Theft

Whenever a person steals property that is worth a p'rutah or more, he transgresses a negative commandment, as Exodus 20:13 states: "Do not steal." Lashes are not administered for the violation of this commandment, for one is obligated to give compensation. For the Torah requires a thief to compensate the party from whom he stole, whether he be a Jew or a gentile, an adult or a minor.

The Torah prohibits stealing even the slightest amount.It is forbidden to steal as a jest, to steal with the intent to return, or to steal with the intent to pay. All is forbidden, lest one habituate oneself to such conduct.

Who is a thief? A person who takes assets belonging to a colleague in stealth, without the owner's knowing - e.g., a pickpocket who is not detected by the owner or the like. If, however, a person takes a colleague's assets in open view and with public knowledge by force, he is not considered a thief, but rather a robber. For this reason, an armed bandit who steals is not considered a robber, but a thief. This applies even when the owner takes notice when he steals.

When two acceptable witnesses testify that a person stole, he is required to pay twice the amount of the stolen property to its owner. If he stole a dinar, he must pay two. If he stole a donkey, a garment or a camel, he must pay twice its worth. He thus loses the amount that he desired that his colleague would lose.

When a thief admits that he stole, he must repay the principal, but he is not liable for the payment of the double amount, as indicated by Exodus 22:8: "one who is deemed guilty by the court must pay double." This excludes a person who admits his own guilt; he need not pay double. This principle applies with regard to all the fines required by the Torah. A person who admits his own guilt is not liable for the fine.

The obligation to make double restitution applies with regard to all articles with the exception of a sheep or an ox. A person who steals an ox or a sheep and slaughters it or sells it must pay four times the amount of the sheep and five times the amount of the ox.

The obligation to pay double - or four or five times the amount - of the value of the stolen article applies equally to a man and to a woman. If a woman is married and thus has no financial resources with which to pay, the double paymentremains a debt that she is obligated to pay when she is divorced or becomes a widow. At that time, the court exacts payment from her.

When a minor steals, he is not liable for the double payment. The stolen article must, however, be returned to its owner. If that article is lost, he is not obligated to pay the principal even after he attains majority.

When a servant steals, he is not liable for the double payment. Similarly, his owner is not liable. For a person is not liable for the damages caused by his servants although they are his property. The rationale is that the servants are mentally competent, and their owner is incapable of guarding them. Were the owner to be held liable for the damages his servants cause, if he angered a servant, the servant could desire to seek revenge and go and ignite a grain heap worth a thousand dinar or precipitate other similar damage to cause his owner to be liable. If the servant is freed by his owner, he is obligated to pay the double payment.

It is appropriate for the court to administer corporal punishment to a child who steals, according to the child's strength, so that he will not become accustomed to such conduct. The same principles apply if he causes other types of damage. Similarly, servants who stole or caused damage should be administered severe corporal punishment, so that they will not become accustomed to causing damage.

When the stolen article increased in value while it was in the thief's possession - e.g., a sheep bore a lamb and it was shorn - the thief must restore the sheep, its shearings and its offspring. If the owner already despaired of the sheep's return, and it gave birth or was shorn, the thief must pay only the value at the time of the theft. If the thief invested in the stolen property, causing its value to increase - e.g., he force fed livestock - the thief is entitled to the increase in value even when the owner does not despair of the article's return. When the thief restores the stolen article and the double payment, he should be repaid for the increase in value by the owner, or that amount should be deducted from the double payment.

When the stolen article remains unchanged in the possession of the thief, it should be returned to its owner regardless of whether or not he despaired of its return. If, however, it increased in value after the owner despaired of its return, the thief is entitled to that increase, as we have explained above. If, however, the stolen article underwent a fundamental change while in the thief's possession, the thief acquires it and any increase in its value, even before the owner despairs of the article's return. All that is required of him is to return the value of the stolen article at the time of the theft.

If he stole a gaunt animal and he fattened it, or he stole a fat animal and he caused its weight to be reduced, he is liable to pay twice - or four or five times - the value of the animal at the time of the theft. If he stole a kid and it grew into a ram, or a calf and it grew into an ox, he is liable to pay twice the value of the animal at the time of the theft. If he slaughtered it or sold it after it matured, it is considered to have undergone a change while in the thief's possession, and he acquires it. Thus, he is slaughtering or selling his own animal; he is not required to pay four or five times its worth.

When a person steals an animal, a utensil or the like that was worth four zuz at the time of the theft, but at the time the case is brought to court, it depreciated and is worth only two, the thief must pay the worth of the principal at the time of the theft, and pay the double - or quadruple or quintuple - amount as evaluated at the time the case is brought to court. The following rules apply if an animal or a utensil was worth two zuz at the time of the theft, but at the time the case is brought to court, it appreciated and is worth four. If the person slaughtered or sold the animal or destroyed or lost the utensil, he must pay double - or four or five times - the worth of the stolen article at the time the case is brought to court. If the animal died or the utensil was lost as a matter of course, he must pay double the worth of the stolen article at the time of the theft.

When a person steals a utensil and destroys it or causes it to decrease in value - or it is destroyed or it decreases in value as a matter of course - the amount of the decrease is not evaluated. Instead, we evaluate the original worth of this utensil, and the thief is obligated to pay the owner twice this amount. The broken utensil becomes the property of the thief. The same laws apply in all similar instances. If the owner desires to take the broken utensil and be compensated for the damage done to it and receive the double payment, his wishes are respected.

When a thief slaughters or sells a sheep or an ox before the owner despairs of its return, he is required to pay four or five times its amount, despite the fact that the sale is nullified and the purchaser does not acquire the article, but instead must return it intact to its original owner. Needless to say, the above applies if he slaughters or sells the animal after the owner despairs of its return. For his deed is effective, and the purchaser is considered to have acquired the article.

When a thief steals from another thief, he is not required to pay twice its amount. This applies even if the original owner despaired of the stolen article's return. If the second thief slaughters or sells a stolen animal, he is not required to pay the first thief four or five times its worth. The rationale is that the law is that this animal must be returned to its owner; it was never acquired by the thief. Nor must the second thief pay twice, four or five times the amount to the original owner, because he did not steal the property from the original owner's domain.

When a thief steals an animal and slaughters it, and then another person steals the meat, the second thief must make double restitution to the first thief, for the first thief acquired the animal because of the change his deed brought about. The first thief must, however, pay four or five times the animal's worth. The following rules apply when a thief stole an animal and sold it, and another person stole it from the purchaser. If the original owner despaired of the animal's return, the first thief must pay four or five times the animal's worth, and the second thief must pay double its worth. If the original owner did not despair of the animal's return, the second thief is required to restore only the principal.

When a person steals from a gentile or from consecrated property, he is required to pay only the principal, as implied by Exodus 22:8: "He shall pay twice the amount to his colleague." "To his colleague" excludes the Temple treasury and a gentile. Similarly, a person who steals animals that were consecrated to be offered as sacrifices - both sacrifices of the highest sanctity and sacrifices of lesser sanctity - is not liable to pay twice or four or five times the animals' worth. This applies whether or not the owner is liable to bring another animal as an offering instead of the stolen animal. The rationale is that Exodus 22:6 describes the article as having been "stolen from a person's home" - i.e., not from the the Temple treasury.

Similarly, a person who steals servants, promissory notes or landed property is not liable to make double payment. For the Torah obligated double payment only for the theft of chattel that is itself worth money. The exclusion of landed property is derived from Exodus 22:8, which speaks about paying double for: "an ox, a donkey, a sheep or a garment." Servants are equated with landed property, as Leviticus 25:46 states: "You shall give them as an inheritance to your sons." And promissory notes are not themselves worth money.

When a person steals a firstling donkey belonging to a colleague before it was redeemed, he must make double restitution to the owner. Although the donkey is not yet his, it is fit to be his at a later date.

A person who steals tevel belonging to a colleague and eats it must reimburse him for his tevel. A person who steals forbidden fats belonging to a colleague and eats it must reimburse him for his fats.

When a person steals terumah from an Israelite who owns it, he is not required to pay double. For the Israelite possesses merely the prerogative to give it to the priest of his choice,and that prerogative is not considered to be equivalent to money.

When a person steals a sheep or a cow from his father and slaughters or sells the stolen animal and then his father dies, he is liable to pay four or five times the animal's worth to his father's estate. If his father dies, and then he slaughters or sells the stolen animal, he must make double payment; he does not, however, pay four or five times the animal's worth. If a thief steals a sheep or a cow, slaughters or sells the stolen animal and then consecrates it as a sacrifice, he must pay four or five times the animal's worth. If, by contrast, a thief consecrates an animal and then slaughters or sells it - even if he consecrates it as a sacrifice of a lesser degree of sanctity - he must make a double payment; he does not pay four or five times the amount. When does the above apply? When he consecrated the animal after the owner despaired of the animal's return. If, however, he consecrates it before the owner despairs of the animal's return, the consecration is not effective. If the thief slaughters or sells it, he must pay four or five times the amount.

If the owner consecrates the animal while it is in the thief's domain, the consecration is not effective. The rationale is that it is not in the owner's possession. If the thief slaughtered or sold it after the owner consecrated it, he must still pay four or five times its worth to the owner.

When a thief slaughters a sheep or a cow, but the slaughter is not ritually acceptable, or he kills the animal or rips out the signs of ritual slaughter, he is liable to pay only double the animal's worth. If, however, he slaughters an animal for medicinal purposes, to feed it to the dogs - and after it was slaughtered it was discovered to be taref - or he slaughtered it in the Temple courtyard although it was not consecrated, he must pay four or five times its worth. Although it is forbidden to benefit from a non-consecrated animal that is slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, since that prohibition is Rabbinic in origin, he is liable to pay four or five times the animal's worth.

Similarly, if a person steals a half-breed that comes from a sheep and another animal, or he steals an animal that had been preyed upon, one whose leg had been cut off, one that limped or was blind, or that belonged to partners, and he slaughtered it or sold it, he is liable to pay four or five times its worth.

When a person steals a cow or a sheep and gives it to another person as a present, or he charges another person with slaughtering it, and the other person slaughters it, or he charges another person with selling it, and the other person sells it, the thief must pay four or fives times its worth. He is also liable for this penalty if he stole it and sold it on credit, exchanged it for another article, paid a debt that he owed, or sent it as an engagement gift to his fiancee in his father-in-law's home.

A thief stole a sheep or a cow and sold it, but posited that the sale not take effect until thirty days have passed - and within those thirty days the thief was apprehended - he is required to pay only double its worth. The following rule applies if the thief sold the stolen animal to another person except for one hundredth of its bulk, or except for its foreleg or its hindleg. If the thief retained ownership of a portion of the animal that is permitted to be used only through ritual slaughter, he is not liable to pay four or five times its worth. If he sold it with the exception of its shearings or its horns, he is liable to pay four or five times its worth, for these portions of the animal are permitted to be used even without ritual slaughter.

If a thief stole a sheep or a cow, cut off a limb and then sold it, or he sold it with the exception of the right to work with it, or he sold it except for a 30-day period, the payment for four or five times its amount should not be expropriated from the thief. If the person whose animal was stolen seizes this amount from the thief's assets, the property that he seized should not be expropriated from him.

If the thief was a partner in the animal he stole and then he sold it, he is not liable to pay four or five times its worth.

The following rules apply when partners steal a sheep or a cow. If one of them slaughtered or sold the stolen animal with his partner's consent, they must both join in the payment of four or five times its worth. If he acted without the consent of his partner, they are not liable for the payment of four or five times the animal's worth. They must, however, make double restitution.

When a thief stole a sheep or a cow, was brought to court and was told by the judges: "Go and give him what you stole," and instead of making restitution he sold or slaughtered the animal, he is not liable for the payment of four or five times the animal's worth. If the judges told him: "You are obligated to return it to him," and then he slaughtered or sold the stolen animal, he is liable for the payment of four or five times the animal's worth. The rationale is that the judgment was not rendered in a definitive manner, and he is persevering in his theft.

When a person steals an object without removing it from the domain of its owner, he is not liable for a double payment.Similarly, if he slaughtered or sold a stolen sheep or cow in the owner's domain, he is not liable for the added penalty. If, however, he lifted the stolen object above the ground, he is liable as a thief, even though he did not take it out of the owner's domain. What is implied? If he stole a lamb from the corral and was pulling it, and it died while in the owner's domain, he is not liable for the added penalty. If he lifted it up or removed it from the owner's domain, and then it died, he is liable. If while in the owner's domain, the thief gave it to a priest in redemption of his first-born son, to his creditor, to an unpaid watchman, to a borrower, to a renter or to a paid watchman, and the recipient was pulling the animal and it died, the recipient is not liable. If the recipient lifted it up or removed it from the domain of its owner and it died, the recipient is liable, because the thief did not remove it from the owner's domain and the recipient did.

When a herd of sheep or cows are in a forest, and a thief prods an animal to move and then hides it among the trees and woods, he is obligated to pay twice its worth. If he slaughters or sells it there, he is obligated to pay four or five times its worth.

When a thief steals a sheep or a cow in the owner's domain, and after the owner discovered the theft, the thief removed it and slaughtered it or sold it outside their domain, or if a thief stole and removed the animal from the owner's domain and then slaughtered or sold it in the owner's domain, he is obligated to pay four or five times its worth.

We have already explained in Hilchot Na'arah Betulah, that whenever a person violates a transgression that is punishable by both capital punishment and a financial penalty, he is not obligated to pay the financial penalty, even though he performed the act unintentionally. When a person performs a transgression that is punishable by lashing and a financial penalty, he shall be lashed and is not required to pay the financial penalty. For a person should not receive both punishments: lashing and a financial penalty for the same deed. Therefore, if he performed the act unintentionally or he was not given a warning, he is required to pay and is not lashed. When does the above apply? When the financial obligation and the transgression obligating capital punishment - or the financial obligation and the transgression punishable by lashing - came about at the same time. If, however, he became liable for a financial penalty and then became liable for capital punishment or lashing, or became liable for capital punishment or lashing and then became liable for a financial penalty, he shall be lashed and pay, or pay and be executed.

What is implied? If he propelled an arrow on the Sabbath, from the beginning of a four-cubit space until the end of the four-cubit space, and it tore a garment belonging to a colleague as it proceeded, he set fire to a grain heap belonging to a colleague on the Sabbath, or he stole a wallet on the Sabbath and was dragging it along the ground until he removed it from the owner's domain - which was a private domain - to the public domain, and caused it to be destroyed there, he is not liable for the damages. The prohibition against labor on the Sabbath, and the prohibition against theft or damages take effect at the same time. Therefore, he is not liable. If, however, he stole a wallet on the Sabbath and lifted it up in the private domain, and then took it out to the public domain and threw it into a river, he is liable to make a double payment. For he became liable for the theft before he violated the prohibition punishable by execution by stoning. The same laws apply in all similar situations. Similarly, if a person cut down a tree belonging to a colleague on a festival, and a warning was issued, or he set fire to a grain heap belonging to a colleague on Yom Kippur and a warning was issued, or he stole and slaughtered an animal on Yom Kippur, he is not under any financial obligation. If, however, a warning was not issued to him, he is liable for payment, and with regard to the slaughter of a stolen animal must pay four or five times its worth.

If a thief stole a sheep or a cow and slaughtered it on the Sabbath or as a sacrifice to a false deity, he is not liable to pay four or five times its worth, as explained above. This applies even when he performs the transgression unintentionally.

If the cow had been lent to him and he slaughtered it on the Sabbath with the intent to steal it, he is not liable even for the double payment, for the violation of the prohibition against the laws of the Sabbath and the prohibition against theft came about simultaneously. For if there is no obligation for theft, there is no obligation for slaughter or for sale.

When a person steals a sheep or a cow and sells it on the Sabbath or sells it to a pagan deity, he is obligated to pay four or five times its amount, for the sale itself does not cause one to incur the death penalty. If a forbidden labor was performed on the Sabbath at the time of the sale, the thief is not liable to pay four or five times its amount. What is implied? For example, he agreed that the sale would not take effect until the animal comes to rest in the courtyard of the purchaser. Thus, when he took the animal from one domain to another domain, the prohibition against labor on the Sabbath and the sale take effect at the same time.

When a thief appointed an agent to slaughter a stolen animal for him, and the agent slaughtered it for him on the Sabbath, the thief must pay four or five times the animal's worth. For the thief did not perform a transgression punishable by death, and as we have explained, a person who has an agent slaughter for him is liable for the additional payment.

When two witnesses testify that a person stole a cow or a sheep, and then they themselves or two other witnesses testify that he slaughtered or sold the animal, the thief is liable to pay four or five times the animal's worth. If two witnesses testify that the person stole a cow or a sheep and one witness testifies that he slaughtered or sold the stolen animal, or the thief admitted that he slaughtered or sold the stolen animal on his own initiative, the thief must pay double. He is not, however, liable to pay four or five times the animal's worth. The rationale is that a person who admits his liability for a fine is not liable for that penalty, as we have explained.

The following rules apply when a person admits liability for a fine, and then afterwards witnesses come and testify to his liability. If he made his admission before a court while they were in session, he is not liable. If he made the admission when the court was not in session, or before two judges, and afterwards witnesses came and testified to his liability, he is liable to pay the fine because of their testimony.

What is implied? A thief admitted that he stole to a court while it was in session, and afterwards witnesses came and testified that he stole. He is not liable for a double payment, because he obligated himself for the principal before the witnesses came. If, however, he denied stealing in the presence of a court in this way, freeing himself of liability, and then witnesses came and testified that he stole a sheep or a cow, at which point he admitted in the presence of the court that he slaughtered or sold the stolen animal, and then witnesses came and testified that he slaughtered or sold the animal, he is liable to pay four or five times the animal's worth. The rationale is that first he denied the obligation entirely before witnesses came.

The following rules apply when a thief steals an ox belonging to two partners and slaughters it or sells it, and makes an admission to one in the presence of a court, but denies his liability to the other. If witnesses come afterwards and testify that he stole or sold, he must pay the partner whose claim he denied five times half the value of the ox. If the same situation takes place with regard to the theft of a sheep, he must pay four times half the value of the sheep.

The law requires a thief to pay the principal and to make the payment of double - or four or fives times - the value of the theft from his movable property. If he does not own movable property, the court assesses his possessions and expropriates the entire debt from the finest of his landed properties, as is the practice with regard to other damages, regarding which Exodus 22:4 states: "He shall pay from the best of his field." If he owns neither landed property nor movable property, the court sells him as a servant and gives the money from his sale to the person from whom he stole, as ibid.:2 states: "If he has no resources, he shall be sold for his theft."

A man, but not a woman, may be sold because of a theft. This law is part of the Oral Tradition. A thief is sold only because of the principal, but not for the payment of twice or four or five times the amount of the theft. If he can repay the principal, the additional amount remains a debt incumbent on him until he acquires the resources.

When a person steals from a gentile or steals consecrated property, he is not sold for the principal. Instead, it remains a debt incumbent on him until he acquires the resources.

When the principal of a theft was worth 100 zuz and the thief could be sold for only 50 zuz, he shall be sold, and the remainder of the principal and the double payment is considered a debt incumbent on him until he attains his freedom in the seventh year, acquires the resources and pays. If the thief was worth 101 zuz, he shall not be sold. This is derived from the above verse, which states: "He shall be sold for his theft." Implied is that his entire worth must be included in the money received for his theft.

The following rules apply if a person stole and was sold for his theft, and then stole again. If he stole from another person, he shall be sold as a servant a second time. Even if he stole from a hundred people, he shall be sold a hundred times. If, however, he stole from the first person a second time, he shall not be sold a second time. Instead, the entire amount remains a debt incumbent on him.

If a thief stole from three different people, they are all considered to be partners for his servitude. If the value of his work is equivalent to or less than the principal he owes the three, he is sold and they divide the proceeds of the sale. The double payments remain a debt incumbent on him until he acquires the resources. If his value exceeds the principal, he should not be sold. Instead, the entire amount remains a debt incumbent on him until he attains the resources.

When partners commit a theft together, the liability is divided among them. Each of them can be sold for his portion of the principal. If the value of one of them is more than his share of the principal for which he is liable, he is not sold.

When a watchman claims that an entrusted article was stolen from his home and takes an oath to this effect, and afterwards, witnesses come and testify that he made a false claim and that he is still in possession of the entrusted article, the watchman is required to pay twice the worth of the stolen article. For the watchman is himself a thief. If he slaughtered or sold a stolen animal after he took the false oath, he must pay four or five times its worth. He is not required to bring a guilt offering for taking a false oath that was discredited by witnesses. Nor is he required to add a fifth of the value of the stolen article. For a fifth is never paid when a double payment is paid. If witnesses come before he takes an oath, he is required to pay only the principal.

When does the above apply? When he took an oath before he misappropriated the entrusted article. If, however, he misappropriated the entrusted article, claimed that it had been stolen, and took an oath to that effect, and then witnesses came and discredited his oath, he is not liable for the double payment. As soon as he misappropriated the article, he became liable for it and acquired responsibility for it.

Similarly, if the watchman claimed that the entrusted article was lost and took an oath to that effect, and then claimed it was stolen and took an oath to that effect, and then witnesses came and testified that it was in his possession, the watchman is not liable for the double payment. For at the time he took the first false oath, the entrusted article was no longer considered the property of the original owner.

When a person who discovered a lost article claims that it was stolen and takes an oath to that effect, and afterwards, witnesses come and testify that the lost article was in his possession and that he made a false claim, he is required to pay twice the article's worth. This is implied by Exodus 22:8, which states that a double payment must be made for "any lost article." The above applies when he claims that it was stolen by an armed thief, in which instance he would not be held liable. If, however, he claims that it was stolen in a manner that is not beyond his control, he is not liable for the double payment. For he would have been liable to pay for the lost article because of his claim, since a person caring for a lost article that he discovered is considered to be a paid watchman, as will be explained.

When a watchman claims that an entrusted article was stolen and takes an oath to that effect, and then witnesses come and testify that the entrusted article is in his possession, and then he again claims that it was stolen and takes an oath to that effect, and then witnesses again come and testify that the entrusted article is still in his possession - even if this sequence repeats itself 100 times - he is liable for a double payment for every claim. Thus, if he took five false oaths, he is liable to pay six times the value of the entrusted article, the principal that was entrusted to him and five times its value, because of the five double payments that result from the five false oaths.

The following rules apply when a watchman claims that an entrusted article was stolen and takes an oath to that effect, and then claims that the entrusted article was lost - and then witnesses come and testify that the article was not stolen, and the watchman admits that it was not lost. Since he must pay twice the value of the entrusted article because of the witnesses, he need not pay an additional fifth as a surcharge because of the other oath, although he admitted it to be false. The rationale is that since this involves the same principal for which he is required to make the double payment, he is not liable for the additional fifth.

The following rules apply if a person entrusted his ox to two people, they claimed that it was stolen and took an oath to that effect, and afterwards one of them admitted that the oath was false, and then witnesses came and testified that the other one lied. They both must pay the principal. If the owner of the entrusted object seizes property belonging to the partner whose oath was refuted in lieu of the double payment for his share of the stolen article, it shall not be expropriated from him. The one who admitted taking the false oath must pay an additional fifth for his share of the stolen article, as must all who voluntarily admit taking false oaths regarding entrusted objects.

These rules apply with regard to the obligations of a watchman and a thief in the following situations. The owner of an entrusted object demanded its return from an unpaid watchman. The watchman took an oath that the article was stolen. Afterwards, the thief was discovered. The watchman filed a claim against the thief, who admitted stealing the entrusted article. Afterwards, the owner of the entrusted article filed a claim against the thief, and he denied stealing the entrusted article. Witnesses then came and testified that the thief stole the article. If the watchman took a true oath when he claimed that the article was stolen, he is considered the agent of the owners, and the thief is freed from the responsibility for the double payment, because he admitted the theft to the watchman. If the watchman took a false oath the question is unresolved. Therefore, the thief is not compelled to pay twice the value of the stolen article. If, however, the owner seizes property belonging to the thief in lieu of the double payment, it shall not be expropriated from him. The owner demanded the return of the entrusted article from the watchman and he paid for the article, and then the thief was discovered. In such a case, the watchman acquires the right to the article and to the double payment. The owner filed a claim against the thief, who admitted stealing the entrusted article. Afterwards, the watchman filed a claim against the thief, and he denied stealing the entrusted article. Witnesses then came and testified that the thief stole the article. The thief is not compelled to pay twice the value of the stolen article. If, however, the watchman seizes property belonging to the thief in lieu of the double payment, it shall not be expropriated from him. Similar laws apply with regard to the payment of four or five times the value of a stolen sheep or cow if the thief sold or slaughtered it.

When a watchman claims that an article entrusted to him by a minor was stolen and takes an oath to that effect, and afterwards witnesses come and testify that the entrusted article is still in his possession, he is not liable. This applies even if the owner entrusted the article to the watchman when the owner was a minor and demanded its return after he attained majority. This is derived from Exodus 22:6, which states: "When a man will give his colleague... articles to watch...." A child's entrusting of an article is of no consequence. Instead, he must be past majority both when he entrusts the article and when he demands its return.

When a watchman steals an article entrusted to him from his own domain - e.g., he stole a lamb from a flock entrusted to him or a sela from a wallet entrusted to him - if witnesses testify regarding the theft, he is liable for twice the amount of the article. The above applies even if he returned the sela to its place, and the lamb to the herd. For he remains responsible for them until he notifies the owner, since with his theft of the article his responsibility as a watchman is concluded. Thus, it is as if he had not returned anything until he notifies the owner. Slightly different rules apply if a person steals a sela from a wallet belonging to a colleague, or a utensil from his home and then returns the utensil or the sela to its place. If the owner knew of the theft, but did not know of its return, the thief is still responsible for the article until his colleague counts his money.

When the owner counts his wallet and discovers the full amount, the thief is no longer liable. Moreover, if the owner did not know that the article was either taken or returned, it is not even necessary for the owner to count his money. As soon as the thief returned the money to its place, he is no longer responsible for it.

When does the above apply? With regard to an article that is not alive. When, however, a thief steals a lamb from a colleague's herd, the owner discovers the theft, the thief then returns it to the herd without informing the owner, and afterwards, the lamb dies or is stolen, the first thief is still liable. If, however, the owner counted his sheep, and the herd was complete,the thief is no longer liable. If the owner did not know that the lamb was stolen or returned, the thief is liable until he informs the owner, so that he will pay more attention to the stolen lamb. This is necessary, because the thief taught it a way other than that followed by the other sheep in this herd.

It is forbidden to buy a stolen article from a thief. This is a severe sin, for it reinforces a transgressor and motivates him to steal in the future. For if he did not find a person who would purchase a stolen article from him, he would not steal. With reference to this, Proverbs 29:24 states: "A person who shares profits with a thief hates his own soul."

When a thief steals and sells the stolen article before the owner despairs of its return, the thief is discovered, and witnesses come and testify that so and so stole this particular article in their presence, the stolen article shall be returned to its owner. The owner must reimburse the purchaser for the money that he paid the thief. This measure was ordained to enable uninhibited trade in the marketplace. The owner then sues the thief for the money he paid. If the thief's reputation was known, our Sages did not ordain any leniency. The owner is not required to pay the purchaser anything, and instead, the purchaser must sue the thief and collect the money he paid from him.

Different laws apply when the owner despairs of the article's return, regardless of whether he despairs before the thief sold the article or afterwards. The purchaser acquires the article because of the owner's despair and the transfer from one domain to another. He is not required to return the article itself; instead, he must reimburse the owner if he purchased the article from a thief whose reputation was well known. If the thief was not known to steal, the purchaser is neither required to give the owner the article, nor to reimburse him. This was ordained to enable uninhibited trade in the marketplace.

The following rule applies when the purchaser sues the original owner for the return of the money he spent. If there are no witnesses who can testify regarding the price, the trader must take an oath while holding a sacred article, stating the price he paid. He then collects this sum from the original owner. Whenever a person takes an oath before he collects, the oath is a Rabbinical ordinance. He must take the oath while holding a sacred article, as will be explained in the appropriate place.

If, when the purchaser sues the thief for the return of his money, the thief claims that he received a lesser sum, the trader must take an oath while holding a sacred article. He may then collect this sum from the thief. He is required to take the oath because the thief is not given the option of taking the oath, since we suspect that he will take a false oath.

If a thief stole and gave the stolen article as payment for a loan or as payment for a debt owed a merchant, our Sages did not ordain any leniency to encourage trading. Instead, the owner of the article shall take his article back from the thief's creditor without paying him, and the thief remains responsible for the debt as before. When the stolen article was given as surety for a loan, regardless of whether the loan was given for more or less than the worth of the article, the original owner shall pay the person holding the surety and then sue the thief for the money, unless the reputation of the thief was public knowledge, as explained above.

When a person purchased a stolen article from a thief whose reputation is not public knowledge, he is entitled to collect the amount he paid from the original owner. Only then must he return the stolen article. This applies regardless of whether he paid 100 zuz for an article worth 200, or 200 zuz for an article worth 100. Our Sages ordained this rule to allow for uninhibited trade, as explained above.

The original owner is not required to reimburse the recipient of the stolen article in the following situation. A person was owed 100 zuz by a thief. The thief stole an article and gave it to his creditor, who gave the thief another 100 zuz. The stolen article must be returned to its original owner, and we tell the creditor: "Demand payment for 200 zuz from the thief. For you did not give him the second hundred only because of the article that he gave you. Just as you trusted him with regard to the first hundred, so too, you trusted him with regard to the second."

Torah law does not allow profit to be made from the sale of a stolen article. For example, if a person purchased a stolen article from a thief whose reputation was not public knowledge, for 100 zuz and sold it to a colleague for 120, and afterwards the thief was apprehended, the original owner must pay the second purchaser 120 zuz. He then may take his article. Afterwards, he shall be reimbursed for 20 zuz by the seller and then collect 100 zuz from the thief. If the reputation of the thief was public knowledge, the original owner shall pay the second purchaser 120 zuz and collect that amount from the trader who purchased the article from the thief. The trader shall then collect the principal, 100 zuz, from the thief. The same principles apply if the second purchaser sold the stolen article to a third, or the third to a fourth. Even if the stolen article changed hands one hundred times. The final purchaser is reimbursed completely by the owner, who takes the profit from each of the middle men and collects the principal from the thief. All of this applies before the owner despaired of the return of the stolen article, as we have explained.

The following rules apply when there is a report that goods belonging to a person who was not known to sell his personal property were stolen, and that person recognizes his utensils and books in the possession of another person. They also apply when the person would frequently sell his personal property, but the utensils he recognized as his own were utensils that are made to lend or to rent out. If witnesses come and testify that these utensils belong to the said individual, the person in possession of the utensils shall take an oath, stating the price he paid for the utensils, and collect this sum from the the owner and then return them to him.

Different rules apply if the owner of the house would frequently sell his personal property, and the objects in question were not utensils that are made to lend or to rent out. In such an instance, even if there is a report that his property was stolen, the original owner is not entitled to claim it back from the purchasers, for it is possible that he sold it to others. The house-owner's word is, however, accepted in the following situation. People came and lodged in his home. At night, he arose and called out: "My utensils and my scrolls have been stolen." His neighbors found a tunnel dug from his home and saw the people who lodged in his home leaving, carrying bundles of utensils on their shoulders. The thieves were not apprehended, but afterwards, the house-owner claimed to have discovered the stolen articles in the possession of another person, and everyone agreed, saying: "These are the house-owner's utensils and scrolls." Under such circumstances, the house-owner's claim is accepted. The person in possession of the articles shall take an oath, stating the price he paid for the articles, and collect this sum from the house-owner and then return them to him.

If a person whose reputation as a thief is public knowledge entered a person's house, and witnesses testify that he left with utensils hidden under his cloak, his word is not accepted even though the house-owner was present. Although the thief claims to have purchased the articles, since the house-owner claims that they were stolen, the house-owner's claim is accepted, provided he was not known to sell his personal property, the articles in question are not generally carried hidden, and the person in possession of the articles does not ordinarily carry them under his cloak. The house-owner must take an oath while holding a sacred article that they are his. He then may take his property. If the person in possession of the articles is not known to be a thief, the house-owner's word is not accepted. Instead, the person in possession of the articles must take a Rabbinic oath that he purchased the articles. He may then depart.

One who plays dice with a gentile does not transgress the prohibition of stealing, but he does transgress the prohibition of occupying oneself with worthless things, for it is not suitable for a person to occupy himself all the days of his life with anything other than matters of wisdom and the developing of the world.

To state the general principle: Whenever a shepherd sells an article that would be noticed by the owner, it may be purchased from the shepherd. If the owner would not notice it, it is assumed to be stolen and may not be purchased from the shepherd.

We may not purchase wood or produce from the watchmen of produce unless they sit openly and sell with baskets of produce and scales in front of them. In such an instance, the matter is overt and will be spoken about; therefore, we can conclude that theft is not involved. We may purchase from the entrance to a garden, but not from its rear. And whenever a seller says: "Hide the goods," it is forbidden to purchase from him. One may purchase from a sharecropper, for he has a share in the produce and the wood.

We should not purchase articles from married women, servants or minors unless the prevailing assumption is that they were granted these articles by their owner; for example, women who sell linen garments in the Galilee or calves in the Sharon. In all instances, if they say "Hide the goods," it is forbidden to purchase from them, for we assume that the goods were stolen. We may purchase eggs or roosters anywhere, from any person. If, however, one says "Hide what was sold," it is forbidden.

One may purchase a large measure of olives or oil from an owner of an olive press. One may not, however, purchase a small amount of olives or oil, for the prevailing assumption is that these would be stolen goods. Similar laws apply in other like situations.

A launderer of a new woolen garment is entitled to the fluff that he removes. The strands that the comber removes, by contrast, belong to the owner of the wool. The launderer may take three strands. Anything more belongs to the owner of the garment. If the additional strands were black against a white garment, the launderer may take all of them.

When a tailor leaves more thread than necessary to sew with a needle, and a piece of cloth that is more than three fingerbreadths by three fingerbreadths, he is obligated to return it to the owner. Anything less than that, he may keep as his own.

A carpenter may keep the shavings of wood that he produces with a plane. The chips he produces with a hatchet, by contrast, belong to the owner. If he is working for the owner as a hired hand, even the shavings belong to the owner. With regard to all these matters, the prevailing local custom is followed.

Whenever a craftsman sells items to which he is not entitled according to the local practice - e.g., strands of fluff sold by a comber where it is customary that they are returned to the owner - it is forbidden to purchase from him, for we assume that they are stolen. If, however, he sells a pillow filled with wool, one may purchase it from him. If a craftsman sells articles to which he is entitled according to the local practice, it is permitted to purchase them from him. If, however, he says, "Hide it," purchase is forbidden.

When a person weighs for a colleague using weights that are less than the weights accepted by the people in that country, or he measures using a measure that contains less than the measure used by people in that country, he violates a negative commandment, as Leviticus 19:35 states: "Do not act deceitfully with regard to a judgment concerning measures, weights and liquid measures."

Although a person who measures with an inaccurate measure or weight is a thief, he is not required to make a double payment of the stolen amount. All that is necessary is to give the proper measure of the article that was sold. Lashes are not given for the violation of this transgression, because the thief is obligated to make financial restitution.

Whoever possesses an imperfect measure or weight in his home or store violates a negative commandment, as Deuteronomy 25:13 states: "You shall not have in your pocket two sets of weights...." One may not even use the imperfect measure as a chamber pot. For even if one does not use the imperfect measure oneself to buy and to sell, another person who does not know that it is imperfect may come and use it as a measure. Lashes are not administered for the violation of this transgression, because it does not involve a deed.

If a standard seal was affixed to all the measures and weights in a city, and the imperfect measure did not have such a seal, it is permitted to leave it for other household purposes. Similarly, when a sela became blemished at its side, a person should not use it as a weight, nor should he cast it among his pieces of scrap metal, nor should he drill a hole in it and hang it around his son's neck, lest another person come and make it appear as a weight. Instead, one should grind it into powder, cut it into small pieces, pulverize it, or throw it into the Dead Sea.

If the size of a sela was reduced to the extent that it was halved, it may be used. If it was reduced to less than half or more than half, it should be cut until it becomes a half. If it was reduced by less than one sixth of its worth, it may be used for buying and selling, but not as a weight. The reason it may be used is that most people will forgo any loss that is less than a sixth.

When a sela is damaged in its center, it may not be sold to a killer or a thief, for they may use it to deceive others. One may, however, place a hole in its center and hang it around a child's neck.

A person should make his measures the size of a se'ah, half a se'ah and a quarter of a se'ah, a kav, half a kav, a quarter of a kav, an eighth of a kav and a twenty-fourth of a kav. He should not, however, make a measure of two kabbim, lest it be mistaken for a quarter of a se'ah, which is a kav and a half. Similarly, with regard to liquid measure, one should make a hin, half a hin, a third of a hin, a quarter of a hin, a log, half a log, a quarter of a log, an eighth of a log and a sixty-fourth of a log. The Sages did not forbid one from making a third of a hin and a quarter of a hin, although they could be confused with each other, because there were such measures in the Sanctuary from the time of Moses our teacher onward.

Whether a person deals with a Jew or a gentile, if he measures or weighs with a measure that is lacking, he transgresses a negative commandment and is obligated to return the difference. Similarly, it is forbidden to deceive a gentile with regard to an account; instead, one must reckon carefully with him, as Leviticus 25:50 states: "You should reckon with his purchaser." This applies with regard to a gentile who is under your control; surely it applies to one who is not under your control. A person who performs such deceit is included among those about whom Deuteronomy 25:16 says: "They are an abomination unto G-d, all who do these things, all who act crookedly."

Similar principles apply regarding the measurement of land. If a person deceives a colleague with regard to the measurement of land, he transgresses a negative commandment, as implied by Leviticus 19:35: "Do not act deceitfully with regard to a judgment concerning measures...." "Measures" refers to the measurement of land. The verse is saying that one should not act deceitfully with regard to any judgment, be it a judgment concerning measures, one of weights or one involving a tiny liquid measure, the size of a mesurah.

When the members of a company are exact in their dealings with each other, and they exchange one portion of a sacrificial offering for another, or they borrow food and then return its equivalent, they transgress the prohibition against false measures, false weights and false amounts if they do not return the exact amount. If the exchange takes place on a festival, it is also a transgression of the prohibition against borrowing and repaying on a festival.

A person who usurps the property boundaries of a colleague and includes even a fingerbreadth of a colleague's landed property in his own property transgresses. If he acts openly, by the power of force, he is a robber. If he acts with stealth, he is a thief. If he usurps a colleague's property in Eretz Yisrael, he transgresses two negative commandments: the prohibition against either theft or robbery, and the prohibition against moving a property boundary. One is liable for the transgression of this negative commandment only in Eretz Yisrael, for Deuteronomy 19:14 states: "Do not usurp the property boundaries of a colleague... in the heritage that you will acquire...."

The punishment for faking measurements is greater than the punishment for forbidden sexual relationships, for one is a sin between a person and G-d, and the other has an interpersonal dimension. Rejecting the commandment of fair weights is like a rejection of the exodus from Egypt, which was the source of the commandment. Likewise, anyone who accepts the commandment of fair weights is like one who accepts the reality of the exodus from Egypt, which is the source of all commandments.

It is a positive commandment to correct the scales, weights and measures carefully and to be exact in their measure when making them, as Leviticus 19:36 states: "You shall have correct scales...." Similarly, with regard to the measurement of land, one must be exact according to the principles of geometry. Even a fingerbreadth of land is considered to be a great loss, as if it were filled with saffron.

The four cubits that are next to an irrigation ditch need not be measured carefully, and those that are next to a river bank are not measured at all, for they belong to the public domain.

A person who measures land should not measure the portion of one partner in the summer and of the other in the winter, because a rope will contract in the summer. Therefore, if the measurement was made with a rod, with iron chains or with the like, the differences in season are of no consequence.

Weights should not be made of iron, lead or other metals of that nature, for they rust and become reduced in weight. One should make them from marble, glass, diamond and the like.

The stick used to level the top of a dry measure should not be made of a gourd, because it is too light, nor of metal, because it is too heavy. Instead, it should be made of olive wood, walnut, box wood, sycamore wood or the like.

The stick used to level the top of a dry measure should not be made with one side narrow and one side thick. One should not level a measure slowly, bit by bit, for in doing so the seller is cheated, nor should it be leveled in one fell swoop, for by doing so the purchaser is cheated.

One may not bury weights in salt so that their weight will be reduced, nor may one heat while measuring a liquid. This applies even if the measure is very small, for the Torah was concerned with even the slightest deviation from an honest measure, as implied by the mention of a mesurah in Leviticus 19:35. A mesurah is a very tiny measure, merely a thirty-third of a log.

Sellers of scrap iron and the like should construct the scale they use in the following manner. The balance that the person who is weighing holds in his hands should hang freely in the air for at least three handbreadths, and should be three handbreadths above the ground. The length of the center pole and the length of the cables should be twelve handbreadths.

A scale used by wool merchants and glass merchants should be constructed in the following manner. The balance should hang freely in the air for at least two handbreadths and should be two handbreadths above the ground. The length of the center pole and the length of the cables should be nine handbreadths.

A scale used by an ordinary storekeeper and a house-owner should be constructed in the following manner. The balance should hang freely in the air for at least one handbreadth, and should be one handbreadth above the ground. The length of the center pole and the length of the cables should be six handbreadths.

The cables on which the balance is hung, and similarly the cables of the scales used to weigh gold and used by merchants of purple fabric should be three fingerbreadths long and should be three fingerbreadths above the ground. No standard measure was given for the length of the balance and the length of its chains; it depends on the desire of the person doing the weighing.

What is the source that teaches us that one must tip the balance in favor of the purchaser when his purchase is being weighed for him? Deuteronomy 25:15 states: "You shall have a perfect and just weight." The Torah's statements can be interpreted to mean: "Justify your balance from what you have and give it to him."

How much should the seller tip in the purchaser's favor? With regard to liquid measure, one hundredth of the amount purchased. With regard to dry measure, one four-hundredth of the amount purchased. What is implied? If he sold him ten pounds of a liquid measure, he should give him one tenth of a pound as an extra amount. If he sold him twenty pounds of a dry measure, he should give him an extra twentieth of a pound. This ratio should be followed regardless of whether the amounts involved are great or small.

When does the above apply? In a place where it is customary to sell by looking at the scale. In a place where it is customary actually to tip the balance, one must tip it at least a handbreadth in favor of the purchaser.

If the seller had to weigh ten pounds for the purchaser, the purchaser should not say: "Weigh them out one at a time and tip the balance each time." Instead, the seller may weigh out all ten at once and tip the balance only once for the entire amount.

In a place where it is customary to measure with a small measure, one should not measure with a large one. In a place where it is customary to measure with a large measure, one should not measure with a small one. Where it is customary to even off the measure, one should not sell a heaping measure and raise the price, nor where it is customary to give a heaping measure should one sell a level measure and reduce the price. Instead, one should measure according to the local custom.

When the inhabitants of a locale desire to increase the size of the measures or weights, they should not increase them more than a sixth. For example, if a kav held five measures, they may establish it as holding six. They should not, however, establish it as holding more than six.

A wholesale merchant must clean his measures once every 30 days. A house-owner must do this every twelve months, and a storekeeper twice a week. Once a week, he must wash his weights, and he should clean the balance after every time that he weighs, so that it will not rust.

A person who desires to weigh three-fourths of a pound of meat should place a pound weight on one side of the balance and place the meat and a quarter-pound weight in the other side of the balance. If one said that he should place a half-pound weight and a quarter-pound weight on one side and the meat on the other side, it is possible that the quarter-pound weight will fall without being seen by the purchaser.

The court is obligated to appoint police in every city and town to inspect the stores periodically, correct the scales and measures, and set the prices. They are permitted to beat any person who possesses an unjust measure or weight or an improper balance according to his capacity, and to fine him as the court sees fit to enforce the matter. Whenever a person raises prices and sells at a higher price, he may be beaten and compelled to sell at the ordinary market price.

Whoever kidnaps another person transgresses a negative commandment, as Exodus 20:13 states: "Do not steal." This verse is stated in the Ten Commandments and serves as a warning against kidnapping. Similarly, a person who sells a kidnapped person violates a negative commandment, for this is included in the adjuration, Leviticus 25:42: "Do not sell him in the manner a servant is sold." These two transgressions are not punished by lashing, because they involve capital punishment, as Deuteronomy 24:7 states: "When a person is found stealing one of his brethren... that thief shall die." He is to be executed by strangulation.

A kidnapper is not liable for capital punishment unless he kidnaps a Jewish person, brings him into the kidnapper's own domain, makes use of him, and then sells him to others, as Deuteronomy, ibid. states: "And he makes use of him, and sells him." Even if he makes use of his services for a minor matter, not worth a p'rutah - e.g., he leaned on him or used him as a shield, even if the abducted person was asleep at that time - the kidnapper is considered to have made use of him.

If the kidnapper kidnapped a person, made use of him, and sold him without taking the abducted person from his own domain and bringing him into the kidnapper's domain, he is not liable for capital punishment. Similarly, he is not liable for capital punishment if he kidnapped him, brought him into the kidnapper's domain, made use of him, and did not sell him, or sold him before he made use of him. Similarly, if the kidnapper made use of the abducted person, but sold him to one of the abducted person's relatives - e.g., he sold him to his father or his brother - he is not liable for capital punishment. For the above verse mentions "stealing... of his brethren." Implied is that the abducted person must be separated from his brothers and relatives through this sale. Similarly, if the kidnapper kidnapped the abducted person, made use of him, and sold him - all of this while the abducted person was sleeping, the kidnapper is not liable for capital punishment.

Similarly, if he kidnapped a pregnant woman and sold only her offspring - i.e., he made an agreement with the purchaser that he retained possession of the woman, and the purchaser is entitled only to her offspring, he is not liable.

The following individuals are not liable for capital punishment: a person who kidnaps his son or a brother who is below majority, a guardian who kidnaps the orphans who are in his trust, a house-owner who kidnaps one of the members of his household, and a teacher who kidnaps one of the students studying under him. This applies even if the kidnapper makes use of and sells the abducted person. This is derived from the exegesis of Exodus 21:16: "And he is found in his hand." This excludes those who are constantly found in their hand.

A kidnapper - either a male or a female - is liable for capital punishment regardless of whether he kidnaps an adult or a one-day-old infant - provided the pregnancy was full-term - and regardless of whether the abducted person was male or female. This is implied by the above verse, which mentions "kidnapping a soul." It makes no difference if one kidnaps a native-born Israelite, a convert or a freed Canaanite servant, for the above verse states: "one of his brethren." And the above are "our brothers," related by the bond of the Torah and its mitzvot. One is not, however, liable for capital punishment for kidnapping a Canaanite servant or a servant who has been freed only partially.

When a person breaks into a home - whether at night or during the day - license is granted to kill him. If either the homeowner or another person kills him, they are not liable. The license to kill him applies both on the Sabbath and during the week; one may kill in any possible manner. This is all implied by Exodus 22:1, which literally reads: "He has no blood."

The license mentioned above applies to a thief caught breaking in or one caught on a person's roof, courtyard or enclosed area, whether during the day or during the night. Why does the Torah mention "breaking in," because it is the general practice for thieves to break in at night.

Why did the Torah permit the blood of such a thief to be shed, although he is only attempting to steal money? Because it is an accepted presumption that if the house-owner arises and attempts to prevent the thief from stealing, the thief will slay him. And thus the thief entering his colleague's house to steal is in effect a pursuer seeking to kill his colleague. Therefore, he should be killed, whether he is an adult or a minor, or a man or a woman.

If it is clear to the house-owner that the thief who breaks in will not kill him and instead is only seeking financial gain, it is forbidden to kill the thief. If the house-owner kills him, the house-owner is consi- dered to be a murderer. This is alluded to by Exodus 22:2, which states: "If the sun shines upon him..." - i.e., if it is as clear to you as the sun that he is at peace with you, do not kill him. Therefore, a father who breaks into his son's home should not be killed. But a son who breaks into his father's home may be killed.

Different rules apply with regard to a thief who stole and departed, or one who did not steal, but was caught leaving the tunnel through which he entered the home. Since he turned his back on the house and is no longer intent on killing its owner, he may not be slain. Similarly, if he is surrounded by other people, or by witnesses, he may not be killed, even if he is still located within the domain which he broke into. Needless to say, if he is brought to the court he may not be killed.

Similarly, a person who breaks into a garden, a field, a pen or a corral may not be killed, for the prevailing presumption is that he came merely to steal money, for generally the owners are not found in such places.

Whenever license is not granted to kill a thief, we should remove stones from an avalanche that fell upon him on the Sabbath. If he destroyed utensils while inside the house, he is liable for the damages. When, however, license is granted to kill a person, and he broke utensils while in the home, he is not liable for the damages, as explained above. This concludes "The Laws of Theft" with G-d's help.