Robbery and Lost Property

Whoever robs an object worth a p'rutah from a colleague transgresses a negative commandment, as Leviticus 19:13 states: "Do not rob." Violation of this negative commandment is not punished by lashes, because it can be corrected by the fulfillment of a positive commandment. For if a person robs, he is obligated to return what he obtained by robbery, as ibid. 5:23 states: "And he shall return the article he obtained by robbery." This is a positive commandment. Even if the robber burned the object that he obtained by robbery, he is not punished by lashing, because he remains obligated to pay its value. And whenever the transgression of a negative commandment results in a financial penalty, it is not punished by lashing.

It is forbidden to rob even the slightest amount. It is forbidden even to rob or to withhold money from a gentile who worships idols. If one robs or withholds money from such a person, one must return it.

What is meant by a robber? A person who takes by force property belonging to a colleague. For example, a person who seizes movable property from a colleague's hand, who enters a colleague's domain and takes utensils against his colleague's will, who seizes a colleague's servants or livestock and makes use of them, or who enters a colleague's field and eats his produce. These and any similar acts are considered robbery, as reflected by II Samuel 23:21, which states: "And he robbed the spear from the Egyptian."

What is meant by withholding a colleague's due? It refers to a person who was given money willingly by a colleague and then, when it was demanded of him, he forcefully maintained possession of it and refused to return it. For example, a person was given a loan or had hired a colleague, and when payment was demanded he forcefully refused to pay. Concerning this we were commanded, Leviticus 19:13: "Do not withhold money from your colleague."

Whoever robs is obligated to return the article that he obtained by robbery itself, as it is written: "And he shall return the article he obtained by robbery." If this article was lost or underwent a change, the robber must pay its value. Whether he admits the robbery himself, or witnesses come and testify that he committed robbery, he is required to pay only the principal that he obtained by robbery. Even if a person robbed a beam and used it in building a house, Scriptural Law requires that he tear down the entire building and return the beam to its owner, for the beam remained unchanged. Nevertheless, to encourage robbers to repent, our Sages ordained that the robber pay the worth of the beam and did not require him to destroy his building. The same applies in all similar situations. Even if a person robbed a beam and used it in building a sukkah on Sukkot, and the owner came and demanded the return of the beam in the midst of the festival, the robber is required to pay only its value. After the conclusion of the festival, however, since the beam remains unchanged and it was not permanently affixed with mortar, the robber must return the beam itself.

When a person robs something worth less than a p'rutah, although he has committed a transgression, he is not required to return the article he obtained by robbery. If a person robbed three bundles of vegetables or of branches that were originally worth three p'rutot, and their value decreased so that the three are now worth only two p'rutot, it is not sufficient for him to return two bundles. He is obligated to return the third, for it was originally worth a p'rutah. If the person robbed two items together worth a p'rutah and returned one of them, he is not considered to possess an article that was robbed, nor has he an obligation to return the item that was robbed.

When a person robs from a colleague in a settled region, and in the desert offers to return the article that he obtained by robbery, the option is given to the person who was robbed. If he desires, he may take his article. If not, he may tell the robber: "I will accept the return of the article only in a settled region, lest it be taken from me here by powers beyond my control." In such an instance, the article remains the responsibility of the robber until he returns it to the person in a settled region. The same principles apply with regard to payment for a robbed article.

When a person robs money from a colleague and returns it by including it in change he returns to the person whom he robbed, he fulfills the obligation of returning the article he obtained by robbery. Moreover, even if the robber returned the money to a wallet belonging to the owner that contains money, he fulfills his obligation, because a person usually checks his wallet at all times, and the owner will count the money that was returned together with his money. The rationale is that an accounting that is made without the owner's having been informed of the money's return is sufficient. If the robber returned the money that he obtained by robbery to a wallet that is empty, he does not fulfill his obligation. He remains responsible for the money he obtained by robbery] until he informs the owner that he returned the money to that particular wallet.

Anyone who covets a servant, a maidservant, a house or utensils that belong to a colleague, or any other article that he can purchase from him and pressures him with friends and requests until he agrees to sell it to him, violates a negative commandment,even though he pays much money for it, as Exodus 20:14 states: "Do not covet." The violation of this commandment is not punished by lashes, because it does not involve a deed. One does not violate this commandment until one actually takes the article he covets, as reflected by Deuteronomy 7:25: "Do not covet the gold and silver on these statues and take it for yourself." Implied is that the Hebrew tachmod refers to coveting accompanied by a deed.

Anyone who desires a home, a wife, utensils, or anything else belonging to a colleague that he can acquire from him, violates a negative commandment at the time he thinks in his heart, "How is it possible to acquire this from him?" and his heart is aroused by the matter, as Deuteronomy 5:18 states: "Do not desire...." Desire refers to feelings in the heart alone.

Desire leads to coveting and coveting leads to robbery.For if the owners do not desire to sell despite the offer of much money and many supplications by friends, the person motivated by desire will be moved to robbery, as Michah 2:2 states: "They coveted houses and stole." And if the owner stands up against them to save his property, or in another way prevents the person motivated by desire from robbing, he will be moved to murder. Take, for example, the narrative of Ach'av and Navot.

Thus, we see that a person who desires another person's property violates one negative commandment. One who purchases an object he desires after pressuring the owners and repeatedly asking them, violates two negative commandments. For that reason, the Torah prohibits both desiring and coveting. If he takes the article by robbery, he violates three negative commandments.

Whenever a person robs a colleague of even a p'rutah's worth, he is considered as if he took his very soul, as Proverbs 1:19 states: "Such are the ways of those who are greedy. They take away the soul of the owner." Notwithstanding the severity of this sin, if the article that was taken by robbery no longer exists, and a robber seeks to repent and comes of his own volition to return the value of the article he obtained by robbery, our Sages ordained that one should not accept it. Instead, the robber should be helped and forgiven, to make the path of repentance more accessible to those who wish to return. Our Sages did not look favorably on anyone who accepts payment for an article that was taken from him through robbery.

When an object taken by robbery remains unchanged, it itself must be returned to its original owner. This applies even when the owner has despaired of its return, and even when the robber himself has died, and the article is in his children's possession. If, however, the article underwent a change while in the robber's possession the robber acquires it because of the change and is required to pay its value at the time of the robbery. This applies even when the owners have not despaired of its recovery.

This is the law as prescribed by the Torah, as Leviticus 5:23 states: "And he shall return the object he obtained by robbery." The Oral Tradition interprets that verse to mean: If the object is still as it was at the time of the robbery, it should be returned. If it has undergone a change, he should pay its value. If the owner despaired of its return, but it did not undergo a change, the robber acquires the right to its increase in value from the time the owner despaired. He is required to pay only the value of the article at the time of the robbery. This is also a Rabbinic ordinance to encourage repentance. In such an instance, when he returns the object he obtained by robbery, the increase in value is evaluated, and the robber is paid for it by the person he robbed.

If the robber sold the article obtained by robbery or gave it as a present and the owner despaired of its return, the purchaser is not required to return the article itself even though it did not undergo a change. Since the owner despaired of its return - regardless of whether that took place before the sale or afterwards - the purchaser acquires possession of it, because of the despair and because of the transfer from one domain to another.

When a person obtains an article by robbery, causes it to increase in value, and then sells it or bequeaths it to another person, he bequeaths or sells the increase in value, and the purchaser or the heir acquires the right to this increase. Therefore, at the time of judgment, he should be reimbursed by the original owner for the increase in value, and then return to him the article obtained by robbery. The original owner may then collect the worth of the increase in value from the robber, for he did not despair of its return. Similarly, if the purchaser or the heir caused the object to increase in value, the original owner should reimburse them for that increase.

If the robber sold the object obtained by robbery to a gentile, and the gentile caused it to increase in value, at the time of judgment, the article and the increase must be returned to the original owner. If the gentile sold it to a Jew after it increased in value, since the robber is a Jew and the person in possession of the article is a Jew, the purchaser is considered to have acquired the increase in value. If, however, the original owner seizes the increase in value without paying for it, it is not expropriated from his possession.

As explained, in order to encourage repentance our Sages ruled that when an article obtained by robbery increases in value after the owner despairs of its return or after it has undergone a change, the robber is entitled to the increase in value. This applies even when the change comes about as a matter of course. What is implied? If a person obtained a cow by robbery and it became pregnant in his possession, whether or not it bore a calf before he was called to court because of the robbery - since the owner despaired of its return, he is required to pay only the value of the cow at the time of the robbery. Similarly, if he stole a sheep and it grew wool, whether he sheared it before he was called to court or it had not yet been shorn, he is required to pay only its value at the time of the robbery. If it bore offspring or was shorn, the robber is entitled to the offspring or the shearings. If it had not borne offspring, nor was it shorn at that time, the animal's increase in value is evaluated and may be collected from the original owner. Then the animal itself is returned.

If a person obtained a pregnant cow by robbery, the owner despaired of its return and then it bore offspring, or he obtained a sheep laden with wool by robbery, the owner despaired of its return and then it was shorn, the robber should pay the value of a cow ready to bear offspring and a sheep ready to be shorn. If the animal bore offspring or was shorn before the owner despaired of its return, the shearings or the offspring belong to the original owner. This applies even if the animal became pregnant or grew wool while in the possession of the thief. Since the owner did not despair, and the animal did not undergo a change, the object obtained by robbery is still considered to belong to its original owner, although the robber is held responsible in cases of loss due to forces beyond his control.

If a person stole or obtained an animal by robbery and consecrated or slaughtered it after its owner despaired of its return, it is considered to be the thief's property only from the time he consecrated it. This was enacted so that the sinner will not profit. All its offspring and its shearings from the time that it was stolen until the time it was consecrated belong to its original owner.

When does the above apply? To an increase in value that comes as a matter of course - e.g., an animal's shearing or its offspring. If, however, an animal was gaunt, and the robber fattened it, the robber may collect the increase in value due to the fattening from the original owner, even if it took place before the owner despaired. The same applies with regard to all instances where the increase in value comes about as a result of expense.

A change that can revert to its original state is not considered to be a change. What is implied? When a person obtains boards by robbery and attaches them to each other with nails and makes a chest, this is not considered a change. For it is possible to separate them and make them simple boards, as they were previously.

If a person obtained sand by robbery and made it into a brick, he does not acquire it, because one can crush the brick and return it to sand. If he obtained a strip of metal by robbery and made it into a coin, he does not acquire it, because one can melt the coin and return it to a strip of metal, as it was beforehand. The same principles apply in other similar instances.

If, however, a person obtained boards by robbery and burned them, cut them or carved them, and in this way fashioned them into a utensil; he obtained wool by robbery and dyed it, spun it or whitened it; he obtained threads by robbery and made them into a garment; he obtained a brick by robbery and made it into dust; obtained stones by robbery and smoothed them; or he obtained coins by robbery and melted them - this is considered a change, for if he makes other coins - or similarly undoes the other changes mentioned above - they are considered to be new entities. The same principles apply in all similar situations.

When a person robs old coins, polishes them and renews them, he is not considered to have acquired them, for they will age and return to their previous state. If, however, he obtains new coins by robbery and causes them to look old, he does acquire them. For if they were made to appear new again, that would be considered to be a new development. A person who robs a date palm that is growing and cuts it down does not acquire it. This applies even if he cuts it into sections. If he makes it into boards, he does acquire it.

If a person obtains large beams by robbery and cuts them into small beams, he does not acquire them. If he cuts them into boards, causing them to be called by a different name, he does acquire them. If one obtained a palm branch by robbery and separated its leaves, one acquires the leaves. If one obtained palm leaves by robbery and made them into a broom, one acquires the broom. If one obtains a lamb by robbery and it becomes a ram, or one obtains a calf by robbery and it becomes an ox, it is considered to have undergone a change while in the robber's possession. Therefore, he is considered to have acquired it, and he is required to pay only the value of the article at the time of the robbery, despite the fact that the owner never despaired of the article's return.

If a person obtains a utensil by robbery and breaks it, we do not evaluate its depreciation. Instead, the robber is obligated to pay its worth, and he is given the broken utensil. If, however, the original owner desires to take the broken utensil, he is granted it, and the robber must pay for its depreciation. This ordinance was instituted for the sake of the owner, and if he does not desire it, he is granted that prerogative. Similar principles apply in other analogous situations.

When an object obtained by robbery does not undergo a change, but its value increases, it itself must be returned to its original owner, and the robber is not entitled to anything. This applies even if the owner has despaired of its return. For the Sages granted the robber only the increase in value after the owner despaired of the object's return, in instances like the shearing of wool and the offspring. He is not, however, granted any increase in value that comes from the rise in article's worth when it is returned intact to its owner.

The following rules apply when a person robs a jug of wine from a colleague that was worth a dinar at the time of the robbery and increased in value while in the robber's possession until it was worth four dinarim. If he broke the jug, drank its contents, sold it or gave it away as a present after it increased in value, he must pay four dinarim - its worth when it left his possession. The rationale is that if he had left it, he would have had to return it intact. If it broke because of other causes or it was lost, the robber must pay only a dinar, its value at the time of the robbery.

If it was worth four dinarim at the time of the robbery, but only one dinar when it left his possession, he must pay the four dinarim it was worth at the time of the robbery. This applies whether he broke it or drank it, or whether it was broken or lost due to other causes. The same principles apply in other analogous situations.

The following rules apply when a person obtains by robbery a basket of fifty dates. If the entire basket were sold together it would cost nine coins, but if the dates were sold one by one they would be sold for ten. The robber is required to pay only nine. We do not heed the claim of the owner, who argues: "I would have sold them one by one." Similar laws apply if a person damages a colleague's property or is required to reimburse him for a loss in a similar instance. This principle does not apply, however, with regard to property that is consecrated. In that instance, the robber must pay ten coins.

When a person obtains an animal by robbery and it becomes old, or it becomes weak and will never regain its strength - e.g., because of an illness for which there is no cure - a coin and it cracked or was disqualified by the ruling authorities, produce and the entire amount rotted, or wine and it became vinegar, he is considered to be a person who obtained a utensil by robbery and destroyed it, and he must pay the worth of the article obtained by robbery at the time of the robbery. If, however, a person obtained animals by robbery and they became weaker, but their strength could be restored; servants and they became old; a coin and it was disqualified as currency by one country, but still accepted by another; produce of which a portion became rotten; terumah that became impure;leaven, and the festival of Passover was celebrated; or an animal that was used for the purposes of sin, became disqualified for sacrifice on the altar, or was condemned to be stoned to death; the robber may tell the original owner: "Here is your article," and return to him the article obtained by robbery.

When does the above apply? When the article obtained by robbery is itself returned. If, however, the article obtained by robbery was burned or lost after benefiting from it became forbidden, the robber must pay its value at the time of the robbery. Based on this rationale, if the robber denied possession of the article after deriving benefit from it became forbidden, and affirmed his denial with an oath, he is liable to pay the principal and an additional fifth of its value, and bring a guilt offering.

When a person obtains an animal by robbery and uses it to transport a burden, rides on it, plows or threshes with it or the like, and then returns it to its owner, he violates the commandment against robbery. Nevertheless, he is not liable for any payment, for he did not cause the animal any injury or weakness. If, however, this person becomes habituated to robbing, withholding property or performing such acts time after time, he should be penalized. This applies even in the diaspora. The court should evaluate the wage or the increase in value that he earned with the animal, and that amount should be paid to the person whose property was taken.

When a person seizes a servant belonging to a colleague and causes him to perform labor, but does not prevent him from performing work for his master, he is not liable. The rationale is that a person is happy that his servants do not go idle. If, however, this prevents him from performing work for his master, the person who seized the servant must pay the master the wages of the servant, as if he were a hired worker.

The following laws apply when a person seizes a boat belonging to a colleague and performs work with it. If the boat is not generally hired out, the damage to the boat should be evaluated and must be paid. If the boat is generally hired out there are two guidelines that apply. If the person took the boat with the intent of renting it, since the owner did not grant his permission, the owner has the option. He may collect the wage usually paid or he may collect payment for the damage to the boat. If the person took the boat as robbery, he must pay for the damages. Similar principles apply in all like situations.

The following rules apply when a person dwells in a courtyard belonging to a colleague without notifying him. If the courtyard is not usually rented out, he is not required to pay him rent. This applies even if the person who dwells within generally rents a dwelling, for one person is benefiting and the other is not suffering a loss. If the courtyard is generally rented out, the person who dwells within must pay rent even though he does not usually rent a dwelling, because he is causing the owner a loss of income.

When a person owned wool that he was dyeing in a vat, and another person came and added other dyes without the consent of the owner, the latter must pay the owner of the wool for the decline in the value of the wool he caused. This payment does not include the value of the dye the owner used for the wool.If the person whose property was damaged seizes the value of dye that he lost, that money should not be expropriated from him.

A person who without the owner's consent takes an object entrusted to him for safekeeping to use for his private purposes in a way that will diminish it, or to take as his own is judged as a robber. This applies whether he takes the article himself, or it is taken for him by his son, his servant or his agent. The person who takes the article is liable for it if it is destroyed by forces beyond his control, and the object that he took is considered to be within his domain according to the laws that govern all robbers. A watchman who decides to take an entrusted article for his private purposes is not held responsible for it until he actually takes it. When, however, he takes the article from one place to another in his domain in order to take it for his private purposes, he is liable although he did not take any portion of the entrusted article. For the watchman becomes responsible in such an instance even when the entrusted article remains intact.

As soon as the watchman lifts up the jug to take a revi'it of wine, he is liable for it in the event of its destruction by forces beyond his control, even though he has not taken it. If, however, he lifts up a wallet containing many coins to take one dinar, there is a doubt whether he is liable for the entire wallet if it is destroyed by forces beyond his control, or he is liable only for the one dinar. Similar laws apply with regard to other instances where a container holds several discrete entities.

When produce was entrusted to a person for safekeeping and he took a portion of it as his own, he is responsible only for the produce that he actually took. The produce remaining in its place remains the property of the original owner. If, however, the entire produce becomes spoiled because of the amount that he took, he is liable for the entire amount. What is implied? If the watchman tilted a jug while it remained in its place and removed a revi'it or more, and then the jug was broken afterwards, the watchman is liable only for the amount that he took, for he did not lift up the jug. If the wine turned into vinegar, he must pay the value of the entire jug at the time he took it. Similar principles apply in all like situations.

When a person denies in court having been given an object entrusted to him for safekeeping, he is considered to be a robber if the object was in his possession at the time of his denial. He is liable for the article if it is destroyed by factors beyond his control.

A person who borrows an object without the consent of its owner is considered to be a robber. If a utensil was in the hands of a person's son or servant and another person took it from him and used it, he is considered to have borrowed the object without the consent of its owner. The article is considered to have entered his domain, and he is responsible for it in the event of its destruction by forces beyond his control until he returns it to the owner. Therefore, if he returns it to the minor or to the servant who was holding it beforehand, and then it is lost or stolen, the borrower is liable. Similar principles apply in all like situations.

When a person seizes collateral from a debtor without receiving license from the court, he is considered to be a robber, despite the debt that he is owed. Needless to say, if he enters the debtor's home and seizes collateral, he is considered to be a robber, for Deuteronomy 24:11 explicitly states: "Stand outside and the man who owes the debt to you will bring the security out to you."

Our Sages penalized robbers and gave the person whose property was taken the prerogative of taking an oath to support his claim regarding the value of the goods taken. He may then collect that money from the robber, provided that there are two witnesses who testify that this person robbed him.

What is implied? A person came into a colleague's home to collect collateral. He was observed by two witnesses. When he entered he was not carrying anything under his cloak, and when he departed he was carrying utensils under his cloak, but the witnesses were not able to discern what the utensils were, and the owner of the home states: "He robbed me of this and this." Regardless of whether the robber claimed: "I never entered his home and I did not take anything," "I entered his home as the witnesses observed, but I did not take anything. The utensils under my cloak were mine," or he said: "I took this utensil," and the owner claims that he took another utensil besides the one he admits - in all instances the owner of the home must take an oath while holding a sacred article to affirm his claim. He may then collect everything that he claims.

When does the above apply? When the owner claims that the robber took articles that one might assume that he owned or that it was possible that such goods would be entrusted to him for safekeeping, and it was possible for those articles to be taken out by the robber under his cloak, as the witnesses testify.

Different rules apply, however, when witnesses observe a person enter a colleague's home to take collateral, but do not see him depart, or they see him depart without appearing to be carrying any utensil under his cloak. Although the owner claims that the defendant took such and such, the defendant is not held liable. This applies even if the defendant denies entering the home and thus contradicts the testimony of the witnesses. The rationale is that if he claimed: "I entered his home but I did not take anything," he would be required to support his claim with a Rabbinic oath, and then he would be exonerated. For it is possible that he entered with the intent of committing robbery, but did not.

Different rules apply when one witness testifies that a person entered a colleague's home and removed utensils under his cloak, but the witness was unable to recognize which utensils were taken, and the person who entered states: "I did not take anything," or he says, "I took goods that you gave to me because of a debt." The person who entered must take an oath while holding a sacred article that he did not commit robbery. He is given this prerogative because he is not considered to be a robber unless two witnesses testify against him.

Just as the owner of a home is entitled to take an oath and collect his due from the robber in the instances mentioned in Halachot 1-3, so too, a watchman appointed by the home owner, or even the wife of a watchman, may take such an oath, stating that the person took goods. This obligates the robber to pay.

If, however, the robber was observed by merely a worker or a harvester of the homeowner, they are not given the prerogative of taking an oath to allow the homeowner to collect against his claim. The person whose property was taken is not given the prerogative of taking the oath, because he was not at home at the time of the robbery. The witnesses are not able to identify the articles that the robber took under his cloak, so their testimony does not obligate him to make restitution. Nor is the robber given the opportunity to clear himself by taking an oath, for we suspect that he might take a false oath.

How is this matter resolved? The home owner has a ban of ostracism issued against any person who took goods from his home and does not admit the matter to a court. Even if the robber admits to having taken certain articles, he is required to return only what he admits, for the owner cannot lodge a definite claim against him.

The following rules apply when a person robs one of five people, but does not know whom he robbed, and each of the five claims that it was he whom he robbed. Although there are no witnesses that this person robbed, each of the plaintiffs may take an oath, and then the robber is obligated to pay each the amount he admits. This is also a penalty enforced by the Sages because he transgressed and robbed. According to Scriptural Law, however, he has no obligation to pay, because the identity of the person whom he robbed is a matter of doubt.

The following laws apply when a person tells two colleagues, "I robbed one of you" - or "...one of your fathers..." - "of a maneh, but I don't know whom." If he desires to fulfill his moral and spiritual obligation, he must pay the full amount of the robbery to each of the persons. The law, however, requires only that he give the value of the robbery, and they divide it among themselves. The rationale is that neither of them knows that he has been robbed; it is the robber himself who is notifying them. Our Sages did not impose a penalty in this instance, because no one is lodging a claim against the robber.

The following laws apply when a person lodges a claim against a colleague, saying: "You robbed me of a maneh." If the defendant replies: "I did not rob from you," he is required to take a sh'vuat hesset, as is the case with regard to any defendant. If he admits that he robbed him of 50 zuz, he must pay the fifty he admits owing and take an oath required by Scriptural Law with regard to the remainder, as is the case with regard to any person who admits a portion of a claim. He is allowed to take this oath because witnesses did not establish that he was a robber. Similarly because it was not established that a person was a robber, he is given the benefit of the doubt in the following situation: a person claimed that a colleague entered his home and stole utensils from him. The colleague replied that he took the utensils as collateral for a debt that that person owed him. The owner of the home denied the debt. Although the colleague admitted that he took the collateral without permission, since there are no witnesses who testify that he committed robbery, he is permitted to take an oath and collect the debt he claims from the collateral. For the very mouth that created the problem, rationalized it. Since he is taking an oath and collecting money, he must take an oath while holding a sacred article, as will be explained in Hilchot To'en.

The following laws apply when witnesses observe a person enter a colleague's home when the owner is not home, and take utensils. These laws apply even when he does not conceal the utensils, and even when the owner of the home frequently sells his household articles. If the owner claims: "He robbed them from me," and the defendant claims: "I entered with your permission, and you sold them to me," "...you gave them to me," or "I took them as payment for a debt you owe me," the defendant's claim is not accepted. The rationale is that whenever a person enters a colleague's home when he is not present and takes utensils and removes them in the presence of witnesses, we presume that he is a robber. Therefore, he must return the utensils to the homeowner. The homeowner is not even required to take an oath, for the witnesses saw that the intruder committed robbery. After the defendant returns the utensils, he may lodge a suit against the homeowner according to his claims, and the judgment will be rendered according to law.

Similarly, if only one witness observed the intruder taking the article, and the homeowner claims that the intruder robbed him of the article, while the defendant claims that he purchased it, he took it as payment for a debt, or it was his and was entrusted to the homeowner for safekeeping, the intruder is obligated to return the article to the homeowner, and the homeowner is not even required to take an oath. The rationale is that if two witnesses had observed the matter, the defendant would have been obligated to pay. Since there is only one witness, the defendant is required to take an oath. And in this instance he cannot take the oath, because he does not deny the statement of the witness. Therefore, we follow the principle: Whenever a person is obligated to take an oath and cannot take that oath, he must pay. Accordingly, different rules apply if the defendant denied the matter, saying: "I never entered his house, nor did I take anything." Since there is only one witness, and the defendant denies his testimony, he is obligated to take an oath mandated by Scriptural Law, stating that he did not take anything from the home. With this, he is exonerated.

The following incident occurred. A person took a slab of silver from a colleague in the presence of one witness. The person who took the silver said: "Yes, I took it; and it was mine." Our Sages obligated him to return the silver, because the testimony of the witness obligates him to take an oath. He cannot take the oath, because he admits to what the witness says. Had there not been a witness involved, he would have been able to take a Rabbinic oath that the silver he seized belonged to him.If he denied the statements of the witness and said, "I never took the silver," he would be required to take an oath required by Scriptural Law that he did not take it. This judgment should be followed universally in all analogous cases.

The following rules apply if a person seizes gold coins from a colleague and the act was observed by one witness. The defendant says: "I seized my own money. There were twenty gold coins." Although the witness does not know how many coins there were, the defendant must pay twenty coins, for the witness knows that he took gold coins. If two witnesses had observed him, he would have been obligated to pay the full amount. Thus, when there is one witness, he is obligated to take an oath, but cannot, as explained above.

There are opinions that maintain that the following rule applies when, in the above situation, the person who took the coins said: "I seized twenty gold coins; they were mine," while the person who was robbed says, "He took 100." The defendant must pay the twenty he admitted to having taken, and take an oath required by Scriptural Law with regard to the remainder, for he was obligated for a portion of the plaintiff's claim. My opinion is that he is required merely to take a Rabbinic oath, for he did not admit any liability. Instead, he said that he took what belonged to him.

The following rules apply when a person enters a colleague's home when he is not present and takes utensils, while observed by one witness. The witness does not know how many utensils were taken. The owner claims that he had twenty utensils in his home, while the person who took them states: "I took only ten, and they were my own." The defendant is required to return the ten, for he is obligated to take an oath, but cannot. He is not required to take even a Rabbinic oath concerning the remainder, because the owner cannot issue a definite claim against the robber.

It is forbidden to buy from a thief something stolen, and forbidden to dress it up with a modification so as to buy it. Anyone who does this, and other things like this, strengthens the hands of transgressors and [doing so] transgresses "do not put a stumbling block in front of the blind" (Lev. 19:14)

It is forbidden for anyone to benefit from an article obtained by robbery even after its rightful owner has despaired of its return, if one knows for certain that this object was obtained through robbery. What is implied? If one knows for certain that a particular animal was obtained by robbery, it is forbidden to ride on it or plow with it.

When a person obtains a house or a field by robbery, it is forbidden to pass through it or enter it. This applies even merely to seek shade or shelter from the rain. If he lives in another person's home, he must pay rent to the legal owners, as mentioned above with regard to a person who lives in a colleague's courtyard without the owner's knowledge. If a person cuts down palm trees and constructs a bridge from them, it is forbidden for anyone to pass over it. The same applies with regard to other similar situations.

If a person transgressed and ate an object obtained by robbery after the owners despaired of its return, he is not liable to compensate the owners. If he ate the article before the owners despaired of its return the owners must be compensated. They may collect from the person who ate the article, for it is still in their possession. Or if they desire, they may collect from the robber.

The following rules apply when a person commits robbery and dies. There is no difference if he fed the object he obtained by robbery to his sons after the owner despaired of its return, or rather than feed it to them he sold it or it was lost. If the robber left landed property, his heirs must reimburse the original owner. According to Talmudic law, they need not, by contrast, reimburse him if he left only movable property. For the value of the object obtained by robbery is considered to be a debt owed by the robber, and movable property is not placed on lien to a creditor after the principal's death.

The Geonim have already ordained that a debt owed a creditor can be expropriated from the movable property in the estate. This applies even to a loan supported by a verbal commitment alone. Therefore, in the above instance, the heirs are liable to reimburse the owners from either the landed property or the movable property in the robber's estate, regardless of whether or not the heirs ate the article obtained by robbery, and whether or not the owners despaired of its return.

The laws applying to a person who purchases movable property from a robber are the same as those applying to one who purchases from a thief. If the reputation of the robber was a matter of public knowledge, our Sages did not grant any leniency. If the robber's reputation was not public knowledge, our Sages ordained leniency to enable uninhibited trade in the marketplace, and required the original owner to pay a purchaser the price he paid for the article taken by robbery. He may then take the article and sue the robber for the price of the article. If the owner already despaired of the article's return, the purchaser is considered to have acquired the article itself and is not required to return it.

It is forbidden to benefit from a robber's property. If even a minor portion of his property was legitimately his, one is allowed to benefit from his property, unless one is certain that the article from which one is benefiting was obtained by robbery.

It is forbidden to benefit from the property of people whom we can assume to be robbers, when all of their property can be assumed to have come from robbery, for their profession is based on robbery - e.g., customs-collectors and highwaymen. We may not change money from their cash-box, for all their money can be assumed to have come from robbery.

If the tax collectors took his cloak and returned to him a different one (took his donkey and returned a different donkey) - Behold, those [switched properties] are his because this is like a sale, and there is presumption of despairing of ownership by the [original] owners, and he does not know with certainty that this was stolen. And if he is established, and strict with himself, he returns [the things] to the original owners.

When is the previous case applicable? When the tax collector is like a robber, like when an idolater or the tax collector that is standing above him or the one sent by the king, and there is no limit, rather, he takes as much as he wants and gives [to the king] as much as he wants. But the tax established by the king, and is he said he should take a third or a fourth, or any amount with a limit. And [if] he appoints a Jew to collect this part for the king and it is known that this person is trustworthy, and he does not add anything over what the king has decreed, he is not under the assumption that he is a robber, since the law of the king is law. Not only that, but one who transgresses and smuggles from this tax is stealing from the king, whether the king is an idolater or a Jewish king.

And so too a king who put a tax over the inhabitants of a city, or over each and every person, a predictable thing of every year; or over a field, something predictable. Or if he decreed that everyone who passes over this thing, all his possessions will be taken to the house of the king. Or that every person who is found in the field at the time of working the threshing floor will pay a tax whether he is or not the owner of the field - and all cases similar: this is not theft, and a Jew that is collecting those for the king is not under the assumption of being a thief, and he is a "kosher" person - provided that he does not add, nor change, nor get anything for himself.

Similarly, if a king becomes angered with a servant or an attendant who is one of his subjects and confiscates his field or his courtyard, it is not considered to be robbery, and one is permitted to benefit from it. If a person purchases it from the king, it becomes his and the original owners cannot expropriate it from him. For this is the law exercised by all kings: to confiscate all the property of their attendants if they become angered by them. Thus, it is the king who annulled the ownership over this courtyard or field, making it ownerless. Therefore, the person buying it from the king legally acquires it. If, however, a king confiscates a courtyard or a field from one of the subjects of his country in a manner that is not in accordance with the laws that he enacted, he is considered to be a robber, and the owners may expropriate the property from the person who purchased it from the king.

The general principle is: Any law that a king decrees to be universally applicable, and not merely applying to one person, is not considered robbery. But whenever he takes from one person alone in a manner that does not conform to a known law, but rather seizes the property from the person arbitrarily, it is considered to be robbery. Therefore, the king's dues collectors and his officers that sell fields with a defined tax on the fields, their sale is valid. But a personal tax is only collected from the person himself, and if they sold the field with a personal tax, behold this is not a valid sale unless the king has decreed that it is.

The following rules apply when the law of a king is that whoever pays the tax for a particular field acquires ownership of that field. If the owner of a field flees to avoid paying the property tax, and another person pays this tax to the king and derives benefit from that field, it is not considered to be robbery. The one who paid the taxes may reap the benefit of the field provided he continues to pay the taxes until the owners return and pay this duty. For the law of a king is binding, as stated above.

Similarly, if a king decrees that whoever pays a head tax for a person who has not paid acquires the delinquent person as a servant the decree is binding. If one Jew comes and pays a head tax for another indigent, he may compel him to work beyond ordinary limits, for the laws of a king are binding. He may not, however, have him toil as a slave.

[In the case of] a king who cut down trees belonging to individual property owners and made a bridge out of them, it is permissible to cross the bridge. So too if he destroyed homes to make a path or a wall, one is allowed to benefit from it. And so it is for all similar circumstances, for the king's law is the law.

In what instances does this principle [the king's law is the law] apply? When the king's coins are accepted throughout those lands [under his control], for the residents of that country have agreed to him and have accepted that he is their master and they are to him as slaves. But if his coins do not circulate, he is like a robber by force and like a band of armed thieves whose laws are not enforced, and such a king and all his servants are considered thieves in all matters.

The following rules apply when a river washes away beams, stones, wood and the like. If the owners despaired of their return, it is permitted for the finder to keep them, and they become his property. If, however, the finder does not know whether or not the owners have despaired, he is obligated to return the objects. Needless to say, this applies if the owners are pursuing the article.

Therefore, the same principle is applied when a person saves an article from the bed of a sea, from a flooding river, from gentiles, from a fire, from a lion, from a bear, from a tiger or from a leopard. If one knows that the owners have despaired of the article's return, it may be kept by the finder. If one does not know, one must return it.

When a person saves an article from a Jewish robber, he may keep it, for we assume that the owners despaired of its return. If, however, he knows that they did not despair of its return, he is obligated to return it. When, by contrast, a person saves an article from a gentile robber, he is obligated to return it, for we do not assume that the owners despaired of its return. If, however, he knows that they did despair of its return, he may keep it. Why do we say with regard to Jewish robbers that we can assume that the owners despair, while with regard to gentile robbers we do not assume that they despair? Because the owners know that the gentile authorities will require a robber to return an article obtained by robbery, although there are no witnesses that he committed robbery. Circumstantial evidence and probability are sufficient.

It is not considered robbery to take fresh cress that grows among flax, because it harms the flax belonging to the owner of the field. If the cress has become dry, taking it is considered robbery, because it has already caused whatever damage it might cause. If it grows on the border of the rows of flax, it is forbidden to be taken even if it is fresh.

We have stated in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon that taking straw and hay that a person has placed in the public domain is not considered robbery. If, however, a piece of feces is placed in the public domain, whether during the time when taking out wastes is permitted or at other times, taking it is considered to be robbery.

When a person's clothes were exchanged for those belonging to another person at a house of mourning or a place of celebration, he should not use the article in his possession unless the owner comes and returns the original article and takes his own. Slightly different rules apply if a person's articles become exchanged for another's in the home of a craftsman. If the craftsman's wife or children gave him the articles, or the craftsman gave him the articles and told him: "Take your articles," the person should not use the articles in his possession unless the owner comes and returns the original articles and takes his own. If, however, the craftsman tells him: "Take this article," he may use it until the owner comes and returns the original articles and takes his own. For it is possible that the article belongs to the craftsman, or that the owner of the article told the craftsman to sell it for him. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

Our Sages forbade many acts, classifying them as robbery - e.g., one who sets doves into flight or plays dice. If a person transgresses these prohibitions, he is considered a robber by Rabbinic decree. What is meant by setting doves into flight? A person should not set doves into flight in a settled area, because he will take property belonging to others unjustly. For he will send out a male and it will bring a female from another dovecote; he will send out a female and it will bring a male. This does not apply to doves alone. Instead, anyone who performs a like act with regard to other fowl, beasts or domesticated animals is considered to be a robber by Rabbinic decree.

Similarly, our Sages forbade snaring doves within a settled area, for we can assume that the doves belong to others. One may not set a snare for doves unless one places a distance of four mil between the snare and the settled area. Moreover, if the settled area is composed of vineyards, one should not set a snare even within 100 mil, for the doves belong to the owners of the vineyards. Similarly, a person should not set a snare among dovecotes even if he owns those dovecotes, or they belong to a gentile or are ownerless, even if the dovecotes are more than 100 mil from the settled area, for the doves from the settled area will come to the area of the dovecotes.

When constructing a dovecote, a person should position it at least 50 cubits from the village. Similarly, a person should not construct a dovecote in his field unless he owns the property in a radius of 50 cubits on all sides, so the doves will not be drawn forth and damage the fields of others by eating their produce. If a person purchased a dovecote from another person, he may continue using it even if there is only a distance in which a quarter of a kav of grain can be sown between the dovecote and the beginning of his colleague's field. We do not require him to move it further away.

What is meant by dice players? People who play with pieces of wood, pebbles, bones or the like and establish a condition that whoever will better a colleague in this sport is entitled to take a certain amount of money from him. This is robbery according to Rabbinic decree. Although the person himself consents to the other person's taking his money, since he is taking it for nothing, as part of the frivolous sport, it is considered to be robbery. Similarly, those who gamble with regard to domesticated animals, beasts or fowl, making a condition that whosoever's animal will vanquish or outrace the other one's is entitled to take a certain amount of money from him - this and all forms of gambling are forbidden and considered to be robbery by Rabbinic decree.

When a person plays dice with gentiles, he does not violate the prohibition against robbery. He does, however, violate the prohibition against occupying oneself with empty matters. It is not fitting for a person to spend any of his days occupied in anything other than words of wisdom or pursuits that lead to a stable world.

The following principle applies with regard to snares for beasts, fowl and fish: If an animal falls into such a snare and another person takes it, this is considered robbery by Rabbinic law. It is not considered to be robbery by Scriptural law because they have not as yet entered the possession of the person who acquires them.

A river and a stream that flow belong to all people. When a poor person climbs to the top of an olive tree and beats the branches so that olives that have been forgotten by their owner will fall, he is entitled to them. If another poor person takes them, it is considered robbery by Rabbinic decree. If the poor person collects them in his hand and then throws them to the earth, taking them is full-fledged robbery, for they have entered the possession of the person who acquires them.

Unlike chickens and ducks, bees are not considered the private property of a person according to Scriptural law. Nevertheless, it is possible to acquire them according to Rabbinic law. A person who steals a swarm of bees or prevents their owner from taking them if the swarm comes into his domain is considered a robber by Rabbinic decree. Thus, if a swarm of bees leaves a person's property and comes to rest in a colleague's property, the owner of the bees has the right to enter his colleague's field and proceed until he takes his bees. If in his progress he damages his colleague's field, he must reimburse him for the damages. He may not, however, cut down a branch with the intent that later he will reimburse the owner for the damages.

We accept the statements of a woman or a minor who says, "this swarm of bees left this property," provided that the statements are made in the course of conversation and the owners are pursuing the swarm and asking "Where did it come to rest?" Although a woman or a minor is not generally accepted as a witness, since the ownership of bees is a matter of Rabbinic law, their testimony is accepted in this case.

Whenever a person is in possession of property that is considered to be robbed according to Rabbinic law, it cannot be expropriated by judges. Similarly, if the person denied possession of it and took a false oath to that effect, he is not required to add a fifth, as he is with regard to property acquired by full-fledged robbery.

Whenever a person becomes financially obligated to a fellow Jew, denies that obligation and takes a false oath to support his denial, should he later admit his obligation he is liable to return the principal that he denied plus a surcharge of one fifth of the new total. He is also liable to bring a sacrifice, which is called a guilt offering, for robbery.

The above applies to any of the following: one who robbed, one who withheld money due a colleague, one who stole, one who took a loan, one who was given an entrusted article, one who discovered a lost article and denied it, a partner with whom money belonging to the partnership remained, and an employer for whom a worker performed work, but was not paid. To state the general principle: Whenever a person who admitted the obligation would be obligated by law to pay, he must pay the principal and a fifth if he denies his obligation, as Leviticus 5:21 says: "If he denies his colleague's claim regarding an entrusted object...."

When does the above apply? When the person is obligated to pay because of his own actions. When, however, he is liable because of his father, he is not liable for the additional fifth. What is implied? If one's father robbed or stole or was in debt to others, and the son knew of the matter, and after the father's death the son denied the claim, took an oath and afterwards admitted his liability, he need pay only the principal. For Leviticus 5:23 states: "that he obtained by robbery," implying that one is liable for an additional fifth for one's own robbery, but not for robbery committed by one's father.

When does the above apply? When the object obtained by robbery no longer exists. Different laws apply however, when a person's father obtained an object by robbery and then died, and the object still exists. If the heir denies his obligation, takes an oath to that effect and then admits his liability, he is liable for the principal and the addition of a fifth.

If the father committed robbery, took a false oath, admitted his guilt and then died, his heir must pay the principal and the addition of a fifth.

If the father committed robbery, took a false oath and then died, and the heir admitted the father's guilt, the heir is liable to pay only the principal. In either instance, the heir is not obligated to bring the guilt offering.

A person who takes a false oath in response to the claim of a gentile and later admits his guilt is obligated to pay the principal, but not the additional fifth, for Leviticus 5:21 speaks of one who "denies his colleague's claim." Similarly, a person who takes less than the worth of a p'rutah by robbery, denies the charge and takes a false oath to that effect is not liable to pay an additional fifth, for anything less than a p'rutah's worth is not considered a significant financial responsibility. What is meant by an additional fifth? One fourth of the principal. For example, if a person obtained four zuz by robbery and took a false oath, he must pay five. If the object obtained by robbery itself still exists, it must be returned and a fourth of its value added.

A person who takes a false oath denying a financial claim is not liable to pay an additional fifth unless he himself admits his guilt. If, however, witnesses come and despite his continued denial establish his guilt through their testimony, he is liable to pay only the principal, but not the additional fifth. The rationale is that the additional fifth and the sacrifice were instituted for the sake of atonement. Therefore, he is obligated for them only when it is his admission that makes him liable.

When a person robs from a colleague, even if he denied the robbery - as long as he did not take a false oath - if he afterwards admits his guilt he is not liable to seek out the owner to return the money in his possession. Instead, it may remain in the possession of the robber until the owners come and take his due. If, however, he took a false oath concerning property worth a p'rutah or more, he is obligated to seek out the owner to return the money to him even if he is on far removed islands. The rationale is that once the robber took a false oath, the owner has despaired of the return of his property and will not demand it again.

Even if a robber returned the entire worth of the object obtained by robbery with the exception of a p'rutah, he is obligated to bring it to the original owner. He may not give the p'rutah to the owner's son or agent unless the owner appointed an agent for this purpose in the presence of witnesses. If the robber brings the principal and the additional fifth to the Rabbinic court in his city, he may bring a guilt offering and gain atonement thereby. The court will then ensure that the object obtained by robbery will reach its original owner. Similarly, the robber may give the article to an agent of the court. Whenever a person returns an object obtained by robbery or the like to a Rabbinic court, he has fulfilled his obligation to return it.

When the robber gave the original owner the principal, but not the additional fifth, the owner waived payment of the principal but not of the additional fifth, or he waived payment of both with the exception of less than a p'rutah's worth of the principal, the robber does not have to seek out the owner. Instead, when the owner comes he will take the remainder of what is due him. This ruling is followed when the owner waives payment of everything but less than a p'rutah's worth of the principal even when the object obtained by robbery itself exists. We do not suspect that perhaps the value of the article will increase, and thus the portion remaining will become worth a p'rutah. If, however, the robber gave the owner the additional fifth, but did not give him the principal, or if the owner waived payment of the additional fifth but not of the principal, or he waived payment of both with the exception of a p'rutah's worth of the principal, the robber must seek out the owner or give the money to the Rabbinic court in his town, as explained in the previous halachot.

If the robber returned the principal to the owner after denying his claim and taking a false oath and then denied owing him the additional fifth and took a false oath concerning this, the additional fifth is considered as part of the principal with regard to all matters, and the robber must pay another fifth because of it. This is derived from Leviticus 5:24, which states: "And he shall add its fifths." The use of the plural teaches that he must add a fifth to a fifth if he continues to take false oaths until the fifth that he denies - and concerning which he takes a false oath - is worth less than a p'rutah.

The following rule applies with regard to a person who had been entrusted with an object for safekeeping and who repeatedly took false oaths concerning the entrusted article. For example, the watchman claimed that the article was lost, took a false oath to support his claim and then admitted that it was in his possession. He then claimed it was lost and took a second false oath and then admitted it was in his possession. He must pay an additional fifth for every false oath, plus the principal. This is derived from the phrase cited above: "And he shall add its fifths." The use of the plural teaches that he must pay several fifths for one principal.

When a person robs from another, the the person robbed dies: that which is stolen shal be returned to the heirs. And if the stolen object was either lost or altered: the heirs shall be given its value. And if [the robber originally denied the crime], took a [false] oath to that effect, and afterwards the person robbed died: he must pay to the heirs both the principal and an additional fifth.

The following laws apply when a person robs his father and takes a false oath, and then the father dies. If the object obtained by robbery no longer exists, or it has undergone a change, he should make a reckoning with his brothers with regard to the principal and the additional fifth. If the object obtained by robbery exists, he is obligated to remove it from his possession. Therefore, he must give the object and the additional fifth to his brothers, and they must make a reckoning with him.

If the robber does not have any brothers, and he is thus the only heir, he must still remove the object obtained by robbery from his possession by giving it to his children. If this son who robbed his father does not have children, he may give it to his creditor, give it as a loan or give it to charity. In such instances, since he has removed the object itself from his possession, he is no longer under obligation, even though he gave it as a present or repaid his debt with it. He must, however, tell the recipient: "This article was obtained by robbery from my father."

Similar laws apply in the following instance. A person robs a convert, takes a false oath in response to his claim and then admits the robbery to him, and the convert considers the entire obligation a debt. If afterwards the convert dies, the robber acquires the object obtained by robbery as his own. He nevertheless is obligated to remove it from his possession.

When does the above apply? When he admitted the robbery to the convert in the interim. If, however, he robbed a convert who did not have any heirs and took a false oath to him, and the convert died, he is obligated to pay the principal and the additional fifth to the priests of the watch serving in the Temple that week. He then brings a guilt offering and thus achieves atonement.

Based on the Oral Tradition, it was taught that the verse in the Torah Numbers 5:8: "If a person does not have a redeemer..." refers to a convert who died without leaving heirs. The guilt offering the verse refers to is the object obtained by robbery or its worth. For this reason, a person who returns an object that had been obtained by robbing a convert to the priests at night does not fulfill his obligation. For the verse describes this return as a guilt offering, and sacrifices are not offered at night. The priests may not divide one object obtained by robbing a convert together with another object obtained by robbing a convert, just as they are not permitted to divide the meat of one guilt offering together with the meat of another guilt offering.

Whenever the value of an object obtained by robbing a convert is not sufficient to give every priest from the watch of that week at least a p'rutah's worth, the robber who returns it does not fulfill his obligation. This is implied by Numbers, ibid., which states "it should be returned to G-d, to the priest," implying that a significant value must be returned to each priest. Why does the verse referring to the robbery of a convert use the term "a man"? To teach that if the convert has attained majority, we must research the matter to determine whether or not he has heirs. If, however, the convert is a minor, there is no need to research the matter, for we can assume that he does not have heirs.

With regard to the repayment of property obtained by robbing a convert, the priests are considered as recipients of presents. Therefore, when a person robs chametz from a convert who dies without heirs and maintains possession of the chametz that he obtained by robbery during Pesach, he is obligated to pay the priests its value at the time of the robbery. For if he gave it to them at the present time, it would not be considered to be a gift, for one is forbidden to benefit from it. If, however, the convert himself were still alive, he could tell him: "Here is your article," as we have explained.

When a priest robs from a convert who has no heirs, takes a false oath to him, and then the convert dies before the object obtained by robbery is returned to him, the priest does not acquire the object in his possession. Instead, he must give it to his brethren, the priests of the watch serving in the Temple that week.

The following rules apply when a person robs from a convert, takes a false oath to him, the convert dies, the robber sets aside his guilt offering and the object obtained by robbery with the intent of bringing them to the priests, but dies before he could gain atonement. The robber's sons inherit the money set aside to pay for the object obtained by robbery or the object itself. The animal set aside for the guilt offering should pasture until it receives a disqualifying blemish, as has been explained in the appropriate place.

If the robber gave the money to the priests of the watch, but died before the sacrifice that brings him atonement could be offered, the robber's heirs may not expropriate the money from the priests. This is derived from Numbers 5:10: "When a man gives it to the priest, it shall be his." Even when the robber is a child who does not have the halachic capacity to give his property away as a present, his heirs cannot have the property expropriated from the priests.

If the robber gave the money to priests from a watch that was not serving in the Temple at that time, and the animal to be sacrificed as the guilt offering to the priests of the watch serving in the Temple that week, the money should be given to the priests of the appropriate watch. For a watch that took money at a time other than its week did not acquire it, and it may be expropriated from the members of that watch.

The guilt offering should not be sacrificed until the robber returns the principal to its owner, or to the priests if it was a convert without heirs who was robbed. If the robber gave the owner the principal but not the additional fifth and had the guilt offering sacrificed, he is granted atonement, for the additional fifth does not prevent atonement from being granted. He is, however, obligated to give the owner the additional fifth after receiving atonement.

The obligation to pay an additional fifth does not apply with regard to the robbery of Canaanite servants, promissory notes and landed property. This is derived from Leviticus 5:21, which states: "If he denies his colleague's claim regarding an entrusted object...." All the subjects mentioned in the verse are movable property that itself has financial worth. Thus, it excludes landed property - and servants, for they are equated with landed property - and promissory notes, for they themselves are not of financial worth. Similarly, if these articles were obtained by robbing a convert who has no heirs, there is no obligation to give them to the priests. Moreover, landed property never becomes the property of a robber, but rather it always remains the property of its rightful owner. Even if it were to be sold to a thousand people in succession and the owner were to despair of its return, it must be returned to its rightful owner without charge. The person from whom it was expropriated should then sue the person who sold it to him. Each person in turn should sue the one who sold it to him, until the person who purchases it from the robber should sue the robber and collect from him, as will be explained in the following chapter.

The following rules apply when a person robs a colleague of property and depreciates its value - e.g., he digs cisterns, trenches or caverns in it, or he cuts down trees, spoils springs or destroys a building - he is obligated to return the house or the field in its original condition, or to pay the owner for the depreciation of value. If, however, the property depreciats in value as a result of natural phenomena - e.g., the flooding of a river or a fire that came as a result of lightning - the robber can tell the owner: "Here is your property." For landed property remains in the possession of its owner at all times, and the robber is not responsible for its decrease in value. Therefore, he is responsible only when he personally causes the damages. This is not the case with regard to movable property, as has been explained.

The following rules apply when a person robs a colleague of a field and it was in turn taken from him by robbery and seized by brigands in the name of the king. If this is a condition that plagues the land as a whole - e.g., the king has confiscated the fields or homes of all the land's inhabitants - the robber can tell the owner: "Here is your property." If, however, it was confiscated because of the robber, the robber is obligated to provide the owner with another field.

If the king compelled the robber to show him all the property he owned, and the robber showed him the field that he obtained by robbery together with his other fields, and the king confiscated it, the robber is obligated to provide the owner with another field comparable to the one taken, or to pay its value.

When a person obtains a field by robbery and damages it by his actions, the owner of the field is entitled to collect the damages only from the property in the robber's possession; his obligation is equivalent to that of a loan supported by a verbal commitment. If the robber was called to court and obligated to pay for the damage to the property obtained by robbery, and afterwards sells other property that he owned, the rightful owner of the property taken by robbery may collect his due from properties that the robber has already sold.

If a person obtains property by robbery and benefits from its produce, he must pay for all the produce that he consumed from the property in his possession. When a person obtains landed property by robbery and increases its worth, the increase should be evaluated. The robber is placed at a disadvantage. If the increase in the property's value is greater than the expenses he undertook, the owner is required to reimburse him only for the expenses. If the expenses he undertook are greater than the increase in the property's value, he receives reimbursement for the expenses only to the extent of the increase in value.

The following rules apply when a person obtains a field by robbery and sells it, and the purchaser causes its value to increase. If the increase in value is greater than the purchaser's expenses, he should be reimbursed for his expenses by the owner. He should collect the principal and the remainder of the increase in value from the robber.

The purchaser may collect the principal even from encumbered property that the robber had sold. By contrast, he may collect the remainder of the increase in the property's value only from property presently in the robber's possession. If the purchaser was aware that the field had been obtained by robbery when he purchased it, he is entitled to collect only the principal. He forfeits the increase in the property's value that exceeds his expense. If his expense was greater than the increase in value, regardless of whether or not he recognized that the field was obtained by robbery, he receives reimbursement for the expenses only to the extent of the increase in value. This he collects from the owner of the field. He collects the principal from the robber, even from encumbered property that the robber had sold.

The following rules apply when a person obtains a field by robbery, sells it, and the purchaser derives benefit from its produce. He should calculate the value of the produce that he consumed and pay that to the owner of the field. He should collect this money from the property in the possession of robber. If he was aware that it was obtained by robbery, he is not entitled to reimbursement for the produce, and may collect only the principal from the robber.

When a person sells a field that does not belong to him, the sale is not binding and the purchaser does not acquire anything, as we have explained. If, however, after selling the field, the robber purchased the field from its rightful owner, the sale to the purchaser is binding. Even if the robber gave the field obtained by robbery away as a present and then purchased it from its rightful owner, the present is binding, because the thief took the trouble to purchase it so that he will have acted in good faith.

For this reason, if the purchaser sued the robber for selling him a field that did not belong to him, the robber was obligated to pay, the court ordered that an announcement be made regarding the sale of the robber's property in order to pay the purchaser, and the robber purchased the field from its rightful owner after the announcement was made, the original sale to the purchaser is not binding. Since a public announcement was made to expropriate his property, it was revealed that the robber had not acted in good faith. We thus conclude that he did not purchase the field from its rightful owner in order to establish the validity of the original sale.

If after selling the field he obtained by robbery, the robber purchased it from its rightful owner, but then sold it again, gave it away as a present or endowed it as an inheritance to another person, he has indicated that his intent in purchasing the field was not to establish the validity of the sale to the person who bought it after it was obtained by robbery. Similarly, if the robber acquired the property as an inheritance, the validity of the original sale is not established.

The following principles apply if the robber expropriated from its owner the property that he had sold as payment for a debt. If the owner had property other than this, and the robber told him: "I want to collect this," we assume that his intent was to establish the validity of his sale. If, however, the owner had no other property besides this, his intent could have been solely to collect his debt.

If the original owner gave the property to the robber later as a present, the purchaser acquires it. The rationale is that if the robber had not exerted himself on behalf of the owner, he would not have given him a present. Why then did he exert himself on behalf of the owner? So that the owner would give him the property and then he could act in good faith and establish the validity of his original sale.

The following rules apply when a person obtains a field by robbery, and after it was established that his intent was to take it by robbery, he then purchases it from the original owner. If the original owner claims: "I was acting under coercion at the time that I sold it to him. I sold it to him against my will, because he was a robber," the robber does not acquire the field, even though there are witnesses that he purchased the field in their presence. Instead, the field should be restored to its original owner, and the robber should be given back the money that he paid.

When is the money returned to the robber? When the witnesses testify that he counted out the money in their presence. If, however, the witnesses testify that the owner of the land sold the robber the field and acknowledged that he gave him such and such an amount of money in their presence, and the owner claims that he never received the money and acknowledged this only because of his fear of the robber, then the robber is not given anything. Instead, the field is expropriated from him without payment. Since it has been established that the field was taken by robbery, we believe the owner's claim that he acknowledged the payment only out of fear.

The owner of the field does not have to issue a protest over the sale in such an instance, for it has been established that the field was taken by robbery, and any proof of ownership brought by the robber is not accepted. For this reason, he need not issue a protest. The laws pertaining to a robber are not the same as those that apply when a person coerces a colleague and inflicts physical harm upon him until he sells the property to him. For the person who applies coercion intends to rob, but as yet has not robbed. Therefore, in that instance, if the owner does not issue a protest, the sale is binding.

The following law applies when a powerful and violent gentile took over property belonging to a Jew by force, seizing his field because the owner owed him a debt, caused him damages or caused him financial loss. If, after taking possession of the field, the gentile sold it to another Jew, the owner cannot expropriate it from the purchaser.

When does the above apply? When the owner admits that the gentile who sold the property told the truth, or when two Jewish witnesses substantiate the truth of the gentile's claims. Similarly, if there was a king or a ruler in that locale who could summon the gentile to court, and the owner did not lodge a claim against him, he cannot expropriate the property from the person who purchased it from the gentile. This applies even though the owner does not admit the truth of the gentile's claim, and even though there are no witnesses that the gentile told the truth. For the purchaser can tell the owner: "If the gentile is a robber, why did you not sue him according to the laws of the land?"

The following laws apply with regard to gentiles who oppress the Jewish people and seek to kill them, unless they ransom themselves from the gentiles by ceding title to a field or a home, and giving it to the gentiles in return for their release. When the oppressor desires to sell this land and the owner has the means to purchase the property, he is given priority over all others. If the owner does not have the means to purchase the property, or the property has remained in the possession of the oppressor for more than twelve months, whoever comes first and purchases the property from the oppressor acquires it. The purchaser must, however, give the original owner a fourth of the land or a third of the funds. For the oppressor sells the land cheaply; since the land is not his, he will sell it for approximately a fourth less than its value. This portion belongs to the original owner, because the reason it was sold cheaply was that it belonged to him. Therefore, a person who acquires it from the oppressor for 30 zuz must pay 10 to the original owner or give him one fourth of the land. If this is done, the purchaser acquires full title to the land. If he fails to do this, the quarter of the land is considered to be property obtained by robbery.

The following rules apply if a squatter enters a field belonging to a colleague without permission and plants trees there. If the field was one appropriate for trees to be planted, we evaluate how much a person would be willing to pay for trees to be planted in this field, and he collects this amount from the owner of the field. If this field is not suitable for planting, the squatter's improvement of the field should be evaluated, and he is judged at a disadvantage.

Moreover, if the owner of the field tells the squatter: "Uproot your tree and go," the owner's wishes are heeded.If the squatter says: "I want to uproot my tree," his wishes are not heeded, because uprooting trees weakens the fertility of the land.

Courtyards are considered to be appropriate for construction and to add homes and lofts. Therefore, the geonim ruled that a squatter who builds in a colleague's courtyard without his consent is regarded like a person who plants trees in a field appropriate for planting. If the building is useful and is appropriate for that courtyard according to the local custom, we evaluate how much a person would give to have such a building constructed and require the owner to pay that sum to the squatter.

When a person enters a colleague's field with the latter's permission, his improvement of the field should be evaluated, and he should be given the advantage in evaluating the amount of money due him. This applies even if he planted trees in a field that was unfit for planting. If his expenses exceed the field's increase in value, he is reimbursed for his expenses. If the field's increase in value exceeds his expenses, he is reimbursed for the field's increase in value. A husband who tills property belonging to his wife, and a partner who tills a field in which he owns a share are considered to have been given permission to enter the land. Their improvement of the field should be evaluated and they should be given the advantage in evaluating the amount of money due them.

When a squatter enters a field belonging to a colleague without permission and plants trees or builds there and the owner of the field comes afterwards and completes the building or guards the trees planted, or performs any other activity that indicates that he is pleased with the squatter's activity and considers it desirable, the squatter's improvement of the field should be evaluated and he should be given the advantage in evaluating the amount of money due him.

When a squatter enters a ruined building belonging to a colleague and rebuilds it without permission, the improvement he has brought about should be evaluated, and he is judged at a disadvantage. If the owner of the building says: "I am taking my stones and wood," his words are heeded with regard to a house,but this principle is not applied with regard to a field, for building and destroying a structure in a field weakens the fertility of the land. If the owner of the land tells him: "Remove what you built,"his words are heeded.

Whenever the improvements a person brought about are evaluated - whether he is judged at an advantage or at a disadvantage - he is not entitled to collect any money unless he first takes an oath while holding a sacred object, with regard to the amount of his expenses. If he says: "Let the judges come and evaluate the expenses. Whatever I spent is in the open. Let them evaluate the worth of the wood, the stones, the mortar, and the wages of the workers according to the lowest standards," his request is accepted, and he is entitled to collect his due without taking an oath. Similarly, if a person collects only the value of the improvement of the property, and he is judged at an advantage, he is not required to take an oath.

The following rule applies whenever the improvements a person made are to be evaluated and he is entitled to collect money, and the owner of the field claims to have paid him, and the person who tilled the field claims that he did not receive anything. The claim of the person who tilled the field is accepted. He must take an oath that he did not receive anything, and he is entitled to collect his due. For we tell the owner of the field: "An evaluation of what he is due was not made yet. Thus, you did not know how much you were obligated to give. How could you have paid him?" A different rule applies, however, if the evaluation was already made and the owner of the field was told to pay a specific amount to the person who tilled it. If the owner of the field claims to have paid him, although the person who tilled the field has not taken an oath yet, the claim of the owner is accepted. The owner must take a Rabbinic oath that he paid, and then he is freed of liability. The rationale is that land is always considered to be in the domain of its rightful owner.

The following laws apply when a husband brings sharecroppers to till property belonging to his wife and then he divorces her. If the husband is himself a sharecropper, their involvement is also terminated when the husband's involvement with the land is terminated, for they agreed to work the field on the husband's invitation. Their improvement of the field should be evaluated, and they are judged at a disadvantage. If the husband is not a sharecropper and they agreed to work the field because it was necessary, they receive the share that is usually given to a sharecropper.

It is a positive commandment to return an object lost by a fellow Jew, as Deuteronomy 22:1 states: "And you shall certainly return it." A person who sees an object lost by a fellow Jew and ignores it, leaving it in its place, transgresses a negative commandment, as it states Ibid.:4: "Do not see your brother's ox... and ignore it." He also negates the fulfillment of a positive commandment. If he returns the object, he fulfills the positive commandment.

If a person takes a lost object and does not return it, he negates the fulfillment of a positive commandment and transgresses two negative commandments: "You may not ignore it" Ibid.:3 and Leviticus 19:13: "Do not rob." Even if the owner of the lost object is wicked and eats non-kosher meat for his own satisfaction and the like, it is a mitzvah to return an object that he lost. If, however, he eats non-kosher meat as a conscious act of rebellion against G-d, he is considered a non-believer. And just as it is forbidden to return a lost object belonging to a gentile, it is forbidden to return a lost object belonging to a Jew who is a non-believer, heretic, idol-worshiper or violator of the Sabbath in public.

It is permissible to keep an object lost by an idolater, for Deuteronomy 22:3 speaks of returning "an object lost by your brother." Indeed, if one returns such an article, one transgresses a prohibition, for one strengthens the power of the wicked peoples of the world. If, however, one returns it to sanctify G-d's name, so that others will praise the Jewish people and know that they are trustworthy, this is praiseworthy. When there is a possibility of the desecration of G-d's name, it is forbidden to keep an object lost by an idolater, and it must be returned. As part of "the ways of peace," we should always bring in their utensils from the outside, lest they be taken by thieves, as we do for utensils owned by Jews.

A mistake in accounts made by a gentile is considered like a lost article, and it is permissible to benefit from it. This applies if he makes the mistake himself. It is, however, forbidden to cause him to make a mistake.

What is implied? A gentile made an account and made an error in a Jew's favor. The Jew must tell him: "Look, I am relying on your account. I know only what you tell me." In an instance like this, if the gentile does not correct himself, it is permitted to take advantage of his error. If, however, one does not tell him this, it is forbidden. It is possible that the gentile's intent is to check the Jew's honesty. By keeping the money, one may cause G-d's name to be desecrated.

The following rules apply in a town in which both Jews and gentiles live. If half the inhabitants are Jews and half are gentiles, and a person finds a lost object, he should take it and announce its discovery. If a Jew comes and describes marks by which the object can be identified, the finder is obligated to return it.

Different rules apply if the majority of the inhabitants of the city are gentiles. If a Jew finds a lost object in a place where most of the people located there are Jewish, he is obligated to announce its discovery. If he finds it on a public thoroughfare, a public market place or in a synagogue or a house of study where gentiles are often found, or in any place where many people are found, the finder may keep the object he discovers. This applies even when another Jew comes and describes marks with which the object can be identified. We assume that the owner despaired of its return when it fell, for he will say: "A gentile found it." Although a person is entitled to keep a lost article that he discovers, one who wishes to follow a good and an upright path should go beyond the measure of the law and return the lost article to a Jew, if he describes marks with which the object can be identified.

If a person finds a jug of wine in a city where the majority of the inhabitants are gentile, it is forbidden to benefit from the wine; the container is permitted as is a lost object. If a Jew comes and describes marks with which the container can be identified, the wine is permitted to be drunk by the person who discovered it.

When a fowl takes a piece of meat and casts it into another field, it is permitted to be kept as is a lost object. This applies even when most of the inhabitants of the town are Jewish, for the owners will have despaired of its return.

A person who finds a lost article on the bed of the sea or in a flooding river that does not cease may keep it. This applies even if the article has a mark with which it can be identified. This concept is derived from Deuteronomy 22:3, which commands us to return "an article that one loses and is found," thus excluding an instance as the one above in which the article is lost not only to its owner, but to all men. In such an instance, the owner has surely despaired of its return.

When a person intentionally abandons his property, there is no need to help him regain it. What is implied? A person placed his cow in a cowshed that did not have a door. He did not tie it there and he left. Or he tossed his wallet away in the public thoroughfare and left. In all instances of this nature, he is considered to have intentionally abandoned his money. Although the person who saw this is forbidden to take the property himself, he is not obligated to return it. This is implied by Deuteronomy 22:3, which states: "So shall you do with regard to every lost article belonging to your brother that he loses." The seeming redundancy in the verse excludes an article that is not lost accidentally, but rather intentionally abandoned.

When a lost article is not worth a p'rutah, the finder is neither obligated to concern himself with it, nor to return it.

The following rule applies when a person finds a sack or a large basket. If he is a sage or a respected elder, who would not usually carry such articles himself, he is not obligated to concern himself with them. He should judge his status in the following way. If the article were his own and he would return it, so too, is he obligated to return an article belonging to a colleague. If, however, he would not forgo his honor even if the article were his own, he is not obligated to return a similar article belonging to a colleague. The following rules apply when he would take such articles in a field, but not in a city. If he finds it in a city, he is not obligated to return it. If he finds it in a field, however, he is obligated to return it to its owner's domain, even though in doing so he will pass through a city, where it is not his habit to carry such articles.

Similarly, if a person finds an animal and spurs it on, he becomes obligated to concern himself with it and to return it - even if doing so is not appropriate for his honor - for he began the performance of the mitzvah. If a person returned an animal and it bolted away, he is obligated to return it again, even if this occurs 100 times. This is alluded to by Deuteronomy 22:1, which states: "And you shall certainly return it." The word השב implies that one must return it even 100 times. A person who finds a lost animal must care for it until he returns it to a place where it is secure in its owner's domain. If he returns it to a place that is not secure - e.g., the person's garden or his ruin and it becomes lost again - he is responsible for the animal.

If a person who discovered a lost article returns it in the morning to a place where its owners enter and leave each morning, he is not obligated to concern himself with it any more. For the owner will certainly see it. This applies even if it is placed in a location that is not secure. When does the above apply? To any article that is not alive. A live animal, by contrast, must be cared for by the finder until it is returned to a secure place in the owner's domain. The owner need not be notified.

If a person sees an animal that has escaped from its corral and he returns it to its place, he has fulfilled the mitzvah. The owner need not be notified.

One who wishes to go on a good and upright path and go beyond letter of the law should return a lost item in any place even if it is not befitting his dignity.

When a priest sees a lost object in a cemetery, he should not make himself impure so that he can return it. The rationale is that at the time the priest would fulfill the mitzvah of returning a lost object, he would nullify the positive commandment "Be holy" Leviticus 21:6 and transgress the negative commandment: "A man may not defile himself for a corpse among his people ibid.:4." And the observance of a positive commandment never supersedes a negative commandment that is reinforced by a positive commandment.

If a person sees a lost object and his father tells him "Do not return it," he should return it instead of obeying his father. For by obeying his father and fulfilling the positive commandment "Honor your father" Exodus 20:12, he nullifies the positive commandment "And you shall certainly return it," and transgresses the negative commandment "You may not ignore it."

When a person sees flood waters coming that will ruin a building or a field belonging to a colleague, he is obligated to put up a barrier before them to check the waters. This is implied by the mention (Deuteronomy 22:3 of "All objects lost by your colleague." "All" also includes the devastation of landed property.

The following rules apply when a person loses an article and then discovers his own lost article and that belonging to a colleague. If it is possible for him to return both, he should return both. If it is possible for him to return only one, his lost object takes priority, even over a lost object belonging to his father or his teacher. His own lost object takes priority over that of any other person.

If he chanced upon [both] the lost object of his teacher and the lost object of his father - if his father was equal to his teacher [in wisdom], his father's takes precedence, but if not his teacher's takes precedence. And this is characteristic of his teacher, that he learned the majority of his Torah wisdom from him.

If a person ignores his own lost article and instead returns the article belonging to his colleague, he is entitled only to the wage due him for his efforts. What is implied? A river washed away his donkey and a donkey belonging to a colleague. His donkey was worth 100 zuz, while his colleague's was worth 200. If, instead of saving his own, he saved his colleague's, he should be reimbursed only for the wages due him for his efforts. If he told his colleague - or made this condition in the presence of a court - "I will save your donkey, but you must reimburse me for my own," the colleague is obligated to reimburse him for his donkey. This applies even if the other donkey ascends from the river afterwards on its own. Since its owner did nothing to help it, the other person should be awarded the sum that he stipulated.

If the owner of the other donkey attempted to save the more valuable donkey, but was not successful, he should be given only the wage fit to be paid him. Similarly, if a person was occupied with his work, and he negated work that was worth a dinar to return a lost article worth 100 dinarim, he may not tell the owner: "Give me the dinar that I lost," but rather the owner should pay him as an unemployed worker of the trade in which he is employed. If he stipulated to the owner or in the presence of a court that he should receive the amount that he lost, and they agreed, he may collect it. If the owner or a court is not present, his own concerns take precedence.

Similar laws apply when two people are progressing on a road, and one was carrying a jug of wine, and the other a jug of honey. If the jug of honey cracks and before the honey spills to the ground, the other person pours out his wine and collects the honey in his jug, he should be given only the wage he is fit to be paid. If he tells the owner of the honey: "I will save your honey, if you pay me for my wine," or he makes such a stipulation in the presence of a court, the owner of the honey is obligated to pay him. If the honey spills to the ground, it is considered ownerless, and whoever takes it, takes it as his own.

Different rules apply if one person is carrying a jug of honey and his jug cracks, while another person was carrying empty jars. If the owner of the empty jars tells the owner of the honey: "I will not save this honey with my jars unless you give me half," "... a third," or "... so and so many dinarim," the owner of the honey is not obligated to keep this agreement. Even if he agrees, he is considered to have spoken facetiously and is not obligated to pay him more than the wage he is fit to be paid. The rationale is that he did not cause him any loss.

Similar rules apply if a person was fleeing from prison and there was a raft near him. If he told the owner of the raft: "Take me across the river and I will pay you a dinar," and the raft owner takes him across the river, the fugitive is required to pay the raft owner only the wage he is fit to be paid. If the raft owner was a fisherman, and the fugitive told him, "Stop fishing and take me across the river," the fugitive must pay him whatever he stipulates. The same principles apply in all analogous situations.

The following rules apply when a caravan was traveling in a desert and they were confronted and attacked by an armed force. If the travelers cannot rescue their property from that force and one of them exerts himself and rescues everyone's property, he has rescued it for himself. If the other members of the caravan can rescue their property, and one of them exerted himself and rescued all the property first, it should be divided among its rightful owners. This applies even if the one who rescued the property stated: "I am rescuing it for myself."

Different rules apply if it was possible for the owners to rescue their property with difficulty. If one person rescues all the property, it should be divided among its rightful owners. But if the one who rescues the property states: "I am rescuing it for myself," he is allowed to keep it as his own. The rationale is that the other owners heard him say: "I am rescuing it for myself." Accordingly, they should have exerted themselves to rescue their property. Since they chose to sit still and not attempt to rescue it, we may conclude that they had despaired of its recovery.

Similarly, if two partners were traveling with goods and were attacked, and one of them rescues the goods, the property still belongs to the partnership. If he states: "I am rescuing it for myself," he has dissolved the partnership and is allowed to keep the goods as his own. By the same logic, if a person hires a worker to rescue goods from a situation of certain loss, whatever he rescues belongs to the employer. If the worker says: "I am rescuing it for myself," he is terminating his employment. Whatever he rescues after making this statement belongs to him.

The following rule applies when a caravan was camped in the desert and an armed force was poised to attack them. If they agreed to pay a ransom to the armed force, the ratio of each person's payment should be determined according to the value of the person's goods and not levied equally by head. If they hired a guide to lead them on the journey, both the value of the persons' goods and the number of people should be considered when determining everyone's share of his wage. One should not, however, deviate from the standard practice followed by donkey-drivers.

Donkey-drivers may make an agreement among themselves saying that if one of the members of a caravan loses his donkey, the entire caravan must combine to provide another donkey for him. If he was negligent, and therefore it was lost, they are not obligated to provide a donkey for him.

If a person's donkey was lost and he said: "Pay me its value. I do not want another donkey. I will, however, guard together with you as if I had one," his request is not heeded. Instead, another donkey is purchased for him so that he will be diligent and guard his donkey. Even if he already owns another donkey in the caravan his request is not heeded. The rationale is that the diligence shown by a person watching one donkey cannot be compared to that of a person watching two.

When a ship was traveling in the sea and a decision was made to reduce its cargo because waves threatened to sink it, the calculation is made according to the weight of each person's goods and not their value. One should not, however, deviate from the standard practice followed by seamen.

Boatmen may make an agreement among themselves saying that if one of them loses his boat, they will combine to provide another boat for him. If he was negligent and therefore it was lost, or he sailed his boat in a region where boats do not travel at that time of year, they are not obligated to provide a boat for him.

When a person finds a lost object that he is obligated to return, he is obligated to announce its discovery and make it known, saying: "Whoever lost this type of article should come, identify it with marks and take it." Even if the article was worth a p'rutah at the time of its discovery, but depreciated in value, the finder is required to announce its discovery. There was a large stone outside of Jerusalem on which the announcements would be made.

How is an announcement made? If a person discovered money, he announces: "Whoever lost coins should come...." Similarly, he announces "Whoever lost a garment..." "... an animal..." or "... promissory notes should come, identify them with marks and collect them." He need not worry because he mentioned the type of object that was discovered, for he will not return it until it is identified with distinctive marks.

If the owner of the lost object came and identified it with marks that are not distinctive, it should not be returned to him until he identifies it with distinctive marks. When a person is known as a deceiver, a lost article should not be returned to him even if he identifies it with distinctive marks. He must bring witnesses who testify that the article is his. Our Sages said: "Deuteronomy 22:2: "It shall remain in your possession until your brother asks... ," can also be interpreted to mean that one must examine the person to see whether or not he is a deceiver.

At first, whenever a person lost an article and came and identified it with marks, it would be returned to him, unless he was known as a deceiver. When the amount of deceivers proliferated, the court ordained that when a person claimed a lost object, he would be told: "Bring witnesses that you are not a deceiver. Then you may take it."

Distinctive marks are relied upon and used as the basis for court rulings in all matters according to Scriptural law. An object's measure, weight, its number or the place where it was lost are considered distinctive marks.

If two people come, and both identify the article by its marks in the same manner, the article should not be given to either of them. Instead it should remain in the finder's possession until one of them acknowledges his colleague's claim or they arrive at a compromise. If one of them identifies the article by marks and the other brings witnesses who testify that the article is his, the article is given to the one who brought witnesses. If both claimants identify the article with marks and one brings one witness to support his claim, the presence of the witness is not considered of consequence, and the article should remain in the finder's possession.

If a person finds a dress or an article of that nature and there are two claimants, one brings witnesses who testify that it was woven for him and one brings witnesses who testify that it fell from his possession, it should be given to the one whose witnesses testify they saw the article fall. If one identifies it by stating its length and the other identifies it by stating its width, it should be given to the one who stated its length, for it is possible for a deceiver to deduce its width by watching its owner when wearing it. If one identifies it by stating its length and width, and the other identifies it by stating its weight, it should be given to the one who stated its weight. If one identifies it by stating its length and width, and the other identifies it by stating the measure of its fringes, it should be given to the one who stated its length and width.

Originally, whoever would find a lost object would announce its discovery at three successive pilgrimage festivals. On the first festival he would say that he was making this announcement for the first time. On the second festival, he would say it was the second time. On the third festival, he would announce the discovery of the article without mentioning the number of times, lest a listener hear incorrectly and confuse the second announcement with the third. After the third festival, he should wait seven days and make a fourth announcement. This provision enabled a person who heard to travel home in three days, check his household articles and return in three days. Thus, he could meet the person when he made the fourth announcement on the seventh day.

When the Temple was destroyed, our Sages ordained that announcements should be made in synagogues and houses of study. When there was an increase in the number of men of violence who say: "All lost objects belong to the king," our Sages ordained that announcements should be made discreetly to one's neighbors and associates. That is sufficient.

If an announcement or notification was made and the owner did not come to claim the discovered object, it should remain in the possession of the finder until Elijah the prophet comes. If it is lost or stolen while it is in the finder's possession, he is responsible for it. If it is destroyed by forces beyond his control, he is not liable. The rationale is that a person who cares for a lost object is considered a paid watchman. For he is involved in the performance of a mitzvah, and as such is freed from the obligation to perform several positive commandments as long as he is occupied with guarding it.

The finder must pay attention to the lost article and inspect it so that it will not become spoiled and ruined over the course of time. This may be inferred from Deuteronomy 22:2, which states: "And you shall return it to him." Implied is that one must see to it that the article will in fact be returned intact. What is implied? If one finds a woolen garment, one should shake it out every 30 days. He should not shake it out using a staff, nor with two people. He may spread it out on a couch for its benefit alone, but not for its benefit and for his benefit. If guests visit him, he should not spread it out in their presence even for its own benefit, lest it be stolen.

If one finds wooden utensils, he should use them so that they do not rot. If he finds copper utensils, he should use them for hot substances, but he should not expose them to fire, because they become worn. Silver utensils should be used only for cold substances, but not for hot substances, because they become discolored. If one finds rakes or hatchets, one should use them with soft substances, but not with hard ones, lest their value deteriorate. If one finds golden utensils, glass utensils or linen garments, one should not touch them until Elijah arrives. The same principles that apply to a lost object which one discovered apply to an entrusted object whose owner undertook a long journey.

If he finds scrolls, he should read them once in 30 days. If he does not know how to read, he should roll them every 30 days. One should never study a subject for the first time, [from the scrolls], nor should one read a passage and repeat it or translate it. One should not open the scroll more than three columns wide. Two people should not read two different subjects from the same scroll, lest each pull it to himself and ruin the scroll. Two people may, however, read the same subject. Three people may not read from the same scroll, however, even if they are reading about the same subject.

If one finds tefillin, he may have their value appraised and don them. The rationale is that tefillin are common-place articles, possessed by everyone, and their purpose is only for the sake of the fulfillment of the commandment.

The following rules apply if a person finds a living being that must be fed. If the found object may be used to earn money although it eats - e.g., a cow or a donkey - the finder should care for them twelve months from the day of their discovery. He should hire them out and feed them. If the rental he receives for their hire exceeds the cost of their food, the additional amount belongs to the owner. Similarly, if one finds chickens, one should sell their eggs and feed them for twelve months. From this time onward, one should have their value assessed, and they are considered as belonging in partnership to the finder and the original owner. The arrangement is governed by the laws applying to one who raises livestock for a colleague.

If one finds calves or ponies that pasture, he should care for them for three months. If he finds beasts that must be fed, he should care for them for 30 days. If he finds large geese or roosters, he should care for them for 30 days. If he finds younger fowl and any other live being whose care is more costly than the wage that may be earned with it, he should care for them for three days. Afterwards, he should sell them in the presence of a court. Similarly, if produce has begun to rot, or other similar things occur to a lost object, it should be sold in the presence of a court.

What should be done with the money from the sale? It should be given to the finder. He has permission to use it as a loan. Therefore, if the money is lost by forces beyond his control - e.g., it was plundered by an attacking force or it sank in the sea - he is liable for its repayment even if he never made use of it. Since he has permission to use it, it is as if he borrowed it.

Which funds may a finder make use of? The money received for the sale of a lost object. Since he cared for the object he is given this privilege. If, however, a person finds money, he should not make use of it. Therefore, if it is lost because of forces beyond his control, he is not liable, for he is considered a paid watchman, as explained above.

During the entire time in which the finder cares for the lost animal before selling it in court, if he feeds it from his own resources, he must be reimbursed by the owner. It appears to me that he is entitled to collect this sum without supporting his claim with an oath. This is a decree ordained for the benefit of society.

When a person finds a lost object, he is not required to take an oath. This is a decree ordained for the benefit of society. For if a finder of a lost article were required to take an oath, he would ignore the lost article and proceed on his way, so that he would not be required to take the oath. Even if a person found a wallet, and the owner of the wallet claimed that there was another wallet tied together with it, and it would be impossible to find one without finding the other tied to it, the finder is not required to take an oath.

Deuteronomy 22:1-3 states: "Do not watch your brother's ox or sheep going astray and ignore them.... Return them to him.... This is what you must do to his donkey and to his garment and to all lost articles that your brother will lose and you will find." A garment is included in the general category of "all lost articles that your brother will lose," as is an ox, a sheep and a donkey. Why then does the Torah mention a donkey individually? To teach that it should be returned when there is an identifying mark on its cushion and not on the donkey itself. Although the mark is on a matter of secondary importance, it should be returned. Why does the Torah mention an ox and a sheep individually? To teach that the shearings of a sheep and even the shearing of the tail of an ox, which is an insubstantial matter, must be returned. Why does the Torah mention a garment individually? To teach the following concept. A garment is unique in that it has marks by which it could be identified, and we presume that its owner would seek its recovery. It thus becomes a paradigm, and any article that has marks and has owners who seek its recovery must be returned. If, however, a lost article no longer has owners who seek it, for they have despaired of its recovery, it belongs to its finder, even if it has marks by which it can be identified.

This principle must be followed with regard to a lost article: Whenever an article does not have a mark by which it can be identified - e.g., one nail or one needle - as soon as the owners knew that it is lost, we presume that the owners despaired of its recovery. For they cannot provide a mark by which it can be identified and returned to them. Therefore, it belongs to the finder.

When by contrast an article has a mark by which it can be identified - e.g., a garment or an animal - we presume that the owners have not despaired of its recovery. For they think that they will be able to identify it by its marks, and it will be returned to them. For this reason, a person who finds it is obligated to announce its discovery unless he knows that the owners have despaired of its recovery - e.g., he heard them saying, "How terrible a loss!" or other things that indicate that they despaired of its return. In such an instance, the lost article belongs to its finder.

Similarly, if a person finds an article that has a mark by which it can be identified - in the sea, in a river or the like, or in a place where the majority of people are gentiles - he may presume that its owners despaired of its recovery at the time that it fell. It therefore belongs to the finder, even though he has not heard that the owners despaired of its recovery.

When the owner of an article does not know of its loss, he is not considered to have despaired of its recovery, even if it does not have a mark by which it can be identified. What is implied? If a person dropped a dinar and did not realize that he dropped it, he is not considered to have despaired of its recovery until he becomes aware that he dropped it. Even though he will certainly despair of its recovery when he realizes that he dropped it it is forbidden to take the article until that time. Moreover, if an owner is unaware that an article was dropped, even though he is aware of its absence, but thinks, "Maybe I gave it to so and so," "... placed it in a cabinet," "... made a mistake in my accounts," or the like, he is not considered to have despaired of the article's return.

When a person sees a colleague drop a dinar on the ground without being aware of it and takes the dinar before his colleague despairs of its recovery, he transgresses a positive commandment and two negative commandments, as we have explained. Even if he returns the dinar to his colleague after the latter has despaired of its recovery, the return of the money is not significant. It is as if he is giving him a present, and he is considered to have already violated the transgressions.

If the finder takes the dinar before the owner despairs of its return, with the intent of returning it, and after the owner despairs of its return decides to take it as his own, he transgresses only the positive commandment, Deuteronomy 22:1: "You shall certainly return it." If he waits and does not notify the owners, but does not take the dinar until the owners become aware that it fell, at which time they will despair, as we have explained, and then he takes the dinar from the ground, he transgresses only the commandment ibid.: "You may not ignore it." The same applies in all similar situations.

A person who sees a sela or another coin drop from even three people, even though there is not a p'rutah's worth for each of them, is obligated to return it. The rationale is that they might all be partners, and one may have been willing to forgo his share in favor of a colleague. Thus, that person has a share in the lost article worth more than a p'rutah.

When a person sees a dinar fall from a colleague into sand or into dust and escape the colleague's vision, it is as if it fell into the sea or into a river, and it belongs to the finder. For the owner despairs of its recovery, since it does not have a mark by which it can be identified. Even if he saw the original owner bring a sifter to search for the lost dinar, the owner is considered to have given up hope. He is searching out of wishful thinking, as would other seekers who search in the dust although they have not lost anything, in the hope that they will find what someone else has lost. The owner is searching in such a manner; it is not that he has not despaired of the recovery of his money.

The following rules apply when a person finds a sela in the market place. If a colleague finds him and tells him: "It is mine. It is new; it comes from this and this country and was issued by this and this king" - indeed, even if he says "My name was written on it" - his words are of no consequence, and the finder is not obligated to return it. The rationale is that the marks on a coin are not an accepted means of identification, because we can assume that a coin will be used for spending. Thus, we can say, "It was his, but he spent it, and it fell from the possession of another person." Since the marks on a coin are not relied upon as means of identification, as soon as a person realizes that a coin has fallen, he despairs of its recovery. Therefore, it becomes the property of the finder.

When a person finds an article that does not possess a mark by which it can be identified, next to an article that possesses such a mark, the finder is obligated to announce the discovery of both articles. If the owner of the article which possesses a mark by which it can be identified comes and takes his article, but says that he lost only this article, the finder acquires the article lacking the mark by which it can be identified.

The following laws apply when a person finds an earthenware utensil or any other type of utensil that is made in a standard manner. If new utensils are found, they are acquired by the finder. For they are like a dinar, and there is no difference between one dinar and another, and thus no way of identifying them. Similarly, the owner cannot identify these earthenware utensils; he does not know whether this jar or this vial is his or if it belongs to someone else. If, however, the earthenware utensils have been in their owner's possession for an extended period, and have become familiar to his eye, the finder is obligated to announce their discovery. For if a Torah scholar will come and say: "Although I cannot identify this utensil with a mark, I can recognize it as my own," the finder is obligated to show it to him. And if the scholar claims to recognize it and says that it belongs to him, it should be returned to him.

When does the above apply? To a refined sage who does not tell any falsehoods except to promote peace, or with regard to the tractate he is studying, the bed that he slept on or the house in which he stays. What is meant by the above? If he was studying the tractate of Niddah and said that he was studying the tractate of Mikvaot, so that he would not be asked about the Niddah laws. He slept in one bed, but said that he slept in another, lest signs of a seminal emission be discovered in the bed in which he slept. He stayed at Reuven's home, but said that he stayed at Shimon's, so that others would not trouble Reuven. He made peace between two people and added and subtracted from the statements each one of them made to heighten their feelings of closeness. Such deceptions are permitted. If, however, witnesses came and testified that he made other false statements, there is no obligation to return an article that he claims to have recognized.

Whenever a person finds an article that appears to have been intentionally placed down, it is forbidden for him to touch it. This applies whether or not it has a mark by which it can be identified. The rationale is that perhaps the owner of the article left it there until he returns. Thus, if the finder takes it he will have ill-treated the owner. If the article does not have a mark by which it can be identified, he has purposefully caused his colleague financial loss, for the article does not have a mark that will enable it to be identified and returned. Even if it has a mark, he has wronged him, for he has troubled him to search for the article and identify it by its marks. Therefore, it is forbidden for the finder to touch it, unless it appears to have fallen. Even if the finder is in doubt and does not know whether the article was lost or placed down, he should not touch it. If he transgressed and took it, he is forbidden to return it to its place. If it is an article that does not have a mark by which it can be identified, the finder acquires it; he is not obligated to return it.

Whenever a person takes an article that can be identified with a mark, whether originally it had been placed down or had dropped, whether in a private domain or in the public domain, he is obligated to announce its discovery. What is meant by an article that appears to have been intentionally placed down? If a person finds a donkey or a cow pasturing on the road during the day, or he finds a utensil buried in a garbage heap, he should not touch them, for Deuteronomy 22:1, the verse that commands the return of a lost object, speaks of an ox or a sheep "going astray" in the way. If, however, he found a donkey with its gear overturned, a cow running through vineyards or a utensil lying openly in a garbage heap, it is considered a lost article. It should be taken and its discovery announced.

If one sees a donkey or a cow pasturing in an ordinary place and manner at night, the animal is considered lost. If he saw the animal pasturing at twilight or at dawn for three consecutive days, it is considered a lost article; it should be taken and its discovery announced. The following laws apply when a person sees a cow running down a road. If it is facing the city, it is not considered a lost article. If it is not facing the city, it is considered a lost article.

If a person finds a cow pasturing among the vineyards, he is obligated to return the animal to its owner because of the damage that will be done to the property. Therefore, if the vineyards belong to a gentile, the animal is not considered lost and there is no obligation to return it. If he suspects that perhaps the gentile will kill the animal when he finds it because it spoiled his vineyard, it is considered a lost article; it should be taken and its discovery announced.

The following rules apply if a person finds a cow in the public domain. If it is found beyond the Sabbath limits of the city, he is obligated to return it. If it was pasturing in the grass or located in a barn that is neither a totally secure place nor one from where it will definitely flee, the finder should not touch it; this is not a lost article. If he found a garment or an axe at the side of a wall, he should not touch them. If he found them in a thoroughfare, he should take them and announce their discovery. The same applies in all similar instances.

If a person finds young doves whose wings are tied together and they are hopping behind a stone wall, a wooden fence or in a lane in the fields, he should not touch them, since it is possible that their owner left them there. If, however, he takes them, they become his property. If they were found tied with a unique knot that can serve as a mark of identification, the finder is obligated to announce their discovery. Similarly, if he found them located in a fixed place, he is obligated to announce their discovery, for the place where an object is discovered can serve as a mark of identification.

If a person finds a utensil buried in a garbage heap, he should not touch it, as mentioned above. If the garbage dump is not usually cleared away, and its owner decides to clear it away, he should take the utensil and announce its discovery, even though it is buried. If he discovers small utensils - e.g., a knife, a spit or the like - he should take them and announce their discovery, even though they were buried.

If one finds scattered produce in the manner of being [intentionally] placed, he should not touch them; in the manner of being dropped, they are surely [the finders]. And likewise if he found small bundles of sheaves in a public area. As behold there is no identifying mark upon them. Or if he found round cakes of figs, bread of a baker, strings of fish, cuts of meat, unprocessed wool fleeces that are coming from their state, flax stalks or strips of combed purple wool, they are surely his - since they do no have an identifying mark upon them. But if they do have an identifying mark upon them, he takes it and announces [its finding]. For an identifying mark that may get trampled is [considered] an identifying mark,

If, however, a person finds bread baked by an ordinary person,wool that has been dyed by a craftsman, jugs of wine or jugs of oil, he is obligated to announce their discovery, for all these articles possess distinctive marks by which they can be identified. If, however, this occurs during the season when the stores of wine and oil are opened, the jugs belong to the finder even when the seal is marked. For all the jugs will be marked in the same fashion. The jugs will thus resemble loaves of bread coming from a baker, which all possess a standard shape and weight.

The following laws apply if a person finds small sheaves in a private domain: If it appears that they have fallen, he may keep them. If it appears that they have been intentionally placed there, he must announce their discovery. The rationale is that although they do not have a mark by which they can be identified, the place where they are discovered can serve as a mark of identification, even though it is not a distinctive mark of identification. If he finds large sheaves, whether in the private domain or in the public domain, he should take them and announce their discovery.

If one found scattered produce located on threshing floors: if they were like a kav within four cubits or more by four cubits, they are surely [the finders] - since the owners will not deal with their collection. If they were scattered within less than four cubits, he should not touch them, lest the owners placed them there. If they were like half a kav within two cubits or two kav within eight cubits or the kav was of two or three types such as dates, sesame [and pomegranates] - all of these are [cases of] doubt. Hence he should not take [them], but if he did take them, he is not obligated to announce [their finding].

A person who finds a collection of fruit, fruit in a container, or an empty container is obligated to announce the discovery of these objects. If one finds a container with fruit in front of it, one may keep the fruit, but one must announce the discovery of the utensil. For it is likely that the utensil belongs to one person and the produce to another, and there is no mark by which to identify the produce. If it appears that the produce and the container belong to the same person, one must also announce the discovery of the produce.

What is implied? If the back of the container is facing the produce, he may keep the produce. If, however, the front of the container is facing the produce, we suspect that the produce fell from the container. Nevertheless, even in such a situation, if the container has a rim, and it is totally empty, the finder may keep the produce. For if it had fallen from the container, the rim would have caused something to remain. If some fruit were in the container and some were on the ground, the finder is obligated to announce the discovery of the entire amount.

When a person finds berries set out to dry in the road, even if he finds them next to a field of berries, they may be kept by the finder. Similarly, when a berry bush hangs over a road and berries are found under it, one is permitted to take them; the prohibition against robbery does not apply. The rationale for these rulings is that a berry becomes repulsive when it falls in the dust. Such berries are considered ownerless, and thus there is no requirement that a tithe should be given. These concepts do not apply to olives, carobs and other similar fruit; they are forbidden to be taken by the finder.

Dates that are blown off a tree by the wind may be taken, for we assume that the owners forgo ownership over them in favor of anyone who finds them. If, however, they belong to orphans below the age of majority, they are forbidden to be taken, because a minor does not have the legal prerogative to waive his ownership over property. Similarly, if the owner of the field takes care not to lose any of his produce and has surrounded the trees with a fence or put nets under the trees so that the fruit that drops should fall there until he gathers them, it is forbidden to take this fruit, for he has shown that he is not willing to forgo ownership.

A perverse cat that kills young children may not be kept by its owner. Hence, taking it from its owner is not considered robbery, nor is one obligated to return it, even though its hide has some worth. Instead, whoever finds it acquires it. He should kill it, and the hide belongs to him.

The following laws apply to a young dove that is found close to a dovecote. If it is found within 50 cubits of the dovecote, it belongs to the owner of the dovecote. If it is found beyond 50 cubits of the dovecote, it belongs to whoever finds it, for a young dove does not hop more than 50 cubits. If a young dove is found between two dovecotes, it is granted to the owner of the closer one. If it is found midway between the two, its value should be divided. When does the above apply? When there are an equal number of doves in each dovecote. But if there are more doves in one dovecote than another, we assume that it came from the majority, even though it is further away.

The following laws apply if a person finds needles, spits, nails or the like. If he finds them one at a time, he may keep them. If he finds them in sets of two or more, he is obligated to announce [their discovery, for the number of articles found is a mark by which they can be identified.

Similarly, if one finds scattered coins, he may keep them. Even if some of the coins are lying on each other, they are considered to be scattered. If, however, one finds a collection of coins, he must announce their discovery. For example, if he found three coins placed one on top of the other like a tower, or there was one to the right, one to the left and one on top of both of them, or they were placed in succession, each one lying slightly on the other, so that if a sliver of wood were placed under them he would be able to pick them all up at one time, he is obligated to announce their discovery. If they were placed in a circle, a line, like a tripod, like steps, the matter is one of doubt. Therefore, at the outset, one should not take them.

If a person finds money in a wallet or an empty wallet, he is obligated to announce its discovery. If he found a wallet with money scattered before it, he may keep the money. If, however, it appears that the wallet and the money belong to the same person and that the money fell from the wallet, he must announce its discovery.

The following rules apply when a person finds money in a store. If the money is found between the counter and the storekeeper, it must be given to the storekeeper. If it is found on the counter, and needless to say, if it is found on the outside of the counter, it may be kept by the finder. Why does the store not acquire the money on behalf of its owner? Because it is not a protected courtyard. Therefore, even though the owner was present, to acquire the money, the owner would have to say: "May my store acquire it on my behalf," as will be explained.

The following rules apply when a person finds money in a store of a moneychanger. If the money is found between the counter and the moneychanger, it must be given to the moneychanger. If the money was found on the counter, even if it was wrapped in a purse and placed on the table, it may be kept by the finder, provided the majority of the clientele are gentiles, as we have explained. If, however, the majority of the clientele are Jewish, the finder must announce the discovery. Since they are wrapped in a purse, they have a mark by which they can be identified.

When a person purchases produce from a colleague or a colleague sends him produce, and he finds money wrapped in a purse among the produce, he must announce the discovery. If the money is scattered, he may keep it. When does the above apply? When one receives the produce from a merchant or from a private individual who purchased it from a merchant. If, however, a private individual threshed produce himself or had his Canaanite servants and maidservants do so, the finder is obligated to return the money to him.

When a person finds a buried treasure in a mound or in an old wall, it belongs to him, for we assume that it belonged to ancient Amorites. This applies provided he finds the treasure buried very low, as would be common for ancient valuables. If, however, it appears that the treasure was recently placed there, even if he has doubts concerning the matter, he should not touch it, for perhaps it was intentionally placed there.

Since a person's domain can acquire property on his behalf without his knowledge, as will be explained, why does the owner of this courtyard not acquire the treasure buried within the old wall even if it originally belonged to the Amorites, and thus he would become its legal owner?

The rationale is that the treasure was not known about by him or by others. Thus, it was "lost to him and to all others." Therefore, it belongs to the finder.

Our Sages derived this concept as follows: With regard to a lost object, the Torah Deuteronomy 22:3 states: "That is lost by him and found." This refers to an article that the owner lost, but others can find, thus excluding an article that fell into the sea and is "lost to him and all others." Surely, this applies to an ancient treasure that the person never owned. It is certainly "lost to him and all others." Therefore, it belongs to the finder.

It appears to me that the above applies only when the owner claims that the buried treasure belongs to him, or he is an heir and we claim on his behalf that perhaps it belonged to his father. If, however, he admits that this is a lost article, it belongs to the finder. Therefore, if the person rents out his house to others, the article belongs to the last renter. If he rented the domain to three gentiles at the same time, he is considered to have made it an inn. Therefore, anything found in the walls, or even within the house itself belongs to the finder. For no one can claim that the article belongs to him or that it was buried, because the domain has been made an inn.

Whenever we have said that the finder acquires the lost article he discovers, it does not become his property until it reaches his hand or his domain. If, however, he sees a lost article - even if he falls upon it - and then another person comes and takes hold of it, the person who takes hold of it acquires it.

If a person was riding on an animal and he saw a lost article and told a colleague, "Acquire it on my behalf," when the colleague lifts it up for him, the rider acquires it, although the rider himself did not take possession of it. If the rider told his colleague: "Give it to me," and the colleague takes it and then says, "I acquired it for myself," the person who took it is granted possession. If, however, he gives it to the rider and then claims to have taken possession of it for himself, his words are of no consequence.

When a person lifts up a lost object on behalf of a colleague, the colleague acquires it, although the colleague did not tell the finder anything. When two people lift up a lost article together, they both acquire it.

When a deaf mute, a mentally incompetent person or a minor lifts up an article on behalf of a mentally competent individual, the mentally competent individual does not acquire the article. For these three types of individuals are not considered of sufficient mental capacity to acquire an article on behalf of another person. If a deaf mute and a mentally competent individual lift up an article together neither acquires it. For since the mentally competent individual does not acquire a share, the deaf mute also does not acquire a share. If both of the people who pick up an article are deaf mutes, our Sages ordained that they should acquire it to prevent strife from arising.

When two people see an ownerless camel or donkey and both rush and lead it, or both draw it after them, or one leads it and one draws it after himself, they both acquire it. When does the above apply? With regard to a donkey. With regard to a camel, by contrast, if one leads it and one draws it after himself, the one that draws it after himself acquires it, and not the one that leads it.

When a person rushes and grabs the reins of an ownerless animal, he does not acquire it until he draws it after him or leads it. The same applies with regard to an animal belonging to the estate of a convert who died without an heir. He does, however, acquire the reins themselves.

The following rules apply when one person rides on an ownerless animal and one holds its reins. The rider acquires the animal and the portion of its reins attached to its cheeks. The one holding the reins acquires the portion that he is holding, and the remainder of the reins are not acquired by either one.

A persons courtyard acquires for him, without his knowledge. So if a lost object falls into it, the owner of the courtyard acquires it. But this is only when its (the courtyard) is watched.

Our Sages ordained this convention so that people who discover lost articles should not come to strife. When is this convention employed? In an alleyway or at the sides of the public domain, which are not crowded with many people, or in a field that is ownerless. When, however, a person stands in the public domain or in a field belonging to a colleague, the area within a radius of four cubits cannot acquire property on his behalf. In such a place, he cannot acquire a lost article until it reaches his hand.

A female minor may acquire an article by virtue of its presence in her courtyard or within the area within a radius of four cubits of her. A male minor, by contrast, may not acquire an article by virtue of its presence in his courtyard or within the area within a radius of four cubits of him. The rationale for these laws is that we derive the concept that a female minor may acquire property by virtue of its presence in her courtyard from the fact that she is able to acquire an article that is placed in her hand. For just as she can be divorced by virtue of a bill of divorce being placed in her hand, so too, can she be divorced by virtue of a bill of divorce being placed in her courtyard. And just as her courtyard is effective with regard to the acquisition of a bill of divorce, so too, it is effective with regard to the acquisition of a lost object. From this we also conclude that she may acquire an article by virtue of its presence in the area within a radius of four cubits of her, for this area is considered her courtyard with regard to the acquisition of a lost article. The potential for a man to acquire property by virtue of its presence in his courtyard is derived, by contrast, from the fact that he is able to acquire an article via an agent. Just as an agent can acquire an article for him, so too, can he acquire an article by virtue of its presence in his courtyard. Since a male minor is incapable of charging an agent to act on his behalf, so too, he cannot acquire an article by virtue of its presence in his courtyard or in the radius of four cubits around him; it must reach his hand.

The following rules apply when a person sees other people chasing an ownerless [animal that is moving - e.g., a] wounded deer or young doves that cannot fly in his property. When the following conditions are met: he was standing at the side of his field, the animals were on his property, and he could catch them if he ran, he can acquire them by virtue of their presence in his field if he states: "May my field acquire them for me." If he cannot catch the animals, they are like a deer that runs normally and doves that can fly, his words are of no substance. Instead, whoever catches them first acquires them. If they were given to him as a present, since another person transferred ownership of them to him, and they are moving in his field, he acquires them by virtue of their presence in his field. Even if they were given as a present, if the deer can run normally and the doves can fly, he cannot acquire them by virtue of their presence in his field.

As a reflection of the paths of peace, the prohibition against robbery applies to a lost object taken by a deaf mute, a mentally incompetent individual and a minor. As such, if a person transgresses and robs such an article from one of these individuals, it cannot be expropriated from him by legal process. If he denies taking the article and takes an oath to that effect, he is not liable to pay an additional fifth.

A person acquires a lost article discovered by the following individuals: a) his son or his daughter who derive their livelihood from his household, even though they are past majority, b) his daughter who is a na'arah," even if she does not derive her livelihood from his household - indeed, even if she has been sold as a maidservant, c) his Canaanite servants and maidservants, d) his wife. A person does not, however, acquire a lost object discovered by a son who does not derive his livelihood from his father's household even if he is a minor, his Jewish servants and maidservants, and his wife who has been divorced, even if there are doubts concerning the validity of the divorce.

When a person finds a promissory note, he should not return it. This applies even if the note does not explicitly say that it creates a lien on the debtor's landed property, the presumed debtor acknowledges his obligation, and the signatures of the witnesses have been validated. The rationale is that we suspect that the note was already paid, and the creditor and the debtor are joining together to deceive the purchasers of the debtor's landed property and expropriate that property unlawfully. This is the reason why the debtor acknowledges the creditor's claim. For the creditor can expropriate property sold by the debtor with this promissory note, even though it does not explicitly say that it creates a lien on the debtor's landed property. We follow the principle that the omission of a clause mentioning the creation of a lien on the debtor's landed property in a legal document is merely a scribal error. This applies with regard to both promissory notes and deeds of sale. Therefore, if the promissory note states explicitly that it does not create a lien on the landed property, and the debtor acknowledges his obligation, the note may be returned. If not, the finder should not return it, lest it have been paid.

Similarly, if a promissory note was dated on the day it was found, the signatures of the witnesses have been validated, and the debtor acknowledges his obligation, it may be returned to the creditor. If, however, the signatures of the witnesses have not been validated, it should not be returned, lest the debtor had the note written in the expectation of borrowing, but did not borrow yet.

If a promissory note is found in a leather container, a wooden vessel or the like, it should be returned to a claimant who can identify it by a mark. If three promissory notes are found wrapped together in one bundle, placed one on top of the other or tied together, they should be returned to a claimant who can identify them by a mark.

If three promissory notes were found together and they mention one borrower and three different lenders, the notes should be returned to the borrower if the signatures of the witnesses have been validated. If the signatures of the witnesses have not been validated, the notes should be returned to whoever can identify them by a mark. For perhaps the lenders gave their promissory notes to a scribe to validate the signatures of the witnesses, and they fell from the possession of the judge. If the notes mention one lender and three borrowers, they should be returned to the lender. If the three were written by one scribe, they should be returned to the person who can identify it by a mark. For it is possible that the three borrowers brought their documents to one scribe to write, and the documents fell from his hand.

If a person found several torn legal documents and among them a promissory note that was not torn, he should not return it. If together with these documents was a receipt for the promissory note, even if the receipt was not signed by witnesses, the promissory note should be returned to the borrower. Had it not been paid, the lender would not have placed it among torn legal documents, and moreover, there is a document stating that it was paid.

The following rules apply when a person finds a bill of divorce. If the husband acknowledges divorcing his wife, the document should be returned to the woman. If the husband does not acknowledge divorcing his wife, but the woman identifies the bill of divorce with a distinctive mark, it should be given her. If she cannot, it should not be returned to either of them. If the husband claims that it fell from his hand, and he was able to identify it with marks, and the wife claims that it fell from her hand, and she was also able to identify it with marks, it should be given to her, provided she mentions a distinctive mark - e.g., there is a hole in the parchment next to a particular letter. The rationale is had the bill of divorce not reached her hand, she would not know of this matter.

If the husband identifies a bill of divorce by describing the signs of the string with which it was tied, and his wife provides the same description, it should be given to her, provided she provides a distinctive mark - the measure of the length of the string. If, however, she merely states that it was red or black, this is not considered a distinctive mark. If the husband identifies a bill of divorce by stating that it was held in a leather container, and his wife provides the same description, it should be given to him, because this is not considered a distinctive mark.

When a person finds a legal document freeing a Canaanite servant, he should return it to the servant if the master acknowledges having given it. If the master does not acknowledge having given it, the finder should not return it to either of them.

The following rules apply if a legal document recording a present is found. If the present was given when the giver was healthy, the document should not be returned even though both the giver and the recipient acknowledge that the gift was given. The rationale is that perhaps the giver originally had the document composed with the intention of giving the present. After having the document composed, however, he sold the field or gave it to another person as a present. He then recanted and now acknowledges the original document in order to deceive the person to whom he later sold the field or gave it to as a present. If the present was given by a person on his deathbed, and the giver acknowledges the gift, it should be given to the recipient. If he does not acknowledge it, it should not be given. The rationale is that if a person on his deathbed gives a present, and then retracts it and gives it to another person, the latter one acquires it, as will be explained.

If the man who gave the present when he was dying passes away, the document should not be returned, neither to the recipient, nor to the heir. This applies even if the heir acknowledges that his testator gave this gift. The rationale is that perhaps the testator originally had the document composed with the intention of giving the present, but did not do so. After the testator's death, the heir sold the property or gave it to another person as a present. He then recanted and now desires to join together with the original recipient in order to take the property away from the latter recipient.

If a person finds a receipt, and the person to whom the promissory note was written admits that his note is no longer viable - e.g., it has been paid or he waived payment - the receipt should be given to its owner. If both the creditor and the debtor do not acknowledge the validity of the receipt, the receipt should not be given to either of them.

If a woman's marriage contract is found, it should not be returned to the woman even if both she and her husband acknowledge that the money due her by virtue of her marriage contract has not been paid. The rationale is that we suspect that the money due her by virtue of her marriage contract has been paid, or that she waived her right to it, afterwards the husband sold his property, and he wants to deceive the purchasers.

All the following legal documents should be returned to their owners if found: a document recording the worth of a debtor's property as evaluated by the court, a document recording a court's decision to sell a man's property to provide for the sustenance of his wife and/or daughters, a document recording a chalitzah or mi'un, a document recording the judge's recollection of the claims made by each of the litigants, a document recording the litigants' choice of judges who they desire to preside over a certain litigation, or any document recording a final judicial act. The general principle is: Whenever a legal document involves a monetary obligation, and there is room to suspect that the obligation has been met, the document should not be returned, lest the obligation have in fact been met. Even when the debtor admits that the debt is outstanding, if it is possible that he is making that admission to deceive a purchaser or a recipient of a present who acquired the debtor's property after the date mentioned on the document, so that the creditor could expropriate the property from them dishonestly, the document should not be returned although both the creditor and the debtor acknowledge the debt. When, however, there is no reason to suspect that a monetary obligation has been repaid or that deception is being perpetrated, a legal document should be returned.

Whenever the law is that a legal document should not be returned, and the document was nevertheless returned, the document is considered acceptable and may be used to expropriate property.These documents should not be taken away from their owners. We assume that they are acceptable, and we harbor no suspicions about them. This, with G-d's help, concludes the laws of robbery and the return of lost objects.