One Who Injures a Person or Property

One who injures his friend is obligated to pay him for five items, and they are: damage, pain, healing, loss of work, and embarrassment. And these five iterms are all paid for from the best of his property, as is the law for all damagers.

Damage, in what manner? If he chopped off the hand or the foot of his fellow, we look at [the fellow] as if he was a slave being sold in the marketplace: how much was he worth [then] and how much is he worth now. And he pays the depreciation of his value that he caused. As it is stated, "An eye for (tachat) an eye" - from the tradition, they learned that that which it states, "for (tachat)" means to pay money.

That which it states in the Torah, "In the way that he gives a blemish to a man, so will it be given to him," is not [coming] to injure this one as he injured his fellow; but [rather] that it is fitting to remove a limb from him or to wound him as he did [to another]. And therefore, he must pay his damage. And behold, it states, "And you shall not take ransom for the soul of a murderer" - for a murderer only may you not take ransom, but for the loss of limbs or wounds, there is ransom.

And so [too], that which it states about one who injures his fellow and causes him damage, "Your eye should not pity;" is [to mean] that you should not pity [him] concerning payments, lest you will say, "This one is a poor person and he injured him unintentionally, [so] I will have mercy on him." Hence, it states, "Your eye should not pity."

And from where [do we know] that that which it states with regards to limbs, "An eye for an eye," is [to be understood as] payments? Since it is stated about it, "A wound for a wound," and it is explicitly stated, "And when a man strikes his neighbor with a stone or with a fist, etc... he should surely give him his rest and his rehabilitation." Behold, you have learned that "for (tachat)" mentioned with regards to a wound means payments. And this is [also] the case with "for (tachat)" mentioned concerning the eye and concerning the other limbs.

And even though these things are apparent from perusal of the written Torah, they are all explained from the mouth of Moshe, our teacher, and they are all laws [given] to Moshe (halacha le'Moshe) that are in our hands. And like this did our ancestors see that they were judging in the court of Yehoshua and in the court of Shmuel the Ramati and in each and every court that stood from the times of Moshe, our teacher, until today.

What is the source that teaches that a person who injures a colleague must pay independently for the pain that he caused? With regard to a maiden who has been raped Deuteronomy 22:29 states that payment is imposed: "because he oppressed her." the same law applies to anyone who causes a colleague bodily pain. He is required to give him financial recompense for the pain he caused.

What is the source that teaches that he is liable for the victim's unemployment expenses and medical expenses independently? It is written Exodus 21:19: "He should pay for his being idled and for his medical expenses."

What is the source that teaches that he is liable for the embarrassment suffered by the victim independently? Deuteronomy 25:11-12 states: "... And she extends her hand, grabbing his private parts. You must cut off her hand." The same law applies to anyone who embarrasses another person.

A person who causes embarrassment is not liable unless he acts intentionally, as implied by the phrase: "And she extends her hand." If, by contrast, a person embarrassed a colleague without intent, he is not liable. Therefore, if a person who was sleeping or the like embarrassed a colleague, he is not liable.

A man is considered mu'ad at all times - whether acting intentionally or unintentionally, whether asleep or awake or intoxicated. If he injures a colleague or damages a colleague's property, he must always reimburse him from his choicest property. When is a person who causes damage while asleep required to make restitution? When they both went to sleep at the same time, and one turned over and injured his colleague or tore his garment. If, however, a person was sleeping and a colleague came and lay down next to him, only the one who lay down afterwards is considered mu'ad. If the person sleeping injures the one who came afterwards, he is not liable. Similarly, if a person places a utensil next to a person who is sleeping, and the one who is sleeping breaks it, he is not liable. For the one who placed the article down was the one who was mu'ad and who acted with negligence.

If a person fell from a roof because of an ordinary wind and caused damage, he is liable for four assessments, but is not liable for the embarrassment he caused. If he fell because of an exceptional wind, he is liable only for the injury, but not for the other four assessments. If, however, he turned over so that he would fall on a person to soften the blow he would receive, he is liable even for the embarrassment he caused. For whenever a person intentionally causes injury, he is liable for the embarrassment he caused, even though he did not have the intent of embarrassing the other person.

When two people injure another person at the same time, they are both liable and they divide the assessment between themselves. If one of them acted intentionally and the other acted unintentionally, the one who acted unintentionally is not liable for the embarrassment that was caused.

If a person intended to embarrass a minor and instead embarrassed an adult, he is required to pay the adult what he would pay for embarrassing a minor. If a person intended to embarrass a servant and instead embarrassed a free man, he is required to pay the free man what he would pay for embarrassing a servant.

If a stone was placed in a person's bosom - regardless of whether he had never known about it, or he had known about it and forgotten it - and when he stood up, the stone fell and caused damage, he is liable only for the injury, but not for the other four assessments. Similarly, if he intended to throw a stone two cubits, and he throw it four cubits and it caused an injury, or if he caused an injury while sleeping, he is liable only for the injury, but not for the other four assessments.

Whenever a person injures a colleague, he is liable for the five assessments. Even if a person enters a colleague's domain without permission and the owner injures him, the owner is liable. For he has permission to remove the intruder from his domain, but he does not have permission to injure him. If, however, the person who entered bumps into the owner and is injured, the owner is not liable. If the owner bumps into him and is injured, the person who entered is liable, for he entered without permission. If they both had permission to be in that domain, or neither had permission to be in that domain, and one bumps into the other and is injured, neither is liable.

In all of the situations to be described, the person who caused the injury is liable for four assessments, but not for the embarrassment he caused: He was chopping wood in the public domain, and a piece of wood took flight and caused injury in the private domain. He was chopping wood in a private domain and caused injury in a public domain. He was chopping wood in a private domain and caused injury in another private domain. A person entered a carpenter's store - whether with permission or without permission - and a block of wood was propelled and hit him in the face.

Just as an evaluation is made with regard to death, so too, an evaluation is made with regard to damages. What is implied? If he strikes a colleague with a small stone that is not large enough to cause injury, or a small sliver of wood and causes an injury that this article is not ordinarily capable of causing, he is not liable. This concept is alluded to by Exodus 21:18, which speaks of "a man strik(ing) a colleague with a stone or a fist" - i.e., an entity that is capable of causing injury. He is, however, liable for the embarrassment that he caused. [For even if he merely spat on his colleague's person, he is liable for the embarrassment that he caused. Accordingly, the witnesses have to know the article that caused the injury. This article should be brought to the court, and an evaluation is made concerning it, and a reckoning. If the article that caused the injury was lost and the person who caused the injury claims: "It was not sufficient to cause the injury. The injury occurred because of forces beyond my control," and the person who was injured claims: "It was sufficient to cause the injury," the person who was injured should support his claim with an oath and collect his due, as will be explained.

A metal object is never evaluated to see whether it can cause injury. Instead, we assume that it can, for even a small needle is capable of killing and surely of causing injury. When a person throws a stone, and afterwards another person extends his head out from a window and is struck by it, the one who threw the stone is not liable at all. This is derived from Deuteronomy 19:5, which speaks of the head of an axe coming loose and "strik(ing) a colleague." This excludes one who causes himself to be stricken.

When a person injures a colleague in a manner that warrants payment of all five assessments, he is required to pay all five. If he injures him in a manner that warrants the payment of only four, he is required to pay only four. If three, three; if two, two; and if one, one.

What is implied? If a person cuts off a colleague's hand or foot, or a finger or a toe, he must pay all five assessments: the damages, his pain, his medical treatment, his loss of employment and the embarrassment he suffered. If he struck him on his hand and it swelled, but it will ultimately return to size; on his eye and displaced it, but it will heal; he should pay four assessments: his pain, his medical treatment, his loss of employment and the embarrassment he suffered. If he struck him on his head and it swelled, he should pay three assessments: his pain, his medical treatment and the embarrassment he suffered. If he struck him on a place where the blow cannot be seen - e.g., he struck him on his knees or on his back - he should pay two assessments: his pain and his medical treatment. If a person swats a colleague with a handkerchief he was holding, a document or the like, he should pay only one assessment: embarrassment.

If a person burned a colleague with a spit or a nail on his fingernails - i.e., in a place where a wound is not made - and that does not prevent the person from working, he should pay only for pain. If one causes a colleague to drink a drug or anoints him with a drug that changes the color of his skin, he is required to pay merely for the medical expenses necessary until his skin returns to its original color. If he locked him in a room, he reimburses him solely for his loss of employment. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

When a person shaves the head of a colleague, all that it is necessary for him to pay is for the embarrassment, for his hair will grow back. If he removes his hair with a potion or burns his head so that his hair will never grow back, he is liable for all five assessments: damages, pain and medical attention, because his head was heated by the burn or by the potion, and this will cause headaches. He must also pay him unemployment, because previously he was fit to dance and shake the locks of his hair, and he is thus prevented from performing this type of work. And he must be paid for embarrassment, because there is no greater embarrassment than this.

Thus, this indicates that whenever a person causes a colleague a loss of limb that will not grow back, he is liable for all five payments. Even if he knocked out a tooth, he is liable for all five payments. For it is impossible that he will not suffer pain in his mouth for a certain amount of time because of the loss. And although there is no medical treatment for the tooth itself, the gums require medical treatment.

Even if he causes him to lose a piece of flesh merely the size of a barleycorn, he must pay all five assessments. He must pay for the permanent damage, because the skin will never return; instead, scar tissue will form. Thus, if a person injures a colleague, cuts his flesh and causes him to bleed, he is liable for all five assessments.

A person who scares a colleague - even if the fright causes him to fall ill - is not liable according to the judgments of an earthly court; he does, however, have a moral and spiritual obligation to compensate him. This applies, however, only when he did not touch him, but merely shouted behind him, appeared before him in the darkness or the like. Similarly, if a person shouted in a colleague's ear and caused him to become deaf, he is not liable according to the judgments of an earthly court; he does, however, have a moral and spiritual obligation to compensate him. If, however, a person grasped hold of a colleague and blew a horn in his ear and caused him to become deaf, touched him and/or pushed him when he frightened him, took hold of his clothes or the like, he is obligated to pay compensation even according to an earthly court.

It appears to me that if the injured party claims to have been deafened or blinded and thus cannot see or hear, his claim is not accepted on faith, lest he attempt to deceive. For we have no evidence about the matter. Instead, he is not entitled to compensation unless he will be observed for an extended period of time, and it will be established that he lost his sight or his hearing. Only then, must the person who caused the damage pay.

What compensation must be paid for pain? It all depends on the nature of the injured party. There are certain people who are delicate, spoiled and wealthy, and would not bear even a slight amount of pain for a large amount of money. And there are people who are heavy laborers, strong and poor, and will bear much suffering for a single zuz. These are the factors that are taken into consideration when evaluating and determining the compensation for pain.

How is the pain evaluated when there is a loss of limb?If a person cut off a colleague's hand or finger, we evaluate how much such a person would give to have this limb amputated with a potion instead of having it cut of with a sword, if the king decreed that his hand or foot must be cut off. We evaluate the difference between the two, and the one who caused the injury is required to pay that amount.

How is the unemployment assessment evaluated? If he did not cause the person to lose a limb, but instead caused him to become sick and invalid, or his arm swelled but it will return to its original size, the person who caused the injury must pay the victim for his unemployment for each day, like an unemployed worker of the trade in which he is employed. If he caused him to lose a limb or cut off his hand, he must pay him full compensation for his hand; this being "damages." In this instance, we judge him as if he were a guard at a patch of squash. We evaluate how much such a guard would earn each day and calculate the number of days he will be incapacitated. This is the amount the person who caused the injury must pay. Similarly, if a person cut off a colleague's legs, we calculate a wage as if he were a door guard. If he blinded him, we calculate a wage as if he worked in a mill. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.

If a person hits a colleague on his ear or blows a horn into his ear and causes him to become deaf, he must pay his entire worth, for the victim is no longer fit to perform any work.

The following law applies when a person blinded a colleague, and before the damages were evaluated cut off his hand, and before those damages were evaluated cut off his leg, and before those damages were evaluated caused him to become deaf. Since an evaluation was not made for each of the damages and ultimately, the person who caused the injury was required to pay the victim's entire worth, that is all that he is obligated to pay. If an evaluation was made for each of the previous damages and then an evaluation was made for his entire worth, the court collects only the injured's entire worth from the person who inflicted the injury. If, however, the injured seizes payment for every injured limb and for his entire worth from the property of the person who inflicted the injury, it is not expropriated from him.

How is the assessment for medical bills evaluated? We estimate how many days this ailment will last and what will be required to treat it. The person who caused the injury is required to give this sum immediately. We do not require him to make payments day by day. This is an enactment in favor of the person who caused the injury.

Similarly, the unemployment assessment is evaluated and must be paid immediately. If the injured party's ailment develops complications and becomes extended beyond the amount originally estimated, the person who caused the injury is not required to pay him more. Conversely, if he becomes healed immediately, the assessment is not reduced.

When does the above apply? When the person who caused the injury agrees, for this enactment is to his benefit. If, however, the person who caused the injury says: "I do not desire that this enactment be followed; instead, I will pay his medical bills day by day" - he is given that prerogative.

If the person who suffered the injury says: "Assess my injury and give me the money. I will heal myself," his request is not accepted. For the person who caused the injury can say: "Perhaps you will not be successful in healing yourself, and I will be viewed as responsible for the injury." Instead, he must pay his medical expenses day by day, or pay an assessment for the entire amount and give the money for his medical expenses to the court on his behalf.

If the person who caused the injury says: "I will heal you," or he says: "I have a physician who will heal you without charge," his words are not heeded. Instead, he is required to bring a professional physician who charges for healing him.

If an assessment was not made at the outset, for the person who caused the injury chose to pay the medical bills day by day, if an infection arose because of the wound, or if the wound opened again after it began to heal, he is required to pay for the medical expenses and for unemployment. If an infection arose that was not caused by the wound, he is obligated to pay for the medical expenses, but is not obligated to pay for unemployment. If the person who was injured disobeyed the physician's instructions and the severity of the ailment increased, the person who caused the injury is not obligated to heal him.

When the court arrives at an assessment and obligates the person who caused the injury to pay, the entire amount is expropriated from him immediately. We do not grant him time to sell his property. If he became obligated for embarrassment alone, we grant him time to sell his property, for he did not cause the victim a financial loss.

How is the assessment for embarrassment evaluated? Everything depends on the character of the person who causes the embarrassment and that of the one who is embarrassed. For the embarrassment caused by a child cannot be compared to the embarrassment caused by a respected adult, since the embarrassment caused by the ignoble one is greater.

A person who embarrasses someone who is naked, or who is in the bathhouse is not liable. If the wind blew and raised a person's clothes up against his face, revealing his nakedness, and then another person removed more of his garments, the latter is liable for causing embarrassment. Nevertheless, the embarrassment caused to this person whose nakedness was revealed cannot be compared to the embarrassment of a person who was not naked at all. Similarly, if a person lifted up his clothes to go down to a river or to ascend from a river, and another person embarrassed him, that person is liable. Nevertheless, the embarrassment caused to this person cannot be compared to the embarrassment of a person who was fully clothed.

When a person embarrasses a colleague who is sleeping, he is liable for the embarrassment he caused. If the person died in his sleep and never became aware that this person had embarrassed him, the assessment for embarrassment should not be expropriated from the person who caused the embarrassment. If, however, the embarrassed person's heirs seized this amount from the property of the person who caused the embarrassment, it is not expropriated from them.

A person who embarrasses a mentally incompetent person is not liable. A person who embarrasses a deaf mute is liable. A person who embarrasses a convert or a servant is liable. The following rules apply when a person embarrasses a minor: If the minor becomes embarrassed when he is shamed, the person is liable. If the minor does not feel the shame, the other person is not liable. Even when he is liable, the liability for embarrassing a minor cannot be compared to the liability for embarrassing an adult, nor can that required for embarrassing a servant be compared to that required for embarrassing a free man, nor can that required for embarrassing a deaf mute be compared to that required for embarrassing a mentally competent person.

When a person embarrasses a colleague with words, or he spits on his clothing, he is not liable for a financial penalty. The court should, however, impose appropriate restraints concerning such matters in every place and time. If a person embarrasses a Torah scholar, he is liable to pay him for the full measure of embarrassment, even though he embarrassed him only by verbal abuse. The rule has already been ordained that anyone who embarrasses a Torah scholar, even with mere verbal abuse, is penalized and is required to pay 35 gold dinarim - i.e., the weight of 8 and 3/4 sela'im. It is an accepted tradition, that this penalty is exacted in all places, in Eretz Yisrael and in the diaspora.

There have continually been instances of this in our community in Spain. There are some scholars who have waived this payment, and this is praiseworthy of them. There are those who demand payment and reach a compromise. The judges, however, tell the person who caused the embarrassment: "You are obligated to pay him a pound of gold."

Although a person who embarrasses someone else verbally is not liable for a financial payment, it is a grave sin. Only a wicked and foolish person abuses and insults people. The Sages of the earlier generations said: "Whoever embarrasses a proper Jewish person in public with words does not have a share in the world to come."

There are many types of blows that involve embarrassment and a small amount of pain, but no permanent damage. Our Sages have already ordained specific payments for these types of blows. Whoever strikes a colleague with one of these blows must pay this specified amount. These are all considered k'nasot. The specific amount that the person must pay is the assessment for pain, embarrassment, medical attention and unemployment. Whether or not the injured requires medical attention and loses employment, this is the amount that must be paid.

How much must be paid? A person who kicks a colleague with his foot must pay five sela'im. If he butts him with his knee, he must pay three sela'im. If he hits him with a fist, he must pay thirteen sela'im. If he slams his colleague with his palm, he must pay a sela. If he slaps him in the face, he must pay fifty sela'im. If he slaps him in the face with the back of his hand, he must pay 100 sela'im. Similarly, if he twists his ear, pulls his hair, spits at him and the spittle touches his body, removes a man's garment or a woman's head covering, he must pay 100 sela'im. He must pay this amount for every blow he gives. What is implied? If he kicks his colleague four times - even if he kicks him in immediate succession, he must pay him twenty sela'im. If he slaps him in the face twice, he must pay him 100 sela'im. The same rule applies with regard to the other payments.

All the sela'im mentioned in this context refer to the silver coins used in Eretz Yisrael at that time. Every sela was composed of half a dinar of pure silver and three and a half dinarim of copper. Therefore, if a person became liable to pay a colleague 100 sela'im because of such blows, he is liable to pay him twelve and a half sela'im of pure silver.

When are these assessments imposed? When a distinguished person is involved. If, however, an ignoble person is involved - one who is not particular about these things or the like - he receives only the amount of money that is appropriate for him, as assessed by the judges. For there are base people who are not concerned with being shamed and will demean themselves in any humiliating manner for foolishness and frivolity, or to receive a p'rutah from the fools who jest with them.

One who strikes a woman and causes her to miscarry, even though this wasn't his intent, he must pay the value of the fetus to the [woman's] husband, and damage and pain to the woman.

How is the payment for the fetus assessed? We evaluate how much the woman would be worth before she gave birth, and how much she would be worth had she given birth. The difference between these two figures should be given to her husband. If her husband died after she miscarried, the assessment should be given to his heirs. If a woman was struck after her husband died and she miscarried, the assessment for the fetus should also be given to the woman.

If the woman who miscarries was married to a convert, and a person injures her during the convert's lifetime, he must pay the assessment for the fetus to the husband. If the convert dies without leaving any heirs, he is not liable. If the woman is injured after the convert dies, she acquires the right to the assessment for the fetus.

If the woman was a maidservant or a gentile at the time of conception, and was freed or converted before the accident took place, the assessment for the fetus belongs to her.

When a person strikes a woman, and she miscarries and dies, he is not liable for payment, even if he struck her unintentionally.This law is derived as follows. Exodus 21:22 states: "If there will not be a fatal injury, he must certainly be punished financially." Thus, we see that Scripture did not distinguish between unintentional and intentional conduct with regard to an act punishable by execution by the court, and freed the perpetrator from financial liability in all instances.

When does the above apply? When the person intended to strike the woman. When, however, he intended to strike his colleague, but instead struck the woman - although she died - since he killed her without intention, this is considered a matter that does not involve capital punishment, and he is liable for the assessment for the fetus.

A person who strikes his father or his mother, but does not draw blood, is liable to pay the five assessments. If, however, he drew blood while striking his parents or injured a colleague on the Sabbath - even if he did so unintentionally - he is not liable for a financial penalty, because these sins are punishable by execution by the court. And as we explained, Scripture did not distinguish between unintentional and intentional conduct with regard to an act punishable by execution by the court, and freed the perpetrator from financial liability in all instances.

With regard to causing injury on the Sabbath, one might ask: "A person who causes injury is considered to be performing destructive activity, and one who performs destructive activity on the Sabbath is not liable for execution. Why then is the person who causes injury considered to be transgressing a sin punishable by execution by the court?" The resolution is: since the person is satisfying his evil inclination by injuring his colleague, he is considered to be performing constructive activity. Thus, he is performing an act that is punishable by execution. Therefore, he is not liable for a financial penalty.

When a person injures a colleague on Yom Kippur, he is liable to pay financial compensation, even though he did so intentionally. This is the halachah although he transgressed a sin that is punishable by lashes. Generally, whenever a deed that a person commits obligates the person to receive lashes and pay a financial penalty, he should be lashed and is not required to pay a financial penalty, for a person is never obligated for both lashes and a financial penalty. Although this is the general rule, an exception is made with regard to a person who injures a colleague. For the Torah specifically stated that a person who injures a colleague should pay compensation, as Exodus 21:19 states: "He shall pay unemployment compensation."

A person who injures a Canaanite servant whom he owns is not liable for any penalty. If he injures a Hebrew servant whom he owns, he is liable for all the assessments, with the exception of unemployment compensation. When a person injures a Canaanite servant belonging to a colleague, the owner of the injured servant receives the five assessments. Even if he gave him powerful medication that caused the servant pain but healed him quickly, the owner is entitled to payment for all medical expenses.

Whenever a servant has been freed, but his bill of release has not been given to him yet, the penalty granted to the owner if the servant is killed by an ox is not paid because of him. If others injure him, he cannot collect the money for himself, because he is not a totally free man yet. Nor may his owner collect that money, because he no longer owns him. For this reason, if an owner knocks out one of his servant's teeth, and then blinds his eye, he must free him because of his tooth, but he is not required to pay him because of the eye. If, however, the servant seizes the assessment that would be due him, it is not expropriated from him.

When a servant has been half-freed, he must work for his master one day, and may work for himself the next day. The following rules apply if such a servant was embarrassed by a person, or one caused him pain, or he was gored by an ox, or the like. If this took place on the day on which he must work for his master, the master is entitled to the payment. If this took place on the day when he works for himself, he is entitled to the payment.

When a person injures a Hebrew servant belonging to another person, he is liable for all five assessments. Land should be purchased with the money, and the servant's master is entitled to the profits. When the servant is freed, the land is released from his owner's control. If the servant was injured in a way that does not impair his work at all - e.g., the tip of his ear or the tip of his nose was cut off - the entire payment should be given to the servant, and his owner is not entitled to the benefit.

The following rules apply when a person injures a girl below the age of majority who is not his own daughter. If the injuries reduce the money her father would receive for consecrating her, the assessment should be given to her father. Similarly, the unemployment assessment should be given to her father, for her wages belong to him, and the money received for selling her as a servant belongs to him. The assessments for pain, embarrassment and medical attention, by contrast, belong to the girl herself. Similarly, if the injuries do not reduce the money he would receive for consecrating her, the assessment should be given to [the daughter]. When a person injures his own daughter, he must pay her only the assessments for pain, medical attention and embarrassment.

The following rules apply when a person injures a married woman. The unemployment benefits and medical assessment should be given to her husband. With regard to shame and damages, the rules are: If the damage is plainly evident - e.g., he injured the woman's face, her neck, her hands or her arms - a third is given to her, and two thirds are given to her husband. If the damages are in concealed places, a third is given to her husband, and two thirds are given to her. The assessment for the husband should be given to him immediately. The assessment for the woman should be used to purchase land, from which the husband is entitled to the profits.

When does the above apply? When others injured her. When, however, a husband injures his wife, he is required to pay her the entire assessment for the damages, the embarrassment and the pain. This money is hers entirely. The husband has no rights to the profits. If she desires to give the money to another person, she may. This is the ruling rendered by the geonim. The husband must pay for her medical expenses, as he pays for all her other medical expenses.

When a person injures his wife through sexual intercourse, he is liable for the damages.

The following rules apply when a woman injures her husband. In a case where he had added an amount above the minimum to her marriage contract, if the husband desires, we require her to sell the right to this additional amount to her husband for the price she would receive for it, and her husband is entitled to collect the damages from these funds. If he desires, he may divorce her and collect the damages from the entire sum of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. If he had not added an amount above the minimum to her marriage contract, she may not sell him the rights to the money due her by virtue of her ketubah itself, for it is forbidden for a person to remain married to a woman for one moment without a marriage contract. Thus, if the husband desires, he may have a promissory note written obligating her to pay for the damages, or he may divorce her and collect the amount due him from the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.

The following rules apply when a person injures his sons who have attained majority. If they are not dependent on him for their livelihood, he must pay them the damages immediately. If they are below the age of majority, he should purchase land for them with the money due them for the damages,and they are entitled to the benefits. The same rules apply if they are injured by others. If a father injures sons who are dependent on him for their livelihood, he is not liable. This applies whether or not they are above majority. If others injure them, the person who causes the injury must compensate them immediately if they are above majority. If they are below majority, the damages should be used to purchase landed property. They are entitled to its profits until they reach majority at which time the property becomes theirs without limitation.

An encounter with a deaf mute, a mentally incompetent individual or a minor is undesirable. For if a person injures them, he is liable, but if they injure another person, they are not. Even if the deaf mute gains the ability to speak and hear, the mentally incompetent person attains competency, and the minor comes of age, they are not obligated to pay for injuries they caused previously. For at the time they caused the injuries, they were not fully mentally competent.

An encounter with a servant or a married woman is undesirable. For if a person injures them, he is liable, but if they injure another person, they are not liable to pay immediately. They must, however, pay afterwards - i.e., if the woman is divorced or if her husband dies and if the servant is freed. They are held responsible because they are mentally competent. They are considered as a creditor who has no resources with which to pay, and who is thus held liable with regard to damages if he becomes wealthy.

A servant belonging to a man is considered as his own person, and an animal as one of his possessions. What is implied? If a person places a burning coal on the heart of a servant belonging to a colleague and causes him to die, or if he pushes him into the sea or into a fire from which the servant could ascend, but the servant fails to do so and died instead, the person who caused his death is not obligated to pay financial compensation. If, however, he does this to an animal belonging to a colleague, it would be considered as if he had placed a coal on a garment and burned it, in which case he would be liable for damages. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

It is forbidden for a person to injure anyone, neither his own self nor another person. Not only a person who causes an injury, but anyone who strikes in strife an upright Jewish person, whether a minor or an adult, whether a man or a woman, violates a negative commandment, as Deuteronomy 25:3 states: "Do not continue... to flog him." One may conclude that if the Torah adjures us against adding to the blows due a sinner, surely this prohibition applies with regard to striking a righteous person.

It is even forbidden to raise up one's hand against a colleague. Whoever raises a hand against a colleague, even though he does not hit him, is considered to be a wicked person.

When a person strikes a colleague with a blow that does not warrant a p'rutah to be paid in recompense, he should receive lashes. For there is no financial penalty to be exacted for transgression of this negative commandment. Even if a person strikes a servant belonging to a colleague with a blow that does not warrant a p'rutah to be paid in recompense, he should receive lashes. This penalty is required because a servant is obligated to perform certain mitzvot. If a gentile strikes a Jew, he deserves capital punishment, as implied by Exodus 2:12 : "He turned to and fro... and struck the Egyptian."

Our Sages imposed a penalty on foolish and violent men, and gave a person who was injured [the following privilege. His word is accepted when he takes an oath while holding a sacred article that another person caused him such and such an injury, and he is awarded the appropriate damages. This applies provided there are witnesses. What is implied? Two people testify that the injured person entered the domain of the accused whole and left after being injured, but they did not see the injury being inflicted. Although the accused claims not to have inflicted the injury, since the injured person claims that he did, the injured person is given the prerogative of taking an oath and collecting the money due.

When does the above apply? When the injury was located in a place where the person could have inflicted it upon himself, or a third person was there whom the injured person could have instructed to strike him to implicate the accused. If, however, a third party was not present, and the injury was in a place that the injured could not have inflicted upon himself - e.g., he was bitten between his shoulders and the like - he may collect the appropriate payment without an oath.

If the person who caused the injury admits causing it, he is liable to pay all five assessments. For there are witnesses that the injured person entered the accused's domain of sound body at the time of the quarrel and departed with an injury. If, however, there are no witnesses there at all, the injured person states: "This person injured me," and the accused admits doing so, he is not liable for the assessments for damages and the pain. He is, however, liable for the assessments for unemployment, embarrassment and medical attention, because of his own admission. For this reason, if he denies causing the injury, he can free himself of liability by taking a Rabbinic oath.

Why should a person pay these three assessments on the basis of his own admission? The assessments for unemployment and medical attention represent a financial obligation and are not considered to be k'nasot. For if he does not reimburse the injured person for them, he will have caused him to forfeit the money he spent on medical treatment and the money he lost through unemployment. And with regard to embarrassment, it was when he admitted before the court that he caused the injury, that he brought about the embarrassment. For when an injury is caused in private, a person is not caused any embarrassment. It is his admission before the court that embarrasses him.

From this one can conclude that there is no difference with regard to the embarrassment assessment, whether that assessment is due him because he caused the person to be embarrassed in the presence of others, or it is due him because he made an acknowledgement in the presence of others of the embarrassment he caused. Therefore, a person is liable for an embarrassment assessment because of his own statements.

A person who damages a colleague's property cannot be compared to one who injures his physical person. When a person who damages a colleague's property pays him what he is obligated to pay him, he receives atonement. In contrast, when a person injures a colleague's physical person, paying him the five assessments is not alone sufficient to generate atonement. Even if the person who caused the injury sacrifices all the rams of Nevayot, he cannot generate atonement, nor is his sin forgiven until he asks the person who was injured to forgive him.

It is forbidden for the person who suffered the injury to be cruel and not to forgive the one who caused the injury. This is not the course of behavior for a descendant of Israel. Instead, since the person who caused the injury asks and pleads of him for forgiveness once or twice, and he knows that he has repented from his sin and regrets his evil deeds, he should forgive him. Whoever hastens to grant forgiveness is praiseworthy and is regarded favorably by the Sages.

There is another difference between the damages to an individual's physical person and to his property. If a person tells a colleague: "Blind my eye..." or "Cut off my arm, and you will not be liable," he is liable for the five assessments. The rationale is that it is well known that a person does not genuinely desire this. When, by contrast, a person tells a colleague: "Tear my garment..." or "Break my jug, and you will not be liable," he is not liable. If, however, he did permit him to damage his property, but did not stipulate that he would not be liable, he is obligated to pay for the damages.

When does the above apply? When first the person entrusted the articles to the person who destroyed them as a watchman - i.e., he borrowed them or was entrusted with them for safekeeping. In such a situation, if the owner told the watchman to break it or rip it, and the watchman did so, the watchman is liable to pay for the damages, unless the owner explicitly stipulated that the watchman would not be held liable. When, however, the owner of an article tells a colleague: "Take this utensil and break it," "Take this garment and rip it," if the other person follows the instructions he was given, he is not liable.

When a person tells a colleague: "Break a utensil belonging to so and so, and you will not be liable," and the listener follows these instructions, the listener is liable financially. It is as if he told him: "Blind so-and-so's eye, and you will not be liable." Although the person who caused the damages is liable to pay, the person who gave him the instructions is considered to be his partner in the transgression and a wicked person. For he caused a blind man to stumble, and supported a person who committed a transgression.

A person who damages property belonging to a colleague is obligated to pay the full extent of the damages. Regardless of whether he did so unintentionally or because of forces beyond his control, it is considered as if he had acted intentionally. What is implied? If a person fell off a roof and broke utensils, or tripped while he was walking, fell on a utensil and broke it, he is liable to pay the full extent of the damages. This is implied by Leviticus 24:21, which states: "A person who strikes an animal will pay for the damages," without distinguishing between an intentional and unintentional blow.

The same laws i.e., that the person who caused the damage should pay for it, as indicated by the proof-text apply whether one kills an animal belonging to a colleague, breaks his utensils, tears his garments or cuts down crops or trees he planted.

When does the above apply? When the damage is done in a domain belonging to the person whose possessions were damaged. If the damage was done in a domain belonging to the person who caused the damage, he is not required to pay unless he purposely caused the damage. If he caused the damage unintentionally or due to forces beyond his control, he is not liable. Similarly, if both of them were present in a domain belonging to a third party with his permission - or without his permission - and one unintentionally damaged property belonging to the other, the person who caused the damage is not liable.

The following rules apply when a person was climbing a ladder and the rung of the ladder broke under him, and it fell and caused damage. If the rung was not tightly fit or it was not strong enough to bear the person's weight, he is liable. If it was tightly fit and strong enough to bear the person's weight, but it slipped from its place or rotted, the person is not liable. For this is an act of G-d. The same concepts apply in all analogous situations. All the above applies if the damage takes place in the domain belonging to the person whose possessions were damaged. If the damage takes place in the domain belonging to the person who causes the damage, he is not liable unless he intentionally causes the damage, as explained above.

If another person filled a courtyard belonging to a colleague with jugs of wine and oil, the owner of the courtyard may enter and leave in an ordinary manner. If any of the jugs break when he enters or leaves, he is not liable for them. This applies even if the jugs were brought in with the permission of the owner of the courtyard, as long as the owner of the courtyard did not accept responsibility for watching them. If, however, the owner of the courtyard broke the jugs intentionally, he is liable to pay for them. This applies even if the jugs were brought in without the permission of the owner of the courtyard.

When one ox climbs on top of another ox with the intention of killing it in a domain belonging to the owner of the lower ox, and the owner of the lower ox pulls his ox away to save it, thus causing the upper ox to fall and die, the owner of the lower ox is not liable. This applies regardless of whether the ox that attacked was tam or mu'ad.

The following rules apply when the owner of the lower ox pushes the upper ox, and it dies. If he could have pulled one ox away, so that the attacking ox would not be pushed violently, and he did not do so, he is liable. If he could not have pulled an ox away, he is not liable.

The following rules apply when two people were walking in the public domain. If one approached carrying a jug, and the other approached carrying a beam, and the person's jug was broken by the other's beam, the owner of the beam is not liable. The rationale is that they both have permission to walk in this domain. If the owner of the beam was walking ahead and the owner of the jug following afterwards, and the jug was broken on the beam,the owner of the beam is not liable. If the owner of the beam stood still to rest because of the weight of his burden, and the jug was broken on the beam, the owner of the beam is liable. If the owner of the beam warned the owner of the jug and told him to stand still, the owner of the beam is not liable. If the owner of the beam stood still to adjust his burden, he is considered as if he is walking, and he is not liable. This applies even if he failed to warn the owner of the jug, for he is preoccupied with his own progress. If the owner of the jug was walking ahead, and the owner of the beam following afterwards, and the jug was broken on the beam, the owner of the beam is liable. It is considered as if he broke the jug intentionally with his hands. If the owner of the jug stood to rest, the owner of the beam is not liable. If, however, the owner of the jug warned the owner of the beam and told him to stand, the owner of the beam is liable. If the owner of the jug stood still to adjust his burden, the owner of the beam is liable, even if the owner of the jug did not warn him. Similar principles apply if one person proceeds while carrying a lamp, and another comes carrying flax, or in other analogous situations.

When two people were proceeding in the public domain, one of them was running and one was walking, and one was injured by the other unintentionally, the one who is running is liable, for he is departing from the norm. If it was Friday afternoon, after sunset, when the collision took place, he is not liable. For he has permission to run at that time, so that the Sabbath will not enter when he is not ready to accept it. If both individuals were running, and one injured the other, neither is liable. This applies even on other days.

There is no difference whether a person injures a colleague with his hand, injures him by throwing a stone or shooting an arrow, opens a current of water on a person or on utensils and damages him or them, or spits or sneezes and causes damage with his spittle or mucus while it is being propelled by his power. All of these are considered derivatives of damage that a person causes,and he is liable for all of them, as if he had caused the damage with his hands. If, however, the spittle or the mucus came to rest on the ground, and afterwards a person slips on them, the person who spat or sneezed is liable as if it were a cistern. For every obstacle is considered a derivative of a cistern, as we have previously explained.

When a blacksmith who was beating with a hammer on an anvil causes a spark to fly from beneath the hammer, and the spark causes damage, the blacksmith is liable. It is as if he threw a stone or an arrow. Similarly, if a builder who is contracted to tear down a wall cracks the stones or causes other damage, he is liable. If he is tearing down one side of a wall, and the stones on the other side fall, he is not liable. If they fall because of his blows, he is liable. For this is considered like shooting arrows and causing damage.

A person who holds under water an animal belonging to a colleague, or if an animal fell into water and he prevented it from ascending and thus caused it to die in the water, or if he left it in the sun and restricted its movement so that it could not find shade until the sun killed it - in all these, and in any analogous situations, the perpetrator of these acts is liable to pay for the animal's loss.

If two people kill an animal together or break a utensil together, the damages are divided between them.

Our Sages ruled in the following manner concerning the liability in the situation to be described. Five people placed their five burdens on an animal and it did not die, and then a sixth person came and placed his burden upon it, and it did die. If the animal was walking while carrying the previous burdens, and it stood still and did not walk when the last person placed its burden upon it, the last person is liable. If at the outset, the animal was not walking, the last person is not liable. If it is not known whether or not the animal was walking, all the six people should share the damages equally.

Similarly, if five people sat on a chair and it did not break, and then another person sat down upon it and it did break, the last person who sat down is liable. Although it was fit to break before he sat down, he is responsible, since he caused it to break sooner. For the others could say to him: "Had you not used it for support, we would have stood up before it broke." If they all sat down at the same time, they are all liable. The same rules apply in other analogous situations.

Our Sages divided the liability for the damages in situations when a man and an ox combined to push into a cistern a person, utensils, or an ox that was disqualified for use as a sacrifice. If the person or the animal pushed into the cistern was injured or died, or the utensils were broken, all three - the person who pushed, the owner of the ox and the owner of the cistern - are liable, and the damages should be divided among them in the following manner. With regard to the payment for offspring which were aborted because of the fall and the four assessments other than damages, the man is liable, and the owner of the ox and the owner of the cistern are not liable. With regard to the atonement fine and the fine of 30 shekalim for killing a servant, the owner of the ox is liable, and the man and the owner of the cistern are not liable. With regard to the destruction of utensils and the death of an animal that was disqualified as a sacrifice, the man and the owner of the ox are liable, and the owner of the cistern is not liable.

When a person causes damage to a colleague's property that is not evident to the eye, he is not liable to make financial restitution according to Scriptural Law. For the object has not changed, nor has its form become altered. Nevertheless, our Sages ruled that he is liable according to Rabbinic Law, for he reduced the value of the article. They required him to pay the amount by which its value was reduced.

What is implied? If a person causes food belonging to a colleague to be rendered ritually impure, he mixes produce together with produce that is terumah causing it to be considered dimu'a, he mixes a drop of wine that had been used for the sake of idolatry in a colleague's wine, causing the entire quantity to be forbidden, or the like - the amount of the loss is evaluated, and the person who caused the loss is required to pay the entire damages from the finest property in his possession, as is the law regarding anyone who causes damages.

This ruling was a penalty prescribed by our Sages so that none of the ravagers will go and render a colleague's produce impure and then excuse himself, saying: "I am not liable." For this reason, if the person who caused damage that is not noticeable dies, the penalty is not expropriated from his estate. For our Sages enforced this penalty only upon the person who transgressed and caused the damage, but not on his heirs, who did not cause any damage. Similarly, a person who inadvertently causes damage that is not noticeable, or as a result of forces beyond his control, is not liable, for our Sages imposed this penalty only upon a person who intentionally causes damage.

When priests intentionally cause a sacrifice to be rendered piggul, they are obligated to make financial recompense to the person who brought the sacrifice. If they cause such an effect unintentionally, they are not liable. Similarly, a person who intentionally performs work with a red heifer or with water designated for its ashes is obligated to make financial recompense to its owner. If he does so unintentionally, he is not liable.

A person who brings a red heifer to the place where a team of cows are threshing, so that it will nurse and thresh, and a person who is carrying water designated for the ashes of the red heifer who diverts his attention from the water is not held liable by an earthly court. He does, however, have a moral and spiritual obligation to make financial recompense.

When a person pours wine belonging to a colleague as a libation to idol worship, he does not cause the wine to become forbidden. For a Jewish person does not cause property that does not belong to him to become forbidden. In any of the following situations, the person does cause the wine to be forbidden, and he is therefore liable to make financial recompense: a) he is a partner with the owner; b) he is an apostate, who is considered like a gentile; c) he is given a warning, acknowledges it, and yet disobeys, in which case he is considered an apostate. How is it possible for such a person to be liable for financial recompense when this act causes him to be liable for capital punishment? Because he becomes obligated to pay for the wine at the time that he lifts it up, while he does not become liable for capital punishment until he actually pours it as a libation.

Whenever a person causes property belonging to a colleague to be damaged - even though he himself is not the one who ultimately causes the damage - since he is the primary cause, he is liable to make financial recompense from the finest property in his possession, like others who cause damage. What is implied? A person throws a utensil that he owns from a roof onto pillows and blankets, and another person comes and removes the pillows from the ground, causing the utensil to hit the ground and break. The person who removes the pillows is liable to pay the entire sum of the damages, as if he broke the utensil with his own hands. For it was the removal of the pillows and the coverings that caused the utensil to break. The same applies in all analogous situations.

When by contrast a person throws a utensil belonging to a colleague from a roof onto pillows and blankets that belong to the owner of the utensil, and the owner comes and removes the pillows from the ground, the person who threw the utensil is liable to pay for the damages to it. His throwing the utensil is the primary cause for its breaking. In the above instance, if a person other than the owner of the utensil removes the pillows, both the person who threw the utensil and the one who removed the pillows are liable. For together they both caused the owner's property to be damaged.

Similarly, a person who burns promissory notes belonging to a colleague is liable to pay the entire debt that was mentioned in the promissory notes. Although the promissory notes themselves are not of financial worth, by burning them one causes his colleague a direct financial loss. When does this apply? Only when the person who burned the note admits that it had been validated in court, that it was for such and such an amount of money and that because it was burned the owner cannot collect the debt. If the person who burned the note does not believe the owner with regard to any of these points,he is required to pay only the value of the paper.

Similarly a person is liable for causing a colleague financial loss in the following situation. Reuven was owed money by Shimon and sold the promissory note recording the debt to Levi. After he sold the note, he waived Shimon's obligation, freeing Shimon of responsibility, as will be explained in its place. Reuven becomes liable to pay Levi the entire amount mentioned in the promissory note, for he caused him to lose the money that he could have collected with the note. It is as if he destroyed it by fire. Similarly, if one of Reuven's heirs waived the debt, the person who waived the debt must make financial recompense for Levi's loss from the finest property in his possession.

Similarly, if a person designates a servant as an apotiki for a loan and then frees the servant, he is liable to pay the creditor, for he nullified his lien and caused him to lose his money. We also compel the creditor to free the servant, so that when he encounters him, he will not tell him: "You are my servant." Similarly, if a person pushes a colleague and causes a coin belonging to him to fall from his hand and roll until it descends into the sea, he is liable to pay for it. Similarly, if a person blemishes the ear of a cow, he is obligated to make financial recompense, for he has reduced its value. Similarly, a person who scrapes the surface of dinarim belonging to a colleague and removes their imprint is liable to pay, for he has caused him a loss. The same applies in all analogous situations.

When a person throws a utensil from a roof toward the earth without there being any pillows beneath it to soften its fall, and another person comes and breaks the utensil with a staff while it is in the air before it hits the earth, the person who breaks it is not liable. The rationale is that he broke only a utensil that would certainly have been broken immediately. And so, it is as if he is breaking a broken utensil. He is not considered to be one who caused damages. Similarly, anyone who performs analogous actions is not liable.

The following rule applies when a person, without the consent of the owner, slaughters an ox that was condemned to be slaughtered because it injures others,or cuts down a tree that was condemned to be cut down because it causes damage to others. He is liable to pay the owner as dictated by the judges, because he prevented him from performing a mitzvah. If the person who caused the damage claims that the owner told him to slaughter the animal or cut down the tree, he is not liable since it was intended for that fate.

Similarly, if a person slaughters a beast or a fowl, and another person covers the blood without the consent of the slaughterer, he is liable to pay a fine as dictated by the judges. There are authorities who rule that in such instances a fine of a fixed amount, ten gold pieces, should be paid. For they ruled that anyone who prevents a colleague from performing a positive commandment - that he is fit to perform - by performing it first, should pay the owner ten gold pieces.

When a person causes damage with his own hands, the damage is evaluated in the same way as it would have been evaluated if the damage had been caused by his property. What is implied? If a person kills an animal belonging to a colleague or breaks one of his utensils, we evaluate the animal's previous worth and the worth of the carcass, or the utensil's previous worth and its present worth. The person who caused the damage must pay the difference to the owner together with the carcass or the broken utensil, as we have explained above with regard to damage caused by an ox. For the same principles prevail. If a person treads grapes belonging to a colleague, we must evaluate the loss. The same principles apply in other analogous situations.

When the loss he caused is expropriated from the person who caused the damage, it should be expropriated from his movableproperty. If he has no movable property, it should be expropriated from the finest landed property that he owns. Similarly, the fines to be paid by a rapist, a seducer or a person who spreads malicious gossip about his wife must be paid from the finest landed property that he owns.

When someone damages property belonging to a colleague and does not know the extent of the damage, the person whose property was damaged is given the prerogative of taking an oath according to the institutions of our Sages - as is a person whose property was stolen - and he may then collect the money that he claims. This applies provided he claims property that one might suppose that he did possess, as has been explained with regard to a person whose property was stolen.

What is implied? A person takes a wallet belonging to a colleague and throws it into the sea, or into a fire, or gives it to a person of force and thus causes it to be lost. The owner of the wallet claims that it was filled with gold coins, while the person who caused the damage says: "I do not know what it contained. Perhaps all it contained was earth or straw." The person whose property was damaged is entitled to take an oath while holding a sacred article and collect the money he claims, provided he claims articles that we may assume that he owns or that were entrusted to him and would ordinarily be put in a wallet or the like. If, however, it is not customary to place such articles in such containers, the owner is considered negligent and the person who caused the damage is not held liable. What is implied? A person grabbed a filled covered leather sack or basket and threw it into the water or burned it. The person whose property was destroyed claimed that it was filled with pearls. His claim is not accepted, and the person who caused the damage is not required to take an oath. For it is not customary to place pearls in baskets or leather sacks. If, however, the person whose property was damaged seizes property belonging to the person who caused the damage equivalent to the value of his claim, it should not be expropriated from him. Instead, he is required to take an oath that it contained pearls, and then he is able to keep their worth from the goods that he seized. The same laws apply in all analogous situations.

If the person who caused the damage knew that the wallet contained gold coins, but does not know their amount, and the person whose property was damaged claimed that it contained 1000 coins, the plaintiff's claim is accepted. He may collect 1000 gold coins without taking an oath provided he could be presumed [to possess such an amount of money. For the defendant is required to take an oath, but cannot, as will be explained with regard to an entrusted object.

When a person informs about property belonging to a colleague and causes it to be taken by a strong, lawless person, he is required to reimburse the owner from the finest property in his possession. If the person who informs about the property dies, the owner may collect his due from his heirs, as is the law concerning others who cause damage. Whether the strong, lawless person is a gentile or a Jew, the person who informs about the property to be taken by him is considered a moseir and is required to reimburse the owner for everything taken by the lawless person. This applies even if the moseir did not actually hand the other person's property over to the lawless person, but merely informed him about it.

When does the above apply? When the moseir showed the lawless person his colleague's property on his own volition. If, however, gentiles or Jews compelled a person to show them property belonging to a colleague, he is not liable to reimburse his colleague. Nevertheless, should he physically give over his colleague's property to a lawless person, he is liable to reimburse his colleague even though he was forced to do so. The rationale is that a person who saves himself with money belonging to a colleague is obligated to reimburse him.

What is implied? A king decreed that wine, straw or the like should be brought to him. A moseir arose and said: "So and so has a storehouse of wine or straw in this and this place." If the king's servants went and took possession of the other person's property, the moseir is required to compensate him. If the king compelled this moseir to go and show him the storehouses of wine or straw, or to show him property belonging to a colleague who is fleeing from the king, and the moseir showed him because of the compulsion, he is not liable. If he had not shown these resources to the king, he would have been beaten or killed.

If the moseir took his colleague's property and handed it to the lawless individual, he is liable to pay, although the king compelled him to do so. When is he liable to pay if, under duress, he took his colleague's property and handed it to the lawless individual? When the property did not come into the lawless person's possession previously. Different laws apply if, however, the lawless person compelled a Jew to show him a colleague's property, and the lawless person stood over the colleague's property and it came into his possession. If he then compelled a Jew to transport the colleague's property to another place, even if the person who transported the property is the moseir who showed it to the lawless person, the Jew is not liable. The rationale is that since the lawless person stood at the side of the storehouse, it is considered as if all its contents had been already destroyed; it is as if they had been consumed by fire.

The following rule applies when two litigants are involved in a dispute concerning landed or movable property, each one claiming that it belongs to him. If one of them turns the property in question over to a gentile, he should be placed under a ban of ostracism until he removes the lawless person from the situation, returns the circumstances to their former state and brings the matter for judgment in a Jewish court.

When a person was apprehended by gentiles because of a colleague, and his money was taken by them because of that colleague, the colleague is not liable to reimburse him. The only instance that reimbursement is required from a colleague when a person is apprehended on that colleague's behalf is when a person is apprehended because of someone's failure to pay the head tax that is applied to all the inhabitants of a country each year, or because of the gift that every individual is required to give the king when he or his soldiers require hospitality. In these instances, the person who failed to pay is obligated to reimburse the person who made the payment, provided the money was taken from him explicitly on account of his colleague, and this took place in the presence of witnesses.

The following laws apply when there are witnesses that a person informed about property belonging to a colleague to a lawless person in a manner that obligates him for reimbursement - i.e., he pointed out his colleague's property on his own initiative or was compelled actually to bring the property to the lawless person, but the witnesses do not know the value of the loss he caused. If the person whose property was taken claims that he lost a specific amount, while the moseir denies that such a loss took place, and the person whose property was taken seizes property belonging to the moseir, it is not expropriated from him. Instead, the plaintiff is required to take an oath while holding a sacred article, and then he is entitled to maintain possession of the property he seized. If the plaintiff did not seize the moseir's property, property may not be expropriated from the moseir unless there is definite proof of the extent of the loss he caused.

A moseir who showed a colleague's property to a lawless man on his own initiative is not given the prerogative of taking an oath. This applies both to a severe oath, or a sh'vuat hesset. For such a person is deemed wicked; there is no disqualifying factor greater than this. When, however, a person was compelled to show a lawless man a colleague's property or compelled actually to bring this property to the lawless person, in which instance he is liable to pay, he is not deemed a wicked person. He may be liable to pay, but he is entitled to take an oath, like other worthy men.

It is forbidden to inform about a colleague to the gentiles and endanger his physical person or his property. This applies even when the person concerned is a wicked person who commits sins, and even if he causes one irritation and discomfort. Anyone who actually informs about a Jew and endangers his person or his property to the gentiles will not receive a portion in the world to come.

It is permissible to kill a moseir in any country,even in the present age, when the court no longer metes out capital punishment. It is permitted to kill him before he informs. When he says: "I will inform on so and so and endanger his person and/or his property" - even property of minimal value - he has made it permissible for others to kill him. He should be warned and told: "Do not inform." If he says brazenly, "No. I will inform about him," it is a mitzvah to kill him, and whoever kills him receives merit.

If the informer has executed what he planned, and reported, it seems to me that it is forbidden to kill him, unless he is a confirmed informer, in which case he should be killed lest he continue to inform against others. There are frequent cases in the cities of Northern Africa where informers, who are known to report Jewish funds to oppressors, are killed or handed over to the non-Jewish authorities to be executed, beaten, or imprisoned, in accordance with their wickedness. One may inform on individuals who pressure or cause pain to the community to an idolater who may beat, incarcerate or fine them. However, one may not inform to protect a single individual from pain. It is forbidden to destroy the property of an informer, even though it is permissible to destroy him physically, since his property belongs to his heirs.

When a rodef pursues another Jew to kill or to rape him or her and breaks utensils - either those belonging to the person he is pursuing, or those belonging to another person - he is not liable to make financial restitution. The rationale is that he is liable to be killed, for pursuing another Jew warrants his own death.

When a person who is being pursued destroys utensils belonging to the rodef, he is not liable. The rationale is that the rodef's property should not be considered dearer than his life. If he breaks utensils belonging to others, he is liable. For a person who saves his own life with property belonging to someone else must make restitution.

When a person pursues a rodef to save the person he is pursuing, and in so doing breaks utensils - whether those belonging to the rodef or those belonging to another person - he is not liable. This does not follow the letter of the law, but is a Rabbinic ordinance, enacted so that a person will not refrain from trying to save his colleague, or will hesitate and proceed carefully while he chases after the rodef.

When a ship is about to sink because it is heavily loaded, and one person stands up and makes it lighter by jettisoning some of its cargo, he is not liable. For the cargo is considered like a rodef who is pursuing them to kill the passengers. On the contrary, by jettisoning the cargo and saving them, he performed a great mitzvah. This concludes "The Laws of Injury and Damages" with G-d's help.