2נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַכּוֹת אֶת חֲבֵרוֹ עַל מָתְנָיו וְלֹא הָיָה בַּכְּלִי כְּדֵי לְהָמִית עַל מָתְנָיו וְהָלְכָה לָהּ הָאֶבֶן עַל לִבּוֹ וְהָיָה בָּהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית עַל לִבּוֹ וּמֵת. אוֹ שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּן לְהַכּוֹתוֹ עַל לִבּוֹ וְהָיָה בָּהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית עַל לִבּוֹ וְהָלְכָה לָהּ עַל מָתְנָיו וְלֹא הָיָה בָּהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית עַל מָתְנָיו וּמֵת. פָּטוּר מִמִּיתַת בֵּית דִּין וְאֵינוֹ גּוֹלֶה שֶׁאֵין הַהוֹרֵג בְּכַוָּנָה גּוֹלֶה. אֲבָל אִם נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַכּוֹתוֹ עַל מָתְנָיו וְהָיָה בָּהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית עַל מָתְנָיו וְהָלְכָה לָהּ עַל לִבּוֹ וּמֵת הֲרֵי זֶה נֶהֱרָג. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:
Similarly, a killer is not held liable for execution in the following instances. He intended to strike a colleague on his loins, and the utensil was not sufficient to kill if it struck a person on his loins, but it instead struck him on his heart and he died. Or a person intended to strike a colleague on his heart, and the blow was sufficient to kill had it struck him on the heart, but instead it struck the victim on his loins and it was not sufficient to kill an ordinary person if it struck him on his loins, but this person died. In these instances, the killer is not liable for execution by the court, nor is he exiled, because a person who kills intentionally is never exiled. If, however, he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was sufficient to kill him if it struck him on his loins, but it struck him on his heart, killing him, the killer should be executed. Similar principles apply in all analogous instances.