together with him" i.e., the animal's owner? To teach that if the owner of the animal was there and goes off to the side, telling the passerby, "Since you have a mitzvah, if you would like to unload it yourself, unload it," the passerby is not obligated. This is implied by "together with him." If the owner of the animal was old or ailing, the passerby is obligated to load and unload the animal by himself.

The following rules apply when the animal [that has fallen is owned by a gentile, but the burden it is carrying is owned by a Jew. If the gentile is the one driving his donkey, one is not obligated toward him. If not, one is obligated to unload and reload it because of the distress suffered by the Jew. Similarly, if the animal that has fallen is owned by a Jew, but the burden it is carrying is owned by a gentile, one is obligated to unload and reload it because of the distress suffered by the Jew. When, however, both the animal and the burden are owned by a gentile, a passerby is not obligated to concern himself with the animal, unless there is the possibility that animosity will be aroused.

When the legs of a donkey owned by one of the donkey drivers in a caravan are shaky, his colleagues may not proceed and pass before him. If it falls, the other donkey drivers may pass him.

If one donkey was laden with a burden, and another was carrying a rider, and the way became too narrow for both of them, the rider must move to the side to allow the laden donkey to proceed. If one donkey was laden with a burden, and another was burden-less, the burden-less one must move to the side to allow the laden donkey to proceed. If one was carrying a rider, and another was burden-less, the burden-less one must move to the side to allow the donkey carrying a rider to proceed. if both are laden with burdens, carrying riders or burden-less, the owners should negotiate a compromise.

Similarly, there are criteria laid down when two ships that are passing through the same straits confront each other, and if they both try to pass at the same time they would sink, but they could pass one by one, or when two camels that are climbing a high pass confront each other, and if they both try to pass at the same time they would fall, but they could pass one by one. What should they do? If one was carrying cargo, and another was burden-less, the burden-less one should move to the side in favor of the one that was carrying cargo. If one was close to the port or city from which it set out and one was further removed, the one that was closer should move to the side in favor of the one that was further removed. If they are both far removed, both close or both laden with cargo, and they both share the same difficulty, they should come to a compromise and reach a financial settlement between themselves. With regard to such situations, it is said Leviticus 19:15: "Judge your colleague with righteousness."

When a person encounters two individuals: one whose donkey is fallen under its load and one with a donkey whose burden has been unloaded, but who cannot find anyone to help him reload it, it is a mitzvah to unload the fallen donkey first, because of the discomfort suffered by the animal. Afterwards, he should reload the other animal. When does the above apply? When the two people he encounters are both friends or both enemies. If, however, the one whose donkey must be reloaded is an enemy and the other is a friend, it is a mitzvah for the passerby to reload his enemy's donkey first, in order to subjugate his evil inclination.

The enemy mentioned in the Torah is not a gentile, but rather a Jew. One might ask: How is it possible for one Jew to hate another? Is it not written Leviticus 19:17: "Do not hate your brother in your heart"? Our Sages explained that this is referring to a person who while alone sees a colleague violate a transgression and rebukes him, but the colleague did not cease transgressing. In such an instance, it is a mitzvah to hate the person until he repents and abandons his wickedness. Even if he did not repent yet, if one sees him in panic because of his cargo, it is a mitzvah to unload and reload with him, instead of leaving him inclined toward death, lest he tarry because of his money and be brought to danger. For the Torah showed concern for the lives of the Jewish people, both the wicked and the righteous, for they are attached to G-d and believe in the fundamentals of our faith. And Ezekiel 33:11 states: "Say to them, 'As I live,' says G-d, the Lord, 'Do I desire the death of a wicked man? I desire that the wicked return from his path and live.' Blessed be G-d who grants assistance. With the help of the Almighty, the eleventh book has been completed. The number of chapters in this book are 62. Hilchot Nizkei Mammon has 14 chapters. Hilchot Geneivah has 9 chapters. Hilchot Gezelah Va'Avedah has 18 chapters. Hilchot Chovel UMazik has 8 chapters. Hilchot Rotzeach USh'mirat HaNefesh has 13 chapters.